(S) M/V ANTARES I: SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANT BOARDING

S E C R E T STATE 073774


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2033
TAGS: GM KN LI MNUC PARM PREL SY

SUBJECT: (S) M/V ANTARES I: SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANT BOARDING

Classified By: ISN ACTING DAS KENNETH W. STALEY, REASONS 1.4 (b),(d)


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ACTION REQUEST
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1. (S) Posts are requested to approach appropriate-level
host nation officials to express our appreciation for a
recent successfully concluded compliant boarding of the M/V
ANTARES I. Posts may draw from objectives, background, and
talking points/non-paper below, as appropriate. The vessel is
Liberian-flagged and owned by a German firm.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (S//REL Recipients) A boarding team from the USS Bulkeley
boarded and searched the M/V ANTARES I, a Liberian-flagged,
German-owned cargo vessel, on 13 June in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea. The boarding was conducted in accordance
with our bilateral Proliferation Security Initiative
Ship-Boarding Agreement (SBA) with Liberia. The vessel was
suspected of carrying a cargo of North Korean-origin steel
from China to Syria. The Syrian consignee for this cargo,
Mechanical Construction Factory of Damascus, Syria, has
procured for Syria's weapons development efforts in the past.
For this reason, the USG decided to invoke the SBA in order
to gather more information regarding the cargo.

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OBJECTIVES
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3. (S//REL Recipients) Posts should:

-- Express our appreciation for responding quickly and
positively (Monrovia only).

-- Note that this is the type of cooperation envisioned under
the Proliferation Security Initiative and bilateral
ship-boarding agreements.

-- Provide additional information explaining why we sought to
board the vessel in question.

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TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
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4. (S//REL Liberia) The following points are for MONROVIA
ONLY:

-- We would like to thank you for your recent cooperation in
granting permission, as the flag state, to board the
Liberian-flagged vessel M/V ANTARES I.

-- We would like to provide you with additional information
regarding our request.

-- We sought permission to board the vessel because we had
received information that the M/V ANTARES I had loaded a
cargo of steel, possibly of North Korean origin, at Damietta,
Egypt.

-- Our information also indicated that this steel was
consigned to the Syrian entity Mechanical Construction
Factory (MCF) in Damascus, Syria.

-- MCF, the consignee, had previously acted as an
intermediary for Syria's weapons development program.

-- The shipper of this cargo was the Chinese shipping company
COSCO Logistics (Dalian) Company. Our information also
indicates that the DPRK company Korea Foreign Transportation
Corporation was also probably involved in this shipment.

-- Given the nature of the cargo and the entities involved in
the transaction, we assessed that we had reasonable grounds
to suspect that the vessel was engaged in proliferation by
sea. In order to gather additional information regarding the
cargo, we sought your permission, as the vessel's flag state,
to board and search the vessel. After the boarding, the
vessel was allowed to continue on its voyage to Syria.

-- We are now analyzing the information obtained during the
boarding.

-- We appreciate your timely cooperation in this matter.
This is exactly the type of timely action that the
Proliferation Security Initiative and our bilateral
ship-boarding agreement is intended to foster.

End points for Liberia.


5. (S//REL Germany) The following points are for BERLIN ONLY:

-- In the spirit of our bilateral non-proliferation
cooperation, we would like to follow-up with you regarding a
boarding conducted earlier this month by a US Navy vessel of
the Liberian-flagged vessel M/V ANTARES I. As a German firm
is the ship's owner of record, we wanted to provide you with
information concerning the reasons for our action.

-- We received information that the M/V ANTARES I had loaded
a cargo of steel, possibly of North Korean origin, at
Damietta, Egypt.

-- Our information also indicated that this steel was
consigned to the Syrian entity Mechanical Construction
Factory (MCF) in Damascus, Syria.

-- MCF, the consignee, had previously acted as an
intermediary for Syria's weapons development program.

-- The shipper of this cargo was the Chinese shipping company
COSCO Logistics (Dalian) Company. Our information also
indicates that the DPRK company Korea Foreign Transportation
Corporation was also probably involved in this shipment.

-- Given the nature of the cargo and the entities involved in
the transaction, we had reasonable grounds to suspect that
the vessel might be engaged in proliferation-related
activities. In order to gather additional information
regarding the cargo, we sought Liberia's permission, as the
ANTARES I's flag state, to board and search the vessel,
pursuant to the U.S. ) Liberia shipboarding agreement.
After the boarding, the vessel was allowed to continue on its
voyage to Syria.

-- We are now analyzing the information obtained during the
boarding.

-- This is exactly the type of timely action that the
Proliferation Security Initiative and our bilateral
ship-boarding agreements are intended to foster.
End points for Germany.


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POINT OF CONTACT AND REPORTING REQUIREMENT
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6. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up is Mark
Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov.


7. (U) Please report delivery of points and any immediate
response by 30 June.


8. (U) Washington thanks posts for assistance. Please slug
responses for AF, EUR, ISN, and T.
RICE


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