Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE20685
2008-02-29 04:11:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

READOUT FROM DECEMBER 4 IRAQ AND NEIGHBORS RSI IN

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL KCRM EAID ADCO KISL ASEC KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0685 0600417
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 290411Z FEB 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0000
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0000
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0000
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0000
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0000
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC 0000
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T STATE 020685 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KCRM EAID ADCO KISL ASEC KU
IZ, SY, JO, SA, TU
SUBJECT: READOUT FROM DECEMBER 4 IRAQ AND NEIGHBORS RSI IN
AMMAN, JORDAN

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR Dell Daley FOR REASONS 1.4 (b)
and (d)

S E C R E T STATE 020685

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KCRM EAID ADCO KISL ASEC KU
IZ, SY, JO, SA, TU
SUBJECT: READOUT FROM DECEMBER 4 IRAQ AND NEIGHBORS RSI IN
AMMAN, JORDAN

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR Dell Daley FOR REASONS 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (S) Summary: U.S. Chiefs of Mission and embassy
representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Turkey, joined by S/CT Coordinator Ambassador
Dell Dailey and other U.S. interagency representatives,
met December 4 in Amman to discuss regional
counterterrorism strategies at an Iraq and Neighbors
Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) conference
(participants listed para 19). The meeting focused on the
flow of foreign fighters (FF) into and out of Iraq.
Significant outcomes and taskers from the meeting
included:
-- A needs assessment for S/CT counter-terrorism training
of Iraqi Security Forces.
-- Intelligence community review of the use of Cairo
airport by foreign fighters.
-- Review of releasability of Objective Massey data to
Syria.
-- Development of an easily accessible database of
documents and videos of statements by Muslim clerics and
leaders encouraging moderation and/or supportive of U.S.
efforts.
-- Development of material on "best practices" for
promoting moderation and countering radicalization.
-- Schedule SVTC for Amb. Dailey to brief on foreign
fighters to the countries he will not be visiting.
-- Schedule follow-up Biometric Conference in Spring 2008.
-- Identify venue for next in-field RSI conference in late

2008.
End Summary.


2. (S) Ambassador David Hale Embassy Amman hosted an Iraq
and Neighbors Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI)
conference on December 4 attended by Chiefs of Mission and
other embassy representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey. They were joined by the
S/CT Coordinator and other representatives of the
interagency process. Amb. Dailey noted past successes in

the RSI process, including Jordan's regional biometric
database initiative, expansion of the TIP/PISCES program,
establishment of S/CT regional counterterrorism
coordinator positions, development of new regional IV
programs, progress in critical energy infrastructure
protection, and a financial needs assessment in northern
Iraq to combat the financing of the PKK and other
terrorist groups. Amb. Dailey described the CT philosophy
behind the RSI concept as a triangle, with the top 15
percent representing kinetic action (kill or capture),the
middle 20 percent representing efforts to disrupt FF
networks by hindering or eliminating their recruitment,
travel, training and operation, and the bottom 65 percent
representing efforts to address root social, ideological,
political and economic causes behind violent extremism.
While DOD, the CIA and law enforcement agencies have the
lead in the top 40 percent, the State Department has the
lead in the lower 60 percent, he stressed.

Leveraging OBJ Massey


3. (S) Participants were briefed on and discussed the
importance of documents seized during a U.S. military
operation raid on Abu Muthanna(OBJ Massey),the primary
al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) leader responsible for facilitating
the infiltration of foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq.
Charge Corbin noted that the Syrian government knows AQI
plans to target Syria, and that while FF facilitators
continue to operate and questions remain about Syria's
role, there is clear evidence of Syrian moves against
extremists.


4. (S) Amb. Dailey pointed out that when areas of
conflict quiet down, FF tend to return home to make
trouble, and urged Posts to make it clear to host
countries that FF bleed-out into their countries of origin
creates a common threat. He reported that he had briefed
leaders in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Yemen on OBJ Massey in
November and plans to brief governments of Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia in February. NOTE: Briefings took
place February 7-11. END NOTE. Amb. Dailey argued that
the U.S. could have the biggest impact by sharing the
names obtained during OBJ Massey with host countries and
let them "run traps" for those FF listed. Most
participants cited sharing this information with Syria as
vital, but requiring policy decisions in Washington.
NOTE: Subsequently, Embassy Damascus has been given the
green light to brief the Syrians yet no date has been set.
The OBJ Massey data on individual terrorists is already
available to Syria through INTERPOL. END NOTE.

Deradicalization and Combating Extremism


5. (S) Participants turned to the question of confronting
extremist ideology and how to redirect confirmed radicals
and potential recruits from terrorism. Ambassador Ford
Fraker briefed on Saudi efforts, which treat confronting
extremism as a struggle to win hearts and minds, not
solely as a police matter. Their key tactic is to deal
with extremists and returnees from Iraq as victims, not
criminals. Returnees from Guantanamo and Iraq, as well as
those extremists that the SAG captures at home, are first
evaluated by psychologists and religious officials.
Second, the subject goes through a religious re-education
program that uses Islamic sources to refute extremist
ideology. Third, the SAG works with the subject's family
and wider community to integrate him back into society, in
part through financial incentives and health care services
to the family and by providing employment to the subject
and encouraging marriage. The SAG continues to monitor
the rehabilitated individuals.


7. (S) Major General Michael Barbero of MNF-I noted that
Iraq was deploying similar programs, using tribes and
religious re-education to turn extremists toward
moderation and away from AQI. Charge DAffaires Alan
Misenheimer noted that Kuwait has a "Moderation Center"
that uses a variation of the Saudi tactic, but stressed
that the Saudi template would not work everywhere. The
Kuwaitis, however, are not sharing the findings from their
research on extremism in Kuwait. EmbAmman DCM briefed on
GOJ efforts to win hearts and minds through the November
9, 2004 "Amman Message" (www.ammanmessage.com). This
message, issued by members of different schools of Islamic
jurisprudence whom King Abdallah II brought together,
sought to delegitimize "takfir," the labeling of other
Muslims as unbelievers worthy of targeting by extremists.
It stressed Islam does not condone terrorism and Muslims
must be loyal and law-abiding members of the states and
societies in which they live.

What About U.S. Public Diplomacy?


8. (S) RSI participants discussed the applicability of
Amman Message-type projects in other countries,
particularly in Saudi Arabia, perhaps with U.S. help.
Participants concluded that a U.S. role, particularly an
overt one, in supporting moderates in the intra-Muslim
dialogue is problematic, and would likely be
counterproductive. The key to getting host-government
buy-in on anti-extremism efforts is appealing to their
desire for self preservation. Governments that recognize
extremism is a direct threat are more likely to confront
extremism and terrorists, and to take more significant
steps against AQ and FF transit through their territories.


9. (S) The participants agreed on the utility of
expending resources in two areas: 1) compiling a database
of and access to significant statements by Muslim
religious and other leaders on moderation as an Islamic
tenet, including public source videos and documents, and
2) acquiring access to anti-extremist curricula from host
governments that have successfully de-programmed
extremists, with the aim of sharing these curricula with
third party governments when appropriate.

Merits of Engaging with Damascus on FF


10. (S) The NSC representative briefed on IA efforts to
stem FF flows through Damascus airport. The NSC has
spearheaded an effort to provide unclassified briefings
for aviation companies that serve Damascus to raise
awareness and elicit information that could illuminate
trends in foreign fighter travel.


11. (S) Returning to the subject of increased engagement
with Damascus, participants weighed using a visit by
General Petraeus or another high-level U.S. official to
change Syrian behavior and direct attention to the FF
issue. The group agreed that DC policymakers would need
to be convinced that such a visit would be a net gain.
Baghdad PolMil Minister-Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries
observed the Iraqi government has gotten Damascus to
listen to its FF concerns through engagement with
counterparts in Syria. The possibility was raised of
using the Damascus-hosted Iraq neighbors' working group on
border security to address the FF issue and create a basis
for information sharing. Several members of the group
pointed out the presence of Iran in the working group
would make it difficult for many Arab governments to share
information through this mechanism.

Status of GOJ Regional Biometric Initiative


12. (S) Amb. Hale reported that, as proposed at the
August RSI video conference, a team of technical experts
from Washington had visited Jordan in October to evaluate
the GOJ's progress toward developing a fingerprint-sharing
database system for known and suspected terrorists. The
visiting team determined that following the purchase of
commercial software and two-to-three months of
development, the GOJ could have a functioning system which
could be demonstrated at a second Biometrics Conference.
The GOJ currently envisions a database populated initially
with fingerprints submitted by each member country.
Member countries would be able to make their own
independent queries and searches against that database.
The GOJ may be in a position to host the second conference
in late spring 2008. Amb. Hale pointed to this initiative
as a good tangible outcome of the RSI process.

Counter-Terror Finance (CTF)


13. (S) Amb. Ries briefed on the visit of the Iraq Threat
Finance Cell (ITFC) to the Kurdistan region of Iraq in
November. The ITFC was looking into the financing of the
PKK and found that they raise money in Europe, Turkey, and
the U.S. through criminal and legitimate means. Most of
the money is moved through an informal financial system
based on hawala-like money exchangers. An S/CT-led
Financial Systems Assessment Team (FSAT) followed up the
ITFC assessment during a December 8-14 visit to northern
Iraq. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz added that
the Resident Legal Advisor in Ankara has been working on
disrupting the financing of the PKK from Europe for the
past year.

Critical Infrastructure Protection


14. (S) Amb. Fraker briefed on continuing U.S. efforts to
work with the Government of Saudi Arabia to protect
critical infrastructure. Since the December 2006 signing
of an MOU between the Department of State and the SAG, a
joint working group has met four times and several
assessment teams have visited Saudi oil and gas
facilities. Charge Misenheimer reported that in Kuwait an
USG assessment has been conducted and a MOU drafted but
the GOK has failed to identify an agency to sign the MOU.

Passenger Name Record (PNR)


15. (C) DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Rosenzweig
discussed the benefits of passenger name record (PNR) data
analysis. Every passenger who travels via commercial air
generates two sets of data: the passenger manifest (name,
sex, country of origin, passport number, country of
issuance) and commercial data (address, phone number(s),
emergency contact information, traveling companions,
travel agency, etc.). While manifest data is effective in
identifying known threats, commercial data can identify
new threats by linking people to those who have
connections to known terrorists, he noted.


16. (S) All airlines that service the U.S. are required
to provide DHS with both sets of data, which has allowed
DHS to identify previously-unknown threats and travel
agencies that specialize in crimes such as trafficking.
DHS wants this information from flights that do not have a
nexus to the U.S. but are known FF routes. DAS Rosenzweig
recounted successes in the Caribbean under CARICOM. To
implement an PNR arrangement, a country needs (1) laws
requiring carriers to provide commercial and manifest
data; (2) a way of transmitting the data to U.S.; and (3)
the infrastructure to compile this data. DHS has already
approached the Libyans, Yemenis and the Saudis. The
Libyans were receptive and the Yemenis were also
interested but lack the required infrastructure. The
Saudis seek additional proof that it works. Amb. Fraker
suggested that a six-month trial in Saudi might be the
easiest way to convince the SAG of its value. Amb. Hale
commented that Jordan would be very receptive, but would
likely expect U.S. financial assistance to implement.
Dailey encouraged all embassies to approach host
governments and describe the benefits of a PNR sharing
arrangement. DAS Rosenzweig agreed to send DHS teams to
brief host countries as needed.

Other Initiatives


17. (C) Deputy Assistant AG Swartz reminded participants
of additional ways that DOJ can support CT efforts. In
addition to LEGATTs posted throughout the region, DOJ has
posted several federal prosecutors in places like Cairo,
Ankara, and the UAE to develop capacity-building programs
to build networks and give ownership to host governments.
Amb. Dailey discussed the value of DOD-sponsored MIST
teams that have been highly effective in South America and
Asia and announced upcoming Voluntary Visitor Programs
(VVPs) focused on counterterrorism training. S/CT, in
collaboration with R, hopes to design multi-country VVP
programs that encourage regional cooperation and use of
open source materials. Dailey also reminded participants
of the CT Fellowship Program which is designed for two-
three star equivalents, parliamentarians, deputy
ministers, etc. Interested embassies should follow-up
with nominations through their Defense Attachs. Amb.
Hale reminded participants of the need to amplify the
message of these programs and encourage attendees to think
creatively about how to broaden the effect when trainees
return home. Others noted DOD's ability to develop
websites and blogs to counter radical views.


18. (S) In wrapping up the session, Amb. Dailey identified
the following issues to be addressed:

-- A needs assessment for S/CT counter-terrorism training
of Iraqi Security Forces. NOTE: DS/ATA is looking into
Embassy Baghdads request and is putting together a list
of courses to offer to the Government of Iraq. END NOTE.
-- Intelligence community review of the use of Cairo
airport by foreign fighters. NOTE: IC has been tasked
with conducting the review. END NOTE.
-- Review of releasability of Objective Massey data to
Syria. NOTE: NSC approved release of OBJ Massey
information by the Embassy Damascus. END NOTE.
-- Development of an easily accessible database of
documents and videos of statements by Muslim clerics and
leaders encouraging moderation and/or supportive of U.S.
efforts.
-- Development of material on "best practices" for
promoting moderation and countering radicalization.
-- Schedule SVTC for Amb. Dailey to brief on foreign
fighters to the countries he will not be visiting. NOTE:
SVTC will be conducted the week of March 10. END NOTE.
-- Schedule follow-up Biometric Conference in early 2008.
-- Identify venue for next in-field RSI conference in late

2008.



19. (U) List of participants at the December 4 RSI
conference in Amman, Jordan:

Amb. David Hale (Amman)
Amb. Dell Dailey (S/CT Coordinator)
Amb. Ford Fraker (Riyadh)
PolMil Minister-Counselor Amb. Marcie Ries (Baghdad)
CDA Michael Corbin (Damascus)
CDA Alan Misenheimer (Kuwait)

Regional Affairs Counselors (Amman, Ankara, Kuwait, and
Baghdad)
Dallas Brown, Director, Joint Interagency Coordination
Group (Centcom)
Maj. Gen. David Scott (USSCOM)
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz
Deputy Assistant Secretary of DHS Paul Rosenzweig
Maj. Gen. Michael Barbero (DCS MNF-I C3)
Brig. Gen. Michelle Johnson (DD/War on Terrorism/DOD)
Mark Hunter (Assistant Director DS/T)
Lynnda Tibbetts (Deputy Director DS/T/ATA)
Matt Diascro (Director, Combating Terrorism, NSC)
Garry Reid (Principal Director OSD SO/LIC)
Lt. Col. Michael Foster (JIATF-West)
Commander Christopher Engdahl (Strategic Planner/War on
Terrorism/DOD)
CIA Briefer
Stephen Newhouse (DD NEA/ELA)
Carol Reynolds (S/CT Regional Coordinator)
Elizabeth Ingalls (S/CT)

Ambassador Dailey's Comment


20. (S) Much of the discussion at this RSI focused on
bilateral issues, and most of the "due-outs" from the
conference were bilateral and will not likely have a
regional impact. To make the RSI process meaningful to
Ambassadors, a more regionally-oriented counterterrorism
focus is needed. Ongoing programs that accomplish this
are the biometrics conference and S/CT's funding for the
participation of counterterrorism officials in the IVLP.
S/CT will work on refocusing the RSI on having more of a
multilateral CT angle. Amb. Dailey asks for Ambassadors'
assistance in thinking more regionally and invites the
field to recommend strategies and programs toward that
end.


Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/
RICE