(S) NIAG 8064: IRAN SEEKS RUSSIAN-ORIGIN NEUTRON

S E C R E T STATE 052481


E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 05/10/2033
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC IR

SUBJECT: (S) NIAG 8064: IRAN SEEKS RUSSIAN-ORIGIN NEUTRON
GENERATORS THROUGH MALAYSIA

Classified By: EUR DAS David Merkel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 4.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (S/NF) Washington has information that a Malaysian firm
with ties to Iran is seeking Russian-origin neutron
generators from the All-Russia Research Institute of
Automatics (II) (VNIIA). Neutron generators are controlled
under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Dual-Use annex
(6.A.5) because of their possible use in initiating a nuclear
fission chain reaction in a nuclear explosive device. They
also have other industrial uses. United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1803 explicitly prohibits the
transfer of items listed on the NSG Dual-Use annex unless
they are for exclusive use in light water reactors and are
necessary for technical cooperation programs through the
International Atomic Energy Agency. We have no information
on the intended end-use of these items including whether this
transaction is connected to an IAEA technical cooperation
program or a light water reactor. Moreover, under UNSCR
1803, the provision of these items must be notified to the
UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee prior to their transfer to
Iran. UNSCRs 1737 and 1803 require states to prevent the
supply, sale, or transfer of items that could contribute to
Iran,s enrichment-related activities, as well as other
proliferation-sensitive activities and nuclear weapons
delivery systems.


3. (S/NF) Background continued: The Malaysian firm that is
requesting the equipment from VNIIA has a history of
procuring for Iran. Washington has recently raised the issue
of this firm,s proliferation activities with the Malaysian
Government.

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OBJECTIVES
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4. (S/Rel RUSSIA) Post is requested to pursue the following
objectives with appropriate authorities and may draw upon the
talking points in para 5:

-- Thank Russia for its cooperation and dialogue on
nonproliferation issues and for its continued support for
counterproliferation objectives, including through the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, United Nations Security Council, the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the
Proliferation Security Initiative.

-- Note that Russia,s cooperation with respect to addressing
Iran,s nuclear activities facilitated our ability to sign
the U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
(123 Agreement),which was submitted to the Congress on May

6. Evidence of illegal or unauthorized transfers from Russia
of NSG-controlled dual-use technology to Iran could affect
Congressional consideration of the U.S.-Russia civil nuclear
cooperation agreement.

-- Emphasize our continued concerns with efforts by
procurement companies associated with Iran,s nuclear program.

-- Request that Moscow take immediate steps to investigate
this export to Iran, either directly or through Malaysia, and
to share with the U.S. any information that they gather in
their investigations.

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TALKING POINTS
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5. (S/REL RUSSIA) Begin talking points for Moscow:

-- In the spirit of our joint commitment in the Strategic
Framework Declaration to advance cooperation on common
nonproliferation goals, we would like to inform you of a case
of potential nuclear proliferation concern and ask your
assistance in ensuring that material controlled by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Dual-Use list is not
transferred through Malaysia to a prohibited nuclear
program/activity in Iran.

-- Your cooperation with respect to addressing Iran,s
nuclear activities facilitated our ability to sign the
U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, about
which the Administration is currently consulting with
Congress. Continued cooperation with regards to Iran will be
essential throughout this process.

-- A Malaysian company with a history of procuring items for
Iran is attempting to acquire ING-07, ING-17, and ING-27
model activation analysis equipment neutron generators from
the All-Russia Research Institute of Automatics (II) (VNIIA).

-- The All-Russia Research Institute of Automatics (VNIIA) is
located at Suschevskaya Street, 22, Moscow, Russia, 127055,
phone (499) 978-7803, website: www.vniia.ru.

-- Neutron generators are controlled in the NSG Dual-Use
Annex under 6.A.5 as they can be used to initiate a nuclear
fission chain reaction in a nuclear explosive device and can
be used to analyze the condition of nuclear reactors or other
critical nuclear assemblies. Neutron generators also have a
number of industrial applications.

-- We recognize that there are certain nuclear-related
activities that are permitted under United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1737, 1747, and 1803. In this
regard, we would welcome learning from Russia whether this
possible transfer would be related to work on a light water
reactor or a technical cooperation project in Iran through
the International Atomic Energy Agency.

-- We recall that UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 require States
to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of items that could
contribute to Iran,s enrichment-related activities, as well
as other proliferation-sensitive activities and nuclear
weapons delivery systems. UNSCR 1803, in particular,
prohibits the transfer of items listed on the NSG Dual-Use
list unless they are for exclusive use in light water
reactors or for IAEA technical cooperation programs.

-- In those cases, the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee must be
notified in advance of the intended transfer by the sending
state.

-- Based on past activities of the Malaysian company, the
U.S. is concerned about the possibility that, following their
export to Malaysia, these neutron generators could be
diverted to a prohibited activity in Iran.

-- We are sharing this information with you as part of our
mutual efforts to prevent the proliferation of commodities
that could provide material support to nuclear programs of
concern and to enforce relevant UNSCRs. We understand from
press reports that a recently issued Russian government
ordinance specifically implements the new provisions of UNSCR
1803 and would make this type of activity illicit in Russia.

-- We hope that you can use this information to investigate
this activity to ensure that VNIIA is not, even
inadvertently, being used as a source for materials destined
for a prohibited activity in Iran.

-- We look forward to hearing the results of your
investigation and hope that if an illegal or unauthorized
activity has taken place that you will be able to use all
available resources to end this activity.

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REPORTING DEADLINE AND POC
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5. (U) Post should report results by May 27, 2008. Please
identify the subject as &NIAG 80648 and slug replies for
ISN and EUR/PRA. Department point of contact is ISN/CPI Matt
Zartman, 202-647-7588.
RICE


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