Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE34310
2008-04-03 02:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

REINTEGRATION MINISTER AGREES FIVE-PLUS-TWO REQUIRES CBM'S

Tags:  PGOV PREL MD 
pdf how-to read a cable
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R 030207Z APR 08
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INFO AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0000
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 034310 

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THE FOLLOWING CHISINAU 000370 DTD 02APR08 SENT ACTION
STATE INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE REPEATED
FOR YOUR INFO 03APR08


QUOTE:


C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000370

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STATE FOR EUR/UMB, EUR DAS MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MD
SUBJECT: REINTEGRATION MINISTER AGREES FIVE-PLUS-TWO REQUIRES CBM'S
AND GOALS

REF: Chisinau 304

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby, for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 034310

SIPDIS

SIPDIS - FOR MINSK

THE FOLLOWING CHISINAU 000370 DTD 02APR08 SENT ACTION
STATE INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE REPEATED
FOR YOUR INFO 03APR08


QUOTE:


C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000370

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB, EUR DAS MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MD
SUBJECT: REINTEGRATION MINISTER AGREES FIVE-PLUS-TWO REQUIRES CBM'S
AND GOALS

REF: Chisinau 304

Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby, for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: Minister of Reintegration Sova agreed with the
Ambassador that a successful "long Five-plus-Two" requires
preparation, confidence-building measures (CBM's),and goals. While
drawing red lines on troop withdrawal and the integrity of the state,
he declared himself flexible and ready for general agreements, with
details to be worked out later. Sova declared his sense of urgency
that a solution be reached before 2009 elections, noted that he had
had profitable consultations with parliamentary factions, and was
delighted that President Bush had publicly stated his support for the
Five-plus-Two process and Moldovan sovereignty. End summary.


2. (C) At an April 1 meeting which he requested, Sova said that he
had been consulting parliamentary factions on progress towards a
Transnistrian settlement, and noted his surprise that the meeting
with anti-Russian firebrand Vitalia Pavlicenco (National Liberal
Party) went more easily than his meeting with the Communist (PCRM)
deputies, who are facing the reality that they will have to actually
vote on a solution. (Note: The Ambassador has been pushing Sova and
the GOM for months to meet with the opposition. End note.) Sova
shared the Ambassador's views that an 80-to-90-member vote of
approval (of 101 members) was required in Parliament, to signal a
broad-based consensus, and indicated that he was aware of the
Ambassador's briefing of opposition members on March 17 (reftel)
regarding the Three-plus-Two talks in Vienna.


3. (C) Sova recognized that the internationally-sponsored 1992
ceasefire agreement between left-and right-bank Moldova requires that
Russian troops be removed from Moldovan soil before joint elections
can be held on both banks. He also stressed the need for
flexibility, and mooted an 18-month transition period for the
peacekeeping force.


4. (C) Underlining the need to reduce Transnistrian suspicions that
the right bank is interested primarily in taking back property
privatized by Tiraspol, he said that public debates on the subject
should be limited if not eliminated, and the courts should decide
after a settlement.


5. (C) Concerning the question of a fixed number of parliamentary
seats for Transnistria, Sova said that he had discussed the idea with
Gagauz Governor Mihail Formuzal, who noted that ethnic Gagauz hold
six PCRM seats already, in addition to several others with other
parties, far in excess of the two seats that the 80,000 voters in
Gagauzia would elect on a proportional basis.


6. (C) Sova stated his expectation that President Voronin would
telephone Transnistrian "President" Smirnov soon after the Bucharest
NATO summit-a move, he said, that the Russians had insisted on. The
call, he said, would be short, symbolic, and publicly acknowledged.
He also hinted that it would be difficult. (Voronin and Smirnov
dislike each other intensely.) However, he noted that the call was a
necessary preliminary to an April 14 meeting between the two sides in
Odessa, to discuss CBM's, such as Dniester ecology. Ambassador Kirby
added the issues of transport (railways, automobile licensing, and
roads that may be built under MCC aegis),and stated his hope that
DAS David Merkel would be able to attend.


7. (C) On dates for the Five-plus-Two, Sova agreed with the
Ambassador that, given Easter holidays, Victory Day celebrations, and
the installation of President Medvedev, May 12 is the earliest
conceivable start for Five-plus-Two. Sova also continued to believe
that St. Petersburg would be a good site, so that the Russians might
feel more responsibility for a successful outcome. He also noted
that a solution needs to be accomplished before 2009 parliamentary
elections, since, he noted, MPs elected in 2009 would want to serve
their full four-year term before the holding of elections that would
follow a settlement and include Transnistria.


8. (C) Comment: Throughout the conversation, Sova showed himself
engaged with the issues, open to suggestions, involved with
Parliament, and ready to accommodate Transnistrian needs. The
Voronin-Smirnov telephone call, if, as we hope, it happens, could be
the significant move that begins the long road to a successful
settlement. End comment.

Kirby
UNQUOTE: RICE