Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE22352
2008-03-04 22:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE MARCH 10-11

Tags:  PREL PGOV EUN ZL PK AF ZI IR GG IS SY LE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 022352 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ZAGREB FOR BELGRADE; BELGRADE FOR PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: ASS: 03/03/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN ZL PK AF ZI IR GG IS SY LE
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE MARCH 10-11
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

REF: N/A

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 022352

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ZAGREB FOR BELGRADE; BELGRADE FOR PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: ASS: 03/03/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN ZL PK AF ZI IR GG IS SY LE
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE MARCH 10-11
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

REF: N/A


1. (U) Classified by William Lucas, Office Director,
EUR/ERA. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).


2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 10.


3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their
next General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on March 10-11. We expect the
agenda to include: Western Balkans (Serbia/Kosovo),
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Georgia, and Iran. Posts are
requested to include the SIPDIS caption on their response
cables. A background section covering some of these
issues is provided prior to a section containing talking
points. Points are to be delivered as soon as possible at
the appropriate level to EU members only. Other posts
should not/not deliver these points.

BACKGROUND
--------------

ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS


4. (SBU) In light of the recent events in Gaza and the
suspension of negotiations by the Palestinian Authority,
our focus is on the resumption of negotiations and
rebuilding the momentum generated at the November 27
Annapolis Conference and the December 17 Paris Donors'
Conference. We continue to encourage expanded budgetary
support for the PA, especially by Arab states. The next
AHLC meeting on May 2 in the United Kingdom will provide a
good opportunity to push donors to meet and expand their
budgetary support to the PA. Secretary Rice has made
clear, both privately and publicly, that we must ensure
continuous progress in Israeli-Palestinians political
negotiations on core issues even in the face of unhelpful
developments. Our goals remain Israeli-Palestinian
Roadmap implementation, Palestinian capacity building (the
mission of Quartet Representative Blair and LTG Keith
Dayton's Security Sector Reform),Arab outreach to Israel

and support for this process, and progress on political
talks between Abbas and Olmert and their negotiating
teams.

SYRIA/LEBANON


5. (SBU) We should encourage our European partners to
join us in providing meaningful support for the Siniora
government, including unified international pressure on
Syria and the opposition to allow an immediate and
unconditional presidential election, funding to support
Lebanese security services and mitigate Lebanese debt
problems, and high-level visits and statements of support.
We also urge additional EU financial support for the UN
Special Tribunal on Lebanon, which will help end the era
of impunity for political assassinations and deter further
violence. We discourage post-Annapolis engagement of
Syria and urge High Representative Solana to serve as the
sole point-of-contact between Damascus and EU Member
States. Syrian government actions have been increasingly
detrimental to the peace process, best demonstrated by the
January 23-25 "anti-Annapolis" conference hosted by
Damascus-based rejectionist groups and facilitated by the
Syrian government. Two Syrian government ministers
attended the conference even while Dutch FM Verhagen
visited Damascus. Isolation-not engagement-is the best
way to improve Syrian behavior.

ZIMBABWE


6. (C) The ruling and opposition parties have failed to
agree on establishing a level playing field for the March
29 presidential and parliamentary elections after nearly a
year of talks facilitated by South African President Mbeki
on behalf of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). President Bush expressed disappointment on
February 14 that the South African government had not been
"more proactive in its intercession to help the people of
Zimbabwe." During his trip to Africa, he reiterated that
"the people of Zimbabwe deserve a government that serves
their interests and recognizes their basic human rights
and holds free and fair elections."


7. (C) We are particularly concerned that the increase
in state-sponsored violence and intimidation over the past
year will continue through the election. Credible
international monitors are needed to document the regime's
use of violence and intimidation. British Foreign
Secretary Miliband has publicly called for international

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monitors for the Zimbabwean elections. Unfortunately,
Mugabe has stated he will only invite "friendly"
countries, to include SADC members, which have been
reluctant to criticize Mugabe in past election-observation
efforts.


8. (C) We have expressed our concerns to the African
Union (AU) and SADC leaders and hope that EU countries
will do so as well. It would be helpful if the EU could
focus its efforts on getting a SADC-Parliamentary Forum
(SADC-PF) observation delegation into Zimbabwe. SADC-PF
has been objective and critical of past elections in
Zimbabwe and would like to monitor the upcoming elections.

IRAN


9. (C) On February 6, EU experts prepared a list of 19 new
entities and 15 new individuals to be designated under the
EU's Common Policy on Restrictive Measures Against Iran.
The EU Member States agreed that the new designations
would not actually be implemented until after the approval
of the third UNSCR, but they planned to go ahead with
preparations so that EU foreign ministers could approve
the new measures at this (March 10-11) GAERC.
Unfortunately, the Italians and Cypriots subsequently
insisted that nothing could be done-not even technical
preparations for the new designations-until the third
UNSCR was adopted. We would like the EU both to implement
the new resolution as quickly as possible and to move
forward with complementary autonomous actions immediately.


10. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
possible (in advance of March 10-11 GAERC).

BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT

WESTERN BALKANS

-- Despite efforts of Serb hardliners to provoke violence
and protests, we assess that overall situation in Kosovo
is stable and positive. Neither the Kosovo government nor
the Albanian majority has responded to provocations in any
way. In fact, the Kosovo government has passed nine
pieces of legislation implementing key elements of the
Ahtisaari plan. KFOR and UNMIK are coordinating well on
the ground.

-- We welcome the participation of many EU states in the
standing up of the ISG on February 28 and the naming of
Pieter Feith, the EUSR for Kosovo, as the International
Civilian Representative for Kosovo.

-- We welcome the early recognitions and declarations of
intent to recognize by a sizeable majority of EU members
and look forward to additional recognitions.

-- The U.S. is committed to participating in the vital
ESDP Kosovo civpol mission (EULEX).

-- We look for continued EU support in pressing the UN and
UNMIK to respond robustly to Serbian challenges and
provocations. With UNSCR 1244 still in effect, UNMIK has
critical responsibilities. Serbia is probing for
weaknesses in an attempt to harden the partition of
northern Kosovo and establish a de facto Kosovo-Serb
"entity" in Kosovo. KFOR is responding appropriately, by
working with UNMIK police to turn back demonstrators at
the border and preventing violence in North Mitrovica. We
are alarmed, however, by UNMIK's early failure to control
borders, unwillingness to keep out Serb government
officials who condone violence, and continued failure to
collect customs at the border. We must press UNMIK to
remain vigilant against future provocations and fulfill
its 1244 mandate robustly; these responsibilities are the
same now as they were before February 17.

-- We encourage the EU to continue International Civilian
Office (ICO) operations in North Mitrovica. The safety of
UN and EU personnel in North Mitrovica is paramount, but
we must also ensure that international operations there
continue. In these critical first weeks, we must make a
clear stand.

-- Undoubtedly there will be challenges ahead, but our
assessment is that long-term stability and democratic
development in Southeast Europe will be achieved by
implementing UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's proposal for
supervised independence. We look forward to working with
the EU to develop Kosovar institutions and community
development offers the best hope for success. The U.S.
looks forward to working with the EU, World Bank, IMF, and
other potential donors to assist Kosovo in the post-
independence transition and longer-term.

-- It is essential to unequivocally condemn provocative
language from Serbia and Republika Srpska. We must urge
Belgrade to avoid actions which will cause long term harm
to its prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration. We must
also continue to reject any suggestion that Kosovo
independence has implications for the future of the
Republika Srpska and closely manage the dangerous
separatist statements of RS Prime Minister Dodik and the
RS National Assembly.

-- We welcome continued EU efforts to offer Serbia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina an EU membership perspective through
signature of Stability and Association Agreements,
provided both follow through on key reforms. Both Serbia
and BiH would be valued members of the Euro-Atlantic
community, and we encourage them to quickly take the
necessary steps.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

-- We appreciate the EU's support for the Annapolis
process and the strong EU financial assistance for the
Palestinians announced at the Paris Donors' Conference
($650 million for 2008). We welcome the EU's transition
from the Temporary International Mechanism to PEGASE, a
mechanism to provide direct European assistance to the
Palestinian Authority, and to focus assistance on
development and reform priorities identified by PM Fayyad
before the Paris Conference. We also look forward to the
next Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee in May in the United
Kingdom.

-- We must sustain the momentum generated at Annapolis and
Paris, especially in light of recent events in Gaza.
Secretary Rice's March 4-5 trip to the region aimed to

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help advance Israeli-Palestinian talks and discuss the
need for real changes on the ground. The Secretary and
the President remain personally engaged on this priority
issue and President Bush has said that he will return to
the region, possibly as soon as May.

-- We believe it is particularly important at this time to
achieve meaningful progress on the ground to build
confidence between the parties. Tony Blair's team has
identified a number of excellent projects. We need to
identify and address any obstacles to get these projects
moving forward.

-- As agreed with the parties at Annapolis, the U.S. will
take on the role of monitoring and judging Roadmap
implementation. LTG William Fraser, who is heading this
effort, has held two rounds of talks with the parties
already and will return to the region on a regular basis
to work with the parties and our diplomatic missions to
discuss progress on Roadmap implementation.

-- On Gaza, we are deeply concerned by the continued and
increased firing of rockets into southern Israel, as well
as the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. We
have stressed to Israel the importance of continued
humanitarian aid to Gaza and are encouraging Israel,
Egypt, and the PA to work together to find a solution for
Gaza that ensures security for all three parties, empowers
the PA, maintains pressure on Hamas, ensures the basic
needs of Gazans are being met, and works to bring about
circumstances that will allow for implementation of the
2005 Agreement on Movement and Access.

-- We will continue to consult closely with our European
partners and with the Quartet over the coming months.

SYRIA/LEBANON

-- We urge the EU and its Member States to press Syria to
stop blocking Lebanese elections and allow the Lebanese to
find a solution to the current political impasse.
Elections must be allowed to occur immediately and without
pre-condition.

-- We urge European states to assist in strengthening
Lebanon's institutions, including the parliament, cabinet,
and military, through statements of support for their
legitimacy and continued financial assistance. The
Lebanese opposition, with support from Syria and Iran, is
trying to erode Lebanon's constitutional institutions,
thereby undermining Lebanese sovereignty and allowing the
reassertion of Syrian influence.

-- We discourage post-Annapolis engagement of Syria by EU
Member States. Syrian government (SARG) actions in past
weeks have been increasingly detrimental to the peace
process, best demonstrated by the January 23-25 "anti-
Annapolis" conference hosted by Damascus-based
rejectionist groups and facilitated by the Syrian
government. Two Syrian government ministers attended the
conference.

-- The repeated visits of Western diplomats to Damascus
have only served to embolden the Asad regime. Since
Syria's participation in Annapolis, it has received
multiple European ministers in Damascus, and Syrian
officials have been received in Europe. And yet, Syrian
interference in Lebanon, support for Hizballah, and
facilitation of foreign fighters to Iraq continues apace,
while repression of Syrian democracy activists at home has
increased.

PAKISTAN

-- We note that the Pakistan Peoples Party and the
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz agreed in principle February
21 to form a coalition, but have a number of issues to
sort out. These include identifying a Prime Minister and
determining how they will interact with President
Musharraf, who we believe will continue to have an
important role to play in Pakistan's government. There
could be an extended period of inter-party negotiations
before a new government is formed.

-- We urge EU support for the creation of a government
that will constructively address Pakistan's serious
economic and security challenges, and for expressions of
support to work closely with the new Prime Minister.

AFGHANISTAN

-- We note that the EU recently announced that the
initial group of 195 police trainers will be fully
deployed in Afghanistan by April.

-- We welcome this mission and are pleased to work
together on police training activities.

-- We believe that a well-trained, professional police
force is essential to the long-term stability of
Afghanistan.

-- With 82,000 poorly-trained police assigned to protect
31 million Afghans, it is clear that for the quality of
the police force to improve, many more international
police trainers are needed. Accordingly, we hope that you
will seriously consider increasing the size of your police
training mission.

-- Moreover, since most police are assigned to isolated
and remote areas, trainers need to work at the district
level to mentor police officers on the job. We strongly
encourage you to consider deploying trainers into the
districts - recognizing that this will require an
additional logistical and security commitment.

-- We also encourage you to expand training to include
other elements of the justice sector, particularly the
judiciary.

ZIMBABWE

-- There is an urgent need for independent international
election monitors, particularly from Africa. Regional
missions have played a key role in observing a number of
recent African elections.

-- We welcome whatever actions the EU can take to press
for Mugabe to immediately invite SADC-Parliamentary Forum,
the AU, and other African regional organizations to deploy
substantial and objective monitoring missions in Zimbabwe.

GEORGIA

-- January 5 was the first truly competitive presidential
election in Georgia. Despite significant irregularities,
the election was consistent with most ODIHR and Council of
Europe commitments and shared standards. The Central
Election Commission answered specific concerns raised by
our own observation team and expressed a willingness to
improve election procedures. Such improvements are
crucial for Georgian democracy and for its NATO
aspirations.

-- Our cooperation with the EU during the election
campaign was outstanding and very productive. We need to
keep working closely to ensure that the May parliamentary
elections represent a significant improvement over the
presidential campaign and balloting.

-- We take seriously Russian statements about possible
recognition of Abkhazia, and have expressed our concern
with Russian officials. We hope EU members are conveying
a similar message to Moscow. We welcome recent, positive
steps toward improving Georgian-Russian relations and hope
they will continue.

-- We welcome whatever actions the EU can take to reduce the
isolation of the Abkhaz people through such initiatives as
the establishment of EU information centers, the deployment
of EU police to the region, or helping develop commercial and
transport links.

-- We continue to support Georgia's Euro-Atlantic
aspirations, including its quest for NATO MAP.

IRAN

-- The adoption of a third Iran sanctions UNSCR and the
release of the IAEA's 22 February report have made EU
action on Iran imperative. The report confirms that Iran
continues to refuse to comply with its UNSC obligations to
suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities,
including enrichment-related activities, and discusses
documentation available to the IAEA that describes Iranian
efforts to develop a nuclear warhead. Olli Heinonen, IAEA
Deputy Director General for Safeguards, elaborated in a
technical briefing on the report on 25 February and showed
IAEA Member States some of the documents and other
materials in question.

-- Iran's response thus far has been to claim that these
documents are "fabrications" and the result of "baseless
allegations." DDG Heinonen stood behind these documents
and stated explicitly that, in light of the fact that
information on Iran's potential weaponization activities
was provided to the IAEA from multiple member states, his
inspectors could not/not conclude that these documents
were fabrications.

-- Iran must make a full disclosure of any nuclear
weapons-related activities and facilitate IAEA
verification that those activities have ceased. We
encourage the EU to highlight these points from the report
and express public and private support for international
efforts to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and
comply with its UNSC obligations.

-- We urge the EU to adopt the new UN sanctions as quickly
as possible and when the EU does so, we encourage it to go
beyond the specific lists of individuals and entities
designated in the resolution, as well as to make mandatory
and expand the scope of any provisions that are left as
voluntary in the resolution, as the EU has done in the
past.

-- We also encourage the EU to move quickly to adopt
additional autonomous sanctions. We support both
additional EU designations under existing mechanisms and
new sanctions. Quick EU action will reinforce the
momentum created by the third sanctions UNSCR, make clear
to Tehran the price of continued defiance of UNSC
requirements and IAEA obligations, and set an example for
others to follow.

END NON-PAPER TEXT
RICE