Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE5584
2008-01-17 20:48:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

FOLLOW-UP: BANK MELLI ATTEMPT TO PURCHASE A

Tags:  KNNP MNUC IR GM UK FR TU EFIN ETTC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5408
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHC #5584/01 0172051
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 172048Z JAN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 2686
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 1574
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 1652
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4464
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6681
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 005584 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC IR GM UK FR TU EFIN ETTC
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP: BANK MELLI ATTEMPT TO PURCHASE A
TURKISH BANK TO CIRCUMVENT UNSCRS 1737 AND 1747

REF: A. A) STATE 153725 (2007)


B. B) ANKARA 2777 (2007)

C. C) ISTANBUL 1052 (2007)

Classified By: EUR/PRA Office Director Anita Friedt for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 005584

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC IR GM UK FR TU EFIN ETTC
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP: BANK MELLI ATTEMPT TO PURCHASE A
TURKISH BANK TO CIRCUMVENT UNSCRS 1737 AND 1747

REF: A. A) STATE 153725 (2007)


B. B) ANKARA 2777 (2007)

C. C) ISTANBUL 1052 (2007)

Classified By: EUR/PRA Office Director Anita Friedt for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


2. (S) In November, REF A cautioned that Iran's Bank Melli
has reached an agreement in principle to purchase a Turkish
bank. Other recent press reports have noted that Iran is
actively working to expand its banking relationships with
Turkey. The U.S. would like to provide the name of the bank
in question (Adabank AS) and reaffirm that expanding banking
relationships with Iran is not a prudent step at this time.
Should Bank Melli purchase Adabank AS in Istanbul, it could
be used as a cover for activities prohibited by UNSCRs 1737
and 1747. The U.S. urges Turkey to prevent the sale of the
Turkish bank to Bank Melli and to exercise increased
vigilance regarding any Iranian financial relationships.

--------------
OBJECTIVES/ACTION REQUEST
--------------


3. (S) Washington requests Posts deliver the talking points
and non-paper in paragraph 4 to appropriate host government
officials in the foreign affairs and financial ministries.
Posts should pursue the following objectives:

FOR EMBASSY ANKARA:

-- Alert Turkey that Bank Melli has reached an agreement in
principle to purchase Adabank AS.

-- Urge Turkey to take the necessary steps to investigate
and prevent this purchase since the bank could be used to
circumvent UNSCR sanctions.

-- Emphasize that the Executive Order 13382 designation of
Bank Melli responds to the threat that it poses to the
international financial system.

-- Note U.S. action against Bank Melli is consistent with
obligations under paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737 and urge Turkey
to take similar action.

-- Urge Turkey to reconsider any plans to expand banking

relations with Iran, including increased cooperation between
each country's central bank, increasing the amount of trade
credits between the countries, and expanding cooperation
between each country's export-import bank.

FOR EMBASSIES ANKARA, BERLIN, PARIS, LONDON:

-- Reinforce the need for increased vigilance regarding any
Iranian financial relationships, as these may be engaged in
proliferation-related transactions.

FOR EMBASSIES BERLIN, PARIS, LONDON:

-- Provide additional information to the EU3 on Bank Melli's
involvement in Iranian proliferation activities.

--------------
BACKGROUND AND NONPAPER
--------------


4. BEGIN SECRET/REL FRANCE, GERMANY, TURKEY, UK NON-PAPER:

-- We previously cautioned that Iran's Bank Melli has
reached an agreement in principle to purchase a Turkish bank.


-- The U.S. has information that Iran's Bank Melli (National
Bank of Iran) has agreed in principle to purchase Adabank AS
in Istanbul for $250 million. Bank Melli sent a delegation
to Turkey to carry out preliminary negotiations, get more

STATE 00005584 002 OF 003


information, and prepare an assessment report. Iranian
officials continued to discuss this purchase in early
November 2007.

-- On October 25, the U.S. designated Bank Melli under
Executive Order 13382 ("Blocking the Property of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferators and their Supporters") for
providing financial services and support to Iranian entities
designated under E.O. 13382 and for providing support for
proliferation-related activities. As a result of this
designation, all transactions involving Bank Melli and any
U.S. person are prohibited and any assets Bank Melli may have
under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen.

-- Bank Melli has facilitated numerous transactions involving
Iranian proliferation entities and others listed under the
asset freeze provisions of UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, including
transactions that took place following the date of these
entities' designations.

-- For example, Bank Melli facilitated a transaction in April
2007 involving a North Korean shipment to Iran; the cargo was
consigned to Bank Sepah, an entity designated in UNSCR 1747
for its involvement in Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

-- Bank Melli has assisted Sepah by providing financial
support and acting on behalf of Sepah, subsequent to Sepah's
designation under UNSCR 1747 and E.O. 13382.

-- The Hong Kong branch of Bank Melli PLC, a UK-based
subsidiary of Bank Melli, facilitated transactions involving
Bank Sepah after Sepah's designations under UNSCR 1747 and
E.O. 13382.

-- We believe that Bank Melli is acting on behalf of Bank
Sepah and is therefore covered by paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737,
which requires UN Member States to freeze assets not only of
designated entities, but also entities acting on their behalf.

-- Bank Melli has also maintained accounts or facilitated
transactions for known Iranian missile and nuclear front
companies and/or their suppliers indicating complicity and/or
a lack of due diligence. These companies include Iran's
Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and subordinates which
oversee Iran's R&D and production of missiles and rockets.

-- The DIO and some of its subordinates, which conduct
research and development for Iran's defense and military
forces and produce a wide variety of military-related
weapons, technologies, and other equipment, have used Bank
Melli's Hamburg branch to receive payments and to transfer
funds.

-- A company subordinate to DIO involved in the marketing of
Iranian-made chemical/biological defensive equipment used DIO
accounts as of early 2005 at Bank Melli's Hamburg branch to
receive payments for unidentified goods.

-- Bank Melli in June 2007 facilitated a number of payments
from companies associated with AIO.

-- Bank Melli also provides banking services to the IRGC and
its Qods Force. Entities owned or controlled by the IRGC or
the Qods Force use Bank Melli for a variety of financial
services. From 2002 to 2006, Bank Melli was used to send at
least $100 million to the Qods Force. When handling
financial transactions on behalf of the IRGC, Bank Melli has
employed deceptive banking practices to obscure its
involvement from the international banking system. For
example, Bank Melli has requested that its name be removed
from financial transactions.

-- As you know the IRGC and Qods Force have been connected to
the transfer of arms by Iran to the Taliban, Hizballah, and
Iraqi insurgents, violating Iran's UNSCR 1747 obligation not
to conduct such arms exports.

FOR TURKEY ONLY:

-- The United States urges your government to take the
necessary steps to investigate and prevent Bank Melli's
purchase of Adabank AS given the risk that such a purchase
could be used to support relationships or facilitate
transactions associated with Iran's WMD and missile programs
contrary to UNSCR 1737 or 1747, or other illicit activities.

-- While the U.S. recognizes that capital is necessary in a
fast-growing economy like Turkey's, allowing this transaction

STATE 00005584 003 OF 003


to take place could expose your banking system to illicit
activity related to weapons proliferation.

-- In addition, we also urge you to exercise increased
vigilance regarding all Iranian financial and commercial
relationships, not just those involving Bank Melli. Should
you identify any proliferation-related activities, we would
urge you to freeze any accounts or transactions held or
conducted in support of this activity.

-- On October 11, 2007, the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) issued a statement cautioning that Iran's lack of
comprehensive anti-money laundering / combating the financing
of terrorism (AML/AFT) regime represents a significant
vulnerability within the international financial system.
FATF advised that financial institutions should take the risk
arising from the deficiencies in Iran's AML/CFT regime into
account for enhanced due diligence.

-- We look forward to hearing the results of any actions you
take in this case at the earliest possible time and are
prepared to provide additional assistance as appropriate.

-- We also look forward to working with you on these and
other related security and counter-proliferation matters.

END SECRET/REL FRANCE, GERMANY, TURKEY, UK NON-PAPER.

--------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


5. (U) Post should report results seven days of receipt of
this cable. Please slug replies for ISN, T, TREASURY, EUR,
and NEA. Please include SIPDIS in all replies.

--------------
POINT OF CONTACT
--------------


6. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up
information is Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5408,
McGeehanKJ@state.sgov.gov.


7. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.
RICE