Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE34695
2008-04-03 18:01:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: REPORTING ON THE NONPROLIFERATION

Tags:  ETTC PARM PREL EWWT PHSA UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 031801Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
S E C R E T STATE 034695 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL EWWT PHSA UP

SUBJECT: UKRAINE: REPORTING ON THE NONPROLIFERATION
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS FEBRUARY 14-15, 2008

REF: A. STATE 4680

B. 07 STATE 161304

C. 07 STATE 109303

Classified By: EUR/PRA Office Director Anita Friedt
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T STATE 034695

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL EWWT PHSA UP

SUBJECT: UKRAINE: REPORTING ON THE NONPROLIFERATION
WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS FEBRUARY 14-15, 2008

REF: A. STATE 4680

B. 07 STATE 161304

C. 07 STATE 109303

Classified By: EUR/PRA Office Director Anita Friedt
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTS: On February 14-15, the
U.S. and Ukraine held the semi-annual U.S.-Ukraine
Nonproliferation Working Group (NPWG) meeting in Washington,
DC. This marks at least nine years of cooperation between
the U.S. and Ukraine on important nonproliferation issues.
Both sides provided updates on various ongoing projects and
highlighted several areas where we have made progress on
longstanding issues. One of the most concrete examples of
progress was Ukraine's nonpaper proposing that the highly
enriched uranium at Sevastopol be relocated to Kharkiv, which
would address a longstanding concern about the security of
this material. For action requests, please see paragraphs 35
and 70.


2. (SBU) A representative from Germany joined the meeting
during the discussion of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and the three U.S. presentations on steps
the U.S. is taking to improve our export control system. For
complete delegation lists, please see para 72. Poland was
also invited to attend the sessions on the Global Partnership
and Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative.


3. (C) Cooperation remains relatively solid on most issues,
but there are still a number of areas where Ukraine's
bureaucracy holds up progress. In particular, internal
government wrangling has for the time being essentially
halted progress on the implementation of the NATO Partnership
for Peace (PfP) project to eliminate ammunition, small arms
and light weapons; Ukraine also has not made much progress on
laying the groundwork to allow for implementation of a number
of Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
projects and Department of Energy initiatives, including the
construction of a central spent nuclear material storage
facility. Washington and Embassy Kyiv need to continue to
follow-up with appropriate Ukrainian interlocutors to press
them to make progress on the large number of ongoing

programs/projects that need to be implemented. The U.S.
delegation was headed by U.S. Department of State (DOS)
EUR/PRA Office Director Anita Friedt and the Ukraine
delegation was headed by Mr. Volodymyr Belashov, Director,
Arms Control and Military Technical Cooperation Directorate,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

--------------
Opening Remarks
--------------


4. (C) The meeting was opened by Ambassador Don Mahley,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
International and Nonproliferation (ISN),and Ambassador Oleh
Shamshur, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States. Amb.
Mahley highlighted the numerous successes in 2007 in the
U.S.-Ukraine nonproliferation relationship and the importance
of continuing these discussions to ensure continued progress.
These successes included the full or partial funding of all
15 projects under the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiate;
increased funding/assistance to improve Ukraine's capability
to combat nuclear smuggling; and the successful PSI exercise
"Eastern Shield." Amb Shamshur echoed Amb. Mahley's remarks
and noted that the security and nonproliferation issues up
for discussion during the following two days were of
international importance and that many countries are involved
in the global challenges faced by the threat of proliferation
of weapons systems, including weapons of mass destruction
(WMD),and acts of terrorism.

--------------
G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction/Prevention of Nuclear Smuggling

--------------


5. (SBU) Mike Stafford, Department of State office of
Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation, opened the G8 Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction (GP)/Prevention of Nuclear Smuggling session
by highlighting the tremendous progress over the past year.
Since the last NPWG, at least partial funding has now been
secured for all fifteen projects under the Joint
Understanding of Ukraine's Priority Needs to Improve Its
Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. New commitments to
assist Ukraine have been received from Germany, South Korea,
Sweden, the United Nations (UN) Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC),and several U.S. agencies. The U.S. is continuing
to seek funding for those projects that are only partially
funded. Reflecting the multilateral nature of
nonproliferation cooperation in Ukraine, an overall total of
nine countries, including the U.S., have been identified as
donors for these projects.


6. (SBU) Project 1 ) securing facilities with high-activity
radioactive sources in use: Stafford noted that the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) has upgraded approximately 50
facilities and believes this reflects all of the relevant
sites in Ukraine. Therefore, the U.S. considers this project
to be completed, although it will reopen the project if any
new facility is identified.


7. (SBU) Projects 2-4 - strengthening Ukraine's nuclear
regulatory system: The State Nuclear Regulatory Commission
of Ukraine (SNRCU) has made significant progress in this area
through assistance from the U.S. State Department's
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). As a result of
this progress, we expect to close out the NDF project in

2008. Related to this, during a donor's meeting in December
2007 hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the SNRCU stated that its priorities for further
international assistance included equipment and training for
new inspectors. Subsequent to this conference, the SNRCU
provided the USG with a specific list of equipment and
training. The U.S. is still reviewing the list to see if we
agree with the request, but we plan to provide the requested
assistance.


8. (SBU) Project 5 ) securing orphaned and at-risk sources:
There is currently one identified facility in Ukraine that
needs funding to be cleaned out, all others are already being
addressed or have sources that fall below U.S. thresholds of
concern. To supplement the efforts to clean out the
identified facilities, Stafford proposed that Ukraine
consider implementing a public orphaned source amnesty plan,
whereby the government collects and secures orphaned sources
of which the public is aware. This would seek to decrease
the prevalence of orphaned sources and nuclear smuggling
scams in Ukraine. Such a program would be at no cost to the
citizen or organization that provides notice of the orphaned
source. Stafford added that the U.S. realizes that such an
undertaking would require additional financial resources and
would be prepared to explore options for USG financial
assistance.


9. (SBU) Project 6 ) construction of a new long-term
radioactive source storage facility: The UK has agreed to
fund design of the facility, known as Vector II, and plans to
fund its construction. At the September 2007 London
conference on nuclear smuggling, the State Department, in
partnership with DOE, announced that the U.S. will fund
approximately half the cost of consolidating sources from the
Radons into the VECTOR II facility. The U.S. is still
seeking potential donors to cover the remaining costs, which
are estimated at $1.3 million.


10. (SBU) Projects 7-11 ) improving detection capability at
borders and other ports of entry: Stafford reported on
additional funding secured from various donors. The project
to improve maritime security in the Black Sea is now
considered fully funded, but further assistance will be
sought for the other projects.


11. (SBU) Project 12 ) legal assistance to improve
prosecution of nuclear smuggling: Stafford reported that the
previously identified donor, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),now believes that it lacks
adequate funding to undertake this project. At the September
nuclear smuggling conference, the UNODC indicated that it had
the expertise and funding available to undertake such a
project in Ukraine. The UNODC is planning a legal review
conference in Kiev for March 10-14, aided by the U.S.
Department of Justice, to determine whether, and if so, how
Ukrainian laws need to be amended to allow prosecution of all
cases of nuclear smuggling. With this development, the U.S.
now considers this project to be fully funded.


12. (SBU) Project 13 ) sponsoring international cooperation
in nuclear forensics: Stafford noted that the U.S. had
funded this project in 2007, Sweden would do so in 2008, and
he was confident a sponsor would be secured for future years.


13. (SBU) Projects 14-15 ) anti-corruption training and
development: The U.S. considers both of these projects to be
fully funded and anticipates future opportunities for
additional contributions in the future.


14. (SBU) One other significant development during the last
six months was the December 2007 announcement at the
IAEA-hosted donor's conference of Germany's intention to
provide approximately five million Euros to Ukraine for
nuclear security assistance. The U.S. is very pleased by
this commitment and by Germany's stated intent to work with
Ukraine and others to determine where these funds can be most
usefully directed. The U.S. side has begun consultations
with the Germans on this matter, and it encourages the
Ukrainian side in its discussions with them to seek to target
this assistance toward those portions of the jointly agreed
projects that remain unfunded.


15. (SBU) In response, Belashov thanked the U.S. for all of
its assistance and for all donor assistance received under
this initiative. The Ukrainian delegation provided the U.S.
with a table on all the nuclear smuggling-related projects
that are ongoing for review. Belashov noted that the table
is a clear indication of the large number of projects going
on in Ukraine and indicated that he did not expect any new
ones to be proposed by Ukraine.

--------------
SS-24 Destruction
--------------


16. (S) James Reid, Director of the Office of Cooperative
Threat Reduction at the Department of Defense, reiterated the
USG's firm commitment to the safe storage of SS-24 solid
rocket motors in Ukraine until they are all eliminated.
Recalling reports from last fall that there had been
deterioration of some of the SS-24 storage buildings, Reid
reported that the U.S. had successfully found funding to
address this issue. Reid indicated that improvements had
been made to the storage facility temperature and humidity
control system that should stop the deterioration of the
SS-24 motors until all the propellant is successfully
removed. Finally, Reid indicated that once the equipment for
the propellant removal was in place, the U.S. would be in a
position to sign the contract to pay Ukraine for elimination
of the SS-24 motors.


17. (S) Belashov expressed Ukraine's appreciation for the
U.S. assistance in ensuring the safe storage of the SS-24
motors. Unfortunately, Ukraine will not finish removing all
the propellant from the motors by the end of 2009. Oleksandr
Dotsenko continued by noting that Ukraine had reviewed the
amendment to increase funding for this project by $4 million
and urged that it be approved as soon as possible. Dotsenko
reported that Ukraine had allocated $30 million last year and
planned to spend $50 million this year on the removal of the
SS-24 solid propellant. Ukraine anticipates that it will be
able to start removing the propellant by the end of 2008 and
complete the project by 2011.


18. (S) Dotsenko then requested that the U.S. review our
participation in the development of the water washout plant,
noting that the U.S. only provides 1.5 percent of the funding
for this project that Ukraine does. The U.S. was also
requested to address the payment for the three empty motor
cases and confirm that the U.S. was prepared to finance the
cleanup of the empty motor cases.


19. (S) In response, Reid stated the USG remained committed
to removing the fuel from all SS-24s in Ukrainian and that
the commitment was not so much under START, but a moral one.
It is important for the U.S. to ensure the safe elimination
of the aging SS-24 motors and the 2009 deadline under START
will not affect the U.S. commitment. Recalling his earlier
comments, Reid reported that the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency is close to a contract that would pay Ukraine for the
three empty motor cases. Ukraine would receive the same
amount of money, adjusted for inflation, as the U.S. provides
Russia.


20. (S) Belashov then raised the Ukraine's request to destroy
SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Rocket motor
cases under the START Treaty by drilling holes so that they
could be re-used as containers for waste disposal. Friedt
responded that this issue was best considered by the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) under the START
Treaty.

--------------
Biological Threat Reduction Agreement Implementation
--------------


21. (C) Extensive discussions were held on the Biological
Threat Reduction Implementation Agreement (BTRIA) both during
the formal NPWG and during a meeting on the margins. During
one of the breaks before discussion of BTRIA, Belashov
approached Jim Reid and Anita Friedt to ask what we could do
to "fix" the diplomatic note we submitted in January. He
pointed out that the current version of the diplomatic note
could not/not be approved. According to Belashov, the way it
was currently written, it obligates the Ministry of Health
(MOH) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of
Veterinary Affairs for issues that are not part of the
individual ministry responsibility. Jim Reid indicated that
this was something that could easily be fixed and that U.S.
would be happy to do it. We would just need to work out the
appropriate language.


22. (C) Andrew Weber, OSD/CTR, began the formal BTRIA session
with a discussion on the U.S. proposed amendment to the
agreement. Reiterating the earlier discussion with Reid and
Friedt, Belashov said that the only way the amendment would
be acceptable would be to clearly list the roles and
responsibilities of each agency. Belashov believed that this
could be done by exchanging a memorandum of understanding
rather than exchanging diplomatic notes. In response, Weber
indicated that our January diplomatic note had addressed this
issue and therefore nothing needed to be addressed. Belashov
reiterated that from Ukraine's perspective, the right phrase
or words needed to be added to address Ukraine's concerns.
Dotsenko continued that Ukraine agreed with the U.S. approach
to amending the implementing agreement, but the diplomatic
note needed to be clear about each agencies roles and
responsibilities.


23. (C) Following discussion on the amendment, Weber moved on
to discuss identifying land for the Central Reference
Laboratory (CRL) for dangerous pathogens in Ukraine.
Dotsenko said that Ukraine had not agreed to create the
Central Reference Laboratory and it is too early to start
discussions about land for the CRL. The U.S. emphasized that
the CRL would be ideal for Ukraine, in particular to ensure
appropriate security for the dangerous pathogens that would
be stored at the facility. In addition, Weber said that the
U.S. is in the process of building such a facility in
Tbilisi. To demonstrate the benefits of having a joint
human-veterinary laboratory, Weber reiterated the U.S. offer
to have Ukrainian experts visit the Tbilisi CRL and the one
in Canada--the model for the CTR lab design.


24. (C) Dotsenko responded that Ukraine was not convinced of
the benefits of the joint central laboratory noting the need
to have facilities located throughout Ukraine that can
monitor outbreaks. Weber understood the importance of being
able to monitor outbreaks, but indicated that the U.S. would
provide satellite facilities that would be capable of
analyzing strains and pathogens, but would not need to store
them. In cases where a strain needed further study it would
be securely transported to the CRL.


25. (C) The third issue discussed as part of the BTRIA agenda
item was pathogen consolidation. Weber began by emphasizing
the importance of consolidating all the dangerous pathogens
in Ukraine that could be used by terrorists. Dotsenko
responded that Ukraine intended the facility in Odesa would
serve as an interim location for pathogen consolidation and
requested that the U.S. clarify what pathogens we wanted to
consolidate. Weber responded that the U.S. seeks to
consolidate the strains/pathogens that could be used by
terrorists on human or agricultural targets. This would only
involve a couple of strains located at two facilities.


26. (C) On the issue of the CRL and pathogen consolidation,
Belashov indicated that the U.S. has not submitted a proposal
for the creation of one laboratory. The agreement, in fact,
calls for the creation of two laboratories. Weber, recalling
the negotiations on the agreement, clarified that there would
be one facility that would have multiple labs (a human and
agricultural lab). The benefit is that it is easier and
cheaper to secure one facility than it is to secure two.
Belashov reported that the Ukrainian Ministry of Health does
not accept the position of having only one laboratory.


27. (C) The final topic of discussion under BTRIA was the
offer of assistance from the European Union (EU) to upgrade
the security at the Crimea Anti-plague Institute. Weber said
that security upgrades at this facility did not make sense
because there were no dangerous pathogens at the Crimea
Anti-plague Institute. Alternatively, the U.S. proposed that
the EU provide the security for the CRL that the U.S. will
build. Belashov requested that the U.S. provide this
counterproposal in writing.

--------------
BTRIA Legal Meeting:
--------------


28. (C) DoD, OSD/OGC, State L/NPV and EUR/PRA held a meeting
after the BTRIA portion of the NPWG agenda. National
Security and Defense Council representative Dotsenko spoke
for Ukraine, with Ruslan Nimchynskyi of the Ukrainian
Embassy. Andy Weber led for the U.S. Participants by
discussing the diplomatic note on BTRIA presented during Sen.
Lugar's trip on January 15th. He started by explaining that
during a meeting with Mr. Belashov in December in Kyiv, Mr.
Belashov had requested that DoD send a revised diplomatic
note and provided DoD the components necessary for Ukraine's
internal requirements. Dotsenko found the note on adding new
executive agents to BTRIA fully satisfactory except for the
need to find a mechanism to delineate the fact that the
Ministry of Public Health (the existing executive agent),the
Academy of Agrarian Sciences and the State Committee of the
Veterinary Medicine would be responsible agents within their
spheres of competencies. The teams agreed that the return
note could cite the phrase within the spheres of their
competency, as long as it was in the portion of the response
note that would not directly quote the U.S. note as sent.
They agreed that the heads of the new executive agents could
submit non-binding letters with details regarding their
spheres.


29. (C) When Mr. Belashov joined the group at the end of the
two-hour session, he balked after explanation of the proposed
resolution. He claimed surprise that the diplomatic note had
been formally passed during the Lugar visit in January
without his seeing a draft first. Accusing DoD of political
opportunism, Mr. Belashov stormed out. Later, Belashov
explained to Friedt that he had not realized that the note
had been passed, and felt that he needed to further
coordinate it within the MFA--if indeed it had not already
made broader rounds within the MFA already. They agreed,
upon consultation with U.S. lawyers, that if needed, the note
could be retracted, with the modification on spheres of
competence entered into a new outgoing note. Belashov
returned the note on February 29 and the interagency is
reviewing the updates made by the Ukrainian MFA.

--------------
SCUD Elimination
--------------


30. (S) ISN/MTR Deputy Director Ralph Palmiero opened
discussion of the issue by expressing appreciation for the
Scud inventory provided by Ukraine in July 2007 and stating
that this elimination project remains a high priority for the
United States. He noted that the U.S. currently does not
have the funding for this project, but stressed that the U.S.
plans to move forward on Ukrainian SCUD elimination as money
becomes available. In preparation for that eventuality, the
U.S. has some preliminary comments/questions on the Scud
inventory. In particular, Palmiero explained that the
inventory included only missiles/launchers and wanted to be
clear that an elimination project would include the
destruction or demilitarization of all associated
Scud-related items. He highlighted several such items and
asked if Ukraine could provide detailed information on all
the Scud-associated equipment in its inventory and when such
a listing could be made available. Specifically, the U.S.
requested the following: information on all SCUD-related
items including ground support equipment, propellant-related
items including the amount of Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric
Acid (IRNFA) in Ukraine, training equipment, spare parts
kits, etc.


31. (S) Oleksandr Dotsenko of Ukraine's Secretariat of
National Security and Defense Council stressed that nothing
had changed on the Scud inventory since July 2007, noting
that the missiles and components were stored in six sites in
Ukraine. He expressed strong interest in having a U.S. team
come to Ukraine so that it could obtain the requested
information on SCUD-related items and hoped that the U.S.
remained committed to providing financial support for this
elimination project.


32. (S) Palmiero said that the U.S. remains committed to
providing both financial and technical support to the
project, but that funding is an issue at this time. He also
explained that the U.S. does not favor sending a full
technical team out to Ukraine until the funding issue is
resolved, adding that the U.S. would, however, consider the
possibility of sending a small team to Kyiv to ask
questions/gather more information on the Scuds and associated
equipment.


33. (S) Palmiero then asked what was indicated by the
categories of qualitative (technical) status on Ukraine's
July Scud inventory. Dotsenko stated that there are five
categories ) scaled from one to five ) with category one
indicating Scuds in good, usable condition, and category five
indicating Scuds in poor, unusable condition.


34. (S) Finally, Palmiero noted that the elimination of
Scud-related inhibited red-fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) is a
sensitive and costly operation, and asked if Ukraine could
provide an estimate of the amount of IRFNA Ukraine possesses.
Dotsenko stated that Ukraine has approximately 16,000 tons
of m,lange (mixed fuel),and that Ukraine and Poland have
cooperated thus far to destroy over 3,000 tons. He also
stressed that Ukraine would appreciate any assistance the
U.S. could provide to destroy the remaining m,lange, noting
the environmental danger that currently exists due to the
deterioration of the propellant storage tanks.
--------------
Missile Nonproliferation Cases
--------------


35. (S) Palmiero raised with Belashov five open missile
nonproliferation cases and asked for updates. Belashov gave
a read-out on one case but said the GOU would need additional
time to respond on the others.

A) Yuzhnoye ) Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO):
Palmiero raised the U.S. longstanding objection to
cooperation between the Ukrainian firm Yuzhnoye and the
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) on the development
of a semi-cryogenic, liquid oxygen-kerosene (LOX-kerosene)
rocket engine. Palmiero recalled the extensive discussion
the U.S. and Ukraine have had on this issue and emphasized
that as an MTCR Partner, Ukraine is committed under the MTCR
Guidelines to apply a strong presumption of denial,
regardless of the purpose of the export, to all exports of
Category I items and to notify the MTCR Partners in advance
of its intention to approve a license for any Category I
transfer to non-Partners such as India.

-- The U.S. is concerned that such an engine and its
associated technology would almost certainly be Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I items. Their
transfer would directly support India's development of
Category I missile systems, which are inherently capable of
WMD delivery. Moreover, providing this type of technology to
India is inconsistent with the MTCR's efforts to encourage
missile restraint in regions of tension, undermines
nonproliferation norms, and sets a bad precedent. Such
cooperation also creates the possibility that highly capable
Ukrainian technology could leak to others.

-- Palmiero used this meeting to provide the following new
information about this case:

-- We understand that in early January 2008, Yuzhnoye was
preparing to host a delegation of cryogenic engine
specialists from ISRO's Liquid Propulsion Systems Center.

-- The USG believes that this delegation was interested in
beginning a contract related to the development of a
semi-cryogenic rocket engine. This would appear to involve
more than the provision of blueprints to ISRO.

-- We would appreciate your confirming whether this contract
has been approved and what it entails.

-- In particular, we would appreciate understanding whether
this new contract would involve cooperation on MTCR Category
I equipment or technology and, if so, when you plan to notify
this cooperation to the MTCR.

-- As an MTCR Partner, Ukraine should help to set the
standard for responsible nonproliferation behavior.

-- Belashov responded that Ukraine takes a very serious
approach to its obligations under the MTCR. He said Ukraine
had not yet approved the contract for this cooperation.
However, Belashov believed Ukraine's desire to engage in
cryogenic engine cooperation with India is in keeping with
MTCR protocol under the Aide Memoire. He said the
cooperation would be for peaceful purposes and that Ukraine
would be obligated to receive government-to- government
assurances from India. Belashov also stressed that the MTCR
envisages transfers of Category I items to non-member states
under certain conditions and said he believed Ukraine had
done all that was required by the MTCR Guidelines. He added
that Ukraine would not go forward with such a project without
adhering to MTCR requirements and that this project is
economically important to Ukraine.

-- Palmiero agreed that the MTCR does not prohibit sales of
Category I items -) the exception being transfers of
production facilities for Category I items -- and that MTCR
export controls are not bans but regulatory efforts intended
to prevent transfers of items that could contribute to
delivery systems for WMD. However, pursuant to the MTCR
Guidelines, exports of Category I items are subject to a
strong presumption of denial and exports of such items are to
take place only on rare occasions that are well-justified in
terms of the six nonproliferation factors specified in the
Guidelines. In addition, per the Regime's Confidential Aide
Memoire, transfers of Category I items to non-MTCR countries
are to be pre-notified to all MTCR Partners.

-- Palmiero asked Belashov whether Ukraine had sent such a
notification to the MTCR Point of Contact in Paris. Belashov
responded that he did not have with him the information that
Ukraine had given to the MTCR POC. However, he assured the
U.S. that he would check into this issue. He also asked for
concrete follow-up questions to take back to Ukraine.
Palmiero then asked for the following information:

-- Please confirm the status of the contract between Yuzhnoye
and ISRO.

-- Please provide details on the cooperation envisioned
between Yuzhnoye and ISRO.

-- Please confirm that Ukraine sent information to the POC in
Paris on Ukraine's intent to transfer a Category I system to
a non-MTCR country.

(NOTE: Since the nonproliferation talks, the U.S. has
received a copy of the Category I notification submitted by
Ukraine to the MTCR POC in Paris. However, the notification
does not provide any details on the type of cooperation
Ukraine intends to engage in with India. Further
transparency and clarity will be necessary for the MTCR
Partners to provide an appropriate response to Ukraine's
notification. END NOTE.)

B) E.O. Paton Electric Welding Institute/Fourth Academy (AKA
The Academy of Aerospace solid Propulsion Technology): Noting
the January 2008 information provided on this case (Ref A),
Palmiero asked for an update on Ukraine's investigation into
the training that individuals affiliated with China's Fourth
Academy (also known as the Academy of Aerospace Solid
Propulsion Technology) were planning to receive at Ukraine's
E.O. Paton Electric Welding Institute.

-- Belashov responded that Ukraine does not have any
additional information on this case. He added that he would
follow-up with the appropriate interlocutors in Kyiv to get a
response.

C, D Arsenal Design Bureau (two separate cases): Recalling
the U.S. concerns about Arsenal Design Bureau's cooperation
with the Chinese entities Beijing Institute of Aerospace
Control Devices (BIACD) and Yuanfeng Precision Machinery
Research Institute or the Hongyang Machinery Factory,
Palmiero asked for an update on Ukraine's investigation (Ref
B).

-- Belashov responded that Ukraine does not have any
additional information on these cases. He said that he would
follow-up with the appropriate interlocutors in Kyiv to get a
response.

E) Ukrainian National Space Agency (NSAU): The final missile
case raised by Palmiero concerned information indicating that
as of June 2007, the Ukrainian National Space Agency (NSAU)
and Nigeria's National Space Research and Design Agency
(NSRDA) were discussing plans for the development of a space
launch center in Nigeria. Belashov responded that Ukraine
does not have any additional information on this case. He
said that he would follow-up with the appropriate
interlocutors in Kyiv to get a response. (Ref C)

--------------
Conventional Arms Transfer Cases
--------------


36. (S) Friedt stated that the U.S. only had one conventional
arms transfer case to discuss, which reflected the benefit of
having these biannual discussions. Margaret Mitchell from
ISN/CATR asked Ukraine for an update on its investigation
into arms sales to Burma, including when the
inter-ministerial commission that would decide the issue
would meet. Recalling that the U.S. has repeatedly raised
this issue, including at senior levels, Mitchell pressed
Ukraine to cease all arms sales to Burma. Belashov responded
that the commission was still vacant and was not sure when it
would meet again. He also indicated that the EU also had
approached Ukraine about its sales to Burma. At this time,
however, Ukraine was not in a position to cease its lucrative
arms sales to Ukraine. Belashov also questioned why the U.S.
was approaching Ukraine when other countries, such as India,
also sell arms to Burma. Mitchell responded that we have
approached India and requested that it cease its arms sales
to Burma. Speaking more generally on the issue of arms
sales, Ukraine indicated that there are many countries that
violate human rights. In cases where there is an
international consensus against arms sales to a country,
particularly when there is a UN ban, then Ukraine will abide
by the embargo.


37. (S) During a separate meeting with EUR DAS David Kramer,
the U.S. again pressed Ukraine on arms sales to Burma and
raised the points in para 38 that provided new information on
the sale of tanks to Sudan. On Burma, Kramer told Belashov
that halting sales to Burma was very important. We
understood that the Burma sale was a lucrative one and that
halting it would be difficult both financially and
politically. Nonetheless, it was important for Ukraine to
halt the transfers, especially given its aspirations for NATO
membership. Belashov told Kramer that Ukraine would not make
any new contracts with Burma; Kramer pointed out that would
not be enough. He then raised our concerns about Ukraine's
sale of T-72 tanks to Sudan (points in para 38 below).
While, we did not expect an immediate reply on Sudan, Kramer
emphasized that halting transfers to both Sudan and Burma are
very important.


38. (S//REL UKRAINE)

--We understand that Ukraine signed a contract to provide the
Government of South Sudan with a range of lethal military
equipment. The Government of Kenya is also involved in
facilitating this deal.

--As part of this deal, Ukraine shipped 35 T-72 tanks, as
well as other small arms/light weapons, to the Kenyan port of
Mombasa and onwards to the Government of South Sudan, in
November-December 2007.

--As of December, the Government of South Sudan was also
seeking to acquire other weapons which, like the T-72s, are
inappropriate for its military needs and too costly and
complex for it to maintain and operate, including
surface-to-air missile systems, attack helicopters, and
self-propelled artillery guns.

--We appreciate our growing cooperation and constructive
dialogue with you on many issues. In the spirit of this
strong partnership, we urge you to cancel any additional
lethal military equipment transfers to Sudan and provide
information relating to past transfers.

--------------
Space Cooperation Agreement
--------------


39. (U) Bryan Marcus from the Ukraine desk used the
opportunity of the NPWG, to provide Ukraine with draft text
for a Framework Agreement for Cooperation in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. This agreement
recalls our earlier agreement signed in 1995 and outlines
future cooperation between the national Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the National Space Agency of
Ukraine (NSAU) in the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes. Belashov thanked the U.S. for the draft
text and committed to review it as soon as possible.

--------------
2008 Conference on Disarmament
--------------


40. (SBU) The U.S. and Ukraine will be one of the six
presidents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this year.
Alexander Liebowitz (ISN/MNSA) used this opportunity to urge
Ukraine to support the immediate commencement of negotiations
for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Liebowitz
reiterated the U.S. commitment both to FMCT and to a viable
CD; we will use our role as one of the six presidents to make
a determined effort to get the CD back to work. Liebowitz
noted that the United States continues to oppose linkage of
work programs in the CD and while we are not yet convinced
that L.1 breaks those linkages, we have made clear that, in
the interest of beginning negotiations on an FMCT and of
reviving the CD, we will not block consensus on L.1 as
originally proposed.


41. (SBU) Regarding the draft outer space treaty that Russia
and China recently submitted in the CD, the United States has
examined carefully previous drafts of the outer space treaty
and we are prepared to continue to discuss outer space issues
broadly at the CD. However, the United States position is
that no new, legally binding treaties are needed, and we will
not support the negotiation of this treaty, or of any other
space-related arms control treaties.


42. (SBU) With regard to Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures (TCBMs) for outer space, the U.S. has noted
repeatedly that some new TCBMs, implemented on a voluntary
basis, have the potential to enhance satellite safety and
reduce uncertainty in an evolving space security environment.
However, the U.S. will oppose any efforts to link
discussions on pragmatic TCBMs to proposals for space arms
control treaties.


43. (SBU) Belashov thanked the U.S. side for its detailed
presentation on the CD and agreed with the overall U.S.
assessment that work in the body is very difficult. The U.S.
and Ukraine, Belashov commented, agree on nearly every issue
currently being considered at the CD and shares the U.S.
opposition to linking issues at the CD. Concluding, Belashov
shared the U.S. concern about the lack of work at the CD, but
reiterated Ukraine's commitment to the work of the body.

--------------
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Cycle
--------------


44. (SBU) Addressing the Nonproliferation Treaty Review
Cycle, Liebowitz noted that the U.S.'s top priority for the
treaty is compliance. At the President's direction, the U.S.
is making major progress in the dismantlement of nuclear
weapons. The U.S. seeks an orderly second PrepCom, with
discussions that lead us toward agreement on key NPT issues.
Liebowitz acknowledged that it is unlikely that consensus
will be reached on all issues in this review cycle, but we
believe that this should not prevent Parties from trying to
narrow differences to help meet the significant challenges
facing the nonproliferation regime. Areas in which we might
be able to narrow differences enough to achieve a consensus
outcome at the 2010 Review Conference are: expanding peaceful
nuclear cooperation in proliferation-responsible ways;
strengthening safeguards, export controls, and nuclear
security; and deterring withdrawal by violators.


45. (SBU) Ukraine shares many of the same positions and
agreed there is a very difficult job ahead to continue the
progress made at the first Prepcom. Responsible nations must
continue to combat nuclear proliferation and therefore we
need to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Indicating that Ukraine was ready to listen to any U.S.
proposals to give new momentum to the NPT review process,
Belashov said that Ukraine was ready to have bilateral
consultations with the U.S. at any time.

--------------
UNSCR 1540
--------------


46. (SBU) Tom Wuchte, ISN/CPI, noted the significant progress
Ukraine has made in improving its export control system in
compliance with UNSCR 1540. He stressed the importance of
transparency and sharing of information for combating
proliferation. Wuchte encouraged Ukraine to set a leading
example by drafting a national implementation plan, sharing
it with the OSCE, and then sending it to the 1540 Committee.
Recognizing the difficulty in creating an accurate and up to
date plan, Wuchte emphasized that the development of the plan
could facilitate further export control-related assistance to
Ukraine.


47. (SBU) Belashov stated the GOU remains committed to UNSCR
1540 and will soon produce a 2007 report on efforts against
proliferation in Ukraine. The national implementation plan
could be included as an addendum to this document.


48. (SBU) Belashov used the discussion of UNSCR 1540 to
provide the U.S. with an update on Ukraine's export control
improvements. First, Ukraine has harmonized its export
controls with the Wassenaar Arrangement and all the other
nonproliferation regimes. In addition, Ukraine is trying to
create one export control list in line with EU standards.
Third, Belashov said that Ukraine strictly controls the
export of conventional weapons and has strict standards that
have to be met before cooperating on a military project.
Ukraine reported that it is going to simplify the process for
approving military cooperation, especially for countries that
are part of the nonproliferation regimes and those that are
not under any sanctions. This proposed change has already
been submitted to the Rada for approval and should be in
place by the end of 2008.

--------------
Proliferation Security Initiative
--------------


49. (SBU) J. Ashley Roach from the Legal Adviser's office
reported that the half day of discussion on the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) shipboarding agreement were useful
and productive. Recalling the previous discussions between
the U.S. and Ukraine on the agreement, Roach believed that
the consultations served to bring both sides much closer
together. To advance the negotiations further, the U.S. side
undertook to prepare and provide a number of additional
papers that addressed key issues covered during the
discussions. Roach said that the U.S. is already working on
these papers and will provide them as soon as possible.


50. (SBU) PSI 5th Anniversary: Jane Purcell (ISN/CPI)
provided a short review of the U.S. plans for the upcoming
5th Anniversary of the PSI. The U.S. will soon issue formal
invitations to senior level officials for events we are
hosting in Washington May 28-29, 2008. The May 28
Senior-Level Meeting will conduct an in-depth substantive
review of what the PSI has achieved and where it needs to go
to continue addressing the proliferation challenges of the
future. Purcell noted the May 29 workshop will provide
detailed briefings on the wide variety of PSI activities,
which will be of interest to experts from a number of
Ukrainian ministries involved with stopping proliferation.


51. (SBU) EASTERN SHIELD Exercise: Carlos Guzman (ISN/CPI)
concluded the PSI discussion with a brief review of the
successful PSI exercise EASTERN SHIELD October 29-31, 2007,
the first PSI exercise conducted in the Black Sea. Guzman
expressed the U.S. appreciation for the work of Ukraine and
Poland in planning and conducting the exercise. The exercise
provided an opportunity to demonstrate PSI principles and
operations to observing nations, including South Korea and
Indonesia. Guzman also pressed Ukraine to provide a final
expense report for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
monies transferred to Ukraine in support of EASTERN SHIELD
(as Ukraine agreed to provide in MFA dipnote No.
414/23-196/54-1760 of October 10, 2007).

--------------
Briefing on U.S. Export Controls
--------------


52. (SBU) Eric Longnecker, from the Bureau of Industry and
Security at DOC, briefed the Ukrainian delegation on U.S.
Export Controls. Longnecker informed the delegation that
there were a number of U.S. agencies involved with export
controls including DOC, DOS, DOE, DOT, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. He then explained from which acts and
regulations U.S. export control policy was derived.
Longnecker stated the U.S. had both multilateral, including
the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime,
obligations and unilateral regulations. Longnecker
highlighted and clarified U.S. regulations in relation to
each of the five U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism
and provided a short briefing on the new export control
directives. The new directives were needed to bring end-user
licenses up to date and keep the U.S. economy competitive.
Longnecker stated that there would likely be an expansion of
the sanctioned entities list this Spring.


53. (SBU) Following the overview presentation on U.S. export
controls, Jay Hatfield from the Office of Enforcement
Analysis (OEA) at DOC, delivered a presentation on how the
U.S. enforces our export controls. This presentation focused
on the importance of end-user checks (EUCs) in reviewing
license applications. EUCs involve either a check of the
end-user before an export license is issued, called a
pre-license check (PLC),or a post shipment verification
(PSV). A PSV involves an official USG visit to the company
to verify that the commodity exported is being used by the
end-user for the stated end-use listed on the export license.
DOC conducts EUCs on approximately 5 percent of total
licenses per year. Approximately 30% of these EUCs are
Pre-License Checks and 70% are Post-Shipment Verifications.
In FY 2007, OEA conducted EUCs in over 80 countries.


54. (SBU) Recognizing that not all licenses can benefit from
a PLC or a PSV, Hatfield explained how Commerce identifies
the licenses that will be subjected to this additional
scrutiny. OEA's risk analysis is composed of assessing the
end-user, country, product, and the exporter. Hatfield
emphasized that it is important to not focus only on one
aspect of an export license in assessing whether a PLC or PSV
is necessary.


55. (SBU) Belashov stated he believed this information would
be of great interest to relevant agencies in Kyiv and asked
for a copy of the briefing. Anita Friedt promised to look
into getting the Ukrainian delegation the pertinent
information.

--------------
NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund
--------------


56. (C) Steven Costner provided a summary of the three main
components of the NATO-Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund
destruction project: the destruction of 15,000 tons of
munitions and 400,000 small arms and light weapons (SA/LW)
and 1,000 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). He
reported that all 1,000 MANPADS and approximately 100,000
SA/LW have been destroyed to date. He explained that we
understand there are two issues that have slowed progress on
this project. 1) Most of the remaining 300,000 weapons
scheduled for destruction under the original agreement have
been reclassified for &disposal by means other than
destruction.8 As a result progress on weapons destruction
has slowed significantly since June 2007 (NAMSA projects a
destruction rate of about 200,000 SA/LW per year with the
current capacity); and 2) Logistical arrangements for the
placement of the Explosive Waste Incinerator (EWI) had to be
reworked resulting in delays in starting the munitions
destruction. Costner noted his understanding that all of the
new officials had been named to the Inter-Ministerial
Commission on Export Control and Military-Technical
Cooperation (the Commission),which would allow that body to
meet and reclassify the weapons for destruction.


57. (C) Costner stated that the U.S. had received Ukraine's
request to extend phase I of the project due to delays in the
munitions destruction. He relayed that the Department is
currently reviewing this request and would provide an
official response. Costner encouraged Ukraine to continue
SA/LW destruction through the fourth year of phase I and to
include some of the weapons that otherwise would be scheduled
for destruction in phase II, so that component of the project
would not go dormant while munitions were addressed during
the additional year under phase I. In response to a
Ukrainian concern for the need to address destruction of
larger caliber munitions as part of the project, Costner
reiterated USG interest in providing additional funding
specifically for destruction of larger caliber munitions
(Ukraine's priority) in exchange for GOU agreement to the
destruction of additional MANPADS (the USG priority). The
USG did not foresee a problem securing funding to extend
phase I through 2009.


58. (C) Belashov explained that EWI construction was
scheduled to begin in March 2008. (Note: Construction will
probably slip to April, since the Ukrainians are taking
longer than foreseen to work through the approvals to import
the EWI.) He also said that the re-categorization of the
SA/LW to be re-designated for destruction would be a decision
that would be made by the Cabinet of Ministers Committee (not
the Commission cited above by Costner) but it has been
delayed due to the change in government. Belashov also
clarified that Ukraine intended to begin phase II of the
project on time in January 2009 and have the additional year
of phase I run concurrently with the start of phase II. In
making his presentation, Belashov stressed that he was
relaying responses provided to him from the Ministry of
Defense, since the appropriate MoD official had been unable
to join the delegation.


59. (C) Costner expressed some concerns about the feasibility
of starting phase II in January 2009 due to the time
constraints and the lead-time necessary to put in place the
preparations for the second phase of the project, as well as
whether the last year of phase I and the first year of phase
II could run concurrently.

--------------
Missile Defense
--------------


60. (S) During an extended break, Steven Winkie and Major
Karin Northcott from the Missile Defense Agency and Anita
Friedt briefly met with Belashov to discuss missile
defense-related issues. Belashov had two specific messages
from the Foreign Minister. First, Ukraine is ready to
cooperate with U.S. on use of the radars at Sevastopol and
Mukachevo. Belashov proposed that the U.S. send a technical
team to Ukraine to inspect the radars. Second, Ukraine is
ready to sell Scuds to the U.S. After speaking about
problems in relationship with Russia, Belashov stated that
this future cooperation would have to be done in a manner
that did not aggravate the Russians. Friedt suggested that
within the next couple weeks she will set up a meeting with
inter-agency attendees to plan a way forward. She said State
supported these two efforts but wanted to ensure Scud
transfer was conducted as part of State's larger effort to
destroy Ukraine's excess SCUDS.

--------------
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Removals from Kyiv and
Sevastopol
--------------


61. (SBU) The Department of Energy has pursued the return of
Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the
Sevastopol University and Kyiv Institute of Nuclear Research
for several years. However, little progress has been made on
a Ukrainian decision to approve the return of the HEU despite
significant funding pledged by DOE and the IAEA. In a new
development, prior to the session Belashov presented the U.S.
side with a nonpaper (see para 68) that said the GOU had made
a political decision to not return the HEU. Instead the GOU
would consolidate the HEU at the National Science Center
"Kharkhiv Physical-Technical Institute." The transfer of
this fuel to Kharkhiv would ensure that the material is
properly secured and stored according to IAEA standards. In
explaining this decision, Ukrainian officials said they did
not want to be dependent on Russia for nuclear fuel. In
addition, Ukraine wants to cooperate with the U.S. as Ukraine
pursues the development and design of new nuclear power
plants. Wayne Leach, DOE/NNSA, indicated that the U.S.
viewed the consolidation of the HEU as a positive idea noting
that it was critical to ensure the physical security of the
material. Belashov thanked the U.S. for the positive
response and emphasized that the material would only be used
for scientific study and would be transported from Sevastopol
to Kharkhiv according to the Convention on Nuclear Material.

--------------
Removal and Storage of Radioactive Sources from Electron
Plant and Kyiv Radon Upgrades Acceptance
--------------


62. (SBU) DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has
a number of ongoing projects in Ukraine to improve security
at sites with radioactive sources and to consolidate disused
sources into secure storage. DOE noted that there was recent
progress on resolving outstanding issues related to
acceptance of DOE-funded security upgrades at the Radons
(storage facilities for disused radioactive sources). DOE
plans a trip to the Kyiv Radon in March to conduct an
inspection of the upgrade performed there and close out this
contract. DOE has also completed upgrades at the Odesa and
Lviv Radons and begun work on the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk
Radons.

63. (SBU) Another major project DOE is working on in Ukraine
is removing the radioactive sources from the bankrupt
enterprise, Electron-Gas, and moving them into secure storage
at the Dnipropetrovsk Radon. The Ukrainian Ministry of
Emergency Situations (MOES) noted that there were more than
2,000 sources at this facility and cleaning these out would
cost substantially more than initially envisioned. DOE's
representative asked MOES representative to assemble a plan,
which would include identifying how many packaging and
transportation containers are needed, what licenses and
regulatory approvals should be obtained from which agency,
whether Ukraine has the specialized vehicles needed for
transporting radioactive sources, and providing cost
estimates for areas where DOE's assistance is needed.


64. (SBU) The DOE representative noted the need to have one
Ukrainian agency with lead responsibility for its projects
that could help resolve issues as they arise, such as tax
exemption of assistance funding. DOE pointed out that after
several discussions between the DOE, the DOE representative
in Kyiv and the SNRCU that the facilities Gemoplast,
Meridian, Institute of Physics, and Electron Gaz are still
not registered as tax exempt entities. DOE has contractors
in place and is ready to begin security upgrades at Meridian
and Gemoplast. Unfortunately DOE cannot begin the work until
Terms of Reference for these two facilities are developed and
sent to the Ministry of Economy for registration for tax
exemption. DOE requests that these facilities be registered
as soon as possible so that work, which is ready to begin,
may do so.


65. (SBU) A MFA representative noted that the MFA could raise
tax exemption issues to the Cabinet of Ministers or directly
to the Prime Minister if necessary. A DOE representative
asked that the Prime Minister or Cabinet of Ministers
designate a single point of contact for coordinating issues
related to implementation of DOE projects, so that it was not
necessary to escalate these types of issue to that level. DOE
has proposed this approach to the GOU, and expects an answer
in a few weeks.


66. (SBU) The MOES representative suggested that one way to
avoid project delays and cost overruns would be to impose a
significant financial penalty on the local contractor.


67. (U) Both sides noted the importance of the VECTOR II
project by which the United Kingdom will fund the
construction of a new long-term radioactive source storage
facility to replace the Radons, which are reaching capacity,
and the U.S. will help fund the consolidation of sources from
the Radons into this new facility.

--------------
Ukraine Nonpaper on Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
(HEU) from the Sevastopol University and Kyiv Institute of
Nuclear Research
--------------


68. (C) Begin Text of Nonpaper.

--Ukraine shares the objectives of the "Global Threat
Reduction Initiatives" and is taking all necessary steps to
prevent the use of nuclear materials for the production of
nuclear weapons in accordance with the International Partners
Conference (September 18-19, Vienna).

--Nuclear energy plays a key role in meeting the energy needs
of Ukraine's economy. Atomic power plants produce over 50%
of (Ukraine's) electrical energy. Ukraine's energy strategy
for the period up to 2030 provides for continued development
of nuclear energy and increasing its role in ensuring our
nation's energy security.

--Fulfillment of the requirements of the Convention on
Nuclear Security (to which Ukraine is a party) with respect
to constantly raising the level of security of the operation
of nuclear power plants requires scientific support, which
calls for a suitable technical and technological basis and
the use of highly enriched nuclear materials.

--At the present time, Ukraine is carrying out the State
Program for Basic and Applied Research on the Problems of
Using Nuclear Materials and Nuclear and Radiation
Technologies in the Development of Economic Sectors for the
2004-2010 Period. Based on the results of its
implementation, the Government of Ukraine will determine the
necessary amount of nuclear materials (including highly
enriched ones) for the needs of scientific and economic
development.

--In this connection, prior to reaching conclusions based on
the results of the implementation of the aforesaid State
Program, the country's leadership has decided to leave the
highly enriched uranium as well as the fresh highly enriched
nuclear fuel that is located at the Sevastopol National
University of Nuclear Energy and Industry.

--In order to provide the appropriate level of safety and
security of nuclear materials in their possible further use
for scientific and research purposes, it has been decided to
transfer the highly enriched nuclear fuel from the Sevastopol
National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry to the
National Science Center "Kharkhiv Physical-Technical
Institute."

--The system for accounting and control and the system for
physical protection of nuclear material at the National
Science Center "Kharkhiv Physical-Technical Institute" meet
international standards and have been highly commended by
IAEA experts.

--------------
Summary of Follow-up Activities
--------------


69. The following issues require follow-up by Washington:

-- (S) The U.S. will inquire about the request to destroy
SS-24 ICBM Rocket motor cases under the START Treaty by
drilling holes so that they could be re-used as containers
for waste disposal.

-- (S) The U.S. was requested to send a team of experts to
begin discussions on destruction of Ukraine's SCUDS.

-- (SBU) The U.S. is to provide Ukraine with the requested
nonpapers on the PSI Shipboarding Agreement.


70. The following issues require follow-up by Embassy Kyiv.

-- (S) Continue to press Ukraine, as appropriate, to cease
arms sales to Burma and Sudan.

-- (C) Continue to press Ukraine to resume full
implementation of the NATO PfP Trust Fund project.


71. The following issues require follow-up by Ukraine.

-- (S) The U.S. has requested the following additional
information on Ukraine's SCUD inventory: information on all
SCUD-related items including ground support equipment,
propellant-related items including the amount of Inhibited
Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRNFA) in Ukraine, training
equipment, spare parts kits, etc.

-- (SBU) Ukraine to provide a final expense report for the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund monies transferred to
Ukraine in support of EASTERN SHIELD. (Note: On March 27,
Ukraine provided its final expense report. End Note)

-- (S) Ukraine was requested to respond to the U.S. request
for updates on all the open missile nonproliferation cases.


72. (SBU) Delegation Lists:

--------------
Ukraine Delegation
--------------

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
--------------

Volodymyr Belashov,
Director, Arms Control and Military and Technical Cooperation
Department

Oleksandr Bondarenko
Counselor, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, Arms
Control and MTC Directorate

Andriy Buriak
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Kateryna Bila
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Secretariat of the President of Ukraine

SIPDIS
--------------

Anatoliy Cherniavskyi
Head of Security and Defense Policy Service

Oleksii Lutskevych
Head of Section of Bilateral Cooperation, General Service of
Foreign Policy

National Security and Defense Council
--------------

Oleksandr Dotsenko
Head, Non-proliferation and Arms Control Division

Volodymyr Riabtsev

Ministry of Emergencies and Affairs of Population Protection
from the Consequences of Chernobyl Catastrophe
--------------

Mykola Proskura
First Deputy Head of the State Department ) Administration
of Exclusion Zone

Ministry of Justice
--------------

Liudmyla Sidlovska
Deputy Director, Department of International Legal Cooperation

Embassy of Ukraine
--------------

Oleh Shamshur
Ambassador

Ruslan Nimchynskyi
Counselor for Science and Technology

Oleksandr Ivasyshyn
Assistant Defense Attache

Olexander Osadchyi
First Secretary, Export Control and Nonproliferation

Volodymyr Shkilevych
First Secretary, Legal Advisor

--------------
U.S. Delegation
--------------

Amb. Don Mahley
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction,
Export Controls, and Negotiations, Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation

Anita Friedt
Head of Delegation
Director, Office of Policy and Regional Affairs, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs
Department of State

James Reid
Director, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction,
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threat,
Global Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Ralph Palmiero
Deputy Director, Office of Missile Threat Reduction, Bureau
of International Security and Nonproliferation
Department of State

Steven Costner
Deputy Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement,
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Department of State

Michael Stafford
U.S. Negotiator, for Nuclear Security and Dismantlement,
Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation
Department of State

Andrew Weber
Adviser, Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, Office of the
Secretary of Defense

SIPDIS
Department of Defense

Eric Longnecker
Export Policy Analyst, Foreign Policy Division, Bureau of
Industry and Security
Department of Commerce

Matthew Hardiman
Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Policy and Regional
Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Department of State

Lisa Benthien
Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Policy and Regional
Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Department of State

Brent Eastman
Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation
Department of State

Jane Purcell
Foreign Affairs Officer, Office Counterproliferation
Initiatives, Bureaus of International Security and
Nonproliferation
Department of State

Carlos Guzman
Office Counterproliferation Initiatives, Bureaus of
International Security and Nonproliferation
Department of State

Tom Wuchte
U.S. 1540 Coordinator, Office Counterproliferation
Initiatives, Bureaus of International Security and
Nonproliferation
Department of State

Robert Gonzales
Ukraine Desk Officer, Office of Ukraine, Moldova, and
Belarus, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Department of State

Brett Golden
Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Export Control
Cooperation, Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation
Department of State

Alexander Liebowitz
Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Multilateral Nuclear
Security Affairs, Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation
Department of State

Wayne Leach
Country Officer (Ukraine)
Department of Energy

Riaz Awan
Department of Energy Office
U.S. Embassy Kyiv

Michael Uyehara
First Secretary, Political
U.S. Embassy Kyiv

Cynthia Oliver
Program Manager, Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security

Carla D'Onofrio
Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security

Steven C. Winkie
Missile Defense Agency
Department of Defense

Maj. Karin Northcott
Missile Defense Agency
Department of Defense


J. Ashley Roach
Attorney- Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser
Department of State
RICE


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