EU COMMISSION CONSULTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION

UNCLAS STATE 033804

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE - VILNIUS FOR MINSK

THE FOLLWOING STATE 033804 DTD 02APR08 SENT ACTION
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE DISARMAMENT COFERENCE
COLLECTIVE EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE USOSCE USNATO UNVIE
VIENNA USUN NEW YORK REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO 02APR08


QUOTE:


UNCLAS STATE 033804

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PEL KNNP SC EU OSCE UNVIE EUN
SUBJECT: EU COMMISSION CONSULTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION
PRIORITIES: IMPROVED COORDINATION

REF: A. STATE 80042 (07)

B. STATE 94077 (07)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) A five-member delegation from the European
Commission met USG nonproliferation experts at the Department
of State March 11-12, and held an exchange of program
activities and country priorities that both sides agreed will
serve as the basis for better coordination. ISN Deputy
Assistant Secretary Hayward and EUR/ERA Director Bill Lucas
opened the consultations; they both noted we would look to
build on this initiative for the upcoming U.S.-EU Summit in
June. The European Commission sought this meeting based on
the 2007 U.S.-EU summit declaration statement promoting
greater coordination of nonproliferation efforts through
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (see
REFTELS). At the conclusion, EU Commission representatives
noted that they will take this information into account for
the development of nonproliferation projects through the EURO
400 million Stability Instrument. An overview of the
consultations follows ) with a request for USEU to follow up
after the April U.S.-EU Troika meeting on nonproliferation.
End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Introductory Remarks -- Overall USG Nonproliferation
Priorities and EU/EC Nonproliferation Priorities
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) EUR/ERA Office Director Bill Lucas opened the
introductory session, expressing appreciation for the EC,s
initiative for the visit and its desire to share ideas and
priorities on the whole range of nonproliferation issues.
Lucas noted that the USG regarded the EC visit and the two
days of meetings as the beginning of a regular process of
bilateral cooperation and coordination to advance shared
goals. He suggested that we consider building on this
initiative and giving it an additional political push at the
US-EU summit in June. ISN DAS Mary Alice Hayward said that
the United States and the EU needed to find more ways to move
forward jointly and be more proactive together on
nonproliferation issues. She suggested that the two sides
could work together to leverage other partnerships (such as
the G8) more effectively to advance nonproliferation goals.
EC Security Policy Head of Unit and delegation leader
Lars-Gunnar Wigemark expressed thanks for the very detailed
program for the visit and the exchange of views that would
take place. He noted that the EC sought input to help shape
its programming for spending the EU Stability Instrument
funds for the period 2008-2013. Wigemark agreed that the
U.S.-EU Summit might usefully be leveraged to give additional
political support to bilateral nonproliferation cooperation
and committed to discussing this with EU Commission, Council
Secretariat, and Presidency colleagues in Brussels.

SIPDIS

--------------
Threat Briefing
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3. (SBU) Robert Walpole of the National
Counterproliferation Center provided an overview of U.S.
perspectives on the changing proliferation threats we face.
Because of the dual use nature of almost all technology of
proliferation concern, understanding the intentions behind
actions was crucial, albeit very difficult. Walpole
described specific U.S. WMD concerns relating to Iran, North
Korea, and Syria, the WMD programs that had been rolled back
in Libya, and the need for vigilance against the emergence of
new illicit supplier networks similar to the former AQ Khan
network. From a policy perspective, Walpole highlighted the
importance of suggesting levers to change the
behavior/intentions of countries of concern.


4. (SBU) Members of the EC delegation noted that their
Stability Instrument focuses more on dealing with longer-term
threats and going beyond traditional &hard8
nonproliferation threats to look at linkages to new issues
such as climate change and public health. The EC is also
concerned about states that seek to keep their options open
on WMD, the threat of terrorist groups using WMD in countries
not normally seen as WMD threats, and developing capacity to
monitor, prevent, and mitigate the consequences of WMD
incidents. The EU Commission, responsible for prioritization
of actions under the Stability Instrument, expressed that a
more substantial threat background may be useful in the
future to target efforts.

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Overview of Existing Coordination Efforts
--------------


5. (SBU) This section covered broadly UNSCR 1540, Global
Partnership, Global Initiative, and Proliferation Security
Initiative. Primarily the European Commission was seeking
how to coordinate better ) particularly focusing on the
global nature of UNSCR 1540. Commission representative Bruno
Dupre noted that UNSCR 1540 had provided a framework to
better coordinate nonproliferation capacity-building among
the many programs in a more comprehensive manner when
addressing third-country assistance priorities. He indicated
that the EU was considering establishing a full-time
coordinator, much like the United States, pending the renewal
of the current 1540 Committee mandate. In response, U.S.
Coordinator Wuchte underscored that the papers provided would
help to determine our next steps and that U.S.-EU
coordination should next look at a working level meeting
where we discuss in detail each 1540 request for assistance
to make sure they are being addressed by the international
community ) even if the reply is that we cannot provide this
assistance. In addition Wuchte stressed:

-- We want to develop ideas that would help to build capacity
and encourage further implementation -- while recognizing a
&one size fits all8 approach is not suitable for many
less-developed states. We agree with the EU that there
should be continued efforts to leverage cooperation with the
various regional and intergovernmental organizations working
on implementation.

-- We hope for a resolution designed to increase Committee
and Member State ability to implement the resolution,s basic
requirements, while recognizing that the pace of
implementation will require a longer strategic timeline than
originally envisioned following 1540,s adoption in 2004.


6. (SBU) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership; GP).
The EC delegation said that it is on track to meet ) and
likely exceed ) its current pledge to the Global Partnership
of $1 billion Euro for 2002-2012. The EC also expressed
their strong support for expanding the geographic scope of
the GP beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union to address
emerging WMD threats worldwide, which is among the highest
U.S. G-8 nonproliferation priorities for 2008. The EC also
agreed that it will be important to extend the GP beyond

2012. The U.S. will continue to closely coordinate with the
EU on these goals, including at the March 2008 Global
Partnership Working Group meeting in Tokyo. Japan has
strongly supported expanding the GP during its G-8
Presidency, but Russia remains concerned that expansion could
jeopardize current GP commitments. Both the U.S. and EC
representatives agreed that expanding the GP should be
accompanied by a renewed commitment to complete existing work
in Russia and the former Soviet Union.


7. (SBU) Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
The EU expressed its commitments to the Global initiative and
reiterated that the EU has both expertise and competence to
contribute to this initiative. The EU was very interested in
participating in the Model Guidelines Document Workshop (MGD)
March 30-April 1 in Washington, DC. The EU felt the MGD is
an excellent program and something it may consider as a
project for its Stability Instrument ) potentially in
conjunction with its projects for detection of illicit
trafficking of nuclear smuggling and forensics. The EU also
plans to send a delegation to the 4th Political Meeting in
Madrid, Spain, June 16-18, 2008. ISN also invited the EU to
attend the Exercise Planning Group meeting on April 15 in
Paris, France.


8. (SBU) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The EC
delegation stated that the EC seeks observer status in the
PSI, analogous to its status in the Global Initiative. While
acknowledging that the EC does not play a role in
interdicting WMD-related trafficking, the EC representatives
said the EC has been assigned certain competencies on behalf
of EU member states in the areas of customs and export
controls that warrant a role for it in the PSI. Their goal
is to have a seat in the Operational Experts Group behind an
EU nameplate. They promised that the EC would provide a
paper soon explaining in more detail the reasons why the EC
believes it should have observer status in the PSI.

-------------- ---
Advancing 1540 through Export Control Assistance
-------------- ---


9. (SBU) OFAC Assistant Director Jennifer Fowler briefed the
EC delegation on the United States, efforts at the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF). She outlined the current approach
at the FATF as 1) identifying the threat, 2) assessing the
effectiveness of current measures, and 3) identifying
additional measures for countries to use. She also briefly
discussed the recent advisories that FATF has issued
regarding Iran, as well as the non-binding guidance on UNSCRs
1737, 1747, and 1803.


10. (SBU) State ISN/ECC Director Yvette Wong briefed the EC
delegation on the Department's Export Control and Related
Border Security (EXBS) assistance program, its regional
activities, and how ISN/ECC sets priorities and assesses
program feasibility. She urged increased cooperation between
the EU and USG on future strategic trade control and
nonproliferation outreach efforts and identified specific
regions where the EU could offer complementary assistance.
She praised EU work in China and encouraged continued
assistance there, in whatever areas possible. Ms. Wong also
urged increased EU outreach activities in Southeast Europe
since most countries in this region aspire to join the EU (or
are in the process of doing so). As the EU looks to broaden
its assistance, it should consider pursuing outreach
activities with Egypt and countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as
well as states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. These
would be welcome initiatives, but coordination with USG and
other donor assistance activities would be of utmost
importance. Ms. Wong also underlined the importance of
increased EU assistance in Central Asia; she suggested in
particular that the EU consider contributing to the
refurbishment of key border crossing points in Central Asia,
which would complement a similar EXBS initiative already
underway to help address this enormous requirement. The EC
representatives responded very positively to Ms. Wong,s
comments; thanked the U.S. for its specific feedback to EC
proposals as well as the EXBS nonpaper provided to the EC
reps ahead of the meeting; promised to consider the U.S.
suggestions and proposals; and expressed their desire to
continue to cooperate with the USG and coordinate assistance
activities in this area.

--------------
Border Security and Illicit Trafficking
--------------


11. (SBU) DOE,s Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program,
DoD,s Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy Office, and
State,s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction made
presentations on their respective efforts to improve border
security and combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radioactive materials. The EU representatives indicated
interest in projects in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and India. The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI)
team provided a paper, which included specific border
security projects in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic that
the EU could fund (developed with input from State,s Export
Control and Border Security program and DOE,s SLD program),
and agreed to provide additional information on other
countries in the future. In response to EU questions, SLD
representatives agreed to send the EU additional information
on the status of SLD efforts to install radiation detection
equipment at 450 ports of entry and to identify countries
where cooperation with SLD was particularly strong and could
benefit from additional EU assistance. All U.S. and EU
representatives agreed that the Border Monitoring Working
Group was an effective tool for regular coordination.


12. (SBU) Both sides noted the importance of providing
training to third countries to help them develop
comprehensive plans for responding to incidents of illicit
trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials and agreed
to coordinate these efforts in the future. The U.S. side
also expressed interest in holding bilateral experts
discussions on responding to unresolved third party (i.e. non
U.S./EU) alarms.

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Nuclear Safety and Security
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13. (SBU) DPRK. Charles Mahaffey (ISN/RA) briefed on the
status of implementation of the agreements on Initial Actions
and Second Phase Actions reached in the Six-Party Talks. He
noted that additional steps in support of the September 2005
Joint Statement remain subject to negotiation. He cited the
removal and disposition of the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods
currently being unloaded from the Yongbyon reactor as one
project where EU participation and assistance may be
welcomed. This activity would take a long time and be
costly. Dupre noted another long-term activity might be the
redirection of North Korean nuclear scientists, a project in
which the ROK had expressed interest to the EU informally,
possibly as part of the Global Partnership, should it be
geographically expanded. Wigemark wondered if these two
activities might be put into the EC,s five-year plan, to
which Richard Johnson (EAP/K) replied that, while there can
be no certainties in the negotiations, it would be wise to be
prepared to support these activities in the next five years.


14. (SBU) Iran. Risa Mongiello (ISN/RA) reported that fewer
than half of UN Member States were reporting to the UN
Sanctions Committee on their implementation of sanctions
under the Iran UNSC resolutions. She suggested that the U.S.
and EC might cooperate to identify gaps in implementation and
assist states in fulfilling their requirements. For example,
an EC-U.S. cooperative monitoring effort could address such
specific issues as how to best implement the travel
restriction requirements in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803,
identifying gaps in states, legislative frameworks to
implement the UNSCRs and, proactively offering to assist UN
Member States to develop road maps or plans of action for
addressing remaining measures to be taken. Wigemark agreed
to put ISN/RA in touch with those who deal with the Iran/UN
Security Council issue in Brussels as they were unable to
attend the Washington meeting.


15. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards. Steve Adams and Jon Sanborn
(both ISN/MNSA) described U.S. voluntary contributions to the
IAEA and suggested that the EU might make similar
contributions. Sanborn also raised the possibility of the EU
strengthening the capabilities of the network of analytic
laboratories that works with the IAEA Safeguard Analytic Lab
(SAL) to analyze samples associated with inspections. EC
representative Said Abousahl replied that the EU also
provides a good deal of support to the IAEA and noted that
the Karlsruhe analytic lab is in fact overloaded with IAEA
samples. He also pointed out that the IAEA has focused only
on the possibility of building a new laboratory to the
exclusion of other options.


16. (SBU) Multilateral Nuclear approaches. Marc Humphrey
(ISN/NESS) briefed on the motivations for providing assurance
of nuclear fuel supply and the various proposals designed to
achieve this objective. He closed with a number of suggested
areas of U.S./EU cooperation on this front. For example, the
numerous EU nuclear energy states that rely on the
international market rather than indigenous enrichment could
advocate the reliability of this approach. In addition, EU
nuclear supplier states could coordinate with the U.S. and
others to ensure consistent nonproliferation standards for
nuclear cooperation. Finally, EU Member States were
encouraged to contribute to the IAEA fuel bank as part of the
NTI challenge grant proposal. Dupre asked how the Nuclear
Threat Initiative proposal for an IAEA-administered fuel bank
differed from national approaches, to which Humphrey replied
that it was one of several mutually reinforcing proposals and
was complementary to U.S. and other national proposals.

--------------
Scientific Redirection/Scientific Engagement
--------------


17. (SBU) Following the Science Centers Program presentation
and also in a meeting with CTR,s Deputy Director, the EC
stated that it intended to decrease its budget for the
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) as it looked
to where it could expand nonproliferation work globally, such
as Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
However, the EC said that there was still a nonproliferation
mission to achieve at the Science Centers and thus the EU
would continue to provide funding.


18. (SBU) ISN/CTR briefed the EC delegation on the Libya
Scientist Engagement Program, and the EC indicated they would
take back the information to their colleagues to discuss how
they would partner with the U.S. While Libya was not
currently a country of EU engagement, the EC thought it would
be easy to add to their &neighborhood of engagement8. The
EC desired to know where the U.S. believed they should focus
their engagement. The U.S. highlighted nuclear medicine and
water desalination training as the areas of greatest need,
which the EC seemed open to providing.


19. (SBU) ISN/CTR also briefed the EC delegation on the Iraq
Redirection Program. The EC delegation noted that some
aspects of the program, such as training and capacity
building, were outside their normal purview but that they
would pass information on to their counterparts in other EU
functions. ISN/CTR expressed interest in learning more about
EU reconstruction activities in Iraq, particularly in the
infrastructure, public health, and education sectors, as
these projects could make use of former WMD and missile
experts, technical skills and provide sustainable civilian
employment opportunities.


20. (SBU) The briefing included a discussion of USG efforts
to temporarily relocate high-proliferation risk-threatened
Iraqi WMD scientists and missile engineers so that these
individuals do not seek refuge in countries of proliferation
concern or cooperate with terrorist groups. Wigemark noted
that there was no common EU policy on Iraq, but that many EU
members, including his own country Sweden, had taken many
Iraqi refugees. He said they would inquire about the
possibility of hosting temporarily relocated former Iraqi WMD
and missile personnel in the EU countries and noted the
possibility of fellowships in the EU,s Joint Research
Center. ISN/CTR responded that the political sensitivities
were understandable, but that there were a variety of ways in
which the EU could be involved to accommodate varying
sensitivities and offered to provide more specific
information on particular projects and areas of collaboration
that might be of interest.

--------------
Chemical Weapons
--------------


21. (SBU) State ISN/CTR and ISN/CB representatives gave
overviews of their efforts to improve chemical security best
practices globally and activities to assist other nations
with CWC implementing legislation. ISN/CB made a pitch,
which was well received, for EU assistance with its own
Member States in meeting their Chemical (and Biological)
Weapons Convention obligations, primarily legislative
commitments. The U.S. has very effectively deployed a small
team of experts to travel to capitals to help draft and enact
CW (and BW) implementing measures - including critical penal
legislation - and ISN/CB suggested a similar effort be
undertaken by the EU. ISN/CTR outlined its Chemical Security
Engagement Program (CSP),which is a global program to engage
chemical professionals and improve best practices in chemical
safety and security. The EU expressed strong interest in CSP
and its activities to engage chemical scientists and improve
chemical security in academic and chemical industry settings.
The EU was particularly interested in efforts to bring
chemical scientists into the international community as well
as security practices at pesticide facilities, which are
areas that ISN/CTR is also seeking to address through CSP.
The EU expressed interest in activities in the Middle East
and also expressed desire to coordinate through its planned
efforts to build a European regional training center for safe
and secure use of chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear materials. CSP is currently active in South and
Southeast Asia and plans to expand to the Middle East next
year.


--------------
Biological Weapons
--------------


22. (SBU) DOS and DOD representatives gave overviews of
their respective programs aimed at reducing biological
threats, including efforts to consolidate dangerous pathogen
collections, support collaborative research, enhance
biosecurity and biosafety, and improve disease surveillance
for emerging infectious diseases, as well as redirection and
sustainability efforts for personnel with biological weapons-
and related expertise. EU representatives stated that while
they are new to third-party assistance related to biological
nonproliferation, they are very interested to learn about
U.S. activities, including those outside of the Former Soviet
Union, and to discuss ways to both complement ongoing U.S.
activities and determine capacities through which they might
develop unique programs. The EU suggested the idea to build a
European regional training center for safe and secure use of
chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN)
materials, which received enthusiastic support from the U.S.


23. (SBU) Interactive discussions focused upon current U.S.
activities, as well as possible collaborative opportunities
for the U.S. and EU. Safe, secure, and sustainable lab
capacity building, technical assistance, and training were
key features of the discussions. The EU expressed specific
interest in engaging former Soviet Union countries - in
particular, Central Asia - as well as expanding into other
parts of the world such as South- and Southeast Asia. Disease
surveillance and detection methods were also considered, in
that surveillance networks and diagnostic equipment used
should be complementary between assistance programs.


24. (SBU) The EU and the U.S. agreed that much room for
collaborative efforts exists in biosafety and security across
the world. Both parties also agree that the public health and
security sectors are difficult to bring together. The EU will
work to incorporate public and agricultural health ministries
in the development of biosafety and biosecurity programs.
Overall, the discussions were useful in helping the EU to
identify needs and potential collaborative opportunities in
global biological security. The EU is currently drafting a
preliminary plan for its program development and will ask for
feedback from the U.S. when complete.

-------------- --------------
EU Plans for a Training Center on CBRN Safety and Security
-------------- --------------


25. (SBU) The EC delegation said that as part of the EU
effort to develop a safety and security culture with all
sensitive technologies, they were interested in building a
CBRN training center based on the existing EU Joint Research
Center, which performs such functions in the nuclear energy
area. They envision having the headquarters of the new
center in an EU country, along with regional training centers
in other parts of the world. This idea is still in the
conceptual stage and the EU wants to ensure that the proposed
center does not duplicate what the United States or others
are already doing. The EU was particularly interested in
U.S. views on which regions such a center might focus its
training efforts. Department specialists welcomed the EU
training center initiative and its multidisciplinary
approach, saying it appeared to complement U.S. efforts in
this area. Close coordination would be necessary to avoid
duplication of efforts, but the EU center could be
particularly useful for training specialists from Africa and
the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. The EC committed
to coming back to the USG when its proposals for the center
had become more concrete.

--------------
Meeting with NGOs and Think Tanks
--------------


26. (U) In response to an EC request to meet with the
nongovernmental community, the Department organized an NGO
roundtable, which included the following participants:

--Deepti Choubey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
--Laura Holgate, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
--Corey Hinderstein, NTI
--Sandy Spector, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at
Monterey (CNS)
--Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, CNS
--Johan Bergenas, CNS
--Julie Khersonsky, Center for International Trade Security
(CITS) at the University of Georgia
--Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
(NPEC)
--Brian Finlay, Stimson Center


27. (U) The NGO discussions were wide-ranging and addressed
topics that included international nuclear fuel assurances,
the World Institute for Nuclear Security, scientist
redirection, export controls, UN Security Council Resolution
1540, the expansion of civil nuclear power, and the
U.S.-India civil-nuclear deal. Some of the specific policy
recommendations for the EC included:

--NTI suggested that the EC could cover part or all of the
remaining $45 million shortfall to establish an international
fuel bank under IAEA management, to which NTI offered $50
million if the international community would contribute an
additional $100 mil by September 2008 (the U.S. has pledged
$50 mil and Norway $5 mil).

--NTI also suggested EC support for the World Institute for
Nuclear Security (WINS) an international forum for sharing
nuclear security best practices, primarily among facility
operators, analogous to the World Association of Nuclear
Operators, a nuclear safety effort that developed after the
Chernobyl accident.

--CITS noted that many advanced dual-use technologies are
produced in European countries, so improving outreach to
industries that produce these items within the EU would
significantly lessen the risk that these technologies end up
in the wrong hands.

--CITS and CNS both noted they have well-developed training
programs in 1540 implementation, export control, and
biosaftety and biosecurity that the EC could take advantage
of in its own training efforts.

The EC representatives noted that they would consider the
recommendations on the IAEA fuel bank, WINS, export control,
and training. They noted, in particular, that the experience
of the NGO community in export control training could be very
valuable in the development of the EC,s proposed CBRN
training center. The EC representatives also noted that
issues of civil nuclear power and the India deal were beyond
the purview of the Commission.

--------------
Concluding Remarks
--------------


28. (U) EUR and ISN thanked the EC delegation for coming to
Washington to consult in such depth on the whole range of
nonproliferation programs. Both bureaus looked forward to
continuing this close collaboration and noted that the
regular CONOP/CODUN troika meetings (next scheduled for April
11 in Brussels) and the June U.S.-EU Summit would provide
opportunities to build on the momentum created by this visit.
The EC delegation expressed thanks for the productive visit
and the two sides agreed to exchange lists of items for
follow up action, and to meet again on a regular basis.

--------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


29. (U) USEU should report results of efforts by cable to
ISN/CPI -- U.S. 1540 Coordinator Tom Wuchte ) after the
April 11 Troika meeting, with info to Jeff Giauque, USEU Desk
Officer.
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