Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE82699
2008-07-31 21:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

FOLLOWING UP WITH MEXICO ON PSI

Tags:  KNNP MNUC PARM PREL MX 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2699 2132111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 312108Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0000
UNCLAS STATE 082699 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL MX
SUBJECT: FOLLOWING UP WITH MEXICO ON PSI

REF: A. MEXICO 01372

B. MEXICO 01331

UNCLAS STATE 082699

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL MX
SUBJECT: FOLLOWING UP WITH MEXICO ON PSI

REF: A. MEXICO 01372

B. MEXICO 01331


1. SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND: In advance of the May 29
U.S.-hosted Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Outreach Workshop in Washington, the U.S. extended
invitations to a number of key countries that have not
yet endorsed the PSI and also urged their endorsement.
Washington appreciates Embassy's work in support of
this PSI outreach effort with Mexico (refs A and B).
Mexican SRE Assistant Director General for Security
and Legal Issues Julian Juarez attended the PSI
Workshop, along with Mexican Embassy Military Attache
Jose Luis Chavez and Embassy political officials
Jorge Colin and Fernando Gonzalez Saiffe.
Representatives of 20 other countries that have not
yet endorsed the PSI also attended the workshop, as
well as most of the 92 PSI participating states.
The workshop provided detailed information on
the broad range of PSI activities and tools that have
been developed for training, organizing for, and
conducting interdictions of shipments of proliferation
concern.


2. On July 17, State/ISN met with visiting CISEN
National Authority Coordinator Jesus Mao Cervantes to
discuss the PSI further. Mao was receptive to the PSI,
but said he and the Mexican interagency still have many
questions about how the PSI functions and how PSI
participation would benefit Mexico. He stated that
Mexico is interested in observing the August 11-21,
2008 PANAMAX exercise in Panama. PANAMAX is an annual
exercise that SOUTHCOM conducts with Western Hemisphere
countries. This year's exercise will include a PSI
interdiction scenario as one of its aspects. Mao also
said that Mexico was interested in sending interagency
observers to PSI exercise MARU in New Zealand September
15-19, to the extent its resources allow. (Mexico has
been invited to observe both exercises.) There was
discussion of the U.S. possibly providing briefings on
the PSI in Mexico City between the two exercises.
Mao said the SRE would be able to arrange meetings in
Mexico City to include other relevant Mexican agencies.


3. OBJECTIVE AND ACTION REQUEST: Washington wishes
to send a small team of PSI experts, led by State/ISN
DAS Ken Staley, to Mexico City immediately following
the PANAMAX exercise to follow up on our recent meetings

and provide in-depth briefings for relevant Mexican
agencies on the value of PSI participation. Embassy is
requested to propose such a visit and obtain host
government's agreement and identification of acceptable
dates. At the same time, Embassy is requested to

provide the following summary of the May 29 Outreach
Workshop to host government and explain that it is
for the information of officials from relevant agencies,
such as the SRE, Ministry of Defense and military
services, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence
agencies.


4. REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINTS OF CONTACT: Embassy
is requested to report host government's response to
the proposed visit by COB August 6. E-mail replies are
acceptable. Washington points of contact on the PSI
are Jane Purcell, e-mail: PurcelJa@state.gov,
202-647-6186; and Carlos Guzman, e-mail:
GuzmanCS@state.gov, 202-647-6320.


5. Begin text of U.S. paper for Mexico:

SUMMARY OF THE PSI FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OUTREACH WORKSHOP,
MAY 29, 2008

Patricia A. McNerney, Acting Assistant Secretary for the
International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau of the
U.S. Department of State, chaired a Outreach Workshop on
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on Thursday,
May 29, 2008, which was open to all PSI countries and
non-PSI countries. Representatives from 21 non-PSI
countries attended the meeting. The workshop provided
detailed information on the broad range of PSI
activities, and shared best practices and tools that
have been developed to assist countries with implementing
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.

-- OVERVIEW OF THE PSI. France led a panel of speakers
from the U.S. and United Kingdom that addressed the
origins of the PSI, the Statement of Interdiction
Principles, and the PSI's practical implications as a
equal and voluntary initiative that fully respects
national and international laws. This panel also
presented new examples of PSI successes and the benefits
of PSI, demonstrating how the PSI enhances the global
nonproliferation objectives of all countries.

-- CURRENT PROLIFERATION THREATS AND CHALLENGES. The UK
led a panel of speakers from Australia, Canada and Italy
that discussed the challenges posed by transshipments by
sea, land, and air and lessons learned during the last
five years; cooperation with industry and involvement of
industry in support of effective interdiction actions;
and the challenges of interdicting dual-use items and
materials. In addition, the topic of proliferation
finance was introduced to convey how proliferators
exploit vulnerabilities of the international financial
system to finance the trade of proliferation-sensitive
items, and how the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
has developed guidance to deal with this problem at
the national and international level. The organization
of national customs operations to prevent and stop
proliferation-related trafficking was also covered.

-- THE PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP (OEG). The UK
introduced the role of the OEG, emphasizing that the
OEG works on behalf of all PSI endorsing states to
develop operational concepts for interdiction; to explore
related operational issues associated with the legal,
law enforcement, customs and intelligence arenas; and to
collaborate to develop an exercise program to increase
partner capacity and improve national and international
interoperability. The presentation highlighted the
record of the OEG in the last five years, to include 16
meetings, over 30 live exercises, tabletop exercises,
and workshops, and developing capacity building products
such as the Model National Response Plan and the WMD
Commodity Reference Manual. The presentation concluded
by addressing the challenges for the OEG in the areas of
growth, sustaining momentum, and adapting to the threat
of WMD proliferation.

-- THE PSI AND INDUSTRY OUTREACH. Denmark introduced its
experience with industry outreach to address ways of
conducting interdiction operations while minimizing
impact to trade; the importance of information exchange
between government agencies and industry; developing
guidelines for cooperation; involving industry during
exercises; and examples of how to conduct industry
outreach at the national and international level.

-- THE PSI EXERCISE PROGRAM. Poland led a panel of
speakers from the U.S., Ukraine, and Croatia that
introduced the PSI exercise program and the history of
PSI exercises; explained the strategy for
current and future exercises; discussed the different
types of exercises in the maritime, land and air
domains, and described the different interagency
actions involved with each area. The presentations
also discussed the benefits of participating in
exercises and ideas on level of involvement and
participation in future exercises, to include non-PSI
countries as observers when opportunities arise.
Ukraine and Poland offered short briefs on their
respective experiences in hosting two recent
PSI exercises. Ukraine hosted PSI exercise "Eastern
Shield" in October 2007 and Croatia hosted PSI
exercise "Adriatic Shield" in May 2008.

-- PSI LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED. The UK and the
Netherlands introduced a primer on legal aspects
related to the PSI, emphasizing that all PSI activities
are consistent with national and international laws.
The presentations highlighted the importance of taking
stock of existing national authorities and emphasized
the utility of the PSI as a tool to implement UNSCR 1540.
Additionally the issues of jurisdiction, disposition and
liability were addressed, highlighting that these issues
pose short-term implementation challenges in some
instances but at the same time, demonstrate a measure of
the success of the PSI in interdicting prohibited
WMD-related items.

-- ORGANIZING FOR THE PSI. New Zealand provided an
overview of the PSI Model National Response Plan, which
provides guidance on key issues that a country needs to
consider when developing a framework for responding to
a PSI situation, and addresses questions and issues
to be addressed when developing or improving national
action plans. A copy of the plan was distributed to
all PSI and non-PSI countries in attendance. Singapore
provided a briefing on how a government can organize
internal interagency coordination to optimize its
ability to achieve overall PSI objectives. It
highlighted the creation of an Inter-Ministerial
Committee to assess, coordinate, and advise senior
officials on relevant agency actions related to PSI
events, with the goal of achieving interconnectivity
among all relevant agencies, prompt exchange and flow
of information, and a timely response.

-- WALK-THROUGH OF AN INTERDICTION SCENARIO. A U.S.
Naval War College professor facilitated a panel
discussion of interdiction decision-making based on two
hypothetical WMD trafficking interdiction scenarios.
The panel consisted of legal, diplomatic, policy,
military, and custom/law enforcement experts highlighting
key issues that may arise during an interdiction
situation. The scenarios provided participants with
lessons about the PSI that have been identified through
previous PSI games, exercises, and actual interdictions.

-- HOW EXPORT CONTROLS SUPPORT THE PSI. Romania
and Croatia presented briefings on their governments'
experience in enacting export control laws, emphasizing
the importance of strengthening primary export control
legislation; taking stock of existing legislation to
address gaps with revised and new legislation;
highlighting the efficiency of a catch-all clause; and
asserting that all countries, including those not a
country of origin, face the threat of WMD proliferation
and may provide opportunities along a proliferation
or smuggling route.

Note: Available presentation materials were distributed
to country representatives who attended the workshop on
May 29. Presentation materials are available upon request.

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