(S) SHIELD S05-08: IMMINENT TRANSFER OF CW

S E C R E T STATE 035977

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC CH IR

SUBJECT: (S) SHIELD S05-08: IMMINENT TRANSFER OF CW
PRECURSOR CHEMICAL TO IRAN

REF: BEIJING 333 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: ISN/CB Acting Office Director Richard D'Andrea for
Reasons 1.4 B, C, D, and H


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5.


2. (S) Background: The U.S. has information that a shipment
of 1000 metric tons of the CW precursor chemical sodium
sulfide (also spelled sulphide) from China to Iran is
imminent. Specifically, the Chinese company China Northern
Chemical and Minerals Company is scheduled to load this CW
precursor chemical shipment in Tianjin aboard the
Iranian-flagged M/V Iran Teyfouri on Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL) Persian-Japanese Line voyage 1854 for
delivery to Bandar Abbas. The M/V Iran Teyfouri is scheduled
to arrive at Tianjin on April 10, 2008. China Northern
Chemical and Minerals Company also sought to transfer 800
metric tons of sodium sulfide to Iran in September 2007.


3. (S) Background Cont'd: China and the Australia Group
control sodium sulfide, and the Iranian recipient in both
cases is a transportation company and therefore not the
end-user. We are concerned that this CW precursor chemical
could be used for, or diverted to, a CW program, and are
interested in learning whether China's export licensing or
customs systems vetted these transfers and, if so, the reason
for their approval. Moreover, as the M/V Teyfouri's
scheduled Tianjin arrival is April 10, the U.S. wants to urge
China to take all steps necessary to investigate this case
and prevent the scheduled transfer.


4. (S) Background Cont'd: The M/V Iran Teyfouri has been
involved in previous proliferation activity (reftel). In
January 2008, the vessel delivered chemicals to Iran,s solid
missile propellant program. In response to U.S. demarches,
China claimed that it investigated and found that the
chemicals were delivered to a company in Singapore vice Iran.
However, open source information proves that the vessel did
not stop in Singapore during the period in questions and
successfully delivered the chemicals to the intended Iranian
missile end-user. Singapore Customs also confirmed that the
Teyfouri did not call in Singapore. We believe that Chinese
authorities were provided with false information during their
investigation. The U.S. has repeatedly proposed sending a
State experts team to Beijing to brief MFA experts on the
January voyage of the Teyfouri and to discuss improving
cooperation on interdiction issues, but this proposal has
continually been turned down by Beijing.


5. (U) Action Request: Request Post convey the points in
paragraph 7 to the appropriate senior host government
officials and report response. Points may be left as a
non-paper. Washington also will deliver the same points to
the Chinese DCM on Tuesday, April 8.


6. (S) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S05-08 and
slug for ISN and EAP. Please contact ISN/CB Peter Roe at
202-647-1194 or via classified e-mail at roepb@state.sgov.gov
for additional information or clarification. Post's
assistance is appreciated.


7. Begin talking points/non-paper.

(Secret//Rel China)

-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we
would like to raise an urgent matter of chemical weapons (CW)
proliferation concern and request the Chinese government's
assistance in preventing this transfer.

-- We have information that the Chinese company China
Northern Chemical and Minerals Co. is supplying the CW
precursor chemical sodium sulfide (also spelled sulphide) to
Iran.

-- Specifically, China Northern Chemical and Minerals Company
is shipping approximately 1000 metric tons of sodium sulfide
flakes to Pakrahan Tarbar International Forwarding and
Transportation Company aboard the Iranian-flagged M/V Iran
Teyfouri.

-- The sodium sulfide is scheduled to be loaded in Tianjin
aboard the M/V Iran Teyfouri on the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL) Persian-Japanese Line (PJL) voyage
1854 for delivery to Bandar Abbas.

-- The M/V Iran Teyfouri is scheduled to arrive at Tianjin on
April 10, 2008.

-- The freight provisional invoice number is 14640/7/31251.

-- Previously, in September 2007, China Northern Chemical and
Minerals also sought to transfer approximately 800 metric
tons of sodium sulfide flakes to the Pakrahan Tarbar
International Forwarding and Transportation Company in Iran.

-- The Iranian recipient in both cases is a transportation
company and therefore can not be the end-user.

-- While it has legitimate civilian uses, sodium
sulfide/sulphide also can be used as a CW precursor chemical
and therefore is controlled by China and the Australia Group.

-- In light of its CW and other programs of proliferation
concern, its support to terrorist organizations, and its
efforts to destabilize other countries in the region, Iran,
we believe, is an unreliable destination for dual-use
exports, particularly hundreds of tons of CW precursor
chemicals.

-- Iranian end-user statements or other assurances are
neither credible nor trustworthy.

-- We therefore are concerned that this CW precursor chemical
could be intended for, or diverted to, a CW program.

-- In addition, transfers of CW precursor chemical to Iran
may result in the imposition of U.S. sanctions against the
entities involved.

-- We therefore request that the Chinese government take all
steps necessary to investigate and stop this transfer in
order to prevent Iran from acquiring CW precursor chemicals.

-- We also are interested in learning whether China's export
licensing or customs systems vetted these transfers and, if
so, the reason for their approval.

-- We look forward to the Chinese government sharing with us
the results of its investigation into this matter as soon as
possible.

-- In a related matter, we would like to strongly request
that China urgently reconsider the U.S. proposal to accept
the visit of a Department of State experts team to discuss
the January voyage of the M/V Iran Teyfouri.

-- Our experts team would like to provide detailed
information that is significant to China,s January
investigation into the vessel and that we believe will also
significantly inform China,s future investigation of related
cases.

-- Providing our experts the opportunity to meet face-to-face
to discuss the technical details of cases such as this one
will contribute to our joint efforts to deepen and improve
our counterproliferation cooperation.

End talking points/non-paper.
RICE


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