US-CHINA DISCUSSIONS ON COOPERATION IN ASIAN REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 054231

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018
TAGS: PREL CH ASEAN ARF APEC XB
SUBJECT: US-CHINA DISCUSSIONS ON COOPERATION IN ASIAN REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

REF: A. STATE 34771 B. BEIJING 900

CLASSIFIED BY EAP/RSP BLAIR HALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B)&(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 1 in Washington, China MFA Asia Department
Deputy Director-General (DDG) Yang Yanyi participated in
broad-ranging discussions with U.S. officials on U.S.-China
cooperation in Asian regional organizations. China sees the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) as useful, particularly in the area of
non-traditional security cooperation. While needed, efforts to
strengthen ARF must occur under ASEAN's continued, albeit
"distracted" leadership. Following a briefing by the U.S., DDG Yang
provided few details on China's comprehensive program of cooperation
with ASEAN. The U.S. and China hold differing approaches to
rationalizing security cooperation in APEC and ARF in light of
Taiwan's membership in APEC. The U.S. prefers a more case-by-case
approach based on the suitability of each institution rather than the
more comprehensive Chinese approach to moving some security issues
wholesale from APEC to ARF. On broader regional architecture issues,
DDG Yang described East Asia Community-building and the priority
China places on regional integration under ASEAN Plus 3. China sees
a growing need for new arrangements perhaps more reflective of
existing regional power arrangements, including recent notions of an
Asian G-8. Overall, U.S. and Chinese views on regional organizations
were somewhat similar, but core disagreements toward Taiwan and the
role of ASEAN limited further agreement. END SUMMARY.

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STRENGTHENING ARF, BUT UNDER ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP
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2. (C) EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall and DDG Yang discussed ARF's
strengths, its weaknesses, and the merits of ASEAN leadership. Both
sides see ARF as useful, particularly in the area of non-traditional
security cooperation. China sees non-traditional security as a
potential substitute for preventive diplomacy (ARF's original
mandate). For Yang, Asia's focus on the strict avoidance of
intervention in another country's internal affairs makes traditional
preventive diplomacy efforts in ARF difficult. On the other hand,
both sides stated that ARF needs to improve its institutional
procedures and produce a clear track record of concrete cooperation.
For Yang, institutional reform should reflect ASEAN norms and
practices like consensus and gradualism. While also critical of
ASEAN's leadership role, China resolutely supports continuing ASEAN's
institutional status in ARF. According to DDG Yang, "internal
distractions reduce ASEAN's capacity to lead ARF." Despite this,
ASEAN "for certain should remain in the driver's seat and the only
acceptable leader of ARF is ASEAN."


3. (C) Giving specifics on Chinese views on ARF's agenda, Yang
referenced China's openness to increasing the roles of defense
officials in ARF, including an eventual ARF Defense Ministers'
Meeting. South China Sea developments should not be on ARF's agenda.
China increasingly supports the role of Track Two organizations such
as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)
and other international organizations in ARF's processes.

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CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS: MUCH HAPPENING, BUT FEW DETAILS
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4. (C) Hall briefed Yang at length on U.S. efforts to further
integrate ASEAN under the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership. This
includes facilitating ASEAN economic integration, political and
security cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation such as disaster
management, public health, and human resources development. However,
DDG Yang provided few details on China's programs of cooperation with
ASEAN. On the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, chapters on goods
and services have been concluded and China plans to conclude a
chapter on investment in August. China has opened an ASEAN Center in
Beijing to coordinate its relations with ASEAN. Notable is China's
offer of 8,000 professional training slots over the next five years
and a draft MOU being developed on media cooperation.

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APPROACHES TO SECURITY IN ARF AND APEC AT ODDS
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5. (C) The U.S. and China hold differing approaches to rationalizing
the overlap of security cooperation in APEC and ARF in light of
Taiwan's membership in APEC. The U.S. prefers a more case-by-case
approach based on the suitability of each institution rather than the
more comprehensive Chinese approach to moving certain security issues
wholesale from APEC to ARF. U.S. APEC Senior Official Ambassador
Patricia Haslach pointed out APEC's structural advantages, such as

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its multi-sectoral focus and strong relationship with the region's
private sector, when developing approaches to trade-related security
threats. On the other hand, ARF may be better suited than APEC for
some initiatives such as military matters. China concurred that APEC
will always play some role in some security issues, citing such
activities such as aviation security, food defense, and energy
security. However, Huang Yiyang, Department of International
Organizations APEC Office Deputy Director, stated that security or
political issues deemed to be the "rightful authority of sovereign
states" should not be discussed in APEC due to Taiwan's membership.
China began to list certain agenda items such as nonproliferation
that they deemed "not suitable" for APEC. Following that, the U.S.
side cautioned against assigning general labels to any specific issue
as "appropriate" or "not appropriate" for either ARF or APEC. Rather
a case-by-case examination of proposals should be sought based on the
institutional structures of each institution. Both sides agreed to
continue the dialogue on future counter terrorism cooperation in
APEC.


6. (C) Huang also referenced past dialogue between the U.S. and China
on a non-paper that outlined several models to allow for work on
security issues in APEC while taking into account China's concerns
regarding Taiwan. He noted with disappointment that the last round
of comments from the U.S. had deleted all mention of these models.
(Note: China has agreed to political commitments on certain topics in
the past, but has subsequently resisted or watered down all attempts
to develop concrete, capacity building activities. There have been
no recent discussions on the non-paper.)

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REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE: INTEGRATION AND NEW DIRECTIONS
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7. (C) Joined by EAP DAS Scot Marciel and NSC and S/P officials for
lunch, U.S. officials probed DDG Yang on China's views on regional
integration and new regional arrangements, particularly among major
powers. Yang described "East Asia Community-building as progressing
along four wheels:" EAS, ASEAN Plus 3, ASEAN's Plus One
relationships, and various trilateral groupings. China sees ASEAN
Plus 3 as the main vehicle for regional integration. However, ASEAN
remains preoccupied with its own internal integration, sometimes to
the distraction of broader, pan-Asian efforts. Speaking personally,
Yang did not observe great value in EAS. EAS shares no agenda or
common objectives among its members. Trilateral cooperation among
China, Japan, and the ROK has increased as Sino-Japanese ties have
warmed. Yang also sought U.S. views on a proposed a U.S.-China-Japan
trilateral forum. Yang said China senses the need for a platform for
major power cooperation such as recent notions of an Asian G-8 among
the major Asia-Pacific powers (ref B). USG interlocutors observed
that Asian regional architecture will continue to evolve, and that
China and the United States do have many similar strategic interests.
They agreed to continue discussions about cooperation in regional
institutions.


8. COMMENT: The U.S. and Chinese sides seemed to agree far more than
they disagreed on substantive views towards these regional
organizations. However, core Chinese interests such as isolating
Taiwan internationally and maintaining strong China-ASEAN ties still
provide a ceiling to the level of synergy between U.S. and Chinese
views toward existing institutions. Similar views on new
arrangements among major powers could provide opportunities for
greater collaboration. These discussions are part of recent efforts
to increase U.S.-China coordination within Asian regional
organizations.


9. (U) Chinese Participants (all MFA):
--Asia Department DDG Yang Yanyi
--International Organizations APEC Office Deputy Director Huang Yiyang
--Asia Department Office of Policy Planning Deputy Director Zheng
Zhenhua
--Asia Department Office of Regional Security Third Secretary Yang
Shichao
--Chinese Embassy Staff PolMinCouns Cai Run, Pol/C Hu Zhaoming, Third
Secretary Zheng Tao

U.S. Participants:
--EAP DAS Scot Marciel
--EAP Ambassador-for-APEC Pat Haslach
--EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall
--EAP/CM Director John Norris
--S/P James Green
--NSC/Asia Kurt Tong
--EAP/EP Amit Mathur
--EAP/RSP Kevin Sheives
--EAP/RSP Jack Andre
--ISN/RA Charles Mahaffey
--OES/IHA Natalia Commella
RICE