Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE63666
2008-06-12 20:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE

Tags:  PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC KNNP TSPA 
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R 122015Z JUN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 063666 


UNVIE FOR S. AMADEO

E. SANDBERG

T. OSTOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC KNNP TSPA

SUBJECT: HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE
PROLIFERATION (HCOC) -- RESULTS OF THE SEVENTH REGULAR
MEETING OF SUBSCRIBING STATES, MAY 29-30, 2008 (SBU)

REF: A. STATE 54671

B. STATE 42285

C. UNVIE 243

Classified By: IO/T Acting Director Dennis Delehanty.
Reason: 1.4. H.


C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 063666


UNVIE FOR S. AMADEO

E. SANDBERG

T. OSTOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC KNNP TSPA

SUBJECT: HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE
PROLIFERATION (HCOC) -- RESULTS OF THE SEVENTH REGULAR
MEETING OF SUBSCRIBING STATES, MAY 29-30, 2008 (SBU)

REF: A. STATE 54671

B. STATE 42285

C. UNVIE 243

Classified By: IO/T Acting Director Dennis Delehanty.
Reason: 1.4. H.



1. (U) The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC) held its Seventh Regular Meeting of
Subscribing States on May 29-30, 2008, at the Vienna
International Center (VIC),in Vienna, Austria. 75 of 130
Subscribing States registered for the meeting. Many
Subscribing States were represented by their UN missions in
Vienna. Ambassador Gyorgyi Martin Zanathy, Permanent
Representative of Hungary to the United Nations, IAEA, CTBTO,
and UNIDO in Vienna, chaired the meeting.

////////////////////////////
Report of the Outgoing Chair
////////////////////////////


2. (C) Outgoing HCOC Chair Ivica Dronjic, Alternate
Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the
United Nations, IAEA, CTBTO, and UNIDO in Vienna, reiterated
the importance of the HCOC as the only global instrument in
the area of ballistic missile proliferation and underscored
the achievements of the HCOC in the past year - four new
countries joined the HCOC, the number of Annual Declarations
(ADs) increased, and the successful organization of an
outreach seminar for countries in the Middle East. He urged
all Subscribing States to diligently implement their
commitments under the HCOC, noting that its role and
importance in addressing ballistic missile proliferation will
be a direct reflection of their willingness to vigorously
implement the Code. Finally, he hoped that the two HCOC
countries that possess the most missile capabilities (e.g.
Russia and the United States) would resolve the Prelaunch
Notification (PLN) issue as soon as possible and begin (U.S.)
or resume (Russia) issuing HCOC PLNs.

/////////////////////////////
Remarks by the Incoming Chair

/////////////////////////////


3. (C) Newly-elected HCOC Chair Ambassador Martin Zanathy
pledged her commitment to upholding the principles of the
HCOC and working for its full implementation and
universalization. She said Hungary believes effective
multilateralism is the cornerstone of the fight against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their
delivery systems and looks forward to working with HCOC
Subscribing States on outreach and other activities to
realize their shared nonproliferation objectives.

/////////////////////////////////////////////
Report of the Executive Secretariat/Immediate
Central Contact (ES/ICC)
/////////////////////////////////////////////


4. (C) The Austrian Executive Secretariat/Immediate Central
Contact(ES/ICC) reported that four countries -- the Dominican
Republic, San Marino, Maldives, and Samoa -- had subscribed
to the HCOC since the 2007 annual meeting, bringing the
current membership to 130. The ES/ICC also reported that the
domain name of the HCOC public website had been changed to
www.hcoc.at. In addition, the ES/ICC noted that it had
continued to disseminate ADs and PLNs and had circulated a
revised annual declaration form for "Nil reports" to further
facilitate the submission of ADs. It also had updated the
HCOC distribution list.

/////////////////////////
Annual Declarations (ADs)
/////////////////////////


5. (C) The ES/ICC reported that 72 Subscribing States had
submitted ADs for 2007. This was 15 more than had been
submitted for 2006. This positive increase was due in large
part to the extensive "inreach" efforts of the ES/ICC and the
incoming and outgoing chairs. However, while the number of
ADs continues to increase, approximately 45% of HCOC
Subscribing States have yet to submit ADs. The ES/ICC
encouraged all HCOC states to use "inreach" to remind those
who had not submitted ADs of their HCOC commitments. The
ES/ICC also reminded Subscribing States that ADs for 2008
would be due on March 31, 2009.

//////////////////////////////
Prelaunch Notifications (PLNs)
//////////////////////////////


6. (C) The ES/ICC reported that since the HCOC's 2007
annual meeting, 50 PLNs had been submitted. Approximately
54% of all PLNs were submitted by Russia - 27. In addition
to Russia, Argentina, France, Japan, Norway, and Ukraine had
submitted PLNs. The ES/ICC called on all Subscribing States
to file PLNs when called for in a timely manner. The ES/ICC
also reported that it had received a notification from Russia
on December 29, 2007 that Russia would suspend submission of
PLNs for an initial period of one year, beginning on January
1, 2008.
Russia added that the reason for this decision was the
persistent noncompliance by other HCOC states with their
obligations on transparency (i.e., the U.S. not submitting
PLNs). Russia added that the decision to impose the
moratorium on PLNs was made by former Russian President
Vladimir Putin.

//////////////////////////
General/Opening Statements
//////////////////////////


7. (C) Australia, Benin, Chile, France, Japan, South Korea,
Libya, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Slovenia (on
behalf of the European Union, as well as Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova,
Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine),Switzerland, Ukraine,
and the U.S. made general statements.


8. (C) Australia said the continuing proliferation of
ballistic missiles capable of WMD delivery is of great
concern and noted that the complementary and reinforcing
nature of the HCOC and the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) is central to addressing the global missile threat.
In this context, Australia sees the true value of the HCOC in
its effectiveness as a confidence building measure where
transparency measures help build trust. But the
effectiveness of the HCOC can only be realized if all HCOC
members implement their HCOC obligations and submit ADs and
PLNs. Accordingly, Australia urged all HCOC states to take
their obligations seriously, noting that the issues the HCOC
was designed to address remain as relevant now as when the
HCOC was established.


9. (C) Benin proposed holding a conference in Benin prior
to the next HCOC annual meeting to promote HCOC
universalization and to raise awareness among developing
countries about the global and regional security challenges
posed by ballistic missile proliferation.


10. (C) Chile (on behalf of Argentina, Colombia, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) expressed concern about the
growing threat to peace and security from ballistic missiles
and affirmed its support for the HCOC as an important and
relevant arms control tool. Chile said the HCOC complements
other initiatives in the missile nonproliferation area and
welcomed the HCOC's four newest members. It also urged all
HCOC states to work to help fill the membership gaps in key
areas, including via greater outreach to Latin America and
the Caribbean. Finally, Chile encouraged all HCOC members to
fully comply with their HCOC obligations.


11. (C) France reiterated its strong support for the HCOC
but regretted that universalization of the Code has not yet
been achieved and called on all states to subscribe. France
also called on all HCOC states to notify, or resume
notification of, space and missile launches. Finally, France
announced its readiness to serve as HCOC Chair in 2010-2011.


12. (C) Japan noted that the proliferation of ballistic
missiles continues to be a serious threat to international
peace and security and expressed particular concern about
missile developments in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the
Middle East. In light of this, Japan has been pleased by the
steady expansion of the HCOC in terms of membership.
However, Japan regrets that not all HCOC countries are
submitting ADs and PLNs. Echoing Australia's comments, Japan
noted the value and significance of the HCOC in promoting
confidence and transparency, and urged all HCOC states to
give serious thought to the importance of meeting their HCOC
obligations. To promote universalization, Japan encouraged
greater outreach to countries in Asia. Japan also encouraged
HCOC Subscribing States to host voluntary site visits.


13. (C) South Korea agreed that the proliferation of
ballistic missile capabilities continues to pose a serious
challenge to the security and stability of the international
community, and said that addressing this urgent issue must be
at the top of the international agenda. The ROK believes the
HCOC can play a role in missile nonproliferation and
reaffirmed its support for the HCOC as the only international
norm against ballistic missile proliferation. The ROK also
urged all HCOC states to submit ADs and PLNs, and encouraged
additional "inreach" to HCOC countries to remind them to
implement the Code's transparency measures and encourage
their participation at HCOC meetings. In addition, the ROK
urged further outreach -- particularly to countries with
significant ballistic missile and space launch capabilities
-- noting that there is still a long way to go before the
HCOC is universalized. Finally, the ROK urged the HCOC to
table a resolution on the HCOC at the 63rd UNGA, explaining
that this would be additional way to promote the HCOC.


14. (C) Libya called on all states to support the HCOC and
urged that monies now being spent to develop missiles be
redirected to peaceful purposes and to meeting the needs of
developing countries. Libya also asked all Subscribing
States to fulfill their transparency and other obligations
under the Code and reported that it is taking steps to adopt
national legislation consistent with international agreements
and resolutions on missile issues. Libya also said that it
continues to seek MTCR membership.


15. (C) The Netherlands said the HCOC remains an essential
instrument in the fight against missile proliferation. To be
successful, it must have the active support of all HCOC
countries. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister of the
Netherlands has sent a written message to all Subscribing
States urging them to meet their HCOC obligations and to
participate in the HCOC annual meeting. The Netherlands also
supported increased outreach to promote universalization and
the tabling of a resolution on HCOC at the upcoming UNGA.


16. (C) Russia focused on improving the HCOC, saying that
it is of the utmost interest to Russia that the Code runs
effectively and at full capacity because Russia considers the
HCOC as the first step toward a global regime on missile
nonproliferation. In this context, Russia greatly
appreciated the message sent by the Dutch Foreign Minister
urging all countries to fulfill their HCOC obligations.
Russia also welcomed the addition of four more countries to
the HCOC membership roster but noted that these countries do
not make a qualitative difference. Instead, Russia believes,
the HCOC should work to bring in those countries like Brazil,
China, India, Israel, and Pakistan that have significant
missile programs. In 2004, Russia put forward three
proposals to amend the HCOC to make it more attractive to
these countries, but so far there has been no interest in
them. Russia would like a good discussion of these proposals
or other ideas to make the Code more effective and more
interesting. Until this is done - and until the HCOC is
working properly - Russia sees noneed to promote the HCOC
at the UN or to do more outreach. In Russia's view, the HCOC
needs to get its house in order and become an attractive
venue for countries with a real perspective on missile
issues. Only when Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan
are inside the door can the HCOC be an international venue
for developing confidence on missile issues and become a
launching pad for a multilateral dialogue aimed at
elaborating a legally binding agreement for a global missile
nonproliferation regime.


17. (C) Slovenia (on behalf of the EU and associated
states) stressed the importance of faithful implementation of
the Code by Subscribing States and regretted that the
submission of PLNs and ADs and attendance at HCOC annual
meetings remains weak. The EU feared that a persistent lack
of full implementation of the HCOC threatens its viability
and called on all HCOC countries to meet their obligations in
full. The EU also urged continued outreach to encourage more
counties in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America to
subscribe, as well as the tabling of a resolution on the HCOC
at the 63rd UNGA. Finally, noting that the proliferation of
ballistic missile delivery systems for WMD is of growing
concern and citing Iran and North Korea as particularly
worrisome in this regard, the EU stressed the importance of a
multilateral response to ballistic missile proliferation and
the role of the HCOC in fulfilling this need as it is the
sole multilateral confidence building and transparency
instrument in the field of missile proliferation.


18. (C) Switzerland agreed that the proliferation of
ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD poses a threat to
global and regional security and said no effort should be
spared to address this issue. Switzerland therefore hoped
that the UN Panel on Missiles scheduled to meet during the
first week of June 2008 would have a good outcome.
Switzerland similarly noted with interest Russia's proposal
for a global INF. It also agreed with the need for continued
outreach to states with significant missile capabilities and
strongly encouraged all HCOC countries to submit their ADs.
While the number of ADs submitted each year continues to
rise, it is still not enough. Switzerland also hoped that
the PLN issue could be resolved soon and that all countries
that launch SLVs and missiles would submit HCOC PLNs.


19. (C) Ukraine echoed the call for all states to fulfill
their HCOC commitments and urged further outreach to the
Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia in order to truly
universalize the Code. Ukraine also supported discussing
ways to strengthen and enhance the HCOC.


20. (C) In response to a decision taken at the November
2004 HCOC meeting, the U.S. included in its opening statement
discussion of the nature of the missile proliferation threat,
its significance for Subscribing States, and measures that
could be taken to address this threat. The U.S. noted that
the trend is toward missiles of increasing ranges, payload,
lethality, and sophistication, and stressed the particular
concerns raised by the missile programs in Iran and North
Korea. The U.S. urged all HCOC states to fully and
effectively implement UNSCRs 1718, 1737, 1747, and 1803, and
to cooperate in establishing a global network of interlocking
national export control systems consistent with the
requirements of UNSCR 1540. In addition, the U.S. noted the
value of taking steps to stem the flow of financial support
for activities of missile proliferation concern and
underscored the critical role export control organizations
and experts can play in assisting financial jurisdictions in
restricting proliferation activities. The U.S. also called on
all countries to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR Guidelines
and to support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

//////////////////////////////
Proposals to Improve the HCOC
/////////////////////////////


21. (SBU) The Chair asked countries to comment on the
issues raised during opening statements and/or on any of the
proposals that had been tabled for discussion.

German Proposal on PLNs, ADs, Definitions, and Consultations
///////////////////////////////////////////// /


22. (C) Germany clarified that its proposal was a
resubmission of a paper first circulated in 2003. The ROK
welcomed the German paper as a useful best practices guide
for PLNs and ADs. The ROK also agreed that for PLNs, the
MTCR definition of a Category I missile should be used as the
HCOC standard. The U.S. disagreed, noting that the HCOC had
long ago determined there was no need for formal definitions
in the HCOC - or definitions borrowed from other
organizations -- as long as each country explained its
approach. The U.S. also thought there was no need for a
formal consultative mechanism and said the HCOC needed to be
flexible in terms of formats for ADs and PLNs. However, the
U.S. did agree that Germany's paper could be a useful
reference tool. France also urged a flexible approach to ADs
and PLNs, noting that the current system seems to be working
well. Poland supported the German proposal, especially with
regard to formatting PLNs and ADs.

German Paper Providing Statistics on HCOC PLNs Compared with
Launches Registered Through Open Sources
///////////////////////////////////////////// //////////


23. (C) Germany noted that the paper was self-explanatory
and welcomed any questions or feedback. There was no
discussion of the paper.

Russian Proposal to Enhance the HCOC
////////////////////////////////////


24. (C) Russia explained that it had tabled the same three
proposals every year for the last four years and was doing so
again because it believed this was the way to attract "
important" countries to the Code. In Russia's view, the only
way to have a viable HCOC is to bring in all countries with
ballistic missile programs and space programs. In other
words, Russia said, the HCOC does not need to achieve full
universality. Instead, Russia believes what is needed is for
the HCOC to be a club that represents the opinions of all
countries with ballistic missile and space programs. In
Russia's view, once the HCOC is such a club, it can move
forward to create a system to affect positively missile
development worldwide.


25. (C) In light of this, and keeping in mind Russia's
assessment that the meetings that led to the formation of the
HCOC did not properly take into account the concerns of many
countries with missile and space programs, Russia has, since
2004, put forward three proposals to address these countries'
concerns. Russia would like to discuss these proposals - and
any other ideas for attracting key missile possessing
countries to the HCOC. In Russia's view, unless there is
change, the HCOC will never be inclusive, nor will it be of
interest to key countries. Moreover, and as Russia has said
many times before, the HCOC needs to discuss these matters
seriously. The HCOC also needs to fully implement all
transparency measures if it wants to avoid further
aggravating the situation.


26. (C) Germany agreed on the importance of bringing the
countries mentioned by Russia into the HCOC. However,
Germany said its outreach activities have shown that the
biggest obstacle to these countries joining the HCOC is not
that HCOC states are obliged to make ADs or PLNs but the fact
that most current HCOC countries do not implement the HCOC's
confidence building measures (CBMs).


27. (C) Noting the numerous implicit, if not explicit,
comments made by HCOC participants thus far about the lack of
PLNs from the United States, the U.S. underscored its ongoing
and active support of the HCOC and reminded participating
countries of its position on PLNs. In particular, and as it
made clear at the HCOC launching conference in 2002, the U.S.
intends to make PLNs under the provisions of an agreement
worked out with the Russian Federation which predates the
HCOC. This system is to be established and operated in
connection with the U.S.-Russia Joint Data Exchange Center
(JDEC). However, the necessary implementing arrangements for
the JDEC have not been finalized, and the U.S. has not yet
been able to provide HCOC PLNs in the manner announced in

2002. But although it is not yet established, neither is the
JDEC "on hold." The U.S. continues to discuss this matter
with Russia at senior levels - most recently at the May 19
Rood-Kislyak talks in Oslo - and both sides have agreed to
further technical talks on the JDEC in June 2008. The U.S.
is hopeful that these talks will be productive and help
advance the HCOC PLNs issue.


28. (C) Russia responded that it had never linked HCOC PLNs
to progress on the JDEC. In Russia's estimation, if a
country makes a political commitment, it should honor it
fully. Continuing, Russia said it is serious about its
commitments and did not take the decision to suspend its PLNs
lightly. This decision was made by the Russian President.
Moreover, Russia said, the GOR does not appreciate emotional
demarches urging it to restart PLNs. Instead, countries
should talk to Russia seriously about important issues like
how to bring the remaining missile possessors into the HCOC.


29. (C) Russia also did not agree with Germany's assessment
that countries like China are not joining the HCOC because
all countries inside the HCOC are not fulfilling their
commitments. Russia views this as a pretext or excuse for
countries to stay away from the HCOC. Russia believes the
problem is that the important missile possessor countries are
being ignored by the HCOC. What the HCOC needs to do, Russia
said, is adopt an approach like the UN Panel on Missiles in
New York, where the views of countries around the global are
taken into account. The point is to bring in serious
countries, not to universalize the Code for the sake of
universalization.


30. (C) The Netherlands noted that Russia seems to attach
great importance to a certain type of HCOC expansion -
expansion that Russia believes will strengthen the HCOC.
However, this seems to be inconsistent with Russia's proposal
to make ADs and PLNs voluntary. In the Dutch view, making
HCOC CBMs voluntary would weaken the Code. Moreover, the HCOC
should not want to admit countries that are not interested in
participating fully.


31. (C) Denmark pointed out that a great deal of effort has
been expended during the past year to animate Subscribing
States. This has begun to pay off: discussion at the annual
meeting has been more robust than in the previous two years,
and more ADs have been submitted. However, there is a
problem with PLNs. Denmark cannot understand why Russia and
the U.S. are not submitting them. While it is true that the
U.S. position has not changed since 2002, the fact that the
JDEC system is not yet up and running has changed the
environment and it is reasonable to expect that the U.S.
would reconsider its position. By the same token, Russia's
cessation of PLNs seems to be inconsistent with its repeated
statements of support for the HCOC. In short, Denmark noted,
transparency measures are the very heart of the Code, and all
HCOC countries need to implement them fully. Denmark also
disagreed with Russia's contention that no attention was paid
to the concerns of "certain countries" when the HCOC was
being created.


32. (C) Germany agreed and urged more "inreach" to other
Subscribing States to animate them further. Germany also
urged additional outreach activities to understand why
countries like China and India have not subscribed.

/////////
Outreach
////////


33. (C) The U.S. reported that since the 2007 HCOC annual
meeting, it had demarched more than 30 countries to urge them
to subscribe to the Code. Both Bahrain and Oman indicated
that they are actively considering subscription, and the U.S.
believes it would be helpful if other countries would
follow-up with them.


34. (C) France briefly outlined its proposed action plan for
universalizing the HCOC, and asked for reaction. The
proposal includes measures to increase awareness of the Code,
as well as targeted outreach activities.


35. (C) Germany, Greece, Poland, the Netherlands, South
Korea, the UK, and the U.S. all supported the proposal.
South Korea highlighted France's suggestion for designating
HCOC sponsors to help shepherd potential members through the
subscription process. The UK and the U.S. both strongly
endorsed the idea of creating a helpful and informative HCOC
website, with the U.S. suggesting that the HCOC think
seriously about adding Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to
the website. NOTE: As a result of this intervention and
related discussions during the Heads of Delegation luncheon,
the Chair asked the U.S. to take responsibility for drafting
a set of HCOC FAQs for review by all Subscribing States. The
U.S. agreed to do so. END NOTE.


36. (C) Russia said it would study the French proposal and
provide an official assessment at a later date. However,
Russia's preliminary reaction is that the French proposal is
aimed in a direction Russia does not want to go. Russia does
not support universalization for the sake of universality.
Russia wants the HCOC to be expanded to include key missile
possessors. To do this, the HCOC must first fix its internal
problems. Additionally, Russia thinks that the idea of an
HCOC country sponsoring a new member is problematic: Russia
cannot imagine any current HCOC country wanting to "put China
or Pakistan on its shoulders."


37. (C) Norway thought the French paper offered a good way
forward and welcomed further discussion. Norway also thought
that universalization could be pursued in parallel with
efforts to promote full implementation of HCOC CBMs.


38. (C) France appreciated the feedback. At the Chair's
request, it agreed to work with the Chair to revise the
paper and circulate a new draft via the ES/ICC.

Ukrainian Proposal on Definitions and Formats
/////////////////////////////////////////////


39. (C) Ukraine noted that it had previously circulated its
paper in 2005. The intent of the paper is to clarify which
missiles are covered under the HCOC by using the MTCR's terms
for ballistic missile, range, and payload. Ukraine
appreciated the comments made earlier by the U.S. on
definitional issues and planned to follow-up off-line.
Ukraine also welcomed comments from other Subscribing States
as well.


40. (C) The Netherlands noted that the MTCR is an export
control regime and that the HCOC is a transparency
arrangement. Given their different approaches, it is
probably not necessary or desirable to have identical
definitions. Denmark agreed that it would be better not to
intermingle the HCOC and the MTCR and to preserve flexibility
by keeping the HCOC language general. If and when there ever
is agreement on specific parameters, this could be put in a
separate internal document.


41. (C) The ROK also agreed that it probably was not wise
to conflate the HCOC and the MTCR. However, the ROK did like
the idea of borrowing the MTCR's 300km/500kg range/payload
parameters.


42. (C) France shared the Dutch view on the differing
objectives and purposes of the HCOC and the MTCR and said it
would need more time to study Ukraine's paper. France also
noted that there are some very concerning missile systems
that would not be captured by Ukraine's proposed definitions.


43. (C) With regard to Ukraine's suggestions concerning
formats for ADs and PLNs, the ES/ICC reminded Subscribing
States that the HCOC had decided in 2003 that there would be
no prescriptive formats for ADs and PLNs.


44. (C) Ukraine appreciated the various inputs and said it
would continue working this issue with interested countries
off-line.

/////////////
UN Resolution
/////////////


45. (C) The Chair asked HCOC participants for their views
on promoting the HCOC in the UN and tabling another HCOC
resolution at the UNGA as a means of increasing awareness of
the HCOC and ballistic missile proliferation more generally.
Slovenia then introduced a proposed draft UNGA resolution on
the HCOC endorsed by the EU countries participating in the
HCOC.


46. (C) Norway supported the proposal, as did Japan and
South Korea. However, Russia objected to advertising the
HCOC in the UN. Russia said that when the HCOC has its house
in order, Russia will support promoting it but not until
then. As Russia has said previously, the HCOC is close to a
crisis, and Russia thinks the priority needs to be on fixing
the HCOC, not on promoting it. Once all countries are making
PLNs and ADs and important missile possessors have joined the
HCOC, Russia will be prepared to promote it. Beyond this,
Russia is concerned that tabling a resolution on the HCOC in
the UN will have a divisive effect as it did in 2005. Some
countries view the HCOC resolution as a counter weight to an
Iranian resolution on missiles. This is not a good thing,
and creates an antagonistic situation, whereas the HCOC
should be about hearing the voices of all countries that have
something to say about ballistic missile proliferation.


47. (C) South Africa said it also had concerns about
putting forward an UNGA resolution on the HCOC. It also
shared Russia's view that the 2005 resolution was divisive.


48. (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Chair concluded
that further consultations on this matter would be needed.


////////////
Next Meeting
////////////


49. (U) It was agreed that the next regular meeting of
Subscribing States would be held in Vienna on May 28-29,

2009.

//////////
Next Chair
//////////


50. (C) The HCOC elected Costa Rica to serve as Chair in
2009-2010 and welcomed France's offer to Chair the HCOC,
beginning with the 2010 annual meeting. France will be
formally elected to serve as HCOC Chair for 2010-2011 at the
HCOC's 8th annual meeting in 2009.

///////////////////////////
HCOC Communications Systems
///////////////////////////


51. (C) France asked whether the ES/ICC had given any
thought to establishing an internet-based information system
to exchange HCOC documents, and offered to assist with such a
project. The ES/ICC was willing to look into the matter but
noted that costs would be involved in such an effort. It was
agreed to discuss this matter further at a later date.

//////////////////
Chairman's Summary
//////////////////


52. (C) The Chair circulated a draft Chairman's Summary
report for consideration by participating countries.
Following several hours of discussion, a revised text was
adopted by consensus. The ES/ICC was mandated to distribute
the agreed final text to all HCOC Subscribing States.

////////////////
DECISIONS TAKEN
///////////////


53. (C) The following decisions were taken by the
Subscribing States present at the Seventh Annual Meeting of
Subscribing States to the HCOC, held May 29-30, 2008, in
Vienna:

(C/RELEASABLE HCOC SUBSCRIBING STATES)

-- Ambassador Gyorgyi Martin Zanathy, Permanent
Representative of Hungary to the United Nations , IAEA,
CTBTO, and UNIDO in Vienna, was elected Chair of the Seventh
Annual Meeting of the HCOC.

--HCOC Subscribing States confirmed that Annual Declarations
on Subscribing States' national space and ballistic missile
policies are to be submitted to the Austrian HCOC Executive
Secretary/Immediate Central Contact (ES/ICC) by March 31.

--The HCOC adopted a Chairman's Summary of the 2008 HCOC
annual meeting. It has been circulated to all Subscribing
States by the Austrian ES/ICC.

--The HCOC will hold its Eighth Annual Meeting on May 28-29,
2009, in Vienna.

--Costa Rica will chair the 2009 annual meeting of the HCOC
and serve as Chair for 2009-2010.

///////////////
U.S. DELEGATION
///////////////


54. (U) The U.S. delegation to the Seventh Annual Meeting
of HCOC Subscribing States included ISN/MTR Director Pam
Durham (head of delegation),ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann,
UNVIE Tom Ostrowski, UNVIE Eric Sandberg, and UNVIE Stefanie
Amadeo.
RICE


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End Cable Text