IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL TO IAEA BOARD OF

UNCLAS STATE 081808


UNVIE FOR IAEA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IAEA TRGY ENRG KNNP ABUD AORC

SUBJECT: IAEA: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL TO IAEA BOARD OF
GOVERNORS (BOG) MEETING, 1 AUGUST 2008

REF: A. UNVIE 392

B. UNVIE 393

C. UNVIE 395

D. UNVIE 397

E. U.S. POSITION PAPERS EMAILED TO UNVIE BY IO/T ON
29 JULY 2008

F. STATE 72255

G. STATE 77866

H. STATE 81299


1. Department appreciates the Mission,s reporting and
analysis for the August IAEA BOG meeting (Refs A, B, C and
D). Instructions for the U.S. Delegation (USDel) follow in
paragraphs 2 through 4.


2. AGENDA ITEM 1 ) Nuclear Verification: Safeguards
Agreement with India

ISSUE: The BOG will be asked to approve the agreement with
the Government of India for the application of safeguards to
civilian nuclear facilities found in document GOV/2008/30.

U.S. POSITION:

BACKGROUND: On 9 July 2008, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) circulated the draft India Safeguards Agreement
for the Board of Governors' review. The Agreement provides
for appropriate, effective safeguards in perpetuity, based on
accepted safeguards principles, while taking into account
India's unique circumstances. The Agreement is based
primarily on INFCIRC/66, the approved IAEA safeguards system
appropriate for states not under NPT full-scope safeguards.
INFCIRC/66 is not a model safeguards agreement, and there
will be differences in the texts of INFCIRC/66-based
agreements to accommodate the circumstances in which
safeguards are applied, as well as the scope of facilities
and materials being offered for safeguards. Nonetheless, the
technical safeguards methods that are applicable under
INFCIRC/66 agreements are the same as those applicable to
states with NPT full-scope safeguards, so that we expect that
safeguards on reactors in India, for example, would resemble
very closely those applied to reactors in NPT states.

India has made public a plan to separate its civil and
military facilities, in which 14 reactors and other
facilities would be offered for safeguards under the
agreement; the separation plan has been circulated to the
Board as INFCIRC/731. Placement of a large majority of
India's civilian reactors under safeguards is a major gain
for nonproliferation. Under this agreement, once India places
a civilian facility into the list of facilities under
safeguards in the Annex, it cannot be withdrawn from
safeguards unless the IAEA and India jointly determine that
the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity
relevant from the point of view of safeguards. Some
preambular language in the safeguards agreement (particularly
that on &corrective measures8) has drawn criticism. This
language reflects the history and context of the application
of safeguards in India. It does not alter the substantive
provisions governing the application of safeguards.

Approval of the Indian safeguards agreement is a necessary
step in the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.
Following a positive Board decision, the United States will
seek to gain consensus in the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG)
for an India-specific exception to the NSG's full-scope
safeguards requirement; any linkages between the IAEA Board
and NSG processes should be avoided. Washington believes
swift consideration and positive action on the India
safeguards agreement will bring India into the
nonproliferation mainstream and represents an important step
toward realizing the economic and energy benefits foreseen by
the Initiative.

U.S. POSITION: Delegation should welcome the conclusion of
the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and India and work
to ensure its approval at this Board of Governors Meeting.
In so doing, Delegation should focus on arguments that this
is a credible safeguards agreement, based on accepted
principles, recommended by the Secretariat, and deserving of
broad international support.

Delegation should attempt to ensure that the Board of
Governors takes its decision on the IAEA-India Safeguards
Agreement by consensus. Delegation should ensure that
Washington is kept informed fully of any efforts to defeat or
delay adoption of the Agreement.

Delegation should work to prevent any Board member from
proposing any amendment to the Safeguards Agreement, keeping
in mind that such amendments to the Agreement will be voted
on before consideration of the Agreement itself (Rules 31 and
44). Delegation should work to defeat any proposal to vote
paragraph by paragraph on the Agreement (Rule 43).

Should any Board member oppose the Safeguards Agreement,
Delegation should induce them not to block a consensus on
approving the agreement and instead to formally state
reservations about the consensus decision under Rule 42.
Such reservations may be made before or after the vote is
taken.

If a vote is taken on the Safeguards Agreement, Delegation
should work to ensure that Rule 37 requiring a two-thirds
majority is not invoked. Should a vote be called, Delegation
should encourage Board Members opposed to the Agreement to
abstain, vice voting against the Agreement, since abstentions
and absences are counted as not voting (Rule 37).

Delegation should bear in mind that on a procedural matters,
points of order have the first preference, followed by
motions to suspend the meeting, adjourn the meeting, adjourn
the debate, postpone a decision until a fixed date, and for
closure of the debate (Rule 29). No debate is permitted on a
motion to adjourn the meeting (Rule 28). Delegation should
work to defeat any motion to adjourn the meeting or to
postpone a decision until a fixed date, provided that
Delegation is confident that there are sufficient votes to
approve the Safeguards Agreement should it come to a vote.
In no case, should the measure be brought to a vote if it
would fail, since, under Rule 33(b),the Agreement could not
easily be brought back to the Board before December 2008.

The U.S. Delegation is instructed to deliver a brief
statement, drawing on the language below.

U.S. Statement:

IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, August 1, 2008
Agenda Item 1


Nuclear Verification: Safeguards Agreement with India


Mr. Chairman,

I will be brief, because in fact the issue before the
Board is a simple one.

India came to the IAEA seeking a safeguards agreement
to enable it to place nuclear facilities and materials under
safeguards, for the purpose of engaging in peaceful nuclear
activity and commerce.

The agreement was carefully negotiated by the Secretariat,
which has recommended it for approval by the Board.

The agreement is based solidly on INFCIRC/66, the
document entitled &The Agency,s Safeguards System.8 The
elements of this agreement are little different than those of
other agreements based on INFCIRC/66 that have come before
this body, agreements which have invariably been adopted by
this body swiftly, and by consensus. Under this agreement,
safeguards would be applied to nuclear facilities in India
using the same methods as applied elsewhere in the world.

The Board has had ample opportunity to consider the
agreement, and both India and the IAEA have provided
occasions for questions to be answered regarding the
agreement. We commend both for their efforts, and for the
openness and thoroughness with which questions were
addressed. Every substantive issue raised has been given a
thorough hearing.

Due to the unique circumstances of this arrangement,
the document was structured as an umbrella agreement, without
identification of specific facilities that would be placed
under safeguards upon entry into force. In its separation
plan, however, India has identified the facilities it intends
to offer for safeguards, and the Secretariat has circulated
this information to you as INFCIRC/731. The document lists
14 reactors along with other facilities. Precisely because
it is an umbrella agreement, India will also be able, in the
future, to add other facilities engaged in peaceful nuclear
activities to that list and place them under safeguards.
Moreover, this agreement allows for replacing the current
agreements with an updated, more uniform, set of safeguards
arrangements for India.

Without this agreement, the safeguards activities, and
the assurance of peaceful use provided by them, will not be
possible.

The only real issue before the Board is whether we allow the
Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under its Statute to
provide these safeguards and these assurances. We urge the
Board to do so, and to approve the Agreement before us.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.


3. AGENDA ITEM 2 ) Technical Cooperation Fund Targets for
2009-2011 triennium

ISSUE: The Co-Chairs of the open-ended Working Group on TCF
targets for 2009-2011 and Indicative Planning figures for
2012-2013 will present a report on the outcome of
consultations they have held since the June BOG.

U.S. POSITION: Instructions for USDel are in Refs G and H.


4. AGENDA ITEM 3 ) Funding of Agency-wide Information
System for Programme Support (AIPS)

ISSUE: The BOG will be asked to approve document
GOV/2008/21/Rev.1.

U.S. POSITION: Instructions for USDel are in Ref F.
RICE


NNNN




End Cable Text