Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE81076
2008-07-28 17:36:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE FOLLOW UP: MAYROW

Tags:  PARM PREL MNUC IR AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
O P 281736Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 081076 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 07/22/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC IR AE

SUBJECT: COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE FOLLOW UP: MAYROW

REF: A) ABU DHABI 325 B) ABU DHABI 729

Classified By: NEA/ARP William Roebuck for reasons 1.4 b,c,d

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------

S E C R E T STATE 081076

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 07/22/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC IR AE

SUBJECT: COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE FOLLOW UP: MAYROW

REF: A) ABU DHABI 325 B) ABU DHABI 729

Classified By: NEA/ARP William Roebuck for reasons 1.4 b,c,d

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------


1. (SBU) Post is requested to deliver the nonpaper in para 3
to Director, International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Yacoub al Hosani.

End action request.


--------------
OBJECTIVES
--------------


2. (S) Post should achieve the following objectives:

-- Thank UAE officials for hosting the third
Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting.

-- Note the United States, appreciation for the growing
collaboration our countries have on counterproliferation as a
result of this process.

-- Provide the information in the nonpaper below that the UAE
requested on Mayrow during the February Counterproliferation
Task Force (CTF) meeting.

-- Inform the UAEG that in the United States there are legal
restrictions placed on sharing information about active
criminal investigations and assure them that we will share
information as it becomes available.

End objectives.

--------------
MAYROW INFORMATION
--------------


3. (U) Begin nonpaper:

(S/Rel UAE) The United States thanks the United Arab Emirates
for the information provided regarding your investigations
into the Mayrow companies and associated individuals as well
as your additional questions on Mayrow. We appreciate the
shared commitment our countries have in ensuring that items
for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),ballistic missile
programs, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) do not reach
countries of concern or terrorist groups. We also respect
the time, energy, and other resources your country has
expended to investigate these companies.

As requested, we are providing information, where possible,
that we hope will help facilitate your investigations. As
you will note, in some cases, where our information is
connected to ongoing legal actions in the U.S., we are unable
to provide details at this time.

U.S. Response to UAE Questions:

-- UAE Question 1: How did the U.S. agency come to the
conclusion that of all the companies in the world, the Mayrow
Company was &the only firm that is suspected of, sending

electronic circuits from Dubai to Iran and from there to
Afghanistan and to Iraq?8 How did the U.S. agency confirm
that it was Mayrow or other intermediary companies that sent
these circuits directly to Iran?

-- U.S. Response 1: The USG did not state Mayrow was the only
firm suspected of this illegal activity. Several other
companies have also been named in the General Order.

-- UAE Question 2: How did the U.S. agency come to the
conclusion that the circuits that were used in Afghanistan
and in Iraq came from Iran and Dubai and, specifically, from
Mayrow and no other company in the world? It is known that
the Chinese firm WING in China sells these circuits to Mayrow
and to others. The same applies to other firms all over the
world.

-- U.S. Response 2: This was determined during the course of
the criminal investigation. The USG welcomes any information
the UAE may have concerning other firms mentioned above.

-- UAE Question 3: Has a conclusion been reached regarding
the Iranian agencies that brought these circuits into
Afghanistan and Iraq? Are they Shi,te or Sunni?

-- U.S. Response 3: We do not have an answer to this question
at this time.

-- UAE Question 4: Was al-Qa,ida using the circuits that
were acquired in Afghanistan?

-- U.S. Response 4: The United States government has
conducted forensic exploitation of IED triggers built by
al-Qa,ida in Pakistan and recovered in Afghanistan since
2002, revealing that the AT89C2051-24PI microprocessor was a
key component. The Dubai-based company Atlinx, a Mayrow
associate, was identified as the only distributor of that
part in the Middle East.

-- UAE Question 5: Was al-Qa,ida using the circuits that
were acquired in Iraq?

-- U.S. Response 5: The United States government assesses
that al-Qa,ida used many of the circuits that were acquired
in Iraq. For example, on 12 August 2006, a Coalition convoy
traveling in Baghdad was attacked using an IED made from
artillery rounds buried in a road and triggered by remote
control. Two soldiers were killed and another was injured.
Examination of the post-blast site uncovered an electrical
wire from the crater to a circuit board plugged into a
cellular phone. The circuit board was attached to the phone
and used to initiate the IED and contained a PIC 16F628A
processor ) a part that has been sold by Mayrow. We assess
that most of these devices are linked to al-Qa,ida in Iraq.
Nearly 100 identical devices have been seized by Coalition
forces.

-- UAE Question 6: During the last meeting that took place in
the offices of our agency, U.S. explosives experts indicated
that the explosives used by Shi,ites in Iraq were more
advanced than those used by al-Qa,ida in Iraq. Does the U.S.
believe that whoever sent the circuits to al-Qa,ida in
Afghanistan also sent them to Shi,ites in Iraq?

-- U.S. Response 6: The United States government does not
believe that the entity that sent the circuits to al-Qa,ida
in Aghanistan also sent them to Shi,ites in Iraq. The
circuits used by Shi,ites in Iraq are different than the
circuits used by al,Qa,ida in Afghanistan.

-- UAE Question 7: Are there any companies that are sending
these circuits from China or from any other Asian, European,
or African state to Syria, Turkey, and Pakistan?

-- U.S. Response 7: The Department of Commerce has named
companies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Lebanon and Syria to
General Order 3. Again, the USG welcomes the information the
UAEG alluded to in question 2.

-- UAE Question 8: Is it possible for these circuits to be
brought into Iraq across the Syrian border, or into
Afghanistan across its border with Pakistan? It should be
noted that the circuits that are being used in Iraq are
circuits of a different kind; and they also have different
manufacturers.

-- U.S. Response 8: General Order 3 targets the procurement
channels that the Department of Commerce has specific and
clear facts about.

-- UAE Question 9: We were surprised during our last meeting
with U.S. explosives experts by their assertion that Iraq,s
ports were being inspected by Iraqis loyal to Imam Sadr. Does
the U.S. have any information about who is engaged in
inspecting the goods that are imported from abroad into Iraq.

-- U.S. Response 9: We do not have an answer to this question
at this time.

-- UAE Question 10: Is it possible to have these circuits
brought into the country through checkpoints that are
controlled by Imam Sadr loyalists?

-- U.S. Response 10: We do not have an answer to this
question at this time.

-- UAE Question 11: In the first statement he made about
Mayrow, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for U.S. Exports,
whose name is Chris Padilla, said that what they found
basically was that &those people and other entities
associated with them were involved in shipping components
that are used specifically in manufacturing primitive
explosive charges.8

-- U.S. Response 11: See response to Question 6

-- UAE Question 12: We would like to have the office of the
Assistant Secretary or any other official clarify for us what
is meant by &specifically.8

-- U.S. Response 12: The General Order targets commodities
that have been and continue to be used in the construction of
improvised explosive devices. The U.S.-origin items being
used have broad commercial applications and were not
specifically manufactured for use in IEDs.

-- UAE Question 13: Is the office of the Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Export Controls, whose name is Chris Padilla,
aware that these circuits, which have no serial numbers, are
available throughout the world in a large number of
electronic devices? Is Mr. Padilla or his office aware that
these circuits can be removed from the electronic devices in
which they were installed and that they are being imported
and exported without export licenses by some countries that
have laws for monitoring and controlling exports?

-- U.S. Response 13: General Order 3 targets the procurement
channels that the Commerce Department has specific and clear
facts about.

-- UAE Question 14: Is the office of the Assistant Secretary
aware that these circuits were not imported by Mayrow General
Trading from the United States of America?

-- U.S. Response 14: The Department of Commerce believes that
Atlinx, MME Middle East Company and Mayrow General Trading
are affiliated with each other.

-- UAE Question 15: Is the office of the Assistant Secretary
aware that Atlinx Electronics and MME Middle East Company
Micro Middle East Electronics are the companies importing
these circuits from America, from Britain, and from other
countries?

-- U.S. Response 15: The Department of Commerce believes that
Atlinx, MME Middle East Company and Mayrow General Trading
are affiliated with each other.

-- UAE Question 16: What is the incontrovertible evidence
that Chris Padilla, Assistant Secretary for Export Controls,
relied upon to accuse one company out of all the companies in
the world that are working in the same field? Your agency
has not compiled a list of these companies, nor has it
confirmed the number of companies that are sending these
circuits to Iran directly from all over the world.

-- U.S. Response 16: General Order 3 names multiple companies
in several countries. Due to the nature of the criminal
investigation, we are unable to provide additional details at
this time.

-- UAE Question 17: Why is it that the Assistant Secretary
did not mention in his statements that Atlinx Electronics and
Micro Middle East Electronics import these circuits from the
United States and elsewhere and that these circuits are
available everywhere in the world at a very low price?

-- U.S. Response 17: The USG acknowledges these commodities
are available commercially and are often inexpensive.
General Order 3 targets the IED related procurement channels
in which the Commerce Department has specific and clear facts.

-- UAE Question 18: How did the Assistant Secretary single
out Mayrow, out of all the other companies that are run by a
man whose name is Ali Akbar Yahya, when it is known that
Atlinx Electronics is the firm that imports these circuits
from the United States?

-- U.S. Response 18: The Department of Commerce has reason to
believe Atlinx, MME Middle East Company and Mayrow General
Trading are affiliated with each other.

-- UAE Question 19: Did your agency request from China any
information on the Chinese firms that sent these circuits
directly to Iran during the past years?

-- U.S. Response 19: The Department of Commerce has named
several Hong Kong firms to General Order 3. We can not
comment on interactions we may have had with the Hong Kong
Government on this matter. It has been the general policy of
the Department of Commerce to provide nations with advance
notice when companies in their countries are being named to
General Order 3.

-- UAE Question 20: Does your agency have any information,
or know of, any new developments in this case?

-- U.S. Response 20: We are not able to share additional
details at this time.

-- UAE Question 21: We would like your agency to confirm the
information about the circuits: that they are the ones that
were imported by Mayrow, and that they were the ones used
against Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

-- U.S. Response 21: We are not able to share additional
details at this time.

-- UAE Question 22: We would like the office of the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of Commerce to present documented Mayrow
shipping documents regarding shipping integrated circuits
manufactured by ATMEL Company.

-- U.S. Response 22: We are unable to do so at this time.

-- UAE Question 23: To assist us in identifying these
circuits that have these specifications, we would like to be
informed about the control list on which they are included,
and we would like to have the state that is strictly
monitoring these circuits as well as the other materials
listed on the control lists identified.

-- U.S. Response 23: We do not have an answer to this
question at this time.

-- UAE Question 24: As you indicated to us in the past,
thousands of these integrated circuits are being
manufactured. They are inexpensive and widely available.
Are we to understand that these integrated circuits are not
listed on any international control list?

-- U.S. Response 24: The fact that these items did not
require a license to the UAE is the reason General Order 3
was necessary. The USG felt it was in the best interest of
both nations not to implement licensing requirements on the
export of these types of items to the UAE, thereby minimizing
the impact on bi-lateral trade.

-- UAE Question 25: We would like the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce to provide us with an explanation
regarding the charges that were made against the United Arab
Emirates: that it was not interested in monitoring Mayrow and
its related entities, nor was it interested in monitoring
exports of these integrated circuits, which, we believe, are
not on any control list. As you know, the statements made by
the Assistant Secretary were specific in this regard. He said
that he will take measures against the United Arab Emirates
for exporting inexpensive materials that are not listed on
any control list.

-- U.S. Response 25: We have no information on the former
Assistant Secretary,s comments.

End nonpaper.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


4. (S) On February 25, Acting ISN Assistant Secretary
Patricia McNerney led an interagency delegation for the third
CTF meeting with the UAEG (ref A). During this meeting, BG
Al-Qemzi reacted strongly to the inclusion of
Mayrow General Trading in the CTF agenda. (Note: Mayrow was a
trading firm in Dubai that we believe was involved in
supplying electronic components that were being used to
develop IEDs in Iraq. End note.) The UAEG had closed Mayrow,
he stated, despite the lack of information from the USG
needed to complete the investigation. BG Al Qemzi asserted
that the UAEG had submitted a paper on Mayrow with specific
requests for evidence needed to further its investigation and
never received any answers. The USG did in fact provide
answers to the UAE in February 2007 were unable to answer
many of their questions because of the ongoing legal
investigation. DAS Borman asked Al-Qemzi to resubmit the
requests. A/AS McNerney also emphasized that this issue
should remain in the CTF as it involved issues related to
Iran,s proliferation activities. (Reftel A)


5. (S) BG Al Qemzi also took the opportunity to raise the
issue of Mayrow during Under Secretary of Commerce Mario
Mancuso,s recent trip to the UAE. Al Qemzi complained that
the U.S. had not adequately responded to a number of
questions raised by UAE authorities. He also repeatedly
emphasized that the CTF was not the appropriate forum to
discuss Mayrow issues since it has nothing to do with
counterproliferation. Al Qemzi pointed to the repeated
inquiries in which the UAE asked the USG for clarification
but did not receive any response. Al Qemzi explained that the
government can be held liable under UAE law for closing
Mayrow related companies without any justifiable legal cause
and that is why they were asking for answers to additional
questions. He explained they wanted to protect themselves
from a suit by the closed companies. Al Qemzi concluded by
stating that cooperation is a two-way street and that he
considers the Mayrow issue to be closed, a comment he also
made at the most recent Counterproliferation Task Force
meeting. U/S Mancuso stated that the U.S. had responded to
the UAE's request for more information as fully as
practicable (this occurred in February 2007). While he
agreed that improvements in communication should be made, he
urged the UAE to not rely exclusively on the U.S. for 3rd
party information and or tips. (Reftel B)

End background.

--------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


6. (U) Please report response by August 1, 2008.

--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------


7. (U) Department point of contact for follow-up is Chris
Herrington ISN/CPI (202) 647-5035. Please slug all responses
for ISN, T, and NEA. Washington appreciates Post,s
assistance.
RICE