APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JUNE 16-17

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 STATE 062450

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: ASS: 06/09/18
TAGS: EUN PHUM PREL PGOV ZL ZK IR IZ IS SY LE
CU, SU, CD, CT, SIPDIS
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JUNE 16-17
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)


1. (U) Classified by Jeffrey Giauque, Senior Political
Officer, EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 24.


3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their
next General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on June 16-17. We expect the
agenda to include: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, Western Balkans, Central Asia,
Cuba, Sudan/Darfur, and Chad/Central African Republic. We
also wish to ensure that the EU retains a strong stance on
Belarus and Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. A background section covering some of these
issues is provided prior to a section containing talking
points. Points are to be delivered as soon as possible at
the appropriate level to EU members only. Other posts
should not/not deliver these points. Posts are requested
to include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables.

BACKGROUND
--------------

IRAN


4. (C) For several months now, we have urged the EU to
take three new actions on Iran in order to pressure it to
suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and
come to the negotiating table: 1) Adopt UNSCR 1803 into
EU policy, 2) designate 20 additional entities (including
Bank Melli) and 15 additional individuals associated with
Iran's nuclear and missile programs under existing EU
policy, and 3) adopt a series of truly new autonomous
measures that go beyond existing EU policy. If the EU is
able to take all three of these steps, it will send a
strong signal to Iran and encourage others to do likewise.
The additional designations have been moving forward since
Italy and Cyprus lifted their holds on them in late April.
We expected the full additional designation list to be
formally adopted without discussion at an EU Council
meeting (Agriculture and Fisheries ministers) on May 19,
but the EU again delayed action.


5. (C) Unfortunately, the situation with the adoption of
UNSCR 1803 into EU policy and the adoption of new
autonomous measures to go beyond existing EU policy is
even more problematic. Adoption of 1803 into EU policy
has been delayed by internal EU discussion on whether to
carry out a minimalist, literal implementation of the
resolution or to go beyond mere transposition of 1803 and
include new EU measures in the updated policy and
regulations. A meeting of EU Political and Security
Committee ambassadors in late April failed to reach
consensus on these issues and the Slovenian EU Presidency
has not set a time line for future deliberation on 1803
implementation and new measures. Behind the scenes, the
UK and France want to ensure that they have the support of
a critical mass of countries for a concrete (and
expansive) 1803 package before holding another discussion
with all 27 member states. In particular, they wish to
avoid any open-ended, undisciplined debate on the matter.
EU Iran watchers in Brussels tell USEU that it is unlikely
the Slovenians have enough time or the desire to pursue
this task before the end of their Presidency on 30 June.
Thus, even though we have urged the EU to act on all three
measures described above at the June 16-17 GAERC, some may
want to wait for the start of the French Presidency on
July 1. We should not accept this delay, however, and
should press EU members to take quick action, lest they
send Tehran the signal that Europe does not want to keep
pressure on Iran.


6. (C) The decision not to approve the pending EU
designations was made by High Representative Solana
himself. Solana placed all EU action on Iran on hold
until he visits Tehran to deliver the refreshed P5+1
incentives package. The Iranians stalled on this visit
for several weeks by refusing to give Solana a date for
the trip. They have finally now agreed that he can visit
Tehran June 13-15. Regardless of what happens with this
visit, we need the EU to take decisive action in all three
of the areas described above.

IRAQ


7. (C) The EU has made clear it is committed to a
partnership with Iraq and is actively exploring options
for enhanced engagement. From 2003-2007 the European
Commission provided more than $1.1 billion in assistance
to Iraq, given largely to the International Reconstruction
Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) - the main multilateral
mechanism for assisting Iraq. In the future, however, the
EC wants to deliver its assistance bilaterally so that the
EU's contributions can be more clearly identified and
recognized. On March 13, the European Parliament adopted
a report recommending an enhanced EU role in Iraq,
including proposals to increase the EC diplomatic and
assistance presence (key to this will be finding new
premises in Baghdad, as those currently located at the
British Embassy are too small); step-up support for UN
activities; assist refugees; and support democracy,
national reconciliation and government institutions with
technical assistance and capacity building. France
assumes the European Union presidency on July 1 and is
expected to encourage greater EU engagement. French FM
Kouchner visited Iraq May 31-June 1, promising additional
support for refugees and confirming France's desire to
assist Iraq.


8. (C) Prime Minister Maliki's visit to Brussels on April
16 and 17 was a welcome step in building the EU-Iraq
relationship. Maliki met with High Representative Javier
Solana and thanked the EU for its Integrated Rule of Law
Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX). The EU committed to extend
and expand this program, which to date has trained more
than 1,450 Iraqi judges and other rule of law
professionals in 18 EU member states. Solana expressed
interest in visiting Baghdad as a follow-up to Maliki's
visit to Brussels; this would further cement the EU-Iraq
relationship and internationalize support for Iraq as it
strives to achieve security and prosperity.


9. (SBU) Negotiations for a new EU-Iraq Trade and
Cooperation Agreement will resume this month. Four rounds
of talks have focused on such topics as human rights,
trade in goods and services, and customs and taxation.
The EU and Iraq are also negotiating an agreement for Iraq
to supply gas to EU countries.


10. (U) EU High Representative Solana, Slovenian FM Rupel,
and European Commission Deputy Director General for
External Relations Hugues Mingarelli represented the EU at
the May 29 International Compact with Iraq Annual Review
Conference in Stockholm. There was near universal
acknowledgement at the meeting that Iraq had made real
progress over the past year. However, continued success
depends on Iraq marshalling its own substantial financial,
human and physical resources with appropriate assistance.
The Commission and the individual European states were of
one voice in expressing their support for Iraq and
intentions for increasing engagement. The European Union
has budgeted Euros 90 million (about USD 135 million at
current exchange rates) for technical and humanitarian
assistance in 2008, on top of the Euros 829 million (some
USD 1.1 billion at then prevailing rates) disbursed from
2003 through 2007. Mingarelli added a strong exhortation
to Iraq to strengthen its structures for implementing ICI
measures. France pledged to uphold this engagement when
it takes over the EU Presidency in June. The UK, Denmark,
Spain and Germany said their bilateral assistance programs
would continue. Greece pledged to "soon" overcome hurdles
and honor its commitment made at the ICI's launch a year
ago to reduce Iraq's debt.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE


11. (SBU) The United States is working toward the vision
of a two-state solution with Israel and a democratic
Palestine living side by side in peace and security. The
Annapolis Conference in November 2007 re-launched Israeli-
Palestinian bilateral negotiations with the shared goal of
a peace agreement before the end of 2008. The parties
further undertook to fulfill their commitments under the
2003 Roadmap, and agreed that implementation of any peace
agreement must be subject to implementation of the
Roadmap. The U.S. agreed at Annapolis to monitor and
judge the parties' progress under the Roadmap. Since
Annapolis, we have been working to achieve progress on
four tracks: bilateral negotiations, implementation of
the Roadmap and improving conditions on the ground,
building Palestinian institutional capacity and supporting
economic development, and sustaining and expanding
regional support for the process.


12. (SBU) Bilateral negotiations began in earnest shortly
after Annapolis with the creation of a negotiating
structure and a vigorous schedule of bilateral talks on
the full spectrum of issues. The parties have kept the
substance of these talks private, which reflects the
seriousness of their effort. As part of this effort,
Secretary Rice has enlisted the services of General (ret.)
Jim Jones, former Commandant of the Marine Corps and NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, who is looking at the regional
security aspects of a permanent status agreement. The
Secretary and Assistant Secretary Welch are also deeply
and personally engaged in supporting the parties' efforts
in this area. We must recognize, however, that a peace
agreement cannot be imposed from outside, and it is the
parties themselves who must work through the difficult
compromises necessary for peace. The United States will
support them in this task, will work to ensure the talks
stay on track, and, when appropriate, we will offer ideas
to help facilitate progress.


13. (SBU) We are working to promote progress by the
parties in fulfilling their obligations under the Roadmap.
For the Palestinians, this means combating and dismantling
the infrastructure of terrorism, undertaking institutional
reforms, and ending incitement. For Israel, it means
halting settlement expansion, removing unauthorized
outposts, easing movement and access to improve
Palestinian economic and humanitarian conditions,
facilitating security coordination, and re-opening
Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem consistent with
previous agreements. The President and Secretary Rice
have asked LTG William Fraser III to monitor developments
in this area and to work with the parties to promote
progress on Roadmap implementation. Given the secret
nature of the bilateral negotiations, progress on the
ground is crucial to reflect the seriousness of the
process as well as progress that is being achieved in the
negotiations.


14. (SBU) We are also working to support Palestinian
economic development and institutional capacity building.
France hosted a donors' conference in December which
generated pledges of $7.7 billion dollars in budgetary and
programmatic support for the PA. The Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee met on May 2 to maintain close donor
coordination. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his
role as Quartet Representative, has taken a leadership
role on this issue, identifying priority projects and
working with the parties and international donors to
facilitate implementation on the ground. The United
States is doing its part. In Paris, we pledged $555
million in support for the PA, including $150 million in
budgetary support, which was delivered to the Fayyad
government in mid-March. Additionally, LTG Keith Dayton,
the U.S. Security Coordinator, is working to reform and
professionalize the Palestinian security forces through a
program to train, equip, and garrison members of the
Presidential Guard and National Security Forces. There is
a particularly urgent need for budgetary support for the
Palestinians, and we are strongly encouraging Arab
governments to do their part.


15. (SBU) Finally, we are working to sustain and expand
regional support for the parties' efforts. Arab political
and financial support will be crucial in order for both
Israel and the Palestinians to make the painful
compromises necessary for peace. The Arab Peace
Initiative was an important step. Now, as President Bush
said in July 2007, "Arab nations should build on this
initiative - by ending the fiction that Israel does not
exist, stopping the incitement of hatred in their official
media, and sending cabinet-level visitors to Israel."


16. (SBU) We will continue to work to promote progress on
each of these four tracks, each of them vital to the goal
of a peace agreement by the end of the year. Secretary
Rice is traveling regularly to the region to advance the
process. President Bush's Middle East trip in May
reflects his personal engagement and commitment to this
issue. There are substantial obstacles that must be
overcome to reach the goal of a permanent status
agreement. Nevertheless, we remain hopeful that an
agreement can be reached before the end of 2008.

LEBANON


17. (SBU) The USG is working to promote a peaceful,
democratic, sovereign, and economically vibrant Lebanon.
The political impasse that began in Lebanon after the
opposition's November 2006 cabinet walkout over Lebanese
government support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
descended into violence in May 2008 after the Siniora
government attempted to rein in Hizballah's state-within-
a-state. Hizballah militiamen took control of west Beirut
and closed Beirut's airport, sparking country-wide
clashes. Arab League-mediated negotiations in Doha, Qatar
resulted in the election of General Michel Sleiman as
President on May 25, agreement to form a national unity
government, principles for a new electoral law, and a
commitment to continue dialogue on "the government's
relations with other groups," i.e. Hizballah's armed
status. Cabinet formation is underway.


18. (C) Most EU members appreciate our concerns about
Syrian interference in Lebanese politics, support for
terrorist organizations in Lebanon and the Palestinian
territories, facilitation of flows of foreign fighters
into Iraq, efforts to undermine the peace process, and
possession of weapons of mass destruction and an
unreported nuclear program. However, robust European
economic ties with Syria leave little appetite for full
isolation, especially now that Lebanon's latest political
crisis is over. For its part, Syria has successfully
courted European engagement by pointing to its role in
facilitating election of a Lebanese president and its
indirect negotiations with Israel as evidence of its
willingness to shift course. Syria is exploiting European
engagement to legitimize its destabilizing foreign
policies and repressive domestic rule.

CUBA


19. (C) The EU is considering dropping its 2003
Restrictive Measures, political sanctions established
after the arrest of 75 dissidents in Cuba and "suspended"
in 2005 in anticipation of greater reform in Cuba, but not
eliminated altogether. The Measures halted high-level
meetings between the GOC and the EU, as well as EU
representative and member state (MS) visits to Havana, and
implemented a policy of inviting dissidents to EU MS
national day celebrations in Havana. Even after the
Measures were suspended, most EU members continued to
restrict high-level meetings with the GOC in Havana.
Without major GOC actions or EU demands for Cuban action,
dropping the Measures could legitimize Raul Castro's
regime. The EU is also committed to following the "dual-
track approach" on Cuba - equal engagement with the GOC
and dissidents.


20. (C) The Spanish, who began a political and human
rights dialogue with the GOC in April 2007, are pressing
other members to drop the Measures in order to begin an EU
political/human rights dialogue with the GOC. The EU made
it clear last year - and previously to the GOC - that it
was already willing to engage in such a dialogue.
However, the Cubans will not discuss human rights with the
EU unless the Restrictive Measures are dropped, and the
Spanish (and others) are helping them in their goal.


21. (C) EU interlocutors often stress the small changes
the GOC has recently implemented: signing the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); releasing four
political prisoners to Spain; allowing the sales of cell
phones and computers; and increased cooperativeness in the
UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and other multilateral
spheres. Many EU members agree that the changes the GOC
has made are small. However, EU governments are also
interested in whether these changes predict substantive
reforms in the near future and whether the EU can best
influence that process by talking to the GOC. Therefore,
many in the EU are being swayed by the Spanish argument
that the EU needs to engage the Cuban government. The
French, the Italians, and the German MFA are squarely on
the side of the Spanish, along with the Portuguese, the
Slovaks, and the Austrians. The strongest holdouts are
the British, the Czechs, and the Hungarians.


22. (C) The Spanish have allegedly offered a tit-for-tat:
the rest of the Member States agree to drop the 2003
Restrictive Measures at the June 16 GAERC, and the Spanish
allow a mention of Cuba in the U.S.-EU Summit Declaration.
While that would be a poor exchange for us, it's likely
the Measures will go regardless - the only question is how
strong the resulting EU-Cuba dialogue will be. The
Czechs, the UK, the Hungarians, the Swedes, and the Danes
are currently fighting for a robust compromise that would
set benchmarks for the Cubans if the EU opened a dialogue,
such as the release of political prisoners, the Cuban
public's access to information, freedom for the EU to
pursue unimpeded engagement with the opposition, and
Cuba's ratification of the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights. The UK has also proposed that the
dialogue's renewal each year be dependent on whether a
consensus of the EU agreed that the GOC meets the
benchmarks. A coalition of EU members, convened by the
Slovenes, has composed a much weaker draft. But, if the
final statement does not sufficiently address the concerns
of the Czechs, UK, and others, they may block consensus on
dropping the Measures altogether.


23. (C) Either EU retention of the Measures or
establishment of concrete benchmarks and consequences
designed to provoke real GOC action should fit our policy.
Regardless, the EU shouldwill retain its strong 1996
Common Position. We should argue that the timing of
dropping the Restrictive Measures now would send a strong
signal legitimizing Raul Castro's cosmetic steps as
sufficient unless the EU establishes new benchmarks on
human rights. It is likely the EU will ultimately drop
the Measures; therefore, we should urge them to use this
step as leverage with the Cubans to push for significant
movement in democratization and movement on human rights,
such as unconditional release of all political prisoners,
unimpeded engagement with the democratic opposition, and
ratification and implementation of the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Likewise, we
should also press the EU Member States to accept a
statement in the Summit Declaration on Cuba that strongly
supports democratic transition, full respect of human
rights, and the unconditional release of all political
prisoners.


24. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
possible (in advance of the June 16-17 GAERC).

BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT

IRAN

--We need the EU to implement its pending designations of
individuals and entities associated with Iran's nuclear
program, adopt UNSCR 1803 as EU policy, and take
additional autonomous measures no later than the June 16-
17 EU foreign ministers meeting (GAERC).

-- We regret that the EU has still been unable to reach
consensus on implementation of UNSCR 1803 and a strong
package of new EU measures to accompany the implementation
of the resolution. This delay weakens the impact of UNSCR
1803 and the new EU designations, and dilutes the message
of EU resolve and of the obligatory nature of UN Security
Council Resolutions.

--Iran continues to defy its UNSC obligations. As the
IAEA's 26 May 2008 report indicates, Iran has not provided
the transparency and access necessary to answer unresolved
questions about its nuclear program, including
weaponization-related work. Iran has also expanded its
enrichment-related activities by the installation of
additional cascades at its Fuel Enrichment Plant and of
new generation centrifuges for test purposes at the Pilot
Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.

--A strong set of EU sanctions would not only send a clear
signal of EU resolve, but also remove the excuse of other
countries for not acting against Iran. Middle Eastern
states and others are looking to the EU for leadership on
Iran, and are likely to follow its lead. It is simply not
acceptable for the UNSC to pass binding resolutions and to
allow over three months to pass with no action to
implement them.

--Time is of the essence. Sanctions may take time to
work, and meanwhile Iran is mastering enrichment of
uranium. We still assess that Iran could have enough HEU
for a weapon by 2010-2015.

IRAQ

-- An expanded European presence (including more
Embassies/diplomatic offices from Member States and a
larger EC office) would be welcomed by the U.S. and the
Iraqis. Has there been any progress on plans to increase
the size of the EC representation? It would also be
helpful if the EU encouraged Iraq's neighbors to play a
more constructive role (including by asking them to send
Ambassadors/open Embassies),speaking out against Iran's
lethal aid to select Shia militant groups, and by
continuing to contribute generously to humanitarian
programs assisting displaced Iraqis.
-- We welcome the April 14 decision to extend and expand
the rule of law mandate of the EUJUST LEX mission and
encourage the EU to engage in other assistance programs.
-- A visit to Iraq by High Representative Solana would be
an effective follow-up to PM Maliki's visit to Brussels.
We encourage an early visit, as well other exchanges of
senior-level visitors. Are there any dates in mind for
the Solana visit?

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE

-- The U.S. remains firmly committed to a two-state
solution and is working to support Israeli and Palestinian
efforts to achieve a peace agreement before the end of

2008. President Bush and Secretary Rice are personally
engaged and view this as a U.S. national interest.

-- It will be vital for the international community to
continue to support not only the negotiating process, but
also Palestinian institutional capacity building and
economic development. Budgetary support is especially
crucial as the Palestinian Authority faces a projected
budget shortfall of approximately $400-600 million in

2008.

-- We appreciate critical EU assistance to date, and urge
that EU and Member States continue to do all they can to
support Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas and
Prime Minister Fayyad and help meet the needs of the
Palestinian people and support the negotiations.

-- We welcome the EU's commitment to the Palestinian
Authority's security reform efforts and the EU's decision
in May to expand the existing EUPOL COPPS mission to
support the PA in the judicial and penitentiary fields in
cooperation with international partners. We urge EU
Member States to support the Berlin Conference in Support
of Palestinian Civil Police and Rule of Law on June 24 and
fully fund all of the criminal justice initiatives that
will be proposed there.

-- The situation in Gaza is complicated and poses a
serious challenge, as the security, economic, and
humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. There is
no easy solution to this problem, but a new approach is
needed and we are talking with Israel, Egypt and the
Palestinian Authority leadership about developing an
approach that would provide security for Israel, Egypt and
the PA, support the legitimate Palestinian Authority,
ensure humanitarian needs are being met in Gaza, work
towards the resumption of normal economic life for the
people of Gaza, and restore conditions that would permit
the implementation of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and
Access.

-- The United States will not abandon the people of Gaza.
We continue to provide humanitarian assistance through the
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA) and other international organizations.

--As the Secretary noted in her remarks with President
Abbas in May, the U.S. is committed to providing

-- Continued Israeli settlement construction is not
helpful. It is inconsistent with the Roadmap and does not
contribute to creating an environment supportive of
negotiations. The Roadmap calls for a freeze on
settlement activity, and we expect Israel to fulfill its
commitments under the Roadmap and to avoid any actions
that could prejudice issues that must be resolved through
negotiations. With respect to outposts, Israel has
committed to removing them, and as President Bush has
said, they need to go.

LEBANON

--We ask the EU to join us in pressing for full
implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 1559,
1680, and 1701, including disarmament of militias in
Lebanon and normalization of Syrian-Lebanese relations via
border demarcation and an exchange of embassies.

--We seek additional EU support to the UN-backed Special
Tribunal, which will provide justice to the numerous
victims of political violence in Lebanon.

--We seek material and financial support for the new
Lebanese government of President Sleiman and PM Siniora,
especially credit, development, and security assistance.

--We continue to ask the EU to designate Hizballah as a
terrorist organization, and note that Hizballah's use of
its weapons against its fellow Lebanese belied its
"resistance" credentials and revealed its true terrorist
identity.

--We note continued Syrian and Iranian interference in
Lebanon, including illegal arms shipments, financial
support for Hizballah and other armed groups, Syrian
refusal to normalize relations, and collusion with local
allies to undermine Lebanon's sovereignty and democracy.

--Engagement with Syria should be conditioned on
normalization of Lebanese-Syrian relations via border
demarcation and exchange of embassies, an end to Syrian
support for terrorist groups, and the prevention of
foreign fighters transiting Syria to Iraq.

SUDAN/DARFUR

--The United States and the EU must continue to push for
robust implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA),particularly resolution of the Abyei boundary
dispute. The recent military confrontation between
northern and southern troops in Abyei, resulting in
extremely dire humanitarian circumstances and the
displacement of nearly 100,000 civilians, underscores the
importance of permanently resolving key areas of impasse
under the CPA.

--Continued U.S. and EU efforts to train and equip troop
contributing countries for their participation in the
UN/African Union hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) are
crucial to helping secure overall peace and security in
Sudan.

--The Darfur peace process needs robust reinvigoration.
The U.S. and EU must jointly continue support for the
UN/AU led process, while increasing pressure on rebel
groups to lay down their owns and join the negotiations.

CUBA

--We urge the EU to condition any weakening of Restrictive
Measures on real progress on human rights from the
Government of Cuba, such as: unconditional release of all
political prisoners; free access to information by the
Cuban public; the ratification and implementation of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights; and
freedom for the EU to pursue "Track 2" engagement with
Cuban civil society and the democratic opposition without
retaliation or impediment from the Castro regime.

--Unless these conditions are met, we urge the EU not to
eliminate the Restrictive Measures, as the timing of
beginning an unconditional dialogue now could legitimize
Raul Castro's government and signal that the cosmetic
steps the regime has taken are sufficient.

--We support the EU's "two-track policy," and we
encourage EU countries to press for real, substantive
progress on democracy and human rights under track one.

--However, under track two, the Cuban government often
refuses to meet with any foreign officials that also meet
with civil society representatives. This has led some in
the EU to shy away from meeting figures in the Cuban
opposition and broader civil society. This is precisely
what the Cuban regime wants: to isolate democratic forces
from contacts with the outside world. Cuban civil society
needs unequivocal support from the entire international
community to retain any space under Cuba's oppressive
regime.

--This could be a crossroads in Cuba's political
development, and we believe the U.S.-EU Summit must speak
to this issue squarely. We want to emphasize points where
our policy converges in the U.S.-EU Summit Declaration:
democratic transition, human rights, political prisoners,
and reconciliation.

WESTERN BALKANS

-- We applaud EU plans to sign the Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)
at the June GAERC meeting. Rapid implementation of the
Interim Agreement will be essential to maintaining
positive political momentum and reaffirming the EU's
strong commitment to BiH's European future.

-- Kosovo's constitution will come into force on June 15,
and the Government of Kosovo will assume responsibility
for administering its own territory, government, and
economy. As UNMIK downsizes to retain only a few residual
functions, the EU and U.S. should maintain the same
message: that Kosovo is now the sovereign authority, and
that the International Civilian Office (ICO) will
supervise Kosovo's implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan.

-- We urge the EU to continue working with the UN to reach
an agreement on the transition from UNMIK Police and
Justice to EULEX as the lead entity assisting the
Government of Kosovo with rule of law issues.

-- We encourage the EU to develop a plan to deploy EULEX
throughout Kosovo, paying special heed to avoid division of
labor with the UN along ethnic or territorial lines and
preserving a clear chain of command on police and justice
issues. The EU should take the lead in discussing this plan
with the UN and should have a contingency plan for moving
ahead in the event the UN does not cooperate on the transfer
of assets and logistical support for EULEX deployment.

-- We greatly appreciate the European Commission's
leadership in hosting the Kosovo Donors Conference in
Brussels on July 11, and we urge political-level
representation to affirm strong transatlantic support for
Kosovo's rapid economic development and regional
integration.

-- (For Lisbon and Valletta only:) We strongly encourage
your government to join us, the nearly three-fourths of EU
member states and the many other European nations which
have recognized Kosovo's independence. Your recognition
would send a positive sign of solidarity with the people
of Kosovo who seek stability and normalcy after years of
conflict and would greatly assist Kosovo's rapid
transition into the international family of nations.

CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

Chad

--Both the U.S. and EU need to support the regional
contact group created out of the Dakar Accord and the
African Union's efforts to urge both Chad and Sudan to
repair diplomatic relations immediately and commit to
bringing peace to the region.

--The U.S. and EU should also support the establishment of
a security force with a mandate to secure the border, also
laid out in the framework of the accord.

--The crisis in Darfur has extended beyond the borders of
Sudan, resulting in an estimated 250,000 Sudanese refugees
living in Chad. Renewed tensions between Sudan and Chad
threaten humanitarian operations and the success of EUFOR
and MINURCAT operations.

Central African Republic (CAR)

--The U.S. and EU should show strong support for the peace
agreement that the CAR government and the rebels recently
signed. This major step forward should be recognized and
used as a model for peace in the region.

--The U.S. and EU should ensure that the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) does not take up settlement in the CAR and
continue to threaten the safety of the people of the CAR.

--There is also a need to show support for international
peacekeeping operations (PKO) efforts in the CAR and
encourage greater involvement by the international
community.

CENTRAL ASIA

-- As the EU moves ahead on implementing its Central Asia
strategy, we welcome its increased engagement in the
region. We look forward to working with the EU to advance
our common goals in Central Asia. We would like to
consult with the EU and the individual Member States to
coordinate priorities and programs where possible to
maximize their complementarity.

-- The U.S. and EU share the same broad goals in the
region: increasing security, especially improved border
management; promoting diversification of energy supplies
and transport routes; supporting good governance and the
rule of law; advancing human rights and democratic
freedoms; encouraging sustainable economic development;
combating trafficking; and promoting natural resource
management. These are all areas in which we can share our
expertise with the Central Asian nations, and with each
other, to promote our common goals for the region.


-- We look forward to the visit by EU Special
Representative for Central Asia Morel to Washington in
July to continue these discussions.

-- (For Paris only:) We welcome France's leadership and
engagement on Central Asia during its upcoming EU
Presidency.

Belarus

-- The Lukashenkoa regime has failed to carry out our
common demand to release all political prisoners
unconditionally and to implement electoral reform, and has
now sought to extricate itself from our sanctions by
expelling U.S. embassy personnel.

-- We appreciate the strong position of the EU, and hope
that all EU member states will avoid being drawn into
Belarusian regime's efforts to divide us. If they judge
that attacks on our embassy bring concessions from other
states, they will apply similar pressure to other
embassies to try to intimidate them into shifting policy.

GEORGIA

-- We welcome Solana's trip to Georgia last week and his
meetings with Georgian officials and the Abkhaz in support
of re-energizing the peace process.

-- To support Georgian-Abkhaz talks, we must continue to
press Russia to encourage Abkhazia's direct engagement
with Georgian authorities on Tbilisi's peace proposals at
the earliest opportunity.

-- We must also continue to urge Russia to decrease
tensions in Georgia by repealing the Presidential
Instructions authorizing increased government contacts
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and by withdrawing its
additional troops deployed to Abkhazia since April.

-- We also need to call on Georgia to continue showing
restraint in response to provocations and to further
develop and implement its peace plan.


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RICE