Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE28931
2008-03-19 23:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

BELARUS:DEMARCHE REQUEST

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM AMGT ODIP OFDP BO 
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VZCZCXRO9800
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #8931/01 0800001
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 192355Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK IMMEDIATE 0716
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 028931 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM AMGT ODIP OFDP BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS:DEMARCHE REQUEST

REF: A. MINSK 163

B. MINSK 168

C. MINSK 191

D. MINSK 33

Classified By: Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer
E.O.12958 Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 028931

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM AMGT ODIP OFDP BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS:DEMARCHE REQUEST

REF: A. MINSK 163

B. MINSK 168

C. MINSK 191

D. MINSK 33

Classified By: Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer
E.O.12958 Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. Embassy Minsk has
requested Department guidance on the demand outlined in
Refs A through C that the U.S. reduce the number of U.S.
diplomatic staff at Embassy Minsk to 17 or face expulsion
of embassy staff. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
has given a deadline of March 24 to provide the list of 17
U.S. diplomatic staff who will remain accredited to
Belarus. The Department, in consultation with other USG
agencies and Embassy Minsk, is preparing a list of 17
staff members who would stay at post in the event of a
U.S. decision to comply with Belarus' demand. We have
not/not taken a final decision to provide such a list;
additional guidance will be provided prior to the March 24
deadline. The focus of this approach should be to push
back on the unwarranted Belarusian request and to point
out the potential consequences of continued Belarusian
recalcitrance regarding political prisoners, and urge
Belarus to pursue a different path. Please deliver on
March 20 at the appropriate level of the MFA. END SUMMARY
AND ACTION REQUEST.

--------------
Objectives
--------------


2. (C) Embassy Minsk is requested to pursue the following
objectives.

-- Inform the MFA that the U.S. is considering its
response to the request to reduce staff.

-- Challenge the request to reduce U.S. citizen staff at
Embassy Minsk, noting that it is highly unusual,
unwarranted, potentially discriminatory, and appears to be
retaliation for U.S. sanctions policy rather than based on
concerns regarding what is a reasonable or normal size for
the mission to conduct its normal business. (See paragraph
4 for additional background on this objective.)

-- Urge Belarus to honor commitments to release all

political prisoners, including Alyaksandr Kazulin, as had
been promised in earlier conversations (Ref D). Relations
cannot be improved without this essential step. Should the
Belarus Government release Kazulin immediately, we would
be prepared to begin a dialogue aimed at additional steps
to improve relations.

-- Emphasize that sanctions against Belneftekhim will not
be reversed until Belarus takes positive steps, including
the release of Alyaksandr Kazulin and the beginning of
democratic reforms as agreed upon in dialogue with the
U.S. If all prisoners are not released, additional
economic sanctions, including additional designations, and
additional clarifications of existing sanctions will
continue to be pursued. It remains in the interest of
Belarus to avoid additional economic sanctions before they
are imposed-- since they are not easily removed under U.S.
law. (See paragraph 5 for additional background on this
objective.)

-- Emphasize that absent positive movement on the
political prisoners, the U.S. will continue to block
Belarus' stalled WTO aspirations, and will consider other
measures.

-- Confirm that if any of our diplomats are expelled, the
U.S. is prepared to take responsive actions which may
include reduction in the number of Belarus diplomats
accredited to the U.S.

--------------
Background
--------------


3. (C) Per Ref C, the Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) informed Embassy Minsk on March 17 that if the U.S.
does not reduce the number of U.S. diplomatic staff to 17
persons by March 24, the Ministry would bring the U.S.
presence down to that size by declaring U.S. diplomats
persona non grata. The Department recognizes Belarus will

STATE 00028931 002 OF 003


likely follow through on this threat. The Department
agrees it is preferable for the U.S. to determine which
staff remain in Belarus in order to best advance U.S.
interests. Keeping in mind the deadlines set by the MFA
(Ref C),we are engaged in an interagency effort to make
such a determination, but there has been no final decision
to provide such a list.

--------------
Background on Vienna Convention
--------------


4. (U) We should reiterate our conclusion that the request
by Belarus to reduce U.S. staff based upon the size of
Belarus' embassy in the U.S. is completely unwarranted,
drawing from the points below.

--To demand that the U.S. reduce the number of people at
its mission to the same number that Belarus has in the
United States is not based on or consistent with the
standard in the Vienna Convention.

--In fact, the demand that the U.S. reduce the number of
people at its mission is highly unusual and inconsistent
with normal diplomatic practice; USG missions overseas,
including our mission in Minsk, are staffed at the level
required to carry out their work. It is immaterial that
it is larger than Belarus, mission in the United States.

--It is also not reasonable to demand that the respective
missions be the same size, since the United States Embassy
has programs that the Belarusian Embassy here does not,
for instance, foreign assistance programs. Our security
requirements also differ.

--We reiterate that the number of people working at the
embassy is the number needed to provide adequate and
appropriate representation and security.

--We also question the intention in demanding such a
reduction. The MFA has publicly acknowledged that the
actions against the U.S. embassy are due to the sanctions
against Belarus state enterprise Belneftekhim and
subsidiaries ) and not driven by concerns related to the
operation of the U.S. embassy.

-- Furthermore, if Belarus has not demanded that other
sending States hold their missions to sizes comparable to
the size of Belarusian missions in their States, this
would call into question Belarus,s adherence to the
requirement under the VCDR that in applying the Convention
Belarus not discriminate among States.

-- Finally, we would like to remind you about the
assurances given by President Lukashenka to the President
of the United States on 20 November 1998, that Belarus
would adhere unconditionally to both the letter and the
spirit of the Vienna Convention and other legal
instruments which regulate the functioning of diplomatic
missions.

--------------
Background on Additional Sanctions
--------------


5. (C) In the meantime, we will emphasize with Belarus
that actions against the United States embassy do not come
without a price. We will continue to pursue visa
restrictions and economic sanctions against persons
responsible for human rights abuses, for impeding Belarus'
transition to democracy and for public corruption. These
sanctions may be directed against new types of targets as
well as continue to target state owned enterprises that
are owned or controlled by persons who are designated.


6. (C) It is in the interest of Belarus to avoid new
sanctions. Recent guidance issued by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) clarified which Belneftekhim
subsidiaries are subject to U.S. sanctions by operation of
law. OFAC is prepared to issue additional clarifications
that will substantially exacerbate the effect of existing
sanctions. OFAC is legally required to issue such
guidance, so the implementation of such guidance should
not be offered as a carrot or a stick. However, it is
important to emphasize that OFAC is working on additional
designations under Executive Order 13405, and it is in
Belarus' interest to avoid additional sanctions.


7. (U) The United States would also continue to block
Belarus' aspirations to restart WTO talks unless all
political prisoners are freed.


STATE 00028931 003 OF 003



8. (U) If United States staff in Minsk are declared
persona non grata, the United States is prepared to take
responsive action which may include action against
Belarusian diplomats in the United States.


9. (U) If, however, Belarus releases political prisoner
Alyaksandr Kazulin, the USG would interpret his release as
a meaningful step toward improving relations. The
Government of Belarus (GoB) would need to take additional
actions, mainly the restoration of fundamental freedoms,
before relations could fully improve, but we are prepared
to engage in a dialogue with the GoB about what needs to
happen after the release of political prisoners.

10.(U) Embassy Minsk's efforts and assistance are greatly
appreciated during this difficult time. Point of Contact
in the Department for questions and follow-up is Stephen
Gee, Desk Officer for Belarus in the Office of Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus Affairs, 202-736-4443, or
geesj@state.sgov.gov.
RICE