(S) SHIPMENT OF MATERIAL TO SYRIAN WEAPONS ENTITY

S E C R E T STATE 058193


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2033
TAGS: IT MNUC PARM PREL SP SY

SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF MATERIAL TO SYRIAN WEAPONS ENTITY

Classified By: ISN Acting DAS Ken Staley,
Reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d)

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ACTION REQUEST
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1. (S//NF) Posts are requested to approach appropriate-level
host nation officials regarding a shipment of steel destined
for an end user in Syria that has acted as an intermediary
for Syria's weapons programs in the past. Posts may draw
from objectives, background, and talking points/non-paper
below, as appropriate.

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OBJECTIVES
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2. (S//NF) Posts should request that host nations
investigate the cargo involved in this shipment to determine
whether:

-- It involves any items that are controlled by multilateral
nonproliferation export regimes,

-- It contains any material prohibited for export by the DPRK
under UN Security Council Resolution 1718, or

-- Could make a material contribution to Syria's WMD or
ballistic missile programs.

-- Posts should urge host nations to prevent the onward
shipment of these items to Syria if it meets any of these
criteria.

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BACKGROUND
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3. (S//NF) We have received information that the
Maltese-flagged vessel M/V Fifth Ocean is transporting 12
containers, the contents of which are described as "steel
materials for construction." The consignee for this cargo is
the Syrian entity Mechanical Construction Factory, an entity
associated with Syria's weapons development program. The M/V
Fifth Ocean will make port calls at the Spanish ports of
Valencia on 31 May and Barcelona on 2 June. It will
subsequently make a port call at Genoa, Italy on 4 June. Our
information also indicates that the DPRK's Korean Foreign
Transportation Corporation was probably also involved in this
shipment

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TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER:
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4. (S//REL SPAIN, ITALY) Begin talking points/non-paper:

-- We would like to bring to your attention a possible
shipment of proliferation concern.

-- According to our information, the Maltese-flagged vessel
M/V Fifth Ocean is transporting 12 containers, the contents
are described as "steel materials for construction."

-- However, the consignee for this cargo has previously acted
as an intermediary for Syria's weapon development program.

-- (FOR MADRID ONLY) According to our information, the M/V
Fifth Ocean is due to make a port call at Valencia on 31 May
and Barcelona on 2 June.

-- (FOR ROME ONLY) According to our information, the M/V
Fifth Ocean will make a port call at Genoa on 4 June.

-- Our information indicates that the consignee for this
shipment is Mechanical Construction Factory (MCF) in
Damascus, Syria. MCF is an entity associated with Syria's
weapons development program. The shipper of this cargo was
the Chinese shipping company COSCO Logistics (Dalian) Company.

-- Our information indicates that the DPRK's Korean Foreign
Transportation Corporation was probably also involved in this
shipment.

-- The cargo in question is loaded into 12 containers, and
was shipped under bill of lading number 8DLCLTK2G0365, dated
10 April. It is loaded into twelve containers, with the
following container and seal numbers:

-- CCLU2969571/92066F
-- CCLU3774445/92068F
-- CCLU3879050/92410F
-- CCLU2960260/92064F
-- GLDU3040498/92078F
-- GLDU3862587/92074F
-- CCLU4109579/92067F
-- CCLU4125543/92060F
-- CCLU4261370/92073F
-- CCLU4394202/92076F
-- CCLU4764400/92061F
-- CCLU4803471/92069F

-- We are uncertain whether the items in question are
controlled by any multilateral nonproliferation export
control regimes, prohibited for export by the DPRK under
UNSCR 1718, or can be used for any WMD, ballistic missile, or
weapons purposes. However, due to the consignee's past
involvement in activities related to Syria's weapons
programs, we request that you investigate this shipment to
determine whether it involves any prohibited items or other
items that could make a material contribution to Syria's WMD
or ballistic missile programs.

-- We appreciate your consideration of this matter and
request that your government quickly share the results of
your inspection with us.

-- (For Madrid Only) We would request timely notification of
your decision to act as we may consider approaching other
partners if you decide not to take action.

-- If your investigation does discover prohibited items or
goods or other items that could contribute to Syria's WMD and
missile programs, we would request that your government
prevent its onward shipment to Syria and would be willing to
discuss with you disposition options for the cargo as
necessary.

END POINTS.

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POINT OF CONTACT AND REPORTING REQUIREMENT
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5. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up is Mark
Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov.


6. (U) Please report delivery of points and any immediate
response by 6 June.


7. (U) Washington thanks posts for assistance. Please slug
responses for EUR, ISN, and T.
RICE


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