Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE64210
2008-06-13 20:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

REPORT: 2008 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Tags:  ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL NPT IAEA 
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 064210 

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TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL NPT IAEA
SUBJECT: REPORT: 2008 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
(NPT) PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM) MEETING

Classified By: ISN/MNSA - Marguerita Ragsdale. 1.4 (d) and (f).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 064210

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TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL NPT IAEA
SUBJECT: REPORT: 2008 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
(NPT) PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM) MEETING

Classified By: ISN/MNSA - Marguerita Ragsdale. 1.4 (d) and (f).


1. (U) SUMMARY: The second meeting of the NPT PrepCom in
the current review cycle was held in Geneva, Switzerland,
from April 28 - May 9. One hundred six Parties participated,
including a U.S. delegation led by Special Representative for
Nuclear Nonproliferation Christopher Ford, and were able to
discuss all aspects of the NPTwithout procedural
obstructions. The meeting was organized into general debate;
decisions on procedures; and focused discussion periods on
disarmament, security assurances, nonproliferation, regional
issues, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Treaty withdrawal,
procedural matters, and the Chairman,s summary. Results of
the meeting included: the first P-5 statement on the NPT in
eight years (and the first ever agreed at a PrepCom);
introduction into the NPT debate of concerns about Syrian
nuclear activities (including DPRK cooperation therewith);
multiple U.S. briefings on disarmament issues; and the
intensification of a U.S.-led process of jointly sponsoring
papers that can be used to gain consensus among Parties on
issues of importance to the United States. As evidenced by
the increasing frequency of comments by other delegations
about how "some" or "most" nuclear weapon states had made
reductions since the end of the Cold War, there seems to be
increasing implicit acknowledgement among States Party that
China is augmenting its nuclear arsenal. The Chairman issued
a summary that sought to reflect the views expressed at the
meeting, which included some views objectionable to the
United States. In spite of considerable unease with the
Non-Aligned Movement,s (NAM) choice of Zimbabwe,s Permanent
Representative to the UN as chair of the 2009 PrepCom,
Parties consented to his election, albeit after delaying the
issue for several days. Initial Iranian and Cuban objections
to having the Third PrepCom take place in New York were also

overcome, and Parties agreed to hold the meeting there from
May 4 - 15, 2009. END SUMMARY.

(U) MORE MIDDLE EAST POLEMICS


2. (U) Statements by most Western delegations once again
criticized Iran,s failure to comply with its
nonproliferation obligations, and some (e.g., U.S., Canada,
France, and Japan) expressed concern about revelations that
Syria had been constructing an undeclared reactor that
appeared to be well-suited for plutonium production. Only
the United States and Canada, however, mentioned the DPRK
connection to this Syrian reactor project. Iran denied all
charges of non-compliance. It also counter-attacked loudly
and with a slightly new strategy, claiming in considerable
(if inaccurate) detail that the United States is violating
various provisions of the NPT (Articles I, III, IV, and VI).
Iran also slammed other Western states (e.g., Australia,
Canada, the European Union, and Japan),including asserting
that Australia, France, Japan, and the UK have all violated
the Treaty as well. Iran released several papers on these
subjects.


3. (U) Syria replied to the concern about its activities by
calling the allegations undocumented, untrue, and meant to
manufacture a crisis in the Middle East and to destroy the
NPT PrepCom. Syria said it could not understand how Canada
could criticize Syria but not Israel, and cited this as
another example of the double standard that is applied to
Israel. Syria continued by saying that the Canadian
representative was suffering from a dishonesty "disease."
Syria also made a statement that appeared to accuse the
United States of having deployed or even used tactical
nuclear weapons in the Middle East, an allegation firmly
rejected by U.S. Special Representative Ford. (COMMENT:
After facing direct U.S. criticism for his claims, the Syrian
equivocated in subsequent comments, at one point indicating -
despite his earlier clarifications that he had indeed meant
nuclear weapons - that he was referring merely to depleted
uranium projectiles. However, his final remarks at the
PrepCom included no such allegations. END COMMENT)


4. (U) Many Arab and several other NAM member statements
cited Israel,s non-NPT status as the most important threat
to the nonproliferation regime and called for Israel to join
the NPT and accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards. (The Arab
League said that Israel "must be required" to do so.)
Several reiterated that Israel had acknowledged having
nuclear weapons in the December 2006 interview by Prime
Minister Ohlmert. Syria said that states' silence on Israel
had emboldened Israel into making this declaration of nuclear

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weapons possession. Egypt stated that failure to address the
Israeli nuclear issue would further weaken the NPT by driving
other Middle East states "to re-evaluate the benefits of the
Treaty."


5. (SBU) The NAM expressed its "serious concern" that
"Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear
facilities of one (nuclear weapon state)." Iran was more
explicit, accusing the United States of violating the Treaty
by assisting Israel,s nuclear weapons program and citing the
recent agreement between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission
(IAEC) ("enabling Zionist regime to access most of the latest
nuclear data and technology available in the U.S.") and a
purportedly declassified 1974 document that "clearly shows
the role of the U.S. in equipping Zionist Regime with nuclear
weapons." The U.S. firmly rebutted these allegations.
(COMMENT: The NRC possesses no information on nuclear
weapons, and its agreement with the IAEC is for the purpose
of safety in peaceful uses and does not cover any classified
information; the 1974 document contains no information on
U.S. nuclear supply to Israel. END COMMENT)


6. (U) An even larger number of Parties, with Egypt in the
vanguard, lamented the lack of progress in implementing the
1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East, which calls for a
region free of weapons of mass destruction. The Arab League
asserted that Arab states would not have agreed to the
decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely without the
Resolution. Many called for concrete steps to implement the
resolution and suggested that the Treaty depositaries (U.S.,
Russia, and U.K.) and/or the P-5 have special
responsibilities to effect such steps. Arab and other NAM
states provided a range of suggestions, including NPT
standing committees, a conference among Middle East states,
and a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to help
implement the goals of the 1995 resolution.


7. (SBU) Arab governments, including Egypt, increasingly
spoke of the 1995 Resolution in terms that derogated from its
actual phrasing; they tended to deemphasize or ignore its
language about a Middle East free of all weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems, preferring to describe the
Resolution as dealing only with nuclear weapons. Because the
NPT forum deals with nuclear weapons issues, as opposed to
other forms of WMD and related delivery systems, Egypt
suggested, the PrepCom and Review Conference should focus
exclusively upon the former, notwithstanding the language of
the 1995 Resolution. Also in spite of the Resolution,s
reference to the importance of the Middle East peace process
in contributing to the achievement of a WMD-free region,
Egypt also criticized those (including the United States) who
tend to link progress on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
Middle East to broader peace issues.

(U) EVIDENCE OF DISARMAMENT PROGRESS


8. (U) In general, apart from updates by Nuclear Weapons
States (NWS) of prior presentations on the NPT,s Article VI
(disarmament) issues, little new was said at the PrepCom
about disarmament. Many Parties criticized the NWS,
particularly the United States, for a perceived lack of
progress toward the goals of Article VI. Some non-nuclear
weapon states (NNWS) were encouraged by the reinvigoration of
disarmament pressures, such as the Shultz, et. al., articles
in "The Wall Street Journal," and the UK-sponsored efforts
involving both policy and technical experts. The New Agenda
Coalition states continued to focus on persuading the NWS to
reduce the alert status of their nuclear forces and to report
more fully and formally on their nuclear postures and plans.


9. (U) Disarmament criticism largely ignored China,s
status as the sole NWS to be expanding its nuclear arsenal.
However, in contrast to past NPT meetings, a greater number
of comments acknowledged progress by "some" or "most" NWS in
making reductions. Criticism of NWS, such as the United
States, consisted of an acknowledgment of real progress in
reductions, in addition to comments that more reductions are
needed and calls for moving ultimately to "zero." China
seemed somewhat more defensive than usual on Article VI
issues, particularly with regard to repeated calls by other
delegations for NWS "transparency" - which some delegates
privately explained to USG officials as being directed at
Beijing (by far the least transparent of the five NWS on such
matters).


10. (U) The United States continued to publicize U.S.
achievements in the area of disarmament. The U.S. Delegation
offered two well attended briefings detailing the
considerable progress the United States has made in reducing

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nuclear weapons and our strategic dependence on them. The
first, which described overall progress, was given by Special
Representative Ford and National Nuclear Security
Administration Deputy Administrator William Tobey, and was
similar to other well-received U.S. briefings given over the
last seven months in New York, Vienna, and Geneva. The
second was new and initiated following Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI) Assistant
Secretary Paula DeSutter,s suggestion that the United States
and Russia give a joint briefing on the implementation of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Scheduling
difficulties prevented a joint briefing, but Ford and VCI
Senior Advisor Harry Heintzelman presented information on the
history of the INF agreement and its relevance to the NPT and
overall U.S. disarmament efforts.


11. (U) Both briefings were well received and added to the
weight of U.S. outreach on Article VI. Our efforts clearly
seem to have made an impact on Parties, understanding of
U.S. accomplishments and perceptions of U.S. transparency on
nuclear weapons. Russia also held a well-attended briefing
on INF dismantlements and its proposals to globalize the
bilateral INF treaty. Russian General Evgeny Buzhinsky gave
a technical briefing on Russian disarmament under INF, while
Vice Foreign Minister Amb. Anatoly Antonov led the
presentation on Russia,s proposal to turn the bilateral INF
treaty into a global treaty. While a number of NGO
representatives asked highly skeptical questions about the
treaty proposal, others in attendance supported the proposal
as an idea worthy of further consideration and study.

(U) BUILDING CONSENSUS ON PEACEFUL USES AND WITHDRAWAL BY
VIOLATORS


12. (U) The U.S. delegation contributed seven working
papers to the PrepCom on the following topics: Treaty
compliance, the Middle East, peaceful nuclear cooperation,
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP),deterring
withdrawal from the Treaty by violators, the process for
choosing NPT leadership, and financing of meetings. In
addition, the Delegation distributed fact sheets on our
bilateral cooperative efforts with over 40 countries, which
provided clear evidence of our strong record on technical
cooperation and were well received. The fact sheets detailed
extensive and entirely peaceful U.S. lab-to-lab relationships
with many states, including those in the Arab world.


13. (SBU) As a means of developing consensus on key NPT
issues, U.S. papers on nuclear cooperation and withdrawal
were designed to focus on relatively uncontroversial matters
in order to attract support from a wide range of NPT Parties.
The contentious and politicized nature of some NPT issues
(e.g., disarmament) has made it difficult for Parties to
reach agreement on any issues at PrepComs and Review
Conferences (RevCons). This, in turn, has contributed to a
growing feeling in some quarters that the Treaty is in
trouble. To counter this trend, the United States sought to
develop language that could form the basis for consensus at
the 2009 PrepCom, which is meant to provide recommendations
to the 2010 RevCon, and at the RevCon itself.


14. (SBU) The effort to gain co-sponsors for the papers on
nuclear cooperation and withdrawal was a partial success. A
number of delegation representatives seemed appreciative -
even surprised in some cases - that the United States was
taking this initiative. The Delegation convened an informal
meeting to discuss the U.S. paper on peaceful uses that was
attended by an interesting mix of delegations, most of whom
were considering co-sponsorship: Canada, Estonia, France,
Germany, Lithuania, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, Thailand, and
the U.K., all of whom were there because of their interest in
co-sponsorship. Japan, Russia, Switzerland and Uzbekistan
also expressed interest - Russia even proposed detailed
changes bilaterally - but their representatives did not
attend. France and the ROK also had papers on which they
were seeking co-sponsors, adding to the sense that Parties
were taking early steps toward consensus. (COMMENT: A total
of 54 papers were submitted to the conference, by various
delegations, many of them sponsored by more than one
government. END COMMENT)


15. (SBU) In the end, France, Thailand, and the U.K. agreed
to co-sponsor the U.S. peaceful uses paper, and the ROK the
withdrawal paper. A small difference on characterizing the
Additional Protocol - necessary to keep the French and UK on
board but bothersome to some others - kept several others
from sponsoring the former paper; Washington will continue to
address this problem in diplomatic channels well in advance
of the next PrepCom. (During the PrepCom, many Western
states urged that the Additional Protocol, combined with an

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NPT-type safeguards agreement, become the new "safeguards
standard," while the NAM cautioned against forgetting the
distinction between legal obligations and voluntary
confidence building measures.)


16. (SBU) The Delegation expects that the differences on the
peaceful uses paper can be resolved and the number of
co-sponsors on both papers increased before the next PrepCom.
Prospects for increasing consensus, possibly including on
additional issues, would seem to be promising given that we
did not have much time to work out language with other
delegations before the PrepCom. Some would-be co-sponsors of
the U.S. papers indicated that they wished to support us, but
had insufficient time to get clearance from capitals.
Finally, difficulty over the treatment of sensitive nuclear
technology kept the United States from co-sponsoring a
French-drafted paper on nuclear energy, but this was less a
substantive problem than a result of insufficient time for
the French to re-clear a U.S. suggestion with other
cosponsors. (COMMENT: Whether this type of effort will be
able to help give a positive dimension to an otherwise highly
contentious review cycle remains to be seen. END COMMENT)

(U) THE P-5 AGREES


17. (C) Another effort to improve the prospects for future
constructive consensus occurred among the P-5. The prospect
of a P-5 statement first arose at a meeting of P-5
representatives in March. This discussion focused upon the
idea of having a P-5 statement only on peaceful use issues,
but prior to the PrepCom, the UK circulated a draft statement
covering most of the major aspects of the Treaty. P-5
cooperation has been growing during the Treaty review cycle,
including in several meetings at the first PrepCom and at
intersessional gatherings in New York and Geneva. On the
margins of the second PrepCom, P-5 delegations held several
fairly intensive discussions on successive drafts and
ultimately reached agreement on an 11-paragraph statement
that was read on behalf of the P-5 by U.K. Ambassador John
Duncan at the last plenary session. In spite of apparently
deliberate leaks by the Chinese toward the end of the
process, P-5 participants were able to keep their discussions
mostly under wraps, thereby avoiding likely disappointment if
agreement had not been reached, and creating a positive
atmosphere when it was.


18. (C) The most difficult issues were whether to include
language on the revelations about the Syrian reactor, and
what to say about the work of the Conference on Disarmament
(CD). Russia initially proposed unacceptable language on the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),
nuclear-weapon-free zones, missile defense, and the INF
Treaty that it dropped at the first meeting. However, Russia
refused to include anything about Syria, even after France
proposed language derived from the public statement on the
issue by IAEA Director General El-Baradei. (COMMENT: Russia
claimed that given the upcoming Russian national holiday,
there was insufficient time to clear any new language
whatsoever in Moscow. The Russian representative would
discuss only proposed deletions from the draft text, but not
any additions. END COMMENT) China held out until near the
end for language on the CD that would have undermined
progress there toward commencing negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty. Given its sensitivity and the
special roles of the NWS, language on other disarmament
issues was also the subject of intensive negotiations.


19. (U) As this was the first P-5 statement at an NPT
meeting since the year 2000, and apparently the first ever
achieved at a PrepCom, it received favorable press and
diplomatic commentary as illustrating the constructive nature
of the 2008 PrepCom. The positive impression made by the
statement was also valuable in light of a display of P-5
disunity on the floor of the PrepCom earlier in the meeting,
when the Russian and Chinese ambassadors quarreled publicly
with the British ambassador over the latter,s
characterization of the Iran-related outcome of the P-5
Ministerial meeting in London on May 2, 2008.

(U) CHAIRMAN,S FACTUAL SUMMARY AND THE FINAL, HEATED WORDS


20. (C) A substantive issue that might have become another
procedural problem was the Chairman's "factual summary." NPT
Parties agreed in 2000 that "the consideration of the issues
at each session of the PrepCom should be factually summarized
and its results transmitted in a report to the next session
for further discussion." PrepCom chairs since have performed
this function. Iran strongly fought last year,s summary
until the last moment, blocking its incorporation into the
formal PrepCom report but finally accepting its attachment as

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a "Chairman's Working Paper." Given the near-certainty that
this would happen again, PrepCom Chair Amb.Yelchenko
(Ukraine) announced at the last plenary session that he was
not in a position to annex his summary to the PrepCom report
and would therefore turn it into a working paper. (COMMENT:
This unilateral decision by the Chairman was also intended to
provide him an opportunity, pursuant to private discussions
with the U.S. Delegation, to make some much-needed
alterations to inaccurate or otherwise problematic language
in his summary, which had already been distributed to
delegations in draft form. END COMMENT)


21. (SBU) In an agreement beforehand with the Chairman, Ford
criticized Yelchenko,s draft for treating Iran too softly.
(The U.S. Delegation had done the same in 2007 with
then-Chairman Amano,s summary.) Ford noted that last year's
summary had also been generous to Iran, yet the proliferation
challenge of Iran had worsened. He added that the 2008
summary,s reference to Syria failed to reflect fully its
evasion of its nonproliferation obligations and the
involvement of North Korea, which was of obvious concern to
States Party. Ford also said that, although the U.S. is
accustomed to unfair and disproportionate criticism on
disarmament, the summary still overplayed claims made against
the U.S. and failed accurately to recount detailed
information presented about U.S. disarmament-related
progress. Finally, he stated in no uncertain terms that,
contrary to repeated allegations at the PrepCom, the U.S.
does not engage in any nuclear weapons-related cooperation
with Israel whatsoever.


22. (U) Iran,s Ambassador Soltanieh,s response to the
summary was characteristically shrill. He opined that the
section of the summary dealing with Iran,s noncompliance was
not logical and that President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister
Brown were nave to urge that Iran be prevented from
enriching uranium, since it was now a "master of enrichment
technology." Furthermore, Iran was pleased with what it
called an "achievement" of the PrepCom: "The shameful
silence of the U.S. on Article VI and Article I has now been
broken," in part because the United States had been "forced
to report" on cooperation with Israel. Iran, therefore would
"push to have verification of what the U.S. said." Iran
also complained that the summary was weak on both disarmament
and proliferation by the NWS through their cooperation with
non-NPT states.


23. (U) In its closing remarks, Syria emphasized its working
paper,s allegations of U.S. "violations" of the NPT,
asserting that they were facts, not rhetoric. It hoped that
the third PrepCom would produce "truthfulness and honesty"
from the United States. Egypt expressed appreciation for the
P-5 statement,s language on the 1995 Middle East Resolution
(as did Syria) and the hope that its words would turn into
deeds. Egypt had serious concern over the language in
Yelchenko,s summary on the Middle East, especially its
reflection of the position - held by the United States and
others, and indeed embodied in the 1995 Resolution itself -
linking implementation of the 1995 Resolution to progress
toward comprehensive peace in the region.

(U) PROCEDURAL ISSUES RESOLVED BEHIND THE SCENES


24. (SBU) The PrepCom was free of procedural obstructions,
which had delayed substantive work at both the 2005 RevCon
and the 2007 PrepCom. However, another disturbing reflection
of NAM attitudes and practices regarding the NPT was its
choice of Zimbabwe,s Permanent Representative to the UN
Boniface Guwa Chidyausiki to chair the 2009 PrepCom. Even if
Amb. Chidyausiki had the requisite skills to manage a major
multilateral conference - and there is every reason to think
that he does not - the symbolism of choosing a Zimbabwean
official at the very time that his government was
intensifying its violent suppression of civil and human
rights was discouraging.


25. (C) Seeking, per instructions, to see whether the
Zimbabwean nomination could be derailed without provoking a
fight with the NAM, which carefully protects its prerogatives
in NPT fora, the United States conducted demarches before and
during the PrepCom, both in capitals and with delegations in
Geneva, to encourage African governments to find a
replacement for Amb. Chidyausiki. With commendable support
from Canadian Ambassador Marius Grinius and his minister,
Colleen Swords, and despite outright refusals to cooperate
from other powers, including British Ambassador John Duncan,
the Delegation was able to persuade Chairman Yelchenko to
postpone formal PrepCom action on the nomination for more
than a week while these efforts were being carried out.


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26. (SBU) The Delegation learned that many African
governments did not like the choice of Chidyausiki, and some
did not even seem to know that it had been made. Several of
them were interested in withdrawal of the Zimbabwean
nomination, and some were eager to take advantage of the
situation if this happened, but they were unwilling to work
to bring it about. Nigeria said that it had an alternate
candidate in mind and wanted to chair the third Prepcom,
because it was concerned that Nigeria had not recently taken
any positions of leadership in UN fora and did not want to
appear to be "fading from the scene." However, a Nigerian
representative told us that Lagos would not put this
individual forward unless something changed regarding the
Chidyausiki nomination, because her government was not
willing to be seen by other African states as taking
advantage of the political situation in Zimbabwe. She
reiterated that if some other government objected to
Chidyausiki,s nomination, Nigeria remained ready to put
forward a candidate to chair the third PrepCom.


27. (C) Thus, for the U.S. delegation the only alternative
to acquiescence was overt opposition to consensus on the
nomination - which would have contravened the delegation,s
explicit instructions. Given these circumstances and the
fact that no other Party was prepared to challenge the
nomination, the United States did not object on the record
and the Zimbabwean was elected with no discussion.


28. (SBU) The other difficult procedural issue was the
choice of venue for the third PrepCom and the RevCon. Iran,
with the support of NAM chairman Cuba, had blocked consensus
at the 2007 PrepCom on the traditional choice of New York for
these meetings on the grounds that the United States made it
difficult for their delegates to obtain visas for the
meetings. Iran continued this opposition for part of the
2008 meeting, speaking out on the subject - again with Cuban
support - at NAM meetings and with the Chairman. No other
Parties, however, supported Iran,s position, and Tehran was
apparently unwilling to torpedo consensus on the PrepCom
report over this issue alone. The Iranians thus began an
effort to save face by persuading Chairman Yelchenko to say
something on the subject during the plenary. After a great
deal of behind-the-scenes discussion with the U.S. and
Iranian delegations, Yelchenko obtained Iranian agreement not
to block the choice of New York for the two meetings. When
the decision was taken in plenary, the Chairman merely stated
his understanding that access to New York would be given
"pursuant to longstanding diplomatic practice." (COMMENT:
This was phrasing suggested to him by the United States,
replacing earlier language that he had urged upon us that
would have promised unrestricted attendance, in effect, by
anyone whom Iran wished to send. END COMMENT.) Iran's
decision to back down in return for this "reassurance" that
nothing would be done differently from before reflected a
lack of support for Iran,s position among NAM governments
keen to keep NPT events in New York for staffing and resource
reasons, as well as the impact of statements by the U.N.
Secretariat that, for logistical reasons, neither Geneva nor
Vienna would be available as a PrepCom location in 2009.


29. (U) Finally, the U.S. Delegation advanced U.S.
objectives regarding financing and the selection of RevCon
and PrepCom leaders. Special Representative Ford raised in
the plenary U.S. proposals for cutting costs, revising the
scale of financial assessments for NPT meetings, and creating
a fairer system for choosing meeting leaders. These
proposals were reinforced by the U.S. working papers on these
topics. The Secretary of the Committee, Tom Markram of the
UN Secretariat, helpfully took the floor after the U.S.
statement on financing to reinforce the merits of its points
on cost-cutting.

(U) REFERENCES


30. (U) Those interested in further detail can go to the
UN,s NPT PrepCom webpage -
http://www.un.org/NPT2010/SecondSession/, which includes all
conference documents, opening statements, and the P-5
statement. Other U.S. statements and papers can be found at
the website of the U.S. Delegation to the CD -
http://geneva.usmission.gov/CD/NPTprepComPage .html (these
materials will also be placed on the State.Gov site). In
addition, summaries of each of the PrepCom,s 15 sessions are
available from ISN/MNSA (Scott Davis - davisms@state.gov).
RICE