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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE27211
2008-03-14 20:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

ANNUAL DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE

Tags:  EC ETTC KSCA MTCRE PARM TSPA AORC 
pdf how-to read a cable
P R 142033Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PAGE 02        STATE   027211  142037Z
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
						C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 027211 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2033
TAGS: EC ETTC KSCA MTCRE PARM TSPA AORC

SUBJECT: ANNUAL DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE
HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE
PROLIFERATION (HCOC)

Classified By: IO DAS BRIAN HOOK FOR REASON 1.4 (D).



1. (U) This is an action request. Please see
paragraph 2.



2. (U) Background/Action Request: Request the Mission
deliver the USG interagency-cleared paper in paragraph
3 to Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) Immediate Central
Contact (ICC) at earliest opportunity for distribution
to all HCOC subscribers.



3. (C/REL HCOC) BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER:

ANNUAL DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE HAGUE
CODE OF CONDUCT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

The United States is submitting this declaration
pursuant to the following provisions of the Hague Code
of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
(HCOC):

a) Transparency measures as follows, with an
appropriate and sufficient degree of detail to increase
confidence and to promote non-proliferation of
Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction:

i) With respect to Ballistic Missile programmes to:
- make an annual declaration providing an outline of
their Ballistic Missile policies. Examples of openness
in such declarations might be relevant information on
Ballistic Missiles systems and land (test-) launch
sites;
- provide annual information on the number and generic
class of Ballistic Missiles launched during the
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in
tiret iii);

ii) With respect to expendable Space Launch Vehicle
programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic
confidentiality principles, to:

SIPDIS
- make an annual declaration providing an outline of
their Space Launch Vehicle policies and land (test-)
launch sites;
- provide annual information on the number and generic
class of Space Launch Vehicles launched during the
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in
tiret iii);
- consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the
degree of access permitted), inviting international
observers to their land (test-) launch sites;

Ballistic missiles are the most threatening means
of delivery for weapons of mass destruction. It is no
accident that the dangerous proliferation of ballistic
missiles occurs predominantly in parallel with programs
for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Such
ballistic missile programs also often exist in parallel
with support for terrorist groups. Viewed in this
context, it is clear why the proliferation of ballistic
missiles threatens international peace and security on
a worldwide basis.

The United States regards the proliferation of
ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) as a direct threat to the United
States, its deployed forces, its friends and allies, as
well as its interests in key regions of the world.

The United States views the Hague Code of Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation as an important
addition to the wide range of tools available to
countries to impede and roll back this proliferation
threat. One element of our strategy is multilateral
efforts against missile proliferation, such as the HCOC
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Another important element is missile defense. We view
our missile defense efforts as complementary to, and
consistent with the objectives of the HCOC and MTCR.
Each seeks in different ways to protect us from the
dangers posed by WMD and ballistic missile
proliferation. Missile defenses, the MTCR, and the
HCOC play important roles in deterring and reducing
missile proliferation, and the United States will be
ready to work with members of the HCOC and the MTCR to
ensure that these complementary efforts are mutually
reinforcing.

While an important addition to the broad arsenal
of nonproliferation measures, it is clear that the HCOC
has its limitations. For example, in taking on the
political commitment pursuant to the HCOC to "exercise
maximum possible restraint in the development, testing
and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction," the United
States -- like other countries -- understands this
commitment does not limit its right to take steps in
these areas necessary to meet national security
requirements that include the ability to maintain a
deterrent umbrella for friends and allies and the
capability to defeat aggression involving WMD attacks.

Most HCOC implementation work concerns the
requirements for pre-launch notification launches and
test flights of the Subscribing States' ballistic
missile and space-launch vehicles. Per the U.S.
statement at the November 25, 2002, Launching
Conference for the International (Hague) Code of
Conduct, the United States intends to make pre-launch
notifications and annual declarations pursuant to the
ICOC (HCOC) based upon current U.S. proposals in its
negotiations with the Russian Federation on a Pre-
Launch Notification System, including on the question
of which launches are to be notified. Once
implementation is completed, the notifications and
declarations that the United States provides pursuant
to the ICOC (HCOC) will be based upon the U.S.-Russian
Pre-Launch Notification System to be established in
connection with the U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange
Center. Over the longer term, the United States and
the Russian Federation previously agreed that the
bilateral U.S.-Russian Pre-Launch Notification system
should be multilateralized. We hope, in turn, that
such a multilateralized system might provide the
mechanism by which all ICOC (HCOC) Subscribing States
exchange pre-launch notifications. We plan to keep all
Subscribing States informed on the progress of
implementation of the U.S.-Russia agreement on launch
notification, and on the implications and opportunities
that a multilateralized U.S.-Russia Pre-Launch
Notification System can present for the ICOC (HCOC).

Ballistic Missiles

An effective strategy for countering WMD,
including their use and further proliferation, is an
integral component of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD.
Meeting the challenges of surprise and uncertainty
requires a new approach to deterrence. While nuclear
forces made an indispensable contribution to deterring
Warsaw Pact aggression during the Cold War, a strategic
posture reliant solely on offensive nuclear weapons is
inappropriate for deterring potential adversaries
across the full spectrum of contingencies the United
States will face in this century. Terrorists or rogue
states armed with weapons of mass destruction will
likely test America's commitments to allies and
friends. In response, the United States requires a
broad range of capabilities to dissuade states from
undertaking political, military, or technical courses
of action that would threaten the U.S., allies or
friends. As such, U.S. forces must pose a credible
deterrent across the spectrum of capabilities to
potential adversaries who have access to modern
military technology, including WMD and the means to
deliver them over long distances. In conjunction with
defenses (active and passive) including ballistic
missile defenses, ballistic missile programs (including
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)) provide
the United States with these credible deterrent
capabilities, as well as providing capabilities that
assure our allies and friends and dissuade adversaries.

Since 2001, the United States developed a new
approach to addressing Strategic Force capabilities.
New, non-nuclear capabilities will provide a broader
range of strategic strike capabilities, enabling
reduced dependence on nuclear deterrence alone. This
approach has allowed substantial reductions to deployed
nuclear weapons and strategic forces. The reductions
codified in the Moscow Treaty began in 2002 and will be
complete in 2012. To date, the United States has
withdrawn from operational service Peacekeeper ICBMs,
removed 4 Trident ballistic missile submarines from
strategic service, and reduced the number of warheads
on remaining Trident SLBMs and Minuteman III ICBMs. In
mid-2007, the United States began reducing the
Minuteman III force from 500 to 450, in accordance with
a recommendation in the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR). Removing the 50 Minuteman III missiles
is expected to take 24 months to complete. At that
time, the United States will have 450 Minuteman III
ICBMs and 288 Trident II SLBMs deployed.

The United States operates several land (test-)
launch sites for ballistic missiles, including
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Cape
Canaveral in Florida.

The United States is committed to making every
effort to prevent states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern from acquiring missiles capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The United
States opposes missile programs of proliferation
concern, and exercises particular restraint in missile-
related cooperation.

Space Launch Vehicles

For nearly five decades, United States space
transportation capabilities helped secure peace and
protect national security, enabled the United States to
lead the exploration of our solar system and beyond,
and increased economic prosperity and humanity's
knowledge of the Earth and its environment. Today,
vital national security, homeland security and economic
interests are increasingly dependent on United States
Government and commercial space assets. U.S. space
transportation capabilities - encompassing access to,
transport through, and return from space - are the
critical foundation upon which U.S. access to and use
of space depends.

In accordance with 2004 Space Exploration Policy,
the United States is embarking on a robust space
exploration program to advance U.S. scientific,
security and economic interests. A central component
of this program is to extend human presence across the
solar system, starting with a return to the Moon in
preparation for human exploration of Mars and other
destinations. The Space Shuttle will be used to
complete assembly of the International Space Station,
planned for the end of this decade, and then retired.
A new crew exploration vehicle will be developed to
provide crew transportation for missions beyond low
Earth orbit.

Access to space through U.S. space transportation
capabilities is essential to: (1) place critical United
States Government assets and capabilities into space;
(2) augment space-based capabilities in a timely manner
in the event of increased operational need or minimize
disruptions due to on-orbit satellite failures, launch
failures or deliberate actions against U.S. space
assets; and (3) support government and commercial human
space flight. The United States, therefore, maintains
robust, responsive and resilient U.S. space
transportation capabilities to ensure access to space.
In doing so, the United States will emphasize safety in
flight and on the ground.

Exploiting space to the fullest extent, however,
requires a fundamental transformation in U.S. space
transportation capabilities and infrastructure. In
this regard, the United States will capitalize on the
entrepreneurial spirit of its private sector to develop
new approaches and technology innovation in space
transportation, options for enhancing space exploration
activities, and opportunities to open new commercial
markets, including public space travel.

The United States operates several space launch
vehicle (SLV) systems. These SLV systems include the
Atlas, Athena, Conestoga, Delta, Minotaur, Pegasus,
Taurus, Falcon-1 and Spaceship One. In addition, there
are several SLV land (test-) launch sites in the United
States; these include: Vandenberg Air Force Base and
California Space Port in Vandenberg, California; White
Sands Missile Range in White Sands, New Mexico; Kodiak
Launch Complex in Kodiak, Alaska; Cape Canaveral Space
Port, Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station in Cape Canaveral, Florida; Wallops Flight
Facility, Virginia; Edwards Air Force Base, California;
China Lake, California; Matagorda Island, Texas; Reagan
Test Range, Omelek Island, Kwajalein, and Virginia
Space Flight Center, Wallops Island, Virginia.

No launches were reported pursuant to the pre-
launch notification provisions of the HCOC in the
period between the previous declaration period, which
ended on December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2007.


End text of paper.



4. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann
with any questions or follow-up related to this issue
(202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or
herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov).



5. (U) A word version of this cable will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE


NNNN




End Cable Text