NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

UNCLAS STATE 043044

SIPDIS


PLEASE SLUG REPLIES FOR ISN/MNSA - SCOTT DAVIS / TERRILL RAY / STEVE
ADAMS
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
UNVIE FOR IAEA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL NPT IAEA

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING: U.S. PROPOSED PAPERS



1. This cable requests action by COB April 25. Action
embassies are requested to deliver the papers contained in
paras 3 and 4 to host government officials responsible for
NPT matters. CD Delegation in Geneva is requested to deliver
the papers to other delegations that will be attending the
PrepCom in Geneva (April 28 - May 9) and to PrepCom Chairman
Voldymyr Yelchenko. UNVIE is requested to provide a copy of
the paper on expanding peaceful nuclear cooperation to the
French Mission in Vienna (Marc Albert),since France has
proposed a similar paper. Since we are seeking multiple
joint sponsors, posts need not put the name of host
government after "joint paper presented by" at the beginning
of each paper. When delivering the papers, action posts may
draw on background information in paragraph 2 and may leave a
copy of this information as a non-paper. Regarding the paper
on nuclear energy, we recognize that not all NPT parties
support such expansion but, in the interest of a common
approach to all fellow Treaty members, would nevertheless
like to share our paper with them. Posts will receive by
Septel a cable or cables with a demarches on NPT issues also
to be delivered in advance of the PrepCom.


2. Posts may draw from the following background information:

-- The United States looks forward to the upcoming Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) and places a high priority on a full discussion of
all substantive matters at the meeting.

-- Among other common objectives, we believe that most NPT
Parties share those of expanding international peaceful
nuclear cooperation in proliferation-responsible ways, and of
deterring and responding to withdrawal from the Treaty by
parties that have violated it.

-- For this reason, we would like to provide you with copies
of papers on these topics that we propose for joint
sponsorship at the PrepCom. We are providing the papers to
most other NPT parties. Many of the working papers submitted
to NPT meetings are sponsored by more than one government.

-- We propose that your government join ours in sponsoring
these documents as Working Papers at the upcoming PrepCom.
We are very interested in any comments that you might have on
the papers.

-- We hope that by pursuing agreement on ideas in both of
these important Treaty areas, we can work toward consensus
among NPT parties. This process will help focus our efforts
at the second and third PrepComs, and will assist us in our
effort to adopt common language at the 2010 Review Conference.


3. Begin paper on "Expanding International Civil Nuclear
Cooperation"

Expanding International Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Joint Paper Presented by
( ),and the United States
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT
Review Conference
April - May 2008

The safe and secure uses of civil nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes offers many benefits to humanity provided it does
not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
meets the highest standards of safety and security. States
Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) share an interest in promoting and expanding
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in ways consistent with
their shared nonproliferation objectives.

As set forth in Article IV of the NPT, all States Party have
the right to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.,
(Article II obligates non-nuclear weapon States Party not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.) At the
2000 Review Conference, States Party also noted that peaceful
use rights must be exercised in conformity with Article III -
which requires safeguards on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within the territory of a non-nuclear weapon State, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.,
In addition, Article IV specifies that all States Party
undertake(s) to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials and scientific and technological information for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.,

These provisions have particular importance in today,s
world. The demand for new sources of energy is increasing
rapidly even as recognition grows that this demand must be
met in ways that conserve existing resources and minimize the
consumption of fossil fuels that can contribute to greenhouse
gas emissions. Furthermore, rising energy demand relative to
current supplies is increasing economic and other pressures
facing most countries. It creates ever-stronger incentives
to improve energy security and further diversify the
available sources of supply. Civil nuclear power generation
that is safely and securely regulated can provide an
important part of the answer to meeting these challenges.
More broadly, nuclear technology can make a key contribution
to sustainable development, an important point addressed in
the second paragraph of Article IV. In short, there exists
today a widely-shared vision of growth in the use of nuclear
energy, including in developing countries, to increase the
supply of electricity, promote economic growth and
development, and reduce reliance on fossil fuels, resulting
in decreased pollution and greenhouse gasses.

International cooperation in the safe and secure uses of
radioactive materials for civilian purposes provides
important benefits in the fields of medical research and
treatment, agriculture and food production, management of
water resources (e.g., seawater desalination or isotope
hydrology),environmental technology, materials science,
improved industrial processes, and other areas. In short,
responsible nuclear cooperation that is consistent with
Article IV and the highest standards of nonproliferation,
safety, and security offers enormous benefits that amply
justify its maintenance and indeed expansion in light of
current and projected future needs.

The NPT fosters the development of the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence that
promotes cooperation in peaceful uses. Nonproliferation
requirements and mechanisms - most prominently compliance
with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty, as well as
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
agreements, including the Additional Protocol - lay the
foundation for international nuclear cooperation by ensuring
that nuclear materials and facilities do not contribute to
nuclear weapons proliferation. Civil nuclear cooperation
also is underpinned by the Additional Protocol and agreements
on safety and security, such as the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material. Ensuring nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear
safety, and nuclear security continue to be indispensable
prerequisites to the peaceful civil uses of nuclear energy,
including nuclear power generation, and provide the
foundation for expanding international cooperation in nuclear
energy applications.

Those countries that have decided to introduce nuclear energy
into their energy mix understandably place a high importance
upon the security of supply of nuclear fuel to develop and
sustain their commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. In order to facilitate the expansion of
international nuclear cooperation, therefore, multiple
proposals have been advanced for providing reliable access to
nuclear fuel.

International arrangements for multilateral approaches to the
nuclear fuel cycle strengthen the ability of States Party to
choose the option of nuclear power without pursuing sensitive
fuel cycle activities. Many countries are choosing to
develop civilian nuclear capacity through commercial means
that rely on assured fuel supplies, for such arrangements
offer a cost-effective and responsible means to achieve
access to the benefits of nuclear energy. Choices to forego
any particular path, of course, are voluntary and therefore
represent no abridgment of rights. The development of
multilateral approaches to assuring the supply of nuclear
fuel is an integral element of the responsible pursuit of
access to nuclear energy, and such an approach helps advance
the goals of Article IV. Such an approach would serve the
objectives of strengthening non-proliferation, while
preserving access to the benefits of nuclear energy and
assurance of supply and services around the world. It is
clear that a growing number of nations view reliable access
to nuclear fuel as an important component of the
international community,s effort to fulfill the vision of
Article IV in the 21st Century, helping ensure that nuclear
energy makes a major contribution to global development
consistent with nonproliferation and safety objectives.

End paper on "Expanding International Civil Nuclear
Cooperation"


4. Begin paper on "Deterring and Responding to NPT
Withdrawal by Treaty Violators"

Joint Paper Presented by
( ),and the United States
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT
Review Conference
April - May 2008

Because the continued integrity and efficacy of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is very
important to international peace and security, all States
Party to the NPT share an interest in ensuring that countries
in violation of its provisions cannot shield themselves from
the consequences of their noncompliance by withdrawing from
it. States Party should make clear that they will work
together to develop and implement more effective measures to
dissuade such withdrawal and to respond vigorously to it,
should it occur.

The issue of withdrawal by States that are in violation of
the NPT has emerged as an important subject of debate, being
a focus of discussion in Main Committee III at the 2005 NPT
Review Conference, an explicit agenda item for the
Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2010 Review
Conference, and the subject of numerous working papers by
various States Party - including the members of the European
Union, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
Developing a common position regarding withdrawal from the
Treaty under these circumstances will help ensure a prompt
and appropriate international response in any future cases.

The Right to Withdraw

The right to withdraw from the NPT is enshrined in Article
X.1, which provides that:

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have
the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country.
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties
to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.

All Parties possess such a right to withdraw, and this right
cannot be eliminated without the Treaty,s amendment pursuant
to Article VIII.1. It has been correctly observed that the
existence of a right of withdrawal is not an issue open to
interpretation, and that it would not be appropriate to
penalize withdrawal per se - for clearly the drafters of the
Treaty envisioned that circumstances could arise in which a
State Party would feel the need to withdraw from the NPT when
confronted with a threat to its supreme interest.

Nevertheless, withdrawal from a treaty does not absolve a
state of any violation of the Treaty that was committed while
still a Party to the Treaty. Should a party withdraw from
the Treaty before it remedies its violations, it should
remain accountable for those violations.

Making Withdrawal Unattractive to Violators

Effective international action to ensure that violators will
not benefit from their noncompliance and withdrawal would
further strengthen the NPT, international peace and security,
and reinforce norms that facilitate international nuclear
cooperation because it would make both violation and Treaty
withdrawal during or after violation less attractive.

Should a Party announce its intention to withdraw, Article
X.1 provides an opportunity for the international community
to address the situation. It is clear that the Treaty
envisions that Parties will consider withdrawal only in the
most serious of circumstances: those extraordinary events
which jeopardize its "supreme interests." The requirement
that notice of withdrawal be given to other Parties and the
United Nations Security Council three months in advance also
allows time for the international community to seek to
influence the withdrawing party or to prepare to deal with
the consequences of a completed withdrawal. The requirement
that the withdrawing party include a statement in its notice
of withdrawal explaining the circumstances it believes
jeopardize its supreme interests - and the requirement that
such events be related to the subject matter of the NPT -
affords the international community an opportunity to
consider the motivations and reasons of the withdrawing
party, and to consider any responses that might be
appropriate.

Although a decision to withdraw is a matter of national
sovereignty, the international community should seek avenues
of redress in the case of withdrawal by a violator of the
NPT, especially where the violator wishes to continue the
course of action that created the NPT violation.

When a notice of withdrawal has been given by a Party in
violation of the NPT, the Security Council should immediately
review the matter, and consult NPT Parties as appropriate to
explore ways and means to address the issues raised by the
notification of intent to withdraw. When given notice of
withdrawal by a party in violation of the treaty, the U.N.
Security Council should consider the potential consequences
of the intended withdrawal for international peace and
security; it should meet promptly to consider the
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of
th(e) Treaty, cited as reasons for withdrawal, as well as
whether there are alternative measures to address and resolve
the circumstances cited by the notice-giving party. An NPT
violator's intention to withdraw will likely be coupled with
the intention to acquire nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the
Council should consider options consistent with the U.N.
Charter that may be warranted - with regard to holding the
withdrawing party responsible for its past noncompliance,
addressing any threat to peace and security that its actions
may present, or both.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Board
of Governors could take steps to help ensure the continuation
of safeguards should a Party in violation of the NPT complete
the withdrawal procedures under Article X, ensure that the
Security Council is fully informed of all relevant
information in the IAEA,s possession, and help prevent
(e.g., through suspending supply agreements, a cessation of
technical assistance, or the withdrawal of nuclear material
and equipment) a State in violation of its NPT or IAEA
obligations from profiting by association with the Agency.
Because a State,s withdrawal from the Treaty risks leaving
nuclear materials and technology unsafeguarded, in cases
where a violator has given notice of its intent to withdraw,
the U.N. Security Council should meet promptly and seek to
ensure that steps are taken to continue implementation of
safeguards until such time as past violations have been
remedied fully. Such withdrawing States also should be urged
to conclude IAEA safeguards agreements that operate
independently of NPT adherence (e.g., pursuant to INFCIRC/66).

States and their entities should not continue any nuclear
supply or cooperation with a country that was in violation of
the NPT at the time of its withdrawal, unless such a step is
endorsed by the U.N. Security Council. Nor should such a
withdrawing Party be allowed to benefit from the use of
nuclear materials and equipment that it imported while it was
an NPT Party. To this end, NPT nuclear supplier states
should seek through appropriate means to halt the use of
nuclear material and equipment previously supplied to the
withdrawing state and to secure the elimination of such items
or their return to the original supplier. NPT nuclear
suppliers should reserve such rights in their bilateral
nuclear supply arrangements and exercise them wherever
appropriate. They should also reserve the right to terminate
supply agreements with an NPT Party that violates its
commitments and then withdraws from the Treaty.

NPT Parties should undertake effective actions to seek to
dissuade a state from withdrawing while in violation of the
Treaty. They should express opposition to such a step
before, during, and after the Article X notice period.
Parties might, for instance, consider holding an
extraordinary meeting to consider such a case of withdrawal.

End paper on "Deterring and Responding to NPT Withdrawal by
Treaty Violators"
RICE


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