Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE43742
2008-04-24 21:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE APRIL 28-29

Tags:  PGOV PREL EUN ZL PK ZI IR IZ IS SY LE CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 STATE 043742 

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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE APRIL 28-29
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 STATE 043742

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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE APRIL 28-29
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

STATE 00043742 001.2 OF 010



1. (U) Classified by William Lucas, Office Director,
EUR/ERA. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 16.


3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their
next General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on April 28-29. We expect the
agenda to include: Western Balkans, Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Burma, Zimbabwe,
and China/Tibet. As of now, Iran and Georgia are not/not
on the GAERC agenda, but this may change and we want to
raise these subjects in any case. Given the importance of
the Balkan, Iran, and Georgia issues, posts are requested
to make a particular effort to press the EU on these
points and to deliver them at the highest appropriate
level. Posts are also requested to include the SIPDIS
caption on their response cables. A background section
covering some of these issues is provided prior to a
section containing talking points. Points are to be
delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level to
EU members only. Other posts should not/not deliver these
points.

BACKGROUND
--------------

IRAN


4. (C) Prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1803, the EU-3
assured us that the EU as a whole would adopt additional,
autonomous restrictions on Iran once the resolution was
adopted. Since then, we have been pressing for three
distinct EU actions:

* implement UNSCR 1803 in EU policy and regulations;
* designate an EU-developed list of 19 additional entities
(including Bank Melli) and 15 additional individuals under
existing EU policy and UNSCRs 1737/1747; and
* adopt a series of new autonomous financial and economic
measures (such as a ban on export credits) that go beyond
existing EU policy.


5. (C) Thus far, EU action has been blocked - largely by
Italy, but with others hiding behind. Italy has the

second largest economic relationship with Iran among
European states and resents being called on to implement
EU-3 decisions without having taken part in consultations
first. Italy has lobbied to have "Quint" (U.K., France,
Germany, United States, Italy) consultations prior to P5+1
political directors meetings. They have also lobbied to
be a part of the P5+1. In exchange, the Italians assured
us that they would lift their hold on EU action and crack
down on Bank Melli and others on the EU list. They would
also work cooperatively to develop new autonomous EU
measures.


6. (C) Acting U/S Fried participated in a Quint
consultation on the margins of the G8 PolDirs on April 15
in Kyoto. In return, Italy lifted its hold on the
designation list on April 18, and we hope that the list
will now move forward if no other country objects by 1800
Brussels time on April 21. However, the debate over truly
new EU autonomous measures (number 3 in the list above)
remained unresolved as of April 21. USEU reports that
Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Spain, and possibly

STATE 00043742 002.2 OF 010

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE APRIL 28-29
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER
Portugal, all spoke out against new autonomous measures
during an April 18 EU Political and Security Committee
meeting. We continue to urge the EU to adopt all the
measures described above at their April 28-29 Foreign
Ministers meeting (GAERC),with the May 26-27 GAERC as a
fall-back. As of now, Iran has not/not been placed on the
April GAERC agenda.

GEORGIA


7. (C) On April 16, President Putin issued instructions to
the Russian government on relations with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The instructions direct the Russian
government to "create" mechanisms to "protect" the
interests of Russian citizens in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, which would appear to provide a range of services
similar to a diplomatic mission, including promotion of
trade, education and scientific exchanges, and consular
services. The document also authorizes Russian ministries
to establish direct contacts with their separatist
counterparts, but does not elaborate where such mechanisms
would be located. This move, taken without the approval
of the Georgian government, comes on the heels of a
rejection by de facto Abkhaz authorities of a Georgian
peace proposal to offer maximal autonomy to Abkhazia
within Georgia, including linguistic and cultural
autonomy, veto power over legislation dealing directly
with Abkhazia, and guaranteed senior positions in the
central government, including a proposed Vice President.
We remain concerned over growing tensions in the region.
On April 21, the Georgians released video purportedly
showing a Russian aircraft shooting down a Georgian UAV
over Georgian territory. We are examining the video. We
have already asked European posts to demarche capitals to
urge Russia not to take provocative actions in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, and specifically to repeal its April 16
instructions, but we want to raise our concerns here as
well.

LEBANON/SYRIA


8. (SBU) Lebanese presidential elections have been delayed
seventeen times, most recently to April 22. Half of the
Arab League's members, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Jordan, boycotted or sent low-level representation to the
March 29-30 Arab League summit in Damascus in protest of
Syria's continued interference in Lebanon. Although
embarrassed, Syria publicly called the summit a success
and has shown no signs of wavering on Lebanon. As the
Lebanese political impasse continues, we are focusing on
strengthening Lebanese institutions sufficiently to govern
despite this political vacuum. Some EU members' support
for the GOL has, disappointingly, been declining in favor
of a more "neutral" policy that seeks not to favor the
ruling "March 14" coalition over the "March 8" opposition.
An earlier flurry of high-level EU contact with Syria,
though, has dropped off since the beginning of the year.
This may reflect increasing EU frustration with the Bashar
al-Asad government. Despite this, EU members remain
unwilling to take stronger actions such as targeted
financial sanctions, similar to the designations recently
undertaken by the Treasury Department, travel bans, or
investment bans.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE


9. (SBU) The EU remains very interested in the degree of
progress on the ground and in Israeli-Palestinian
Negotiations since the November 2007 Annapolis Conference.
The EU remains supportive of our efforts and has provided
much needed budgetary and project assistance to the PA
since November. Germany is coordinating with the EU to
organize a Palestinian justice sector capacity building
conference in June, and U.S. officials are coordinating

STATE 00043742 003.2 OF 010

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE APRIL 28-29
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER
with the EU on an integrated plan for Palestinian security
and economic development to gain EU support for this
project-oriented approach to building Palestinian capacity
and easing Israeli restrictions in the West Bank. In
private meetings with U.S. officials, EU representatives
have voiced concerns that the lack of visible progress to
date could undermine the process launched at Annapolis.
We continue to stress U.S. commitment to the Annapolis
process and to the shared goal of an Israeli-Palestinian
peace agreement before the end of 2008.

ZIMBABWE


10. (C) Since the March 29 elections, the Zimbabwe
government has dramatically increased its campaign of
intimidation, harassment and physical violence against
regime opponents. These concerted actions demonstrate the
regime's blatant disregard for democracy, human rights,
and the electoral process.


11. (C) The orchestrated violence in Zimbabwe is
widespread and includes attacks on election observers, and
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party officials and
other opposition supporters. Youth militia, the so-called
war veterans, local security personnel, and the military
are carrying out the attacks. These hard-line tactics are
being coordinated by the Mugabe regime and its ZANU-PF
allies to disrupt the democratic process and maintain
their hold on power at any cost. The Department issued a
formal press statement on April 11 condemning the
brutality. The EU issued a similar statement on April 16.


12. (C) The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) has
withheld the results of the presidential election for
three weeks. On April 19, the ZEC began a recount of the
votes cast for president and parliamentary candidates in
23 constituencies. Any results that the ZEC might now
release showing a Mugabe win or the need for a runoff
would be suspect, and the results of a recount should not
be accepted because the ballot box chain of custody has
been compromised. The attacks on regime opponents have
undermined the electoral environment to such an extent
that a runoff election could not be free and fair.


13. (C) In its April 13 communiqu,, the SADC heads of
state emergency summit called for the expeditious release
of the election results, transparent counting of the
ballots, and a secure electoral environment in the event
of a runoff election. If these conditions are not met,
the international community must consider UNSC action,
including imposing multilateral sanctions.

BURMA


14. (SBU) Burma's military regime has made no progress
toward a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other
democratic and ethnic minority representatives. Despite
the efforts of UN Special Advisor Gambari to facilitate
such a dialogue, he reported the regime delivered no
"concrete results" during his March 6-10 visit to Burma,
his fifth in eighteen months. On the contrary, the regime
is imposing its self-styled "roadmap to democracy," which
lacks popular input. The regime plans to hold a May 10
referendum on a constitution drafted in secret by a hand-
picked committee without the input of democratic and
ethnic minority groups. The regime has criminalized
dissent, continues to hold roughly 1,800 political
prisoners, and arrests more peaceful political activists
every week. Furthermore, it has rebuffed calls by the
United States, the United Nations, EU countries, and many
others around the world to make the necessary changes that
would make the referendum free, fair, and credible.

IRAQ

STATE 00043742 004.2 OF 010



15. (SBU) On March 13 the European Parliament approved a
report recommending an enhanced EU role in Iraq. In
particular, it proposed increasing the size of the
European Commission (EC) presence in Iraq; stepping up
support for UN activities; supporting democratic
governance, national reconciliation and federal, regional
and local institutions; providing assistance for refugees;
and focusing EU aid on technical assistance and capacity
building. We want to see the implementation of these
recommendations, and recognize that much will depend on
the EC being able to move its presence to larger
facilities. Prime Minister Maliki's visit to Brussels on
April 16 was a positive step in building the EU-Iraq
relationship. EU lobbying of Arab states to increase
their diplomatic representation in Iraq would be helpful
in reinforcing the points we are making.


16. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
possible (in advance of the April 28-29 GAERC).

BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT

IRAN

--We urge the EU to adopt the provisions in UNSCR 1803
into EU policy and regulations immediately, along with
both the pending list of additional designations that can
be adopted under existing EU policy, and the strongest
possible package of new autonomous sanctions.

--There is a clear need for strong EU leadership on Iran.
Further delay sends the wrong message to Iran and
undermines the credibility of international efforts toward
a diplomatic solution. The credibility of the EU, the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the UNSC is at stake.

--A strong package of EU sanctions would not only send a
clear signal of EU resolve but also remove the excuse of
other countries for not acting against Iran. Strong EU
action in April will build on the momentum of UNSCR 1803.

--We regret that the EU has thus far moved so slowly in
all three areas of pending action on Iran sanctions. Iran
has deepened its defiance by beginning testing of an
advanced centrifuge design using nuclear material.
Additional, substantive actions are critical to
demonstrate to Iran that they cannot continue to ignore
the international community.

WESTERN BALKANS

Kosovo:

--We all need to work collaboratively to emphasize to UN
Secretary-General Ban how important it is for stability in

SIPDIS
the Balkans for the UN to cooperate on ensuring a smooth
transition to new international presences in Kosovo.
Implementing transition to EULEX must continue.

--We look to the EU's leadership on how to proceed with
deploying EULEX throughout Kosovo. There must be a
single, unified chain of command on police and justice
matters. We must not take any step that would imply
partition of Kosovo. We understand the significant
logistical, political, and financial obstacles posed by
UNMIK's inability to cooperate at this moment. How does
the EU plan to deal with this in a way that will leave no
rule of law gap in Kosovo?

--When Kosovo's constitution takes effect on June 15, we
still expect ICO to begin supervising Kosovo per the
Ahtisaari Plan.

STATE 00043742 005.2 OF 010


--We strongly support the leadership of UNMIK SRSG Joachim
Rucker and his American deputy Larry Rossin, and we ask
you join us in actively discouraging micromanagement of
UNMIK from the outside, including from New York.

--We urge strong EU participation in the Kosovo Donors
Conference. We expect the conference in Pristina this
summer to focus on over $2 billion worth of assistance
needed by Kosovo over the coming three years. The U.S.
anticipates contributing approximately 25 percent of the
total.

Serbia:
-- Serbia is at a critical juncture - after Kosovo
independence and ahead of May 11 elections.
-- We believe that the EU should reach out to Serbia and
offering a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
at the EU Foreign Ministers' meeting (on April 28),with
the understanding that further progress will be contingent
on Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY.
-- Such an offer will show a clear way forward for Serbia
toward the EU and encourage voters to support modern, pro-
Europe candidates in the election
-- We feel strongly that full accountability for war
crimes is a moral imperative.
-- However, if the Radicals win the election on May 11,
ICTY cooperation will be completely stopped. They have
publicly stated they will actively protect indicted war
criminals.
-- Our common goals are best served if all EU members take
a common position on this issue. We believe this will
boost the pro-western forces in Serbia and signing the SAA
now - while continuing to hold Serbia to its ICTY
obligations throughout the EU accession process.
Bosnia:

--We congratulate the EU, High Representative/EU Special
Representative Lajcak and the Bosnian people on the BiH
Parliament's approval of police reform legislation. We
understand this removes the sole remaining obstacle to
BiH's signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the EU.

--We strongly encourage the EU to sign the SAA with BiH at
the April 28 GAERC meeting. This will help maintain
positive political momentum in BiH, send a clear signal of
the EU's commitment to BiH's European future and
contribute significantly to stability in BiH and the
region.

--We believe that rapid signature of an SAA with Bosnia,
before the Serbian parliamentary elections on May 11,
would also help focus Serbian voters on importance of EU
integration.

GEORGIA

-- We have serious concerns about the new Russian
Presidential instructions authorizing increased contacts
between the Russian government and the separatist regimes
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, without approval of the
Georgian government.

-- This move, joined by Russia's recent lifting of CIS
sanctions on Abkhazia, as well as recent reports of a
Russian plane shooting down a Georgian UAV over Georgian
territory, have increased tensions in the region.

-- We recognize MFA assurances that Russian sanctions on
military services and equipment remain in place and that
Russia stands by its commitments and responsibilities not
to supply weapons to the conflict zones.


STATE 00043742 006.2 OF 010

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE APRIL 28-29
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER
-- However, Russia's position of openly siding with the
separatists is not in keeping with its status as a
facilitator in the peace process in Georgia or its
commitments to respect Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity.

-- We urge you to join us in dissuading Russia from taking
provocative actions in Abkhazia or South Ossetia,
specifically to repeal the April 16 instructions or seek
Tbilisi's permission for the activities described in the
Presidential instruction regarding Georgia's regions.

-- We also ask that you join us in urging Russia to play a
constructive role in accordance with its commitment to act
as a facilitator to the peace process, and to work with
Georgia to encourage the Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders
to engage on Georgia's new proposals for a peaceful
settlement of the conflicts as a basis for finding a way
forward.

-- We will continue to urge Tbilisi to show restraint and
develop/explain its settlement proposal in greater detail.

LEBANON/SYRIA

-- Lebanon's Parliament must be allowed to convene and
elect a president. Although Lebanese parties have agreed
on a consensus candidate, the opposition continues to
insist on extra-constitutional preconditions that further
perpetuate the political stalemate.

-- As the political crisis drags on, the EU and U.S. must
be united in supporting Lebanon's legitimate government;
we urge continued political and economic support to the
GOL and its institutions, including the security services.
Specifically, we urge the EU to consider high level visits
to Beirut, receiving GOL representatives in capitals,
statements of support for the GOL, and economic and
security assistance to the GOL. The USG is actively
pursuing these options now.

--The democratically-elected Lebanese Government must be
seen as the representative of the state rather than just
one political faction.

--Separately, international support for the March 14
Coalition is also important. The Hizballah-led opposition
is backed politically, financially, and economically by
Syria and Iran, both state sponsors of terrorism.
--We must continue to support the UN International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) and the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).

--Turning to Syria, we remain deeply concerned by the
regime's efforts to undermine security in Iraq, derail the
Middle East peace process, threaten Lebanese sovereignty,
and deny its citizens basic human rights.

--Until Syria responds positively to international demands
to cease its destructive behavior, we will continue to
work with our allies to isolate the regime diplomatically,
financially, and militarily. Neither UN Security Council
resolutions, engagement by foreign governments, nor
pointed calls by this Administration have yielded the
change we all hope to see.

--Syrian interference in Lebanese internal affairs
undermines Lebanese sovereignty. We should urge Syria to
respond to repeated Lebanese requests to demarcate their
common border, renew diplomatic relations as called for by
UNSCRs 1559 and 1680, and cease support for armed groups
in Lebanon. We continue to see evidence that the Syrian
regime actively facilitates the transfer of weapons,
fighters into Lebanon in contravention of UNSCR 1701.

STATE 00043742 007.2 OF 010


--Syria continues to support Palestinian terrorist and
rejectionist groups including Hamas and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command that
threaten the peace process.

--The Syrian regime continues to repress human rights and
democracy advocates, deny its citizens basic rights
including free speech and association, and discriminate
against religious and ethnic minorities. We are pleased
to work alongside you to support patriots such as Riad
Seif, Anwar al-Bunni, Kamal Labwani, other members of the
National Council for the Damascus Declaration, and all
Syrian citizens working for justice and democracy.

--Syria continues to facilitate the flow of foreign
fighters traveling to Iraq and is actively working to
stoke violence inside Iraq. Syria must understand that
instability in Iraq threatens all of Iraq's neighbors.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE

--Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: We encourage strong
EU support for bilateral negotiations. The talks are
proceeding in secret, which reflects the level of
seriousness. Still, visible progress is necessary to
maintain regional support as well as the support of the
Israeli and Palestinian public. We are urging both
parties to make progress on the ground, particularly on
Roadmap obligations, to build confidence and create an
atmosphere supportive of the negotiations. LTG Fraser is
leading our effort to monitor and promote progress on
Roadmap implementation and he and Secretary Rice made
important progress in recent trilateral meetings with the
parties.

--Palestinian Capacity Building: We appreciate the EU's
budgetary assistance to the PA and encourage the EU to
provide support for a project-oriented approach to
Palestinian security and economic development projects.
Budgetary support remains a priority, but we urge the EU
to focus its capacity building funds on projects linked to
an integrated approach, whereby we will work with the
parties and donors to link economic development projects
and Palestinian security sector capacity building and
deployments, focusing on certain geographic areas (e.g.,
Jenin). Linking security and economic projects will help
the GOI take steps to ease restrictions on movement and
access associated with these specific projects, which we
believe can help yield visible results on the ground in
the immediate term. We believe this is consistent with
the EU Action Strategy. The EU has provided crucial
support for the PA to date through its new assistance
mechanism, PEGASE.

--(IF RAISED) Moscow Conference: In order for this
proposal to gain traction and make a meaningful
contribution to the Annapolis process, it needs a clear
objective and narrow scope. The Russians initially
proposed a Ministerial meeting to address Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations, regional cooperation mechanisms,
and additional tracks (i.e., Syria). The parties are
unlikely to discuss their private talks at this forum
given the sensitivity of the issues. Additional tracks
would also be problematic as Syrian misbehavior in Lebanon
(and elsewhere) makes it unlikely that there would be
support for adding it to the agenda. The Russians have
said they will only move forward with their proposal if
they have the backing of the Quartet as well as the
Israelis and Palestinians.

ZIMBABWE

-- We appreciate EU statements calling for the release of

STATE 00043742 008.2 OF 010

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE APRIL 28-29
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER
the presidential election results and calling attention to
the deteriorating human rights situation and reports of
violence.

-- We have been calling for the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission (ZEC) to immediately release the presidential
election results, but to no avail. We must now be
prepared to reject any announcement the ZEC makes on the
presidential election or on the recount it has scheduled
for April 19 that favors Mugabe or ZANU-PF parliamentary
candidates because of the possibility of fraud.

-- We welcome continued EU efforts to urge the ZEC to
release immediately the results of the presidential
election, accurately reporting the voice of the Zimbabwean
people for change.

-- If the Mugabe regime does not take the appropriate
steps, the international community must consider
multilateral sanctions through the United Nations.

BURMA

--The Burmese regime continues to ignore the demands of
the Burmese people as well as calls by the international
community for a genuine dialogue with democratic and
ethnic minority representatives.

--The referendum on the regime's draft constitution is
taking place in an environment of pervasive fear and
intimidation. Regime laws criminalize dissent and deny
freedom of expression, assembly, and association.
Security forces continue to arrest Burmese for peaceful
political activities.

-- Based on the regime's refusal to make changes to its
referendum process, we can expect that it will not meet
international standards for free and fair elections and
referenda and will therefore lack legitimacy and risk
renewed turmoil and instability in Burma. This will
demand a strong international response. We would welcome
the EU's ideas for actions post-referendum.

--We understand that the EU is set to renew its Common
Position on Burma. We would welcome your country's views
on promoting a transition to democracy in Burma and on the
prospects for additional EU restrictive measures to
increase pressure on the regime to begin a genuine
dialogue.

--We encourage your country to consider supporting EU
sanctions on Burma's three state-owned foreign exchange
banks as an effective means of ratcheting up pressure on
the regime, as well as more effective implementation of
designations against regime members and cronies. Our
leading experts from Treasury/OFAC recently visited a
number of EU capitals, and we are ready to continue the
working level dialogue.

IRAQ

--We welcome the April 14 decision to extend and expand
the mandate of the EUJUST LEX mission; this is an example
of the kind of support we would like to see the EU
provide. Are there any other such proposals in the works?

--We hope the EU will be able to join us in encouraging
Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to open
diplomatic missions in/send Ambassadors to Baghdad.

--Are there any plans for Javier Solana to visit Iraq?
Such a visit would be an effective follow-up to Maliki's
visit to Brussels and would further cement the EU-Iraq
relationship.

STATE 00043742 009.2 OF 010


--Any progress to report on moves to implement the March
13 recommendations of the European Parliament?

--How is the search for new premises for the Commission
representation going, and are there any plans for other
Member States to open up Embassies/offices in Iraq? An
expanded European presence would be welcomed by U.S. and
the Iraqis. UNAMI expansion has been a success, and we
are sure European expansion would be as well.

CHINA/OLYMPICS/TIBET

--The United States hopes for the success of the 2008
Beijing Olympics and President Bush is looking forward to
joining the Chinese people for the Olympic Games in
Beijing.

--In accepting President Hu Jintao's invitation to attend
the Games, President Bush noted that the Games provide
China with an opportunity not only to showcase the
enormous economic progress the country has made in recent
decades, but also demonstrate its commitment to greater
openness and tolerance.

--The United States and others in the international
community believe that a truly successful 2008 Beijing
Olympics will be one in which China shows definitive
progress on human rights and religious freedom issues of
concern to both Chinese citizens and the international
community.

--We urge China to seize the chance to put its best face
forward by upholding its Olympic bid commitments to
increase access to information, expand freedom of the
press, and take positive steps to address international
concerns about its record on human rights and religious
freedom.
--For example, China should be urged to fully implement
the somewhat relaxed controls over foreign journalists it
promised the IOC, to make such relaxed rules permanent and
expand them to Chinese journalists, and to cease its
current efforts to remove potential critics from Beijing
prior to and during the Olympics.
-- Concerning Tibet, we are greatly concerned and
disturbed by recent events in the Tibetan regions of
China, and we urge all sides to show restraint and defuse
tension. China should respect the fundamental human right
of freedom of expression for all its citizens, whether
Tibetan or Han Chinese or of any other background.
-- We call on China to hold a meaningful and direct
dialogue with the Dalai Lama regarding the way forward to
a better future for the people of Tibet. The Dalai Lama
is a man of peace, and China should listen to him.
--(IF RAISED) Does the USG support calls to boycott the
Beijing Olympics or seek to link progress in human rights
or Tibetan affairs to its planned participation in the
Games?
--The USG wants to see a successful Olympics and does not
support calls for prohibiting athletes from participating
in the Olympic games. However, the President has made
clear both privately and publicly our call for progress in
human rights and on Tibet specifically, and the upcoming
Olympics makes such statements all the more timely and
important. Statements and actions in Congress and in the
public as well reflect real concerns, widely held in the
United States and elsewhere, over China's human rights
practices.

--The Olympics provides an opportunity for China to show
progress on a range of issues, including human rights
protection at home, and responsible leadership abroad.

-- We note that the Dalai Lama also opposes an Olympic

STATE 00043742 010.2 OF 010


-- President Bush has said many times that he has and will
continue to press China's leadership, especially in direct
private meetings, to respect human rights and religious
freedom. The President's attendance of the Olympics in
Beijing will provide another such opportunity.

PAKISTAN

--We are encouraged by the recent successful elections in
Pakistan and the return to democratic civilian government.
At the same time, we remain seriously concerned with the
existence of safe havens for al-Qa'ida and other extremist
elements within Pakistani territory. We will continue to
work with all members of Pakistan's government to support
Pakistan's efforts toward political and economic
development, and in its battle against violent extremists,
particularly on the border with Afghanistan.

--We are in the process of briefing Pakistan's civilian
leaders on U.S. policy, assistance, and programming.
Despite these civilians' public attempts to float "fresh"
approaches to militancy in the Tribal Areas (relying more
on negotiation than force),civilian politicians offer us
a more realistic assessment of the need for continued
military action in private. In Pakistan's current
political environment, statements that distance civilians
from Musharraf-era counter-terrorism policies may continue
but we urge the civilian government to take public
ownership of the battle against violent extremists and to
confront extremist elements.

--Recently, Japan and Australia doubled their aid to
Pakistan; the United States is considering our ability to
increase aid as well. We encourage the EU and its Member
States to share with the Pakistani government your own
concerns about extremist safe havens in Pakistan, consider
current aid commitments to Pakistan and increase current
support levels where possible.

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