MARCH 26 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

UNCLAS STATE 035962

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CA CBC ETTC FR GM JA KNNP PARM PREL RS TRGY UK
SUBJECT: MARCH 26 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
WORKING GROUP IN TOKYO

REF: STATE 13105

--------------
SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) AT THE MARCH 26 G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP WORKING GROUP
MEETING (GPWG),RUSSIA POURED MORE COLD WATER ON THE PROPOSAL
TO EXPAND GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP (GP) ACTIVITIES BEYOND RUSSIA
AND THE REST OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU) -- THE PROPOSAL
SUPPORTED BY ALL OTHER G-8 MEMBERS AND THE MAJOR GP
OBJECTIVE FOR THE U.S. UNDER JAPAN'S G-8 PRESIDENCY. AT THE
TABLE AND ON THE MARGINS, RUSSIA MADE CLEAR IT WOULD OPPOSE
ANY SUMMIT LANGUAGE ON GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION THIS YEAR, CITING
THE NEED TO FINISH THE PROMISED PROJECTS IN RUSSIA FIRST.
DURING DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF GP PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION IN RUSSIA, THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE
COMPLAINED ABOUT THE FAILURE OF SOME PARTNERS (IDENTIFIED ON
THE MARGINS AS ITALY AND FRANCE, IN PARTICULAR) TO FULFILL
THEIR GP PLEDGES OR TO RESPOND MEANINGFULLY TO RUSSIA'S
EARLIER REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION OF THEIR INTENTIONS IN
THAT REGARD. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAYWARD REAFFIRMED THE U.S.
COMMITMENT TO FULFILL ITS PLEDGE IN RUSSIA, A COMMITMENT
ECHOED BY MOST OTHER DELEGATIONS. SHE ALSO JOINED THE
JAPANESE GPWG CHAIR AND OTHER DELEGATIONS IN DECLARING THAT
THE GP HAS IN FACT -- IF NOT IN NAME -- ALREADY EXPANDED
GEOGRAPHICALLY, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RANGE OF
NONPROLIFERATION PROJECTS ALREADY BEING CARRIED OUT BY GP
PARTNERS WORLDWIDE. THREAT BRIEFINGS BY THE U.S. AND OTHERS
MADE THE CASE THAT THERE EXIST BOTH A WORLDWIDE THREAT AND A
RISK THAT CURRENT THREAT REDUCTION EFFORTS MIGHT LEAVE GAPS
THAT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST GROUPS OR PROLIFERANT
STATES. THE JAPANESE CHAIR WAS COOL TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL
THAT PROSPECTIVE NEW GP DONORS BE APPROACHED IN ORDER TO
GENERATE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO HELP FILL SUCH GAPS, BUT
AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE INFORMAL CONTACTS TO CONVEY
INFORMATION ABOUT THE GP, SUCH AS WITH KAZAKHSTAN. THIS
EXPANDED GPWG SESSION INCLUDED THE G-8 PARTNERS, TWELVE
OTHER DONOR NATIONS, THE EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, THE EU
COMMISSION, THE IAEA, AND UKRAINE. END SUMMARY.

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JAPAN'S AGENDA -- A TWO-PART ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF GP
EXPANSION
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2. (SBU) AT THE JANUARY GPWG (REFTEL),RUSSIA HAD MINCED FEW
WORDS IN COMPLAINING ABOUT THE UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF
SEVERAL PARTNERS (MENTIONING ITALY, FRANCE, AND JAPAN) IN
FULFILLING THEIR PLEDGES TO UNDERTAKE AND COMPLETE PROJECTS
IN RUSSIA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN

2002. AS THEY HAD LAST YEAR, THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED IN
JANUARY AND MARCH TO ARGUE THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON
UNFINISHED WORK IN RUSSIA INSTEAD OF ON EXPANDING TO NEW
COUNTRIES. IN AN ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE RUSSIANS FROM THEIR
OPPOSITION BY ADDRESSING THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT FUNDING
SHORTFALLS, THE JAPANESE PRESIDENCY MADE A REVIEW OF PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION IN RUSSIA THE AGENDA'S FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS.
THE OTHER MAJOR AGENDA ITEM CONCERNED THREAT BRIEFINGS,
INTENDED TO ESTABLISH THE URGENCY OF THE GLOBAL WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION THREAT AND THEREFORE THE
NEED TO EXPAND THE GP GEOGRAPHICALLY TO MEET IT.

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RUSSIA'S COMPLAINTS
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3. (SBU) THE DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY TOOK
PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TWO SETS OF DOCUMENTS
DISTRIBUTED BEFORE THE GPWG: A CATALOGUE OF CHALLENGES
COVERING IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, AND A LISTING
OF PROJECT BENCHMARKS AND ANTICIPATED TIMELINES -- BOTH
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY EACH OF THE GP DONORS. TO LEAD OFF,
RUSSIAN HEAD OF DELEGATION ANTONOV CLAIMED RUSSIA HAD SO FAR
RECEIVED ONLY 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL FUNDS PLEDGED TO IT,
AS ILLUSTRATED ON A CHART. HE NOTED WITH REGRET THAT RUSSIA
HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSES TO ITS JANUARY REQUEST FOR
CONFIRMATION FROM CERTAIN COUNTRIES -- WHICH HE LATER
IDENTIFIED ON THE MARGINS AS ITALY AND FRANCE -- CONCERNING
THEIR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO FULFILLING THEIR PLEDGES.
IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH CLARIFICATIONS, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR
RUSSIA TO IDENTIFY THE NECESSARY BENCHMARKS OR DO ITS OWN
BUDGET PLANNING. THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF FUNDS FOR
CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION (CWD). BASED ON A CHART
COVERING GP ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM ALL COUNTRIES, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM ROSATOM THEN MADE A POWERPOINT
PRESENTATION CONCERNING THE STATUS OF PROJECTS IN RUSSIA,
SPECIFICALLY SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST.



4. (SBU) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS NOTED THAT ADMINISTRATIVE
OBSTACLES THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED IN RUSSIA HAD SLOWED THE TEMPO
OF THEIR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ALSO
TOOK ISSUE WITH THE RUSSIAN CHART'S FIGURES, POINTING OUT
THAT THEY CONCERNED ONLY THE MONIES EXPENDED DIRECTLY INSIDE
RUSSIA, BUT NOT THE EQUIPMENT, SHIPPING, SERVICES, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD COVERED BY EXPENDITURES OUTSIDE
RUSSIA.
GERMANY NOTED THAT IT HAD COMMITTED $1.2 BILLION IN 2002,
NOT THE $1.8 BILLION CLAIMED ON THE RUSSIAN CHART. FRANCE
SAID
ITS FIGURE SHOULD BE SHOWN AS $750 MILLION, NOT THE $950
MILLION ON THE CHART. CANADA SAID ITS DISBURSEMENTS HAD BEEN
SOMEWHAT DELAYED BY ITS OBLIGATION TO SPEND THE FUNDS
EFFICIENTLY; OVER THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, IMPLEMENTATION
CHALLENGES, INCLUDING TAXATION AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS, HAD
SLOWED A PACE, BUT IT WAS HOPED THINGS WOULD NOW SPEED UP.
KOREA ASKED WHY ITS ASSISTANCE DID NOT APPEAR IN THE RUSSIAN
FIGURES.


5. (SBU) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAYWARD REITERATED THE U.S.
COMMITMENT TO FULFILL ITS ENTIRE PLEDGE TO RUSSIA BY 2012.
THE U.S. CATALOGUE OF CHALLENGES CONTAINED A RECORD OF
PROBLEMS
SOLVED AND SUCCESSFUL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. (WHEN ASKED ON
THE MARGINS, THE RUSSIANS HAD NO COMPLAINT ABOUT U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION. THEY ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEIR PERCENTAGE
FIGURE FOR PLEDGE FULFILLMENT, WHICH LISTED ONLY 31 PERCENT
FOR
THE U.S., MIGHT WELL FALL SHORT OF THE REALITY SINCE IT A
ADMITTEDLY INCLUDED ONLY MONIES TRANSFERRED TO RUSSIA AND NOT
THOSE LEGITIMATE EXPENSES INCURRED OUTSIDE RUSSIA. WHILE
THIS
UNDERSTANDING APPLIED TO SOME OTHER DONORS AS WELL, IT DID
NOT
APPLY TO ALL DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN RUSSIAN FIGURES AND
DONORS'
CLAIMS.) THE UK REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THE CHART'S 61 PERCENT
COMPLETION FIGURE FOR HIS COUNTRY'S PROJECTS LOOKED ACCURATE A
ND AFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO FINISH THE WORK IN RUSSIA AND
UKRAINE. ITALY, WHICH THE RUSSIAN CHART SHOWED AS HAVING
SPENT
ONLY 2 PERCENT OF ITS PLEDGE, SAID ITS OWN FIGURES FOR ITS
ASSISTANCE "MIGHT BE A LITTLE HIGHER" THAN THOSE ON THE
RUSSIAN CHART, AND IT "MIGHT HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL CONTRACTS TO
ANNOUNCE SOON." FRANCE SAID IT "INTENDED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA
TO IMPROVE" ITS IMPLEMENTATION RECORD. SWITZERLAND, THE EU,
AND
THE NETHERLANDS BRIEFLY REVIEWED THEIR SUCCESSFUL
IMPLEMENTATION
HISTORIES IN RUSSIA. THE UK NOTED THAT IT HAD ALLOCATED MORE
GP
FUNDS TO ROSATOM THAN ROSATOM HAD BEEN ABLE TO SPEND. MOST
DELEGATIONS ECHOED HAYWARD'S COMMITMENT WITH REGARD TO
FULFILLMENT OF PLEDGES. THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION REPORTED
THAT ITS PARLIAMENT HAD QUESTIONED WHY THE GOVERNMENT WAS
SUPPORTING A NOW PROSPEROUS RUSSIA WITH GP ASSISTANCE. THE
RESPONSE TO PARLIAMENT WAS THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE SERVED A
"COMMON
SECURITY INTEREST". NONETHELESS, THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE
NOTED,
HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HOW THE TAXPAYER
VIEWED THE FUNDS PROVIDED UNDER THE GP.


6. (SBU) ANTONOV RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT SO MUCH ONE
OF
"COMMITMENTS", BUT RATHER OF ACTUALLY TRANSFORMING THEM INTO
PROJECTS. RUSSIA HAD REAL PROBLEMS TO SOLVE: ECOLOGICAL ONES
WITH REGARD TO SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT AND THE ISSUE OF
TREATY
OBLIGATION WITH CWD. RUSSIA WOULD MEET THESE CHALLENGES --
WITH
OR WITHOUT GP HELP. IT WAS SPENDING ITS OWN MONEY TO DO SO,
BUT
SIMPLY NEEDED TO KNOW THE ACTUAL PROSPECTS FOR ASSISTANCE.


7. (SBU) TO THOSE WHO HAD CITED DIFFICULTIES WITH SITE
ACCESS
(MENTIONING ITALY),ANTONOV NOTED THAT, LIKE OTHERS, RUSSIA
HAD
CLEAR RULES ABOUT NOTIFICATIONS WITH WHICH PARTNERS SIMPLY
HAD TO
COMPLY. REFERRING DIRECTLY TO FRANCE'S BENCHMARKS DOCUMENT,
ANTONOV SAID, "THIS IS MONEY YOU SPENT SOMEPLACE ELSE." TO
KOREA,
ANTONOV BRUSQUELY DISMISSED ITS QUESTION WITH THE COMMENT
THAT IT
HAD TRANSFERRED ITS FUNDS TO JAPAN (IN A "PIGGYBACK"
PROCESS).
(FROM THE GPWG CHAIR MORINO LATER POINTEDLY REGRETTED THAT
RUSSIA
HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO THANK KOREA FOR ITS ASSISTANCE.) ANTONOV
WENT
ON TO COMPLAIN THAT PIGGYBACKING WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE WAY
TO
EXTEND ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE PROJECTS, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE
APPROPRIATE FOR SMALL PROJECTS -- AN ARGUMENT THAT WAS
INTERPRETED
PRIVATELY BY OTHER DELEGATIONS AS THE RUSSIANS' DESIRE TO
HAVE THE
CHECKS WRITTEN DIRECTLY TO THEM.) ANTONOV CITED THE UK AS AN
EXAMPLE OF WHERE PIGGYBACKING CAUSED A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY,
SINCE
IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL WHERE A PIGGYBACKING COUNTRY'S
MONEY
HAD GONE. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS RESPONDED, MAKING A COMPELLING
CASE
FOR SMALLER DONORS' USE OF LARGER DONORS' ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPABILITIES AND ESTABLISHED LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE
RUSSIAN
AUTHORITIES. THE UK REP CALLED ANTONOV'S ATTENTION TO PAGE
47 OF
THE (120 PAGE) UK BROCHURE, "GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION
PROGRAMME",
WHICH COVERED IN DETAIL THE SOURCES AND PROJECTS OF THE
STERLING
61 MILLION CONTRIBUTED BY SOME DOZEN PIGGYBACKERS ON UK GP
PROGRAMS.


8. (U) IN THE FACE OF EVIDENT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON A
HOST OF
IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONS, JAPANESE CHAIR (MORINO) SAID HE
MIGHT
SUGGEST THAT THE APRIL 23 GPWG INCLUDE A DISCUSSION ON
PROJECT
COORDINATION INVOLVING AGENCY EXPERTS, CONTRACTORS,
SUBCONTRACTORS,
ETC. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER MORINO NOW INTENDS TO
MAKE SUCH
A DISCUSSION PART OF THE APRIL GPWG. (THE U.S. WILL MAKE
CLEAR TO
MORINO THAT SUCH ISSUES ARE BEST ADDRESSED IN A BILATERAL
CONTEXT
IN DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN DONORS AND RUSSIA AND THAT IT IS
DIFFICULT
TO SEE WHAT EXPERTS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES COULD
ACCOMPLISH IN
ONE OR TWO DAYS IN TOKYO.)

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BRIEFINGS ON THE GLOBAL WMD THREAT
--------------


9. (SBU) A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE IAEA MADE A FULL
PRESENTATION ON
THE NUCLEAR THREAT FROM ITS PERSPECTIVE, THOUGH NOTING THAT
HIS
ORGANIZATION'S CHARTER DID NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH DEFINING
TERRORISM
OR COLLECTING INFORMATION ON TERRORIST GROUPS. IN ITS
REASSESSMENT
OF NUCLEAR SECURITY, THE IAEA HAD CONCLUDED THE NUCLEAR
TERRORISM
THREAT CONSISTED OF, IN ASCENDING ORDER: A) THEFT OF A
NUCLEAR WEAPON;
B) A DIRTY BOMB; OR, C) SABOTAGE OF A NUCLEAR
INSTALLATION/POWER
PLANT. THERE HAD BEEN 1340 RELEVANT INCIDENTS RECORDED.
PAST
BEHAVIOR WAS THE KEY GUIDE TO TERRORISTS' INTENTIONS. BIN
LADEN AND
OTHERS WERE QUOTED ON THE ACQUISITION OF WMD. ATTEMPTS TO
BREAK INTO
RUSSIAN WEAPONS INSTALLATIONS WERE CITED, AS WERE A NUMBER OF
NUCLEAR
TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS.


10. (SBU) THE U.S. PRESENTATION COVERED NUMEROUS UNCLASSIFIED
CASES
WHERE WEAPONS OR MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION --
RADIOLOGICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL, AS WELL AS NUCLEAR -- WERE EITHER THE OBJECTIVES
OR AT
RISK OF ACQUISITION BY TERRORIST GROUPS. THE BRIEFING NOTED
THAT,
WITH INCREASED GLOBALIZTION IN TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS,
PROLIFERATORS AND TERRORISTS FOUND IT MUCH EASIER TO OBTAIN
THESE
MATERIALS. THE INCIDENTS CITED COVERED ASIA, EUROPE AND
LATIN
AMERICA AND INVOLVED EQUIPMENT, WEAPONS, MATERIALS AND THE
KNOWLEDGE
TO MAKE USE OF THEM.


11. (SBU) FRANCE MADE A BRIEF INTERVENTION ON SECURITY ISSUES
CONCERNING CATEGORY I RADIOLOGICAL SOURCES IN FRANCOPHONE
AFRICA,
WHICH IT SAID TESTIFIED TO THE LEGITIMACY OF GP EXPANSION.


12. (SBU) AUSTRALIA REVIEWED INCIDENTS INVOLVING TERRORIST
GROUPS
IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION AS WELL AS THE
LESS-THAN-ADEQUATELY
ADDRESSED VULNERABILITIES OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND CHEMICAL
TOXINS
IN THE AREA.

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CONCLUSIONS DRAWN
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13. (SBU) WITH REGARD TO THE THREAT BRIEFINGS, THERE APPEARED
TO BE
A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THEY WERE SUGGESTIVE OF A WORLDWIDE
THREAT
AND THE RISK THAT CURRENT EFFORTS MIGHT LEAVE GAPS THAT COULD
BE
EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST GROUPS. U.S. REP HAYWARD AGAIN
AFFIRMED THE
U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PROLIFERATION POTENTIAL
REPRESENTED
BY UNSECURED MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERTISE IN RUSSIA
AND OTHER
AREAS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION BY FINISHING THE JOB THERE.
AT THE
SAME TIME, SHE SAID, THE THREAT WAS NOT STATIC, BUT EVOLVING,
AND THE
GP NEEDED TO BE READY TO RESPOND TO IT ON A GLOBAL BASIS, AS
DEMONSTRATED IN THE COURSE OF THE THREAT BRIEFINGS. THE TIME
WAS
RIPE TO LOOK TO NEW DONORS, NEW RESOURCES THAT WOULD BE
APPLIED TO
THE REGIONS DOCUMENTED IN THE BRIEFINGS. SHE FURTHER NOTED
THAT THE
GP HAS IN FACT ALREADY EXPANDED, AND IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE
PARTNERSHIP TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS.


14. (SBU) GERMANY, JAPAN, SWITZERLAND, CANADA, AND THE UK
TOOK THE FLOOR I
N SUPPORT OF IMMEDIATE GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION TO DEAL WITH
GLOBAL THREATS
THAT, AS JAPAN SAID, SHOULD NOT BE LEFT UNADDRESSED. GERMANY
ADDED THAT
IT COULD NOT ACCEPT A DECISION FOR EXTENSION BEYOND 2012 AND
CAUTIONED
THAT ANY NEW GP DONORS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED FROM
THE POINT OF
VIEW OF LIKEMINDEDNESS, A POINT LATER ECHOED BY JAPAN AND
RUSSIA. ALSO,
TOO MANY GP PARTNERS MIGHT MAKE COORDINATION DIFFICULT,
ACCORDING TO THE
GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE.


15. (SBU) ON THE U.S. SUGGESTION THAT POTENTIAL NEW DONORS BE
APPROACHED
IN CAPITALS AND/OR THAT AN OUTREACH SESSION BE HELD FOR THEM
IN CONNECTION
WITH THE APRIL GPWG, JAPAN POINTED TO THE CONCEPTUAL
AWKWARDNESS OF FORMAL
DISCUSSIONS WITH NEW DONORS IN THE ABSENCE OF A GP DECISION
TO ADMIT THEM.
INSTEAD, THE JAPANESE SUGGESTED THERE COULD BE INFORMAL
DISCUSSIONS WITH
COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE GP, INCLUDING POTENTIAL NEW DONORS, IN
ORDER TO
ACQUAINT THEM WITH THE GP.


16. (SBU) RUSSIA (ROZHKOV) AGREED THAT THE THREAT BRIEFINGS
HAD SHOWN THE
DANGERS THAT EXISTED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. SUCH
DANGERS MIGHT
EVEN BE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN SUGGESTED IN THE BRIEFINGS. IT
WAS ALSO TRUE
THAT MOST OF THE TASKS INVOLVED IN COPING WITH SUCH THREATS
RELATED TO THE
KANANASKIS PRINCIPLES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE WERE
OTHER,
EXISTING, GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS (IAEA, ETC.) TO ADDRESS THESE
ADMITTEDLY GLOBAL
THREATS. MOREOVER, THREAT ASSESSMENT WAS NOT REALLY A TASK
FOR WHICH THE GP
HAD BEEN DESIGNED. WHAT NEEDED TO BE UNDERLINED WAS THAT THE
GP WAS A UNIQUE
INSTRUMENT INTENDED TO BRING POLITICAL WILL AND RESOURCES TO
BEAR IN SPECIFIC
COUNTRIES (RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE FSU). THAT WAS TO BE
THE FIRST STAGE.
AND, WITH THE FIRST STAGE ONLY 26 PERCENT COMPLETED, IT WAS
NOT TIME TO GO
LOOKING FOR NEW TASKS -- TASKS FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC NEW
DONORS WITH
RESOURCES HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, NO SPECIFIC PROJECTS PREPARED,
AND NO SPECIFIC
WILLING RECIPIENTS RECRUITED.


17. (SBU) ROZHKOV CONCLUDED BY READING THE RELEVANT EXCERPTS
FROM THE REPORT
OF THE HEILIGENDAMM SUMMIT, CLEARLY INDICATING THAT RUSSIA
WOULD AGREE TO
SIMILAR SUMMIT LANGUAGE FOR THIS YEAR, RESTATING THE
GEOGRAPHICALLY GLOBAL
VOCATION OF THE GP, BUT AGAIN ONLY IN PRINCIPLE AND ONLY AS
AN ISSUE TO BE
EXPLORED FURTHER.

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ON THE MARGINS
--------------


18. (SBU) ASKED PRIVATELY ABOUT HIS GOVERNMENT'S STAND ON
EXTENSION OF THE GP
BEYOND 2012, THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS
HAD TWO REDLINES:
NO AGREEMENT ON EXTENSION BEYOND 2012 AND NO NEW GERMAN FUNDS
FOR THE GP BEFORE
THEN. PERSONALLY, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THERE WOULD BE
EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ON GP
EXTENSION, BUT HE FELT GERMANY WOULD NOT BE READY TO ADDRESS
THIS BEFORE 2010.
WITH REGARD TO FUNDING FOR PROJECTS BEYOND THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION IN A
GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPANDED GP, GERMANY HAD BEEN THINKING THAT
SOME OF THE FUNDS
ALREADY PLEDGED BUT NOT YET COMMITTED TO RUSSIA MIGHT BE USED.


19. (SBU) DURING A PRE-GPWG BREAKFAST U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL,
MORINO NOTED THE
AWKWARDNESS OF TRYING TO ATTRACT NEW DONOR GOVERNMENTS IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY
AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THEM INTO THE G-8'S GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP.
NONETHELESS, HE
ACCEPTED THE U.S. PLAN TO APPROACH POTENTIAL NEW DONORS ON AN
INFORMAL BASIS
AND SUGGESTED KAZAKHSTAN AS A GOOD START.


20. (SBU) SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION
IN AN EXPLORATION
OF POSSIBLE SUMMIT LANGUAGE COMPROMISES THAT MIGHT ACCOMPLISH
EFFECTIVE GP
GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION ENDED WITH ROZHKOV'S FLAT DECLARATION
THAT MOSCOW HAD
DECIDED THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH LANGUAGE THIS YEAR.

--------------
LOOKING AHEAD
--------------


21. (SBU) THE JAPANESE CHAIR HAS SIGNALED ITS RELUCTANCE
WITH REGARD TO
FORMAL APPROACHES TO NEW DONORS, AND TIME IS SHORT TO AFFECT
RUSSIA'S STAND
AGAINST GP EXPANSION IN TIME FOR THIS YEAR'S SUMMIT.
NONETHELESS, THE U.S.
IS PREPARING TO OPEN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SOME POTENTIAL
NEW DONORS IN
ORDER TO BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIA'S
OBJECTIONS THAT
NO DONORS, PROJECTS, OR RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED, AS
WELL AS TO ALLAY
THE RUSSIANS' BASIC CONCERN THAT EXPANSION WOULD MEAN
DIVERSION OF ALREADY
PLEDGED FUNDS AWAY FROM THEM.


22. (U) THIS EXPANDED GPWG SESSION INCLUDED THE G-8 PLUS
TWELVE OTHER DONOR
NATIONS, THE EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, THE EU COMMISSION, THE
IAEA, AND UKRAINE.
THE NEXT GPWG, SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 23 IN TOKYO, WILL INCLUDE
ONLY THE G-8, PLUS
THE EU.
RICE