Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE31896
2008-03-27 21:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN LONDON,

Tags:  KNNP MNUC PARM PREL 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 STATE 031896 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
BERN ALSO FOR LIECHTENSTEIN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL
SUBJECT: PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN LONDON,
UK (FEBRUARY 4-6, 2008)

SUMMARY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 STATE 031896

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
BERN ALSO FOR LIECHTENSTEIN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL
SUBJECT: PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN LONDON,
UK (FEBRUARY 4-6, 2008)

SUMMARY


1. The sixteenth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting took place in London,
UK on February 4-6, 2008. Immediately following the OEG on
February 7, the UK Ministry of Defense hosted an outreach day
with six invited countries from the Gulf/Levant region.
Information contained in this cable is provided for Posts,
information and is not to be passed to non-OEG participant
governments. A follow-on cable septel will provide a
non-paper to pass to host nation governments of all
PSI-endorsing states to keep them abreast of developments in
the PSI community.

BACKGROUND


2. Meeting Summary: UK hosted the sixteenth Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG)
meeting in London on February 4-6, 2008. All twenty
participants in the OEG attended (Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Singapore, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States). Russia sent only a representative from its local
embassy, claiming visa difficulties. The OEG focused on
three main objectives: reviewing the first five years of PSI
and identifying challenges for the future; outreach to
non-OEG PSI partners; and enhancing the operational momentum
of PSI. The agenda also included presentations and
discussions on the 2005 SUA Protocol, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) amendment process, new national
counterproliferation structures created to facilitate
interministerial work within the Canadian government, a
Germany-hosted PSI website, an update on the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF),and the U.S.-hosted PSI fifth anniversary
event planned for May 28-29 in Washington. The OEG heard
presentations from three invited industry organizations,
including Lloyds Maritime Intelligence Unit, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO),and Hutchinson
Ports (UK) Ltd. New Zealand distributed final copies of the
PSI Model National Response Plan and countries were asked to
describe their recent and planned outreach activities to
non-OEG and non-PSI countries. Finally, delegations received

an update on future PSI exercises. Break-out sessions were
conducted on the legal, law enforcement, exercise and
intelligence areas related to PSI. New this time, the UK

STATE 00031896 002 OF 017


organized the first ever joint legal/law enforcement breakout
group. Items proposed by the U.S. included: a master PSI
activities calendar to include exercises and outreach
activities and the development of diverse unclassified PSI
success stories for use at the PSI 5th Anniversary event in
Washington, DC to be held May 28-29, 2008. For further
detail, see Chairman's Statement in para (10).


3. Delegation: The U.S. delegation was led by Richard
Douglas, OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats.
The delegation included representatives from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (Policy and General Counsel),the
Department of State (ISN),the Joint Staff (J5 and Legal
Counsel),U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.
Pacific Command, U. S. Strategic Command, the Department of
Homeland Security (Customs and Border Protection and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement),the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Energy, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency.


4. Introduction: Dr. Kim Howells, Minister of State of the
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, welcomed PSI Operational
Experts to London on February 4, 2008. The OEG was chaired
by Commodore Simon Williams of the UK MOD. Dr. Howells
suggested three primary areas for the OEG to consider:
identifying priorities for future work based on an analysis
of the successes achieved to date; outreach to countries that
support PSI but that do not participate in the OEG; and
renewed operational and practical work.


5. The OEG Process - 5 Years On: A key objective of the
London OEG was to assess the first five years of PSI. OEG
participants discussed PSI successes and the challenges to
address for the future. Presentations emphasized the notable
growth of PSI - in the number of endorsing countries from 11
at the start of the Initiative to over 85 presently - and
identified key challenges including how to grow inclusively,
how to sustain PSI,s momentum and how to adapt to the
changing proliferation threat. The ensuing discussion
brought out a need to develop effective information
strategies to various PSI audiences, including participants'
own national governments, non-OEG PSI endorsing states, and
media and the general public. Delegations were encouraged to
develop a diverse set of unclassified PSI success stories to
complement those information strategies.


6. Outreach: The second priority of the London OEG was to
focus efforts on assisting non-OEG PSI partners'
understanding of and capabilities to support PSI activities.
Presentations offered specific suggestions that OEG countries

STATE 00031896 003 OF 017


could consider to maximize effectiveness of outreach
activities. Several delegations noted the need to increase
coordination of outreach activities. All countries made
brief presentations on their recent and planned outreach
activities.


7. Enhancing Operational Momentum: The final objective of
the OEG was to retrain the OEG's focus on operational
progress. In this vein, several topics were raised,
including capacity-building and technical assistance, a
password-protected website that Germany created, and
improvements to national organization structures that
facilitate whole-of-government support for PSI. Additionally,
delegations heard updates on the 2005 Protocol to the
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) amendment process. The
U.S. reminded delegations that the U.S. Executive Branch
transmitted the 2005 SUA Protocols to the Senate in October
2007 and announced that the first briefing on the SUA
Protocol to Senate staff was provided on January 23, 2008.
It was well-received, and the Senate staff members expressed
interest in receiving further information.


8. Turkey offered insights into some of the difficulty it
experiences as the recipient of frequent requests for
interdiction assistance, noting a need for more and better
information and longer lead times for decision-making and
options development. Turkey's intervention highlighted the
perspectives of requested versus requesting parties in any
interdiction case and the need for PSI partners to work
together to devise mutually workable solutions.


9. The U.S. offered to do the following: (a) facilitate a
virtual working group to coordinate outreach activities led
by OEG countries; (b) collate responses to the legal
non-paper on disposition and liability with a goal of
creating a document that captures the OEG's understanding of
the international and national laws that govern interdiction,
disposition and liability; (c) host a conference and outreach
event May 28-29, 2008 in Washington to commemorate the fifth
anniversary of PSI; and (d) sponsor multi-day
capacity-building workshops for non-OEG PSI partners.


10. Begin Chairman's Statement:


CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
February 4-6, 2008


STATE 00031896 004 OF 017



1. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational
Experts Group (OEG) met in London, United Kingdom from
February 4th - 6th, 2008. Twenty OEG countries were present
- Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States.

Welcoming Remarks


2. DR Kim Howells, Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, welcomed PSI Operational Experts to
London. DR Howells stressed UK's commitment to countering the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, their means of
delivery, and related materials, and the key role that PSI
plays in this work. He emphasized the importance that, after
nearly five years of work, the Group should develop fresh
ideas to take its work forward. DR Howells identified three
areas in particular where he believed there was scope for
continued and vitalized development: fresh priority work in
the future based on an analysis of the successes achieved to
date; outreach to countries who support PSI but who do not
participate in the OEG; and renewed operational and practical
work.

The OEG Process - 5 Years on


3. The Group reviewed the successes achieved by the OEG since
it was launched in 2003, and the challenges and key
priorities for the future. The UK and Greece gave overviews
of what had been undertaken and achieved since the launch of
the group, emphasizing the high-paced tempo it has adopted
from the start, how the Group has acquired deeper
understanding of the best ways to approach the multifaceted
nature of interdiction work, and how it has broadened its
activities to ensure comprehensive coverage of interdiction
work. The OEG had also been active in capacity building (for
example, the production of the Model National Plan - which
Portugal offered to translate - and the WMD Handbook) and in
adopting flexible working practices to respond to the dynamic
evolution of the proliferation threat.


4. The US, New Zealand and Poland set out the challenges and
key priorities for the future. The principal challenges were
seen as maintaining the success of the initiative whilst
stimulating its increasing membership, sustaining the
momentum of work, and adapting to new developments in the
proliferation threat; the key priorities were seen as being
to regionalize and deepen outreach, to align the exercise
programme with prioritized operational issues, to develop
knowledge using new tools. Turkey stressed the importance of

STATE 00031896 005 OF 017


accurate and timely intelligence-sharing, as well as
adherence to the principle of control at origin. The OEG
needed to remain alert to any need to develop fresh avenues
of work, for example in identifying the scope for new
elements of international legislation and new policy
initiatives; there was also a need to develop a comprehensive
media and public relations strategy to ensure that PSI was
better understood by opinion formers and the wider public.


5. During the discussion some countries proposed a range of
ideas which might contribute to increasing the effectiveness
of the PSI, for example Regional OEGs, working groups or a
focal point.

Outreach


6. The United States and New Zealand gave presentations on
the opportunities and challenges of outreach to non-OEG PSI
endorsees. It was emphasized that the OEG operates on behalf
of all endorsing States, and that the priorities for outreach
to these endorsing States should be: to improve their
knowledge and dispel the myths of PSI; to improve Partners,
capacity to contribute effectively to PSI
counter-proliferation efforts and interdictions, in
particular in linking agencies across Government to handle
and respond to requests for assistance. It was noted that it
would be important to vary the type of capacity building
offered to Partners, and to ensure that there were regular
opportunities for dialogue, including through
regionally-based outreach. Equally, it was recognized that
outreach was resource-intensive and that OEG Participants
should look to combine their outreach efforts. New Zealand
circulated both hard and e-copies of the finalized PSI Model
National Response Plan as well as a 10-page summary of it.


7. A number of OEG Participants briefed on their recent
outreach activities. Poland briefed on the outreach
undertaken as part of Exercise EASTERN SHIELD in 2007, and
the seminars in the Black Sea and Gulf regions; further
activity was being planned for 2008, including an exercise in
Croatia. France briefed on Exercise GUISTIR, which took place
in Djibouti, March 10-12 2008; this to include a seminar
followed by a LIVEX, and its main aim would be outreach to
Maghreb and Red Sea countries. Japan briefed on the outreach
elements of Exercise PACIFIC SHIELD 07, which involved
outreach to PSI Partners from Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and
Europe, as well as to non-PSI endorsees; all parts of the
exercise were fully open to all countries and the media, to
allow a high level of discussion between those involved.
Turkey briefed on Black Sea security, setting out a number of
maritime security arrangements and initiatives in the region,

STATE 00031896 006 OF 017


including BLACKSEAFOR, Operation Black Sea Harmony, and
Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field
in the Black Sea.


8. Australia briefed on its outreach activity in the
Asia-Pacific region, highlighting the need to have a good
understanding of individual non-OEG Partners' concerns.
Table-top exercises were seen as good outreach vehicles, in
particular because they demonstrate the need for an
inter-agency approach. Equally, outreach on PSI should be set
in the wider context of maritime security.

9 In a Tour de Table, other OEG Participants briefed on the
outreach activities they had undertaken recently, and their
future plans. A recurrent theme was the need to co-ordinate
PSI outreach activity with broader export-control and
counter-proliferation outreach activities.

Enhancing Operational Momentum


10. In this session, the UK introduced its thoughts on
enhancing operational momentum through presentations on the
lessons process and the experience of HM Revenue and Customs
in PSI. The UK offered to "streamline" the lessons database.
We need to make sure that in operationalising PSI we achieve
the aims of deterring proliferators.

Capacity Building/Technical Assistance


11. Australia updated the Group on the progress made by ICAO
on the proposal to create a new transport offense for the
carriage of WMD and related materials by air. A draft text to
support this proposal had been circulated, and was being
considered by a special sub-committee in Montreal in February

2008. Australia asked states to discuss the text and consult
with relevant national authorities, prior to the Montreal
meeting. Outreach to the Air Transport industry, both
internationally and nationally, was being considered. The UK
gave a presentation on its experience of establishing a
Competent Authority for obtaining Flag-State consent for
at-sea boarding under the Protocol to the Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea, setting out the
information a Competent Authority would need in order to come
to rapid decisions on consent, and the parallels with the
system already in place for granting boarding consent under
counter-narcotics legislation.

National Organization


12. Canada provided an update on its national CP coordination
structure, which had been instrumental in facilitating strong

STATE 00031896 007 OF 017


interagency coordination and cooperation on the full range of
CP issues and activities. Turkey briefed on the establishment
of a national Naval CBRN detection team, which would be used
to augment maritime boarding teams. Singapore briefed on the
changes to their Strategic Goods (Control) Act which come
into effect in January 2008, to allow all items controlled
under the four international export control regimes to be
covered in its national legislation; outreach to Singaporean
industry had been conducted as part of the programme of
implementation of these amendments.

Classified OEG website


13. Germany briefed on the development of a classified PSI
website, which would provide access to a full range of PSI
tools, including OEG points of contact, a master event list,
OEG Chairman's statements, PSI Law Library, the PSI Model
Response Plan, and the Exercise Lessons Learned.

Updates


14. The UK updated the Group on the work being undertaken by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Proliferation
Finance. Work was being undertaken to develop a typology for
Proliferation Finance, which was due to be finalized in June
2008; this would form the starting point for future guidance.
In the longer term, FATF would undertake work on broad-based
prohibitions, which would be informed by the conclusion of
the work on typologies. Furthermore, the Plenary meeting of
FATF in February 2008 would discuss adding Proliferation
Finance to the Task Force's regular mandate.

Break-Out Group Reports

OEG Legal Breakout Session.


15. Presentations were given by:

-- Greece on the implementation of the SUA Protocols in the
Greek legal system.

-- Japan on domestic legal issues highlighted by their
Pacific Shield exercise.

-- Australia on air transport offenses in relation to
possible amendments to the Montreal Convention which would be
discussed further in ICAO in two weeks' time.

-- The US on the overflight consent matrix; its domestic
implementation of the 2005 SUA protocols and Law of the Sea
Convention; the PSI Law Library; its non-paper on

STATE 00031896 008 OF 017


interdiction, disposition and liability; and its views on
liability incurred during maritime interdictions.

-- The UK on the Super gun case.

-- The Greek presentation on the implementation of the SUA
Protocols generated lively discussion on its liability
provisions in article 8bis(10)(b). A number of countries
explained that liability issues still remained for them.


16. It was agreed that the US non paper on the International
Legal Framework for Interdiction, Disposition and Liability
circulated at the Rhodes OEG provided a useful framework for
PSI partners to set forth domestic considerations they may
have with regard to interdiction, disposition, and liability.
The US agreed to collate any responses with a goal of
creating a document that captures the OEG's understanding of
the international and national law that governs interdiction,
disposition and liability.

OEG Law Enforcement Breakout Session


17. Presentation on a new type of procurement network from
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. OEG law enforcement
group learned about a new type of procurement method using
Internet mail forwarding companies, originally set up for
legitimate purposes, that use virtual offices for reshipping
schemes to enable proliferators to evade export controls.
Proliferators can place orders for controlled items
manufactured in the US and arrange for shipment to the US
mailing address for the virtual office. Goods are
photographed and placed on a password protected website
enabling the proliferators or foreign clients to view the
items in the first instance. Goods are then shipped to
overseas addresses evading export controls and foreign import
restrictions. To date, this system has identified goods such
as missile & electronic components & conventional firearms
procured using this system.
A variation on this scheme has been identified whereby the
virtual office clones a manufacturer's website and adds its
own company name as a legitimate distributor for the
manufacturer's goods. When the manufacturer "googles" and
checks the company name it will come up as a legitimate
distributor for type of goods concerned - due to the cloned
website.


18. Presentation on the UKs UNSCR Enforcement Plan.

-- UK's presentation focused on 3 specific areas: 1) the
development of an Iran action plan 2) risk profiling and 3)
the identification of high risk dual use goods for export.

STATE 00031896 009 OF 017



-- The action plan was developed to ensure implementation of
UNSCRs and at the same time assess HMRC's current activity
and capability in this area. The plan involved the
development of a risk picture using a systematic method of
capturing information on entities dealing and exporting high
risk goods to Iran and known diversionary countries from a
variety of different sources. A list of UK companies was
formulated & risk assessed for visits by compliance officers
- focusing on non compliance with export controls (e.g. lack
of understanding through ignorance) to deliberate attempts to
evade controls. Work is still ongoing and results are yet to
be assessed but the plan has placed a greater UK compliance
focus and tightening of controls on goods exported to Iran.

-- Complementing the compliance plan, UK discussed the
conduct of an exercise last year focusing on 2 key risk areas
: 1) aircraft parts to Iran 2) selected CN Commodity Codes on
the EU dual use list correlation table. Automated risk
profiling was used and results were encouraging; over 200
consignments were inspected and 8% of these warranted further
investigation.


19. The group discussed pros and cons of automated profiling
noting in particular the importance of officers' own
initiative when profiling. Automation was no substitute for
this. Also, it cannot target goods in transit nor does it
allow for the checking of all relevant documentation
concerning the movement of goods. On the positive side it
allowed for new risks and profile changes to be made quickly
and allowed Customs Officers to be deployed on other work.


20. In summary, OEG LE members felt that whilst the use of
traditional customs techniques based on customs data can be a
good profiling tool that yielded positive results, it was no
substitute for enforcement activity predicated on quality and
specific intelligence. That said, countries acknowledged the
importance of profiling work and focused exercises from time
to time, as it enabled law enforcement agencies to
concentrate on areas that for a variety of reasons, might
lack enforcement attention.

-- One OEG member is currently developing risk analysis tools
to help tighten export controls - using details of end users,
brokers, suspect end users and exporters.


21. Joint presentation from Norway and UK - very recent case
study concerning dual use goods to Iran demonstrating
excellent cooperation between Norwegian, British and third
country authorities.


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-- The investigation concerned the procurement of 14
gyrocompasses capable of being used as internal components of
ballistic missiles. The goods, manufactured in France, were
exported from the UK to Iran - some via Norway and an attempt
to export the items via a third country without requisite
export licenses. The investigation resulted in the successful
prosecution of the UK proliferator who is currently awaiting
sentence and a criminal investigation in Norway against a
customs agent which is yet to be concluded. Importantly the
case resulted in the recovery of 9 of the items although 5
did in fact successfully reach Iran. An interactive session
considered the differing export control interpretations
between countries and licensing regimes, investigative
options open to the investigators during the lifecycle of the
investigation and transshipment powers. Both UK and Norway
posed whether the case could be deemed successful given the
fact that 5 items did get through to a country of concern.

-- OEG LE members concluded that it was a success; the fact
that a proliferation network had been identified, had been
successfully prosecuted and shut down and nearly 70% of the
gyrocompasses were prevented from reaching their ultimate
destination was testament to this. Celebration and
publication of successes were also important deterrent tools
for governments and it was important for law enforcement to
use these where possible. Analysis of the case did identify a
disconnect between Intelligence and Law Enforcement channels
- the speedy dissemination of intelligence was crucial to
allow Law Enforcement officers sufficient time to assess
whether time critical enforcement action was feasible. In
this case, it was arguable that information could have been
passed from Customs to Customs using mutual assistance
agreements; this would have speeded up intelligence flows.
However, an important point was the fact that an interdiction
made by one Customs Authority (which involved initiative and
tenacity on the part of its officers) was passed on to other
affected customs authorities in a timely manner. This
stimulated a short debate on licensing authorities and the
benefits that might be derived from up-skilling their
officials in law enforcement requirements as an aid to
enforcement action - in particular the prompt sharing of
information. There was also a short debate on the issue of
denial notices and the differing stances taken by OEG
countries in relation to compliance visits undertaken to
affected traders.

Other issues


22. The group briefly discussed whether or not there was a
requirement for procurement typologies to be circulated
within OEG countries. This was considered problematic due to

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sensitive issues that were often intrinsically connected to
investigations.


23. An interesting presentation was conducted by the US
Department of Energy in relation to non dual use listed
commodities that were capable of having an application in a
nuclear program and how the WMD handbook could be used to
support PSI actions.


24. The format of the law enforcement breakout differed from
previous breakouts in that it did not include a common
scenario but focused on a recent real life investigation that
considered what went well, what went not so well, learning
points and the importance of international collaboration.
The UK questioned whether or not there was a continuing need
for a common scenario and whether discussing real life cases
was more beneficial. Participants were invited to provide
feedback on the content and style of the breakout session for
the next OEG in Paris.


OEG Intelligence Breakout Session


25. The intelligence Breakout Group addressed a variety of
new challenges. Partners were briefed on Iranian shipping by
the United States and on developments in maritime and air
transportation in North Korea by the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom also briefed partners on new developments in
commercial shipping.


26. Partners were requested to consider the exchange of data
on North Korean and Iranian shipping within existing
international law, and to exchange data on a national basis
in the interim. The UK agreed to put forward proposals with a
view to this scheme being implemented by the next OEG.


27. Australia briefed partners on national measures to assess
risk in respect of Intangible Technology Transfer with
particular references to visa applicants. The United Kingdom
provided partners with background material to be used, as
required, in national and outreach PSI exercises. Partners
reviewed previous 'lessons identified', and agreed that those
relating to the need for realistic intelligence play in
exercises, and the importance of exchanging information in a
timely and secure manner remained the most relevant. For the
first time, Partners engaged in a "Red Teaming" exercise to
identify future proliferation-related transportation trends
over the next five years. All agreed that this was a success.
Partners also identified a wide range of achievements by the
intelligence breakout group, especially in relation to
increased co-operation between the intelligence, and

STATE 00031896 012 OF 017


enforcement, communities; along with more realistic exercise
scenarios.

OEG Exercise Breakout Session


28. Discussions in the Exercise Breakout centered around 4
main topics: the PSI exercise schedule; the lessons
identified; taking exercises forward and; exercise briefs and
debriefs.

Exercise Schedule:


29. The schedule was updated. Taking up the task from the
main plenary discussion centered around expanding the
exercise schedule to be a PSI Master Events List (MEL). There
was consensus that this should be looked after by one country
and be hosted on the PSI German website although it is
recognized there will be a requirement for technical issues
to be resolved.

-- The MEL format should develop from the current version and
should include OEGs, Exercises, Outreach and Industry Events.
Australia has offered to investigate co-coordinating the
MEL, and will liaise with OEG states in the lead-up to the
Washington 5th year anniversary meeting.


30. Lessons:

-- The UK introduced the lessons database noting that a lot
of issues discussed in main OEG plenary were contained on the
database. The UK asked nations to consider the usefulness of
the database including its format and discussion centered
around breaking out Strategic, Operational Tactical lessons;
differences between Land, Air and Maritime and; incorporation
into exercises.

-- There was also discussion about how to share lessons and
promulgate them to other OEG products like the MNRP. The UK
will refresh the database on an inter-sessional basis and
discuss how to make it more accessible to other OEG nations
and evaluate its use in developing capacity in other nations.

-- Nations were asked to continue to review the Lessons
database and to prioritize lessons.


31. Exercises:

-- The US introduced incorporation of PSI into existing
exercises to efficiently strengthen non-proliferation,
national capacity and promote outreach. This effort must be
carefully crafted so as not to interfere with larger non-PSI

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exercise goals or dissuade participating nations based on
political sensitivities.

-- Australia gave a presentation on the use of table top
exercises which the group saw had great utility. Further
discussion highlighted the need to maintain the panoply of
different exercises.


32. Exercise Briefs:

-- NZ gave a presentation on their forthcoming exercise MARU
to be held in Auckland from 15-19 September 2008. Following
on from a LIVEX, there will be a table-top exercise which
will focus on disposition issues. It will also feature an
outreach element. Japan and Poland debriefed their recent
exercises Pacific Shield and Eastern Shield.


33. In summary the UK chair identified the following actions:

-- Develop a Master Events List (MEL) (Australia).
-- Develop the lessons database (identify top 15 lessons)
(UK).
-- Continue to address lessons in exercises (All).

Law Enforcement/Legal Joint Breakout Session.

34 Presentations were given by:

-- The UK on the results from the intelligence as evidence
questionnaire. It was agreed that the work was useful but so
far only eight responses had been received. Delegates were
urged to provide their response to the UK in time for the
next OEG when a more meaningful analysis can be given.
Canada said that they were awaiting the results of a
Government Inquiry into the Air India case which could have
an impact on their current perspective.

-- New Zealand on the offenses in the SUA Protocol and the
challenges that they present for a potential prosecution,
especially in relation to dual use goods. This sparked an
interesting debate on how PSI partners would implement the
Protocol in domestic legislation, especially considering the
different legal systems that applied.

-- The UK on a recent prosecution for a trafficking and
brokering of arms offense for which a UK national pleaded
guilty and was subject to a custodial sentence and
confiscation order representing his benefit from the trade.
The presentation highlighted the importance of information
sharing with foreign partners even where no formal legal
agreements were in place and the importance of inter agency

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co-operation. Without this the prosecution could not have
taken place.

5th Anniversary meeting


35. The US gave a presentation on the forthcoming 5th year
Anniversary meeting of PSI in Washington on May 28 and 29.
The first day will be a substantive conference of all PSI
states, with participation at deputy foreign minister level.
The second day will comprise a PSI outreach workshop at
expert-level. The first day will assess the first 5 years of
PSI and look ahead at ways to strengthen the initiative,
outreach being a major feature of this. The second day will
combine efforts to support PSI activity by all endorsees as
well as increasing support for the initiative by
non-participants.

Preview of next OEG meeting


36. France provided further detail on their offer to host the
next OEG meeting in Paris from 24-26 September. This OEG will
follow on from the London OEG and the Washington 5th year
anniversary meeting, and will coincide with France's
presidency of the EU.

Industry Outreach Workshop "Trust and Innovation"


37. As part of the OEG meeting, an Outreach Workshop with
industry was held.

-- Poland, Norway and Denmark gave presentations on their
recent activities in outreach to their national industries.
Poland had held a PSI Industry Day in January 2008, which had
included representatives from shippers, haulers and air and
sea port authorities. The outreach covered international
legal instruments, export control legislation, transfers of
intangible technologies, and the PSI principles. Norway had
developed a "Prevent Programme" industrial outreach strategy,
which included visits to industry, and educational
programmes, such as export control seminars. Denmark gave a
two-fold presentation on industry outreach. The first part
touched on the importance of preventing proliferation at the
earliest time possible by performing outreach to industry
involved in production, development, research and export.
The latter part showing an example of dialogue and
co-operation with the transportation industry, once goods of
proliferation concern have entered into the transportation
industry segment.

-- A representative from Lloyds Maritime Intelligence Unit
gave a presentation on Information Flows in Shipping.

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Shipping information assists maritime domain awareness and
should be seen by business as a facilitator rather than a
drain on resources. The global Automated Identification
System would be a major step forward in generating this
domain awareness. Equally, there needed to be trust between
Government and industry to provide the confidence that
sensitive information passed by industry would be treated
appropriately. Suppliers should be given incentives to
provide information, for example by granting fast-track
clearance, or official validation.

-- A representative of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) gave a presentation on developments in
International Maritime Security. The IMO Diplomatic
Conference in 2002 agreed to strengthen maritime safety and
security including detecting and deterring acts that threaten
security. Co-operation between the IMO and the International
Labour Organization has resulted in a joint code practice on
security in ports; equally, co-operation between the IMO and
the World Customs Organization had brought Governments and
business together to discuss security and safety. It was
important that Governments now moved forward to ratify the
2005 Protocol to the Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts at Sea, incorporate the offenses into national
legislation, and established a national Competent Authority
for granting Flag State consent for boarding. There was
already a potential source of best practice on granting Flag
State consent in the work undertaken to implement Article 17
of the 1988 Vienna Convention.

-- A representative of Hutchinson Ports (UK) LTD gave a
presentation on Supply Chain Security. The information flows
that support supply chain security bring not only commercial
and national security benefits, but also bring commercial
efficiency benefits in terms of inventory management and
asset utilization. The International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code was an important tool for improving port
security and in encouraging the monitoring of what was coming
into ports. Other important data supplies could be obtained
from radiation detection systems and container imagery; these
sources of information would be enhanced through extended
data integration.


38. ANNEX: SUMMARY OF OEG ACTION ITEMS

The OEG Process - Five Years On

Participants are asked to:

a) work up examples of successes and benefits of PSI that
could be released to the public, especially examples that

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could be used at the Washington 5th anniversary meeting. Such
examples would be useful in outreach and in getting other
countries to endorse PSI. It was agreed that there was no
single metric of success: examples of success could include
specific interdictions, or improvements to national
capacities and capabilities;

b) Organise a workshop to develop a PSI media strategy,
including messages for think tanks, international
organizations and academics, as well as for non-endorsees and
the wider public. This workshop should reflect input from
Participants' own media or communications experts;

c) give consideration through the Legal Experts to whether
there were opportunities to strengthen the existing
international legal framework relevant to PSI actions and its
implementation;

d) review the trial classified OEG website hosted by Germany
and make comments and recommendations.

e) provide feedback and updates to the Flag State consent and
Technical Verification capabilities matrices to Singapore.

Outreach

Participants are asked to:

a) develop a Calendar of outreach activities for 2008 in time
for the Washington High Level Political Meeting. This should
be done through the website being developed by Germany;

b) contribute to a small virtual Working Group established by
the US to develop a strategy for outreach to non-OEG
endorsees, including how OEG Participants might combine their
efforts, and giving particular attention to the knowledge
base amongst some PSI Participants and the need to address
how Participants might handle and respond to requests for
assistance in an interdiction. Such a strategy should address
how Participants could pool their strengths to make outreach
most effective;

c) make an outreach event part of the standard structure of
future OEG meetings;

d) give further consideration to regional OEG meetings.

Industry Outreach: "Trust and Innovation"

Participants are asked to:


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a) take steps to promote timely ratification of the 2005
Protocol to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts at Sea;

b) consider how industry may be encouraged to take a positive
view of PSI activity, including through outreach activities;

c) take forward Government-Industry PSI exercises.

End Chairman's Statement


POINTS OF CONTACT
--------------



11. Please slug responses for OSD GSA (Beth Flores) and
State/ISN/CPI (Carlos Guzman). USG POC for PSI Operational
Experts Group issues is Beth Flores, OSD/GSA. USG POC for
operational legal matters is Chip Wedan, DOD/OGC. USG POC for
PSI policy issues is Carlos Guzman, State/ISN/CPI.
RICE