Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE42905
2008-04-23 16:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND

Tags:  PGOV PREL EUN UN XG XF AR IR 
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DE RUEHC #2905/01 1141705
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231656Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0437
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3926
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2451
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1461
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 042905 

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NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UN XG XF AR IR
SUBJECT: US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND
US-EU MIDDLE EAST TROIKA MEETINGS AT THE DEPARTMENT, APRIL
10

REF: LISBON 2750

Classified By: EUR/ERA BILL LUCAS. REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 042905

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UN XG XF AR IR
SUBJECT: US-EU-CANADA TRILATERAL MEETINGS ON IRAN AND
US-EU MIDDLE EAST TROIKA MEETINGS AT THE DEPARTMENT, APRIL
10

REF: LISBON 2750

Classified By: EUR/ERA BILL LUCAS. REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During the April 10 U.S.-EU-Canada
trilateral meetings on Iran for the Slovenian EU Presidency,
all three delegations agreed that Iran sought to undermine
everything that the international community sought to achieve
in the Middle East, and that its nuclear program and state
sponsorship of terrorism constituted direct challenges to the
international community and its norms of behavior. All
agreed that Iran seemed increasingly confident in its
influence in the region and its ability to defy the rest of
the world. There was consensus that much more must be done
to increase the pressure on the Iranian regime to change its
external and domestic policies, but some divergences emerged
on the means of doing so, particularly due to EU internal
divisions on the Iranian nuclear program. In the U.S.-EU
troika Middle East meetings that took place the same day,
Department officials urged greater EU engagement on Iraq and
support for regional reform efforts, explained the rationale
behind USG support for autonomy (rather than independence)
for Western Sahara, and updated the EU on our efforts to
promote Arab-Israeli peace and Lebanese freedom from Syrian
interference in Lebanon,s internal affairs. In most of the
other Middle East discussions, the EU reps were primarily in
listening mode, but they did express frustration at the
apparent slow progress of Israeli-Palestinian peace
negotiations and defended engagement with Syria. In
introductory remarks, EUR/ERA Director Bill Lucas urged the
EU delegation to work with the Department to find ways to use
the U.S.-EU summit in June to highlight and strengthen our
bilateral cooperation on Middle East issues. END SUMMARY.

IRAN'S REGIONAL ROLE
--------------


2. (C) The EU delegation opened the Iran discussions by
highlighting the uniformly negative role that Iran plays in

the region, opposing the Arab-Israeli peace process,
sponsoring Hizballah, Palestinian rejectionist groups, and
other militant and terrorist organizations, and denying
Israel,s right to exist. Iran was a troublesome actor on
all the regional issues of interest to the international
community and it was growing increasingly self confident and
assertive. The influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) was growing within the regime and the constant
regional travel of President Ahmadinejad and FM Mottaki gave
the Iranian public the impression that their country was not
isolated. The apparent lack of progress in
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations also served to increase
Iranian influence, even in predominantly Sunni Arab countries.


3. (C) NEA PDAS Feltman shared the EU,s concerns and much
of its analysis, agreeing that Iran was a threat to all of
our regional priorities. Many of Iran,s neighbors were
troubled by its actions but hesitated to speak out. Through
the ongoing Gulft Strategic Dialogue, the USG was working
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the GCC 2 to
provide defensive weaponry to Gulf states to strengthen their
ability to stand up to Iran. The Iranians claimed to be
supportive of the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, but
their actions did not match their words, as the recent
congressional testimony of Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus had highlighted in the case of Iraq. The
international community needed to find ways to increase the
price that Iran pays for its efforts to destabilize its
neighbors. Feltman noted that while there might be
differences of opinion and tactics within the Iranian regime,
the decision to use violence and terror to destabilize
Iran,s neighbors had to be made at the highest levels.
Acting Iran Office Director Wooster stressed that we have to
judge Iran by its actions, and it has sent no signals of any
kind that it wants to change its behavior or negotiate
seriously on any issue.


4. (C) Canadian delegation head Venner agreed with the U.S.
and EU analysis. He reported that Canada had amended its
"controlled engagement policy" with Iran to add discussion of
regional issues to the existing three subjects of engagement
(the Iranian nuclear program, human rights, and consular

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affairs) with Tehran. Venner also reported that the Iranians
had forced the Canadian ambassador to leave Tehran after
Canada refused to accept three successive Iranian nominees
(two of which were former hostage takers) to be ambassador to
Canada. The Canadians had expected that Iran would
eventually overplay its hand as it meddled in its neighbors,
internal affairs and provoke a backlash, but this had not
happened yet. However, certain events, including the UN
Security Council sanctions on Iran for its nuclear
activities, U.S. financial sanctions, and the U.S. capture of
IRGC operatives in Iraq, had thrown Tehran off balance, and
the international community should continue to find ways to
keep the regime off balance.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
--------------


5. (C) PDAS Feltman explained that the USG remained
committed to the dual track approach to Iran,s nuclear
program--proceeding with sanctions as long as Iran continues
to defy the UNSC, but offering a package of incentives if
Iran is willing to cease enrichment and negotiate. It was
crucial to increase the pressure on Iran, and Feltman hoped
the EU would move quickly to implement UNSCR 1803 in EU
policy/regulations, designate additional individuals and
entities associated with Iran,s nuclear program, and enact
still further new EU sanctions. The international consensus
that existed against Iran,s nuclear program had to be
leveraged to pressure Iran to make a strategic decision to
end that program. The new Iran sanctions that the U.S.
Department of the Treasury had implemented in 2007 were
having an impact, and this should give us hope that
additional measures can have an even greater impact. Wooster
stressed that if the EU failed to approve a strong package of
autonomous sanctions on Iran, that would send a clear message
of weakness to Iran, and it would grow even bolder. Possible
Russian or Chinese replacement of EU countries as Iran,s
business partners--or insufficient UNSCR implementation by
those two countries--should not serve as an excuse for EU
inaction.


6. (C) Venner reported that Canada was 95% finished
implementing UNSCR 1803 and would take the final steps very
soon. Going forward, Canada would support any new steps
developed by the P5 1. The economic impact on Iran of
sanctions thus far seemed greater than might have been
anticipated, but the sanctions nevertheless showed no sign of
pressuring Iran to change its policy. At least in terms of
rhetoric, the UN sanctions had only increased the
determination of the Iranians to press forward. Tehran had
also shown no interest in the P5 1 incentives package. It
was not clear whether it was high oil prices, Iranian public
support for the nuclear program, or insufficient scope or
bite to the sanctions that accounted for the regime,s
ability to resist thus far. Feltman agreed that the Iranians
had shown no real interest in serious negotiation on any
incentives to end their nuclear program. While the U.S.
position on the preconditions for negotiations had shifted a
great deal over time, the Iranians had shown no flexibility.


7. (C) The EU participants all stressed that they shared
the goal of increasing the pressure on Iran, but the internal
EU discussion on how to pursue this goal was unresolved.
Several EU participants said it was difficult for the EU to
act if Russia and China did not, because otherwise the latter
pair would simply replace any economic ties that European
countries might cut with Iran. The EU also felt that more
needed to be done to send a clear message to the Iranian
public that the international community recognizes Iran,s
right to civilian nuclear energy. This was necessary to
counter the regime,s claims that the West seeks to hold Iran
back technologically. The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iran had not changed the EU,s position on
Iran sanctions, but the poor messaging and focus of the NIE
had confused European publics and blunted support for
decisive action.


8. (C) When the EU repeatedly noted that lack of consensus
was preventing it from acting, Feltman and Wooster noted
their frustration with this situation. The EU was not even
in a position to state that it would be able to act if the
waters that the NIE had muddied somehow became crystal clear.
During a break after this session, the French and Council
Secretariat representatives approached Wooster and asked the

SIPDIS
U.S. side not to "force the EU to say what it cannot",
meaning that to force it to admit that internal divisions
have paralyzed it. Instead they urged the USG to "twist the

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arms" of the Germans and Italians to get them on board with
the sanctions effort.

IRAN AND THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
-------------- --------------


9. (C) PDAS Feltman noted that Iran,s state sponsorship of
terrorism was aimed against everything the international
community sought to achieve in the region. In blatant
violation of UNSCRs 1701 and 1747, Iran had rearmed Hizballah
since the 2006 war and it continued to use Hizballah as tool
of propaganda and policy. Syria facilitated Iranian arms and
financial transfers to Hizballah and others, but Iran was the
key actor. Iran armed Palestinian rejectionist groups and
provided funds and sophisticated weapons to elements in Iraq
and Afghanistan that were using this support to attack U.S.
and international forces. It was crucial that the
international community devote greater attention to these
Iranian actions and that it force the regime to pay a greater
price for using such methods. Thus far the UNSC had been
unable to reach agreement on a statement regarding Iran,s
violations of Security Council resolutions relating to
Lebanon. Both Feltman and S/CT Feierstein noted that Iran
was using the international diplomatic and financial systems
to implement terrorism as state policy. Feierstein urged the
EU to reconsider designating Hizballah a terrorist
organization, particularly if Hizballah carried out some sort
of revenge act for the killing of terrorist Imad Mugniyeh.


10. (C) Slovenian MFA Middle East Department head Majhen
and French representative Salins noted that the EU listed
Hamas as a terrorist organization, but not Hizballah, due to
the lack of an EU consensus on the latter group. Some EU
Member States did not want to close off dialogue with
Hizballah because it represented a significant portion of the
Lebanese population, but everyone recognized that it was
seeking to undermine the Lebanese government. Some in the EU
felt that engagement of Hizballah and its participation in
Lebanese politics would moderate the organization over time.
PDAS Feltman questioned this belief, noting that some people
in Lebanon had taken this view and had brought Hizballah into
the Lebanese government, but it had only grown more radical
and irresponsible; it had even provoked a war with Israel
while it was participating in the government. Feierstein
added that Hizballah remained a tool of Iran, and not an
independent Lebanese actor. Salins noted that the presence
of Iranian FM Mottaki at the funeral for Mugniyeh showed that
Iran no longer felt the need to make much effort to conceal
its sponsorship of terrorism.


11. (C) Venner said Canada was concerned by Iran,s active
support for terrorism in the region. He noted that Iran was
supplying ever more dangerous rockets to militants in Gaza.
Its rearmament of Hizballah could enable that group to launch
another conflict with Israel. Venner agreed that the world
needed to call more attention to what Iran was doing, but
beyond this it was difficult to find an effective response.
Some Canadian parliamentarians were considering legislation
to allow Canadian citizens to sue foreign governments in
Canada for acts of state-sponsored terrorism, but the MFA had
concerns regarding some of the likely diplomatic consequences
of such legislation. Feltman noted that the U.S. already had
such legislation, but that it was problematic for diplomatic
purposes and there were few Iranian assets in the United
States to be seized in any case.

POLITICAL SITUATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN
--------------


12. (C) Venner said the only significant developments in the
Iranian domestic political and human rights situation in the
last six months were the March Majlis elections and the
general worsening of human rights abuses. The Majlis
election was so utterly flawed that it was difficult to make
much of either the outcome or the 60% turnout that the regime
claimed. The new Majlis might give President Ahmadinejad
some difficulties, but the significance of the Majlis
election results for the upcoming presidential elections was
not clear. It did appear that Ahmadinejad could be reelected
if his opponents failed to unify against him. However, we
should not focus overly on the presidential elections since
little would change in Iran no matter who won the presidency.
Although the human rights situation was worsening, it was
becoming more difficult each year to secure passage of the
Canadian-sponsored UN human rights resolution on Iran.
However, if the international community gave up on the
resolution and human rights in Iran more generally, it would

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lose credibility on the nuclear issue and play into the
regime,s arguments that the west did not care about the
Iranian people. Ethnic minorities remained restive, but were
not a serious threat to regime stability. Similarly, the
economy was weak, but not faltering.


13. (C) DRL DAS Barks-Ruggles agreed with Venner,s
presentation, noting that many Iranians were effectively
compelled to vote if they wanted to retain their jobs,
student status, food subsidies, etc. It appeared that the
number of spoiled ballots in the March election had been very
high. The international community needed to do more to
highlight all the ways Iranian elections failed to meet
international standards and to show the Iranian people what
real elections are like in other countries. On human rights,
Barks-Ruggles agreed the situation was worsening; she raised
the idea of reviving the previous practice of circulating
lists of specific cases to track and highlight. Supporters
of the UN Iran human rights resolution would have to redouble
their efforts to ensure it continued to be approved each year.


14. (C) Majhen said Canadian, U.S., and EU views on these
issues were virtually identical. The Slovenian EU Presidency
had issued a number of strong statements on the human rights
situation in Iran (which both Feltman and Barks-Ruggles
acknowledged and appreciated). The Presidency would continue
to issue statements and raise the issue with the Iranians.
Majhen noted that the EU continued to try to persuade Iran to
resume a human rights dialogue with it, but it was not
optimistic that Tehran would do so. European Commission
representative Tezapsidis noted that the Iranians often
refused to receive EU demarches on human rights and that
sometimes the only way they could be delivered was for the
Slovenian MFA to summon the Iranian Ambassador in Ljubljana
to receive the messages. Tezapsidis noted that the regime
had also refused to approve any presence by the European
Commission in Iran. EU Council Secretariat representative
Cosse described the elections as a victory for the Iranian
Supreme Leader since he succeeded in sidelining the
reformists and reducing them to a purely intellectual
opposition. Salins cautioned that the international
community must be careful if it sought to observe Iranian
elections in any way, so as not to give any legitimacy to a
completely flawed process. Salins noted it was unclear
whether the regime,s manipulation of the Majlis elections,
which was much more blatant than in the past, reflected
confidence or insecurity.

IRAQ
--------------


15. (C) S/I Deputy Coordinator Blakeman noted that the
recent testimony by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus,
as well as the April 10 statement by President Bush, made
clear that the USG remained committed to supporting a stable,
democratic Iraq. Violence had dropped considerably in the
last six months, but more political progress was necessary.
Some significant legislation of interest to the Sunni
minority had already been approved, including modification of
de-Baathification laws, an amnesty, pension reform, and a
provincial powers law that would lead to new provincial
elections by the end of the year. International engagement
was growing as well, with an upcoming Iraq neighbors
ministerial in Kuwait on April 22 and an International
Compact meeting in Sweden May 29.


16. (C) Blakeman urged the EU to implement elements of the
Iraq recommendations in a recent report of the European
Parliament and to move against the broadcasting and fund
raising efforts of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in
Europe in order to help forestall additional Turkish military
activity in Iraq. He also asked the EU to increase its
diplomatic presence in Iraq and support U.S. efforts to
encourage additional Arab diplomatic representation and
outreach in Iraq. When Iraqi PM Maliki visited Brussels the
week of April 14-18, it would be helpful for the EU to press
Maliki to do more to assist Iraqi refugees (a message the USG
was already sending). Blakeman also noted that the USG would
welcome an early visit by EU High Representative Solana to
Iraq and updated the EU on the status of U.S.-Iraqi
negotiation of a status of forces agreement (SOFA).


17. (C) Majhen stressed the EU,s support for national
reconciliation efforts in Iraq and its efforts to find ways
to increase its engagement in Iraq. The EU remained
concerned by the human rights situation in Iraq and by the
plight of internal and external Iraqi refugees. Tezapsidis

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added that Commission assistance to Iraq was shifting towards
institution and capacity building. Negotiation of the
EU-Iraq trade and cooperation agreement was progressing well,
and a fifth round of talks would take place June 18-20.

REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
--------------


18. (C) NEA DAS Patton stressed the commitment of President
Bush and the Secretary to the promotion of democratic reform
as a key pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East. We were
now focusing on country-specific programs and cooperating
with reformers and governments in an effort to develop the
region,s governing institutions and democratic processes to
international norms. In some countries we were pressing for
comprehensive reforms (Syria, Iran),in other places we
sought to strengthen existing democratic institutions (Iraq,
Lebanon, Palestinian Authority),and in the rest we had a
mixed package of technical assistance programs focusing on a
wide variety of reform efforts including promoting education,
strengthening civil society, and supporting women,s rights.
The G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA)
initiative was another tool we used to promote political,
education, and financial reform.


19. (C) EU participants asked DAS Patton if the U.S. worked
with the Arab League in these efforts, how certain cases of
"elections gone wrong" had affected U.S. policy, whether
steps towards democracy had increased sectarianism in the
region, and how the U.S. viewed the EU role on these issues.
Patton said that those regional elections that had taken
place in open, transparent systems had led to defeats for
radical parties (including in Jordan, Morocco, and Pakistan).
It was when the state sought to crush and de-legitimize any
political opposition that radical Islamists grew stronger, as
had happened with the PA,s efforts against Hamas prior to
the 2006 elections and as we were now seeing in Egypt. There
was no single model for everyone to follow, but people needed
to feel that they could change and improve their governments
by peaceful means. In U.S. policy, these efforts had to be
balanced with security interests in a nuanced, long-term
approach. Overall we saw EU policy on these issues as
complementary to our own, but Patton urged the EU to send a
stronger, more consistent pro-reform message in its
engagement with the region and not simply to focus on
political or economic ties.

WESTERN SAHARA
--------------


20. (C) NEA DAS Gray reported that the USG had just
completed a policy review on the Western Sahara issue; we had
concluded that it was time to resolve this long-running issue
and that the most realistic solution is autonomy for Western
Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. Morocco would not accept
Western Sahara independence, the international community
would not impose it, and such an independent state would not
be viable. The U.S. thus encouraged the Polisario to discuss
the Moroccan autonomy plan or put forth its own autonomy
plan. There were indications that the Polisario might seek
to wait out the end of the current U.S. administration, but
this was a mistake, as our policy would not change with a new
administration. Majhen noted that the EU had no common
position on Western Sahara due to divisions among EU Member
States. Salins clarified that while this was true, all EU
Member States supported the negotiation process.

ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE
--------------


21. (C) NEA DAS Danin noted that the Secretary and President
Bush were committed to reaching an Israeli-Palestinian
agreement by the end of the year. The United States
continued to work on four tracks: quiet negotiations between
the parties, capacity building of Palestinian institutions,
implementation of Roadmap commitments, and regional support
for the process. Hamas was a challenge to these efforts, but
the door for dialogue was still open to Hamas if it chose to
meet the requisite criteria. In principle, the USG welcomed
the Russian proposal for a conference in Moscow as a follow
up to Annapolis, but only when the focus and objectives for
such a conference were clearer and the timing appropriate.
It was possible there might be a Quartet meeting in early May
to coincide with the May 2 meeting of the Ad-Hoc Liaison
Committee (AHLC) in London.


22. (C) The EU representatives welcomed regular high level

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meetings to keep the two parties on track and ensure that
their negotiations progressed. The EU also stressed the need
for improvements in the situation on the ground, and placed
the onus for action on Israel. The growth of Israeli
settlements and the increase in the number of Israeli
obstacles to movement in the West Bank had to be addressed if
negotiations were to progress and economic development in the
West Bank to be possible. If something were not done, the
West Bank could go the way of Gaza. The EU could not keep
putting its money into an economic "black hole." Pessimism
was growing among Arab countries, and they might withdraw
their support for the current peace efforts if there were no
visible progress. Danin agreed that Israel should do more,
but so should other countries in the region. Many Arab
countries had not yet delivered on their pledges of support
to the Palestinian Authority; the Arab states needed to
actively support the process and not simply be observers.

LEBANON/SYRIA
--------------


23. (C) The EU representatives highlighted their support for
the Arab League initiative on Lebanon. They recognized that
Syria was the main obstacle to progress in Lebanon, but did
not want to isolate Damascus. The EU preferred to engage
Syria and find ways to move Damascus out of the Iranian
orbit. There had to be a way to end the Iranian-Syrian
"marriage of convenience" and bring Syria back into the
mainstream Arab fold. DAS Danin said the USG was
disappointed with Syria,s post-Annapolis behavior and its
failure to follow up with any actions that would indicate a
willingness to change its problematic behavior. The USG was
not trying to isolate Syria, but rather to persuade it to
choose a new course. If Damascus wanted to change, it could
begin to demonstrate this by allowing the election of a new
president in Lebanon. If there were a way to separate Syria
from Iran, it was not apparent to us. High profile visits to
Syria by a variety of leaders had failed to produce any
results. In response to a question from the EU, Danin said
that U.S. warships were stationed off the Lebanese coast as a
reflection of our concern for regional stability. The
deployment was intended to have a stabilizing effect, and
thus far it appeared to have done so.

NEXT MEETINGS
--------------


24. (U) The Canadian delegation proposed that the next
U.S.-EU-Canada trilateral meetings on Iran and the U.S.-EU
Middle East troika meetings take place in Ottawa in September
(with a specific date to be determined).


25. (U) Participants:

United States:

Jeffrey Feltman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Kent Patton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Gordon Gray, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Robert Danin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Chat Blakeman, Deputy Coordinator for Iraq policy, S/I
Henry Wooster, Acting Office Director, NEA/IR
Erica Barks-Ruggles, Deputy Assistant Secretary, DRL
Gerald Feierstein, S/CT
Bill Lucas, Office Director, EUR/ERA
Jeffrey Giauque, Senior Political Officer, EUR/ERA

Canada:

Gordon Venner, Director General for the Middle East and North
Africa, Canadian MFA
Jeffrey McLaren, Deputy Director, Iran/Iraq, Gulf and Maghreb
Division, Canadian MFA
Racha Mishra, Iran Desk Officer, Canadian MFA
Allen Brown, Counselor, Canadian Embassy, Washington DC

EU Council Secretariat:

Didier Cosse, Middle East/Gulf Task Force, Brussels
Colin Scicluna, Middle East/Gulf Task Force, Brussels

EU Commission:

Leonidas Tezapsidis, Head of Unit for the Near East, DG
RELEX, Brussels
Reinhold Brender, Political Counselor, Delegation of the
European Commission, Washington DC

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Slovenia:

Miljen Majhenm, Chair of Middle East and Gulf Section,
Slovenian MFA
Tomaz Mencin, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the
Department for Asia, Africa, and Pacific, Slovenian MFA
Tadej Rupel, Political Counselor, Slovenian Embassy,
Washington DC

France:

Renaud Salins, Counsellor for Middle East Affairs, French
Embassy, Washington DC
RICE