Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE135268
2008-12-30 21:37:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON KENYAN SEIZURE OF

Tags:  KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM KE XA XW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5268 3652150
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 302137Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 135268 

NOFORN
SIPDIS
ISN/WMDT FOR MICHAEL CURRY/ARYN LESTER/JOSH BOYD
DOE/IN FOR JOSH FRIEDMAN
DHS/DNDO FOR BRENT BREDEHOFT/CARA STANKEWICK
DS FOR IRV SOLOWAY
INR/SPM FOR JANINA DE GUZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM KE XA XW
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON KENYAN SEIZURE OF
+URANIUM,

REF: A. A) AFP20081214950009

B. B) AFP20081222316001

C. C) 2007 STATE 162091

Classified By: Dexter Ingram

S E C R E T STATE 135268

NOFORN
SIPDIS
ISN/WMDT FOR MICHAEL CURRY/ARYN LESTER/JOSH BOYD
DOE/IN FOR JOSH FRIEDMAN
DHS/DNDO FOR BRENT BREDEHOFT/CARA STANKEWICK
DS FOR IRV SOLOWAY
INR/SPM FOR JANINA DE GUZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM KE XA XW
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON KENYAN SEIZURE OF
+URANIUM,

REF: A. A) AFP20081214950009

B. B) AFP20081222316001

C. C) 2007 STATE 162091

Classified By: Dexter Ingram


1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Nairobi.
Please see paragraph 4.


2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: According to Ref A, on 12 December
2008 Kenyan Flying Squad officers detained two individuals
suspected of smuggling uranium into Kenya from the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The men had been living in the Uthiru
estate for a month while middlemen, who have yet to be
arrested, arranged to sell the substance and smuggle it out
of Kenya. No additional information was released to the
press about suspected middlemen or prospective buyers.
Reports initially indicate one individual is a Ugandan
soldier while the accomplice is also suspected to be Ugandan
despite his possession of a fraudulent Kenyan identity card.
However, Ref B identifies the two arrested individuals as
Bwambale Nason Ndyambo of Uganda and David Juma Osoma of
Democratic Republic of Congo. Both articles indicate the
material is contained in a 20-centimetre-high metal cylinder
which weighs approximately nine kilograms and has had most of
its markings rubbed off. The material was reportedly bought
for 3.9m shillings ($50,000 USD) and the individuals had
hoped to sell it for 100m shillings ($1.2 million USD).
Media reports also indicate the material was initially tested
by the Geology and Mining Department before being transferred
to the National Radiation Protective Board for analysis as
well as safe and secure storage according to Arthur Koteng,
Deputy Head of the board.


3. (S//NF) ASSESSMENT: Based upon open-source reporting and
previous trafficking incidents in the region it is most
likely this case is a scam and is associated with profit
driven motivation. Previous nuclear smuggling incidents in
the region have involved containers with similar dimensions

and weight. Additionally, press reports about past smuggling
incidents purported the material to be highly radioactive but
were later proven inaccurate due to incorrect procedures used
to test the material. Uranium (depleted, natural, low and
highly enriched) is not highly radioactive which also casts
further doubt that the seized material is uranium. The
purported uranium could also be a container made of depleted
uranium previously used to shield a radioactive source.
Radioactivity in such a container may still be detectable.
The container might have also previously contained naturally
occurring radioactive material, such as uranium-bearing ore
or unenriched uranium, and still have detectable traces of
radioactivity. Supplementary analysis from the DHS Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office's Nuclear Assessment Program will be
forwarded to post via email.


4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: In order to clarify information
gaps, Post is requested to seek answers from appropriate
Kenyan officials to questions contained in paragraphs 5, 6,
7, and 8. Questions were generated by Washington and also
derived from questions contained in Ref C. Post is requested
to provide a coordinated response to Washington via
front-channel cable.


5. (S REL KENYA) FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS ABOUT SEIZED MATERIAL:

--Are photographs of the cylinder available where any writing
is clearly legible? (NOTE: Photos of the cylinder that
include something of known size, such as a ruler, are
particularly helpful.)

--Is there any further detailed descriptive information
regarding the seized item (e.g. a label, even if it is rubbed
off)?

--Where was the analysis conducted, by whom, and with what
equipment and techniques? What were the results of the
analysis, to include isotope and physical form of the
material?

--If a radiation detector was used, what was the distance
from the radiation detector to the object being measured and
what was the detector type (make and model)? Please also
note the placement of the detector. When gamma spectral data
is provided, a calibration spectrum and a background spectrum
should always be provided.

--Who is informed when suspect nuclear material is seized?
How was the material handled by Kenyan authorities? Which
agencies are responsible for investigating this case?


6. (S REL KENYA) FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS ABOUT TRAFFICKERS AND
METHODS:

--Do the suspects have criminal records, prior involvement in
illicit nuclear trafficking, and/or terrorist ties?

--Have the "middlemen" referenced in the press been
identified, specifically or by nationality? Do Kenyan
authorities know to what country the middlemen were intending
to smuggle the "uranium"?

--Where and from whom (by name or other descriptors) did
those arrested obtain the cylinder? Did the source of the
material identify where the "uranium" came from?

--How did the suspects initially find out the material was
for sale in the DROC?

--Where was the $50,000 USD obtained in order to purchase the
material in the DROC?

--What route/method of transportation was used in order to
move the material from the location where it was purchased in
the DROC to Kenya (e.g. specifically identifiable roads and
border checkpoint crossings)?

--Where and how was the fraudulent Kenyan ID card obtained?
From whom? Was it obtained specifically for this instance?

--Was any other operational tradecraft employed during the
timeframe the material was being moved? (Were they attempting
to disguise the material while in transit? Did they avoid
major roads / border crossings? Did they have to bribe anyone
or have contact with any law enforcement officials?)

--Were there any other facilitators or safe-houses along this
route?


7. (S REL KENYA) FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS ABOUT END-USERS:

--What did the suspects believe that a buyer would do with
the uranium they were trying to sell? Do they believe that
their plans or attempts to sell uranium had terrorist goals?

--How did the individuals in custody come into contact with
the middlemen that had been trying to identify buyers?

--Had a buyer been identified? (If so, is anything known
about their plans to move the material?) What route/method of
transportation was used?

--Were there any plans for completing the transaction (where,
how, and when)?

--How would that amount of money been exchanged (cash,
electronically, through banks, hawalas)?

--Would any of the profits received by them have gone to
other individuals not yet identified?

--Who (by name or other descriptors) did the suspects
interact with in attempts to sell the cylinder?


8. (S REL KENYA) FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS ABOUT UGANDAN AND DROC
COOPERATION:

--Do the governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo know about the seizure?

--Does the Kenyan government intend to inform those
governments in the near future? Will the governments
collaborate on the investigation?
RICE