Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE72058
2008-07-03 23:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

GUIDANCE FOR CCW DELEGATION: JULY 7-25

Tags:  ARM PREL PGOV UN 
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DE RUEHC #2058 1852305
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 032309Z JUL 08
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TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 072058 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS: ARM PREL PGOV UN
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR CCW DELEGATION: JULY 7-25

REF: STATE 66793

Classified By: IO Acting A/S Hook, Reason: 1.4(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 072058

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS: ARM PREL PGOV UN
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR CCW DELEGATION: JULY 7-25

REF: STATE 66793

Classified By: IO Acting A/S Hook, Reason: 1.4(d)


1. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The U.S. delegation has participated
actively in the first two rounds of negotiations (in January
and April) on the issue of cluster munitions in the Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) to the Convention on Certain
Convention Weapons (CCW). These two sessions resulted in
progress on a section of a new Protocol addressing
international humanitarian law (IHL) issues that arise in the
context of cluster munitions use, as well as clarifying the
issues that need to be addressed in the next round of
negotiations, from July 7-25.

OBJECTIVES


2. (C) The July session will likely be critical in
determining whether these negotiations will have a successful
outcome. The primary objective for the July session will be
to find some middle ground between the group of countries
that wants to ban some or all cluster munitions and those who
oppose any legally binding provisions banning cluster
munitions or requiring technical improvements in cluster
munitions. Any outcome on this core issue must be one we can
implement consistent with the new DOD policy on cluster
munitions. Two other important objectives for the U.S.
delegation will be to ensure that the section on IHL remains
consistent with existing law (with the exception noted in
paragraph 5 below) and to find a way to address victim,s
assistance, clearance, and international cooperation in a
manner that does not undercut or complicate implementation of
Protocol V.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE


3. (SBU) Definitions. The U.S. delegation should not
agree to efforts to define specifically &reliable8 or
&accurate8 submunitions or establish a list of &good8 vs.
&bad8 submunitions. The U.S. delegation may accept a broad
definition of cluster munitions that generally matches the
definition the U.S. delegation proposed in January. The U.S.
delegation should not accept a definition of cluster
munitions or submunitions that excludes those systems that
are generally considered to be cluster munitions. The U.S.
delegation may agree to exceptions for nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons, as well as for obscurants,
pyrotechnics, non-lethal systems (e.g., leaflets),
non-explosive kinetic effect submunitions (e.g., flechettes

or rods),and electronic effects systems.


4. (C) Technical improvements. It is anticipated that
many countries that have expressed an intention to sign the
Oslo Process treaty text later this year will push to include
a ban on some or all cluster munitions in the draft
instrument in the CCW. At the same time, Russia, as well as
China, India, Pakistan, and others have signaled that they
are not willing to join consensus on such a ban and are
generally skeptical about legally binding provisions or
technical improvements. The U.S. delegation should not
support an explicit ban on cluster munitions. Instead, the
U.S. delegation should strive to find common ground between
these two groups by promoting an article on technical
improvements to cluster munitions that could, for example,
focus on the rate of unexploded ordnance produced by cluster
munitions. Such an article could be binding or non-binding,
so long as it does not impose obligations the USG would not
be able to implement under the new DoD policy (ref septel).
It should have a transition period of at least 10 years.


5. (C) International humanitarian law. The U.S.
delegation should seek to finalize an article that sets forth
existing IHL as it applies in the context of cluster
munitions use. The Friend of the Chair,s paper on IHL from
the April negotiations should serve as the basis for further
work on this issue. If additional elements of existing IHL
are proposed for inclusion in this article (as they were in
the chairman,s draft text circulated informally in advance
of the session),the U.S. delegation should ensure a common
understanding of any such provisions to ensure that there is
no confusion among delegations about existing IHL functioning
as a de facto ban on cluster munitions. U.S. delegation is
authorized, if helpful in the course of the negotiations, to
propose an IHL article that goes somewhat beyond existing law
along the following lines ) &Those who plan or decide upon
an attack shall refrain from using cluster munitions against
military objectives where concentrations of civilians are
also present unless it is judged, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, that the use of such weapons against the
military objectives would cause less incidental loss of life
to civilians, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, than the use of
alternative weapons.8


6. (SBU) Transfers. Israel has proposed text that would
prohibit the transfer of cluster munitions to terrorist
organizations. In this regard, the U.S. delegation may agree
to a text that restricts transfers to states or agencies
authorized by states and which prohibits the transfer of
cluster munitions to non-state actors. The U.S. delegation
may also agree to restrictions on transfers along the same
lines as any eventual article on technical improvements so
long as a suitable transition period is built into any such
provision.


7. (SBU) Clearance and international cooperation. The new
Protocol should make reference to victim assistance,
international cooperation and clearance, but should not
create wastefully duplicative structures in these areas.
Specifically, the U.S. delegation may accept the
incorporation by reference or the repetition of obligations
contained in Protocol V to the CCW. These obligations should
not substantially exceed or differ substantively from the
obligations with respect to ERW more generally contained in
that Protocol. They also should not give priority to such
activities if cluster munitions are involved, as opposed to
other types of munitions. The delegation may accept
additional language related to responsibilities of states
receiving assistance. The provision of financial assistance
must remain voluntary.


8. (SBU) Victim assistance. The Chairman,s draft text
closely follows a similar article in the Oslo Process
document. The United States is a strong supporter of
victims, assistance programs and the Delegation should be as
flexible as possible in language in a new victims,
assistance provision. The language should ensure that any
provision of assistance provided to other states is voluntary
and connected to strengthening existing international and
national structures, in particular national health care
systems. The delegation should not accept language that
would create new obligations for the United States for which
there is no existing legislative authority. In this regard
the delegation should take particular care in how provisions
would apply to any potential victim within the United States.


OSLO PROCESS


9. (SBU) The Delegation should make known the U.S.
interpretation of Article 21 of the Oslo Process Convention
as agreed at the Dublin meeting May 31, 2008 in keeping with
the &low-key8 approach set forth in &Guidance on the
outcome of the Oslo Process8 (ref A). The delegation may
also draw from the paper &Assessing/Interpreting Article 21
with Respect to Interoperability" when engaging on this
issue. The delegation may discuss with international
organizations as well as foreign governments.
RICE