NUCLEAR FORENSICS EXPERTS PLAN PATH FORWARD

UNCLAS STATE 077144


SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC BE KNNP PREL PTER ENRG MNUC

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR FORENSICS EXPERTS PLAN PATH FORWARD


1. (SBU) Summary: Atomic energy, law enforcement and
policy experts from nearly 30 countries met in Sofia,
Bulgaria June 17-19 under the auspices of the Nuclear
Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) to
share experience on nuclear forensics and illicit
trafficking issues. The ITWG will conduct an analytic
exercise this fall involving nuclear material, agreed on
elements of a 3-year plan for further forensic exercises,
and is preparing a guideline for crime scene analysis
involving nuclear or radiological materials. These
activities will allow the ITWG to make tangible
contributions to many governments' forensics efforts. On
the margins of the ITWG, German, French and UK reps
expressed support for a Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Plan of Work activity this fall
on collective experiences in international forensics
cooperation. End Summary.


2. (U) Background: ITWG was established by the G-8 in
1995 as an informal technical body to promote
international cooperation to prevent nuclear smuggling.
The ITWG holds annual meetings that include atomic energy,
law enforcement and policy experts with roles in nuclear
forensics. Presently more than 40 governments
participate. The ITWG has four task groups involving
evidence collection, analytic and tabletop exercises,
guidelines and communications/outreach. The United States
and EC co-chair the ITWG, which has an executive council
with representatives from US, EC, Hungary, UK and France.
In addition, U.S. National Laboratory employees lead or
co-chair three of the task groups (Exercises, Guidelines
and Communications/Outreach). The Evidence Collection
task group is co-chaired by Australia and Canada. The
ITWG has held joint analyses of highly-enriched uranium
and plutonium that have led to the identification of
international best practices in the field of nuclear
forensics. The last exercise was
completed in 2002.

Evidence Collection and Processing Task Group
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3. (SBU) The Evidence Collection and Processing Task
Group (ECPTG) is preparing a draft guideline on crime
scene evidence, collection that involve nuclear or
radiological material. The draft will be prepared by
Canada, draw from U.S. and Australian procedures and will
be circulated among the task group for comment late this
summer. In addition, ECPTG is preparing a template for a
catalogue of national response exercises involving the
analysis of nuclear or radiological material which they
will evaluate with real-world data from Canada and
Hungary. (Comment: The USG - possibly the NTNFC - should
consider sharing exercise data with the group to help
evaluate the catalogue. End Comment.) The group hopes to
post the catalogue to the ITWG's secure web site later
this year.

Exercise Task Group
--------------


4. (SBU) The Exercise Task Group (ETG) is finalizing
preparations for an 11-country round robin scheduled for
later this fall. Arrangements to ship samples to nine of
the eleven labs have been initiated and the organizer
hopes to finalize arrangements for the other two labs in
the coming weeks. (Comment: Efforts to incorporate an
IAEA brokering role into the round robin failed to
materialize. This delay has led to some frustration among
round robin participants and a lull in ITWG activities.
The U.S. interagency should evaluate the circumstances of
the material shipment and whether the IAEA brokering role
is a valid method for shipping samples of illicit
trafficked materials to forensic labs. The EU ITWG
co-chair opined that such IAEA support requires
cooperation across the Office of Nuclear Security,
Safeguards division and analytic labs and that they need
to work out the kinks in the 'brokering relationship' the
Agency has with ITWG Nuclear Forensic Lab (INFL). End
Comment.)


5. (SBU) In addition, the ETG outlined expected exercises
in the coming three years. These include a possible round
robin involving plutonium metal, another comparing
pelletized and powdered LEU, and another involving
contaminated evidence. The ETG will prepare a strategic
plan in the next six months for these exercises which will
be posted to the ITWG's secure web site. In addition, the
ETG will post to the web site a series of tabletop
exercises that they have prepared and are available to
ITWG members. The ETG also offered a framework for graded
evaluations derived from measurements that characterize
sample materials. This graded evaluation framework is
being finalized into a guideline and is expected to be
approved prior to the execution of the materials exercise
this fall.

Guidelines Task Group
--------------


6. (SBU) The Guidelines Task Group (GTG) articulated a
definition of ITWG guidelines for materials and methods as
well as a statement on their intended use and audience.
In addition they articulated review/approval procedures
for ITWG guidelines. In the past ITWG guidelines and
reference materials have been incorporated in IAEA Nuclear
Security Series documents. The GTG has several draft
guidelines in the queue including: a graded nuclear
forensics evaluation framework, the crime scene document
being worked by ECPTG, as well as ones on radio-chemical
separations, thermal ion exchange and X-ray diffraction.
Ekaterina Kuteynikova of the Bochvar Institute offered to
draft two guidelines. The first is a guideline on
analytical sampling issues in nuclear forensics. She will
be assisted in this effort by Dinara Abbasova of
Azerbaijan. The second is a guideline on a classification
scheme for nuclear materials.

Outreach and Communications Task Group
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7. (SBU) The Outreach and Communications Task Group
(OCTG) plans to create a modest web site that would be
open to the public and to continue interactions with the
G8 (particularly briefing the Nuclear Security and Safety
Group),the GICNT and the IAEA.


8. (SBU) Experts from Afghanistan, the Republic of South
Africa (RSA) and Singapore joined the ITWG for the first
time and briefed the plenary on their experiences with
nuclear forensics. The Afghani rep highlighted the
lengthy uncontrolled border they have with their neighbor
and requested the group's support in addressing illicit
trafficking and forensics issues. The RSA rep noted that
laboratory forensic specialists need to work closely with
law enforcement to guide a graded response to illicit
trafficking. A representative from the Democratic
Republic of Congo was supposed to participate but was
unable to attend the conference at the last minute.


9. (SBU) Juraj Vaclav from Slovakia's Nuclear Regulatory
Authority briefed the ITWG on the November 2007 seizure of
natural uranium (i.e., non-isotopically enriched). Police
seized 481.4 grams of uranium oxide during a sting
operation on the Hungary-Slovakia border. The material
was reported to be smuggled from the Ukraine. A portable
gamma detector allowed analysis in the field. The 98.659%
confidence in the spectral measurement of 235U was
incorrectly reported by a journalist as the isotopic
enrichment of the sample. Subsequent analysis by alpha
spectrometry was undertaken by a Slovakian university and
confirmed that the uranium was not enriched. In March,
2008, 5.036 grams of the sample was transferred to the
European Commission's Institute for Transuranium Elements
(ITU) for comprehensive forensic analysis. The forensic
data remains embargoed until the completion of the
prosecution by the Slovakian authorities.

Institute for Transuranium Elements Analysis of Uranium
Powders
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10. (SBU) M. Wallenius briefed the ITWG on an Institute
of Transuranium Elements analysis of uranium powders to
deduce their origin. Uranium has many molecular forms
including oxides, fluorides, carbonates, and diuranates.
There are many different ways to produce these powders.
Uranium powder represents an intermediate product between
uranium ore and nuclear fuel fabrication. There are no
powder standards available. However, the powders are
highly indicative of the processes used for their
manufacture. Often the powder is a mixture of different
inputs that complicate straightforward interpretation of
origin. Several case studies have recently been completed
or are underway at ITU on interdicted uranium powders.
These analyses are important since they will contribute to
a sample archive and a database on powdered uranium.

Thorianite Ore Trafficking in Brazil
--------------


11. (SBU) Jorge Eduardo De Souza Sarkis from the Institute
de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares briefed the ITWG on
thorianite ore trafficking in Brazil. Thorianite is a
mineral with high partition coefficients for thorium,
uranium, lead, and rare earth elements (REEs)
characterized by a high specific activity of up to 38, 000
kBq/kg. Thorianite, which is common in Brazil, can be
found in beach sands and pegmatites. The price of the
mineral has increased to $300 dollars per kilogram due to
the increasing demand for REE elements for high technology
applications. As a result, thorianite ore trafficking is
troublesome in Brazil and involves extensive smuggling of
the mineral. Police seized 520 kilograms of thorianite in
February 2006 and are conducting further interdictions and
arrests. To pursue prosecution of these smuggling cases
and pursue criminal prosecutions requires reference
materials for thorianite analysis. Presently it is
difficult to state the origin of these materials based on
absolute conce
ntrations of thorium, uranium, and lead. However, using
ternary discrimination diagrams of U2O8 ThO2, Pbo2,
sourcing is possible when samples are plotted in
comparison to other international sources of thorianite.
Research continues into the use of lead isotopes and the
REEs to discriminate different thorianite source
geochemistry.

German RDD Response Exercise
--------------


12. (SBU) M. Hoffman from the German Federal Office for
Radiation Protection briefed the ITWG on a radiological
dispersal device (RDD) response exercise. In the spring
of 2008 Germany sponsored a major weapons of mass
destruction emergency exercise entitled the Cologne
Response Exercise; 16 internal German states participated
throughout Germany. All 16 states can respond without the
intervention of the federal government. The objective of
the two-day exercise was defense against nuclear hazards.
The exercise tested radiological detection, categorization
of radiological materials, estimates of activity levels,
medical deployment and decontamination. Additionally
alarm protocols were evaluated, as was the deployment of
local and federal responders for a variety of scenarios.
The exercise commenced on June 2, 2008. The presence of a
simulated dirty bomb (i.e., radiological dispersal device)
was confirmed. On June 3, 2008 the simulated device was
removed and transported to an examining laboratory. The
exercise was complex to plan but extremely valuable. The
after-action report determined that statewide emergency
and consequence management communication was good.
Because of the extensive preparation required for
large-scale exercises, it may also be beneficial to do
smaller exercises. Regular and credible liaison with the
press and general public is essential in both exercises
and actual events. A second national-level exercise for
Germany is planned for November 2009.


13. (SBU) U.S. participants gave presentations on the
U.S. technical nuclear forensics program and forensics
cooperation. In addition, DOE funded the participation of
Kyrgyzstani experts, and the DOS funded the participation
of Afghanistan, Kazakhstani and Ukrainian experts.

Bilateral Discussions on Forensics Cooperation
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14. (SBU) In separate bilateral discussions with
representatives from the IAEA, Russian, Germany, France
and the UK on the margins of the ITWG, Curry previewed
U.S. interest in holding a GI Plan of Work Activity on
nuclear forensics this fall and our desire to enhance
forensics cooperation by promoting the development of
national nuclear material libraries. German, French and
UK representatives were supportive. The IAEA
representative believed the framework was well grounded
but wanted to consult with Anita Nilsson before
responding. The Russia representative agreed with the
premise of national nuclear libraries but suggested using
the G-8's CT group to develop the proposal further. Curry
explained that the GI would provide a better forum because
of our desire to include critical partners like the
Central Asians.

U.S.-Russia Cooperation
--------------


15. (SBU) Bilats with Rosatom -- Curry also discussed a
proposal to enhance U.S.-Russian nuclear forensics
cooperation with RosAtom. The RosAtom representative
reiterated the need to show his new leadership the legal
foundation for this cooperation and suggested citing the
Nuclear Terrorism Convention, the 1996 G8 summit statement
on nuclear security and the MPC&A agreement. The RosAtom
representative said that the MPC&A agreement has an
explicit reference to bilateral cooperation on illicit
trafficking and opined that forensics could be included if
both sides agreed. The RosAtom representative said that
bilateral forensics cooperation was discussed at the 9th
JCC, and he suggested raising this issue again in this
forum.

Side Meeting with IAEA on Technical Cooperation with ITWG
-------------- --------------
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16. (SBU) The ITWG Co-Chairs met with P. Colgan of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the
plenary to discuss the future technical cooperation
between the IAEA and ITWG. The IAEA indicated that closer
collaboration between the two organizations was important
to the Agency and the IAEA was willing to promote this
partnership to best apply nuclear forensics to the
counter-terrorism and nonproliferation interests of its
member states. The Agency recognizes the substantive
nuclear forensic technical expertise represented by ITWG.
In the past, the IAEA has had difficulty formally
recognizing the ITWG because of its lack of legal
standing; due to the longevity of the ITWG, and its
formulation of the Model Action Plan, it may be possible
for experts in international law to review Agency
products. The ITWG could be better integrated into the
Agency's ongoing Cooperative Research Program in nuclear
forensics. Potentially the IAEA might host a future ITWG
annual meeting and have a representative s
erve on the ITWG Executive Committee. Anita Nilsson of
the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security will be consulted
about potential mechanisms for increased cooperation with
the ITWG. A meeting of the ITWG Executive and other
senior members with the IAEA to evaluate paths for
increased cooperation was proposed for later in 2008.

Bulgarian Interest in Improving Forensic Capabilities
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17. (SBU) At the request of the Bulgarian National
Security Service, and DNDO manager (S.Chase) and LLNL
contractor (D.Smith) met with counter-proliferation staff,
border police, and interior security representatives to
discuss further development of nuclear forensic
capabilities in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians were interested
in training and access to field portable gamma detectors
and generalized training in nuclear incident border
response. These law enforcement officials desire
practical information on nuclear categorization and
characterization more specific than that described in
their national response plan. USG program staff informed
the Bulgarians that a government-to-government agreement
was required to initiate USG assistance and that an
operational USG entity like the FBI or Customs Border
Protection was required to conduct training of this type.
The initial request from the Bulgarians for USG assistance
should be made through U.S. Embassy Sofia. The Bulgarians
stated they had just entered into
an agreement with the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Second Line Defense as part of an
emerging comprehensive program in nuclear border
security.

Tajikistan Request for Assistance with Yellowcake and
Tailings
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18. (SBU) In a side discussion, a DOE/NNSA representative
received a request from Dr. Muzafar Yunusov of State
Enterprise Vostokredmet in Tajikistan to find a buyer for
about 10,000 kgs of U3O8, currently in locked storage at
Vostokredmet. To date, Dr. Yunusov says he has approached
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and France to locate a buyer, but
to no avail. Secondly, he described a very large field of
uranium tailings at the Digma site, which he would also
like assistance in stabilizing and securing. By his
calculation, these tailings are the equivalent of 2,500
tons of yellow cake, which he believes could also be
sold. He has previously approached LLNL with this request
for assistance to locate a buyer for the U3O8 and has
documented the inventory of ore concentrate. DOE/NNSA did
not promise assistance, but agreed to circulate the
request.


19. (U) ITWG participants:

AFGHANISTAN: Afzal Ahmadi and Dr. Abdul Malik (Ministry
of Public Health)

AUSTRALIA: Michael Colella (Australian Nuclear Science &
Technology Organization) and David Hill (ANSTO);

AZERBAIJAN: Dinara Abbasova and Ibrahim Gabulov (Institute
of Radiation Problems)

BRAZIL: Jorge Eduardo De Souza Sarkis (Institute de
Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares -- IPEN) and Marcos R.L.
do Nascimento (Comissao Nacional des Energia Nuclear --
CNEN)

BULGARIA: Angel Angelov (Ministry of Inferior Affairs),
Tzveta Apostolova (Institute for Nuclear Research and
Nuclear Energy),Emil Bonev (Nuclear Regulatory Agency),
Nina Nikolova (Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear
Energy),Rumen Christov (Border Police Directorate),Spas
Stoyanov (NSS),Aleksandar Strezov (Institute for Nuclear
Research and Nuclear Energy) and Boris Tsenov (NSS)

CANADA: Carey Larsson (Defence Research and Development
Canada)

CZECH REPUBLIC: Jan Lengyel (Nuclear Research Institute
(Central Analytical Laboratory)

EC: Klaus Mayer (European Commission-Joint Research
Center) and Maria Wallenius (Institute for Transuranium
Elements)

EUROPOL: Jose Garcia Sainz

FINLAND: Paula Karhu (STUK) and Antero Kuusi

FRANCE: Stephane Baude (Commissariat a l'Energie
Atomique) and Jean-Charles Hubinois (CEA Valduc)

GEORGIA: Grigol Kiknadze (Institute of Physics)

GERMANY: Michael Hoffmann (German Federal Office for
Radiation Protection),Emily Kroger (German Federal Office
for Radiation Protection),Peter Milpert (AMT fur
Militarkunde) and Roland Grasegger (AMT fur Militarkunde)

HUNGARY: Gabriella Racz, and Stefanka Zsolt (Institute of
Isotopes)

IAEA: Peter Colgan

ISRAEL: Uri Adman (IAEC-NRCN)

KAZAKHSTAN: Seiylkhan Kabayev (KazahAtomProm)

LITHUANIA: Laima Pilkyte (Radiation Protection Centre)

NETHERLANDS: Jan Dalmolen, and Rabinderpersad Gajadhar
(Netherlands Forensic Institute)

RUSSIA: Victor Erastov (Federal Atomic Energy Agency
(ROSATOM),Ekaterina Kuteynikova (Bochvar Research
Institute of Inorganic Materials-- VNIINM)

SERBIA: Dragana Nikolic (The 'Vinca' Institute of Nuclear
Sciences)

SINGAPORE: Sng Mui Tang

SLOVAKIA: Pavol Admek (Institute of Public Health) and
Juraj Vclav (Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak
Republic)

SOUTH AFRICA: Arnaud Faanhof (NECSA)

SWEDEN: Vitaly Fedchenko (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute) and Olof Karlberg

TAJIKISTAN: Muzafar Yunusov (Sl "Vostokredmet')

UKRAINE: Aleksandr Krasheninniku (Ukrainian Security
Service)

UNITED KINGDOM: Paul Thompson (AWE)

UNITED STATES: Christina Andersson (DOE),Jim Blankenship
(FBI),Steve Chase (DHS),Eugene Cheney (DOD),Michael
Curry (STATE),Rich Hanlen (PNNL),Greg Haugan (DHS),Mike
Kristo (LLNL),Jeff Leggitt (FBI),Mark Porter (Civilian
R&D Foundation),David Smith (LLNL),and John Wacker
(DOE),
RICE


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