Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE134228
2008-12-24 01:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

U.S. RESPONSE TO FRENCH GLOBAL INF PROPOSAL

Tags:  PARM KACT JCIC START INF RS US FR 
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O 240110Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134228 


GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PARM KACT JCIC START INF RS US FR

SUBJECT: U.S. RESPONSE TO FRENCH GLOBAL INF PROPOSAL

REF: A. P3 CONSULTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION AND
DISARMAMENT IN PARIS (PARIS 002134)

B. RUSSIA PREVIEWS PROPOSED GLOBAL INF TREATY
(STATE 012526)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. Reason
1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134228


GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PARM KACT JCIC START INF RS US FR

SUBJECT: U.S. RESPONSE TO FRENCH GLOBAL INF PROPOSAL

REF: A. P3 CONSULTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION AND
DISARMAMENT IN PARIS (PARIS 002134)

B. RUSSIA PREVIEWS PROPOSED GLOBAL INF TREATY
(STATE 012526)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI. Reason
1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an Action Cable for Embassy Paris, see
paragraph 5.


2. (C) Background: During a P-3 meeting in Paris on
November 7, 2008 (Ref A),the French provided Acting
Undersecretary for Arms Control and International
Security, John Rood, a draft French proposal to globalize
the INF Treaty entitled "Basic Elements of a Treaty
Banning Short and Intermediate Range Ground-to-Ground
Missiles" (Unofficial translation in paragraph 7). The
INF Treaty, formally known as the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range Missiles, entered into force on June 1,
1988, and is of indefinite duration. The INF Treaty
obligates the United States and the USSR successor states
to eliminate all their ground-launched ballistic or cruise
missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and
not to produce, flight test or launch such missiles.


3. (C) On February 12, 2008, Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov presented a similar proposal to Globalize the INF
Treaty to the Conference on Disarmament during a speech to
the CD in Geneva (Ref B). The French proposal has two
options for expanding the scope of INF prohibited missiles
to include those with a range in excess of 150 km or 300
km (as opposed to INF minimum range of 500 km). While the
U.S. supported in principle the renunciation of
ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles of
INF ranges, the U.S. was not convinced that a global
treaty was the best way to address the issue. The points
in paragraph 5, below, provide the U.S. analysis of the
French INF proposal and are consistent with the U.S.
response to the Russian proposal. The points also note
U.S. objections to the French proposal to include missiles
with a range between 150/300-500 km.



4. (U) On December 5, 2008, French President Sarkozy, in
his role as the President of the European Union (EU),
provided to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the
United Nations, a memorandum on the EU's views on
disarmament. Sarkozy's memo contained, inter alia, a
recommendation to "start ... consultations on a treaty
banning short and intermediate-range ground-to-ground
missiles." The memo did not provide any clarifying detail
on the proposal.


5. (U) Action Request: Embassy Paris should provide the
points in paragraph 6 below, to an appropriate host
government official. Embassy is requested to confirm
delivery of the points, the name and office of the
official to whom they were delivered, the date of
delivery, and any comment or reaction provided at that
time.


6. (C/REL FRANCE) Begin points:

- The United States has reviewed the French proposal to
globalize the INF Treaty, entitled "Basic Elements of a
Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate Range
Ground-to-Ground Missiles" provided on November 7, 2008,
in Paris.

- The United States recognizes that France has made a
serious proposal and is willing to meet bilaterally to
discuss the proposal. We note that your proposal expands
upon a similar proposal made by the Russian Federation at
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on February
12, 2008, in that it would lead to the eventual
elimination of entire classes of ground-launched ballistic
and cruise missiles under the range of 5500 km.

- The United States agrees that the growing proliferation
of these missiles is a concern that should be recognized
and dealt with by the international community and we
welcome the fact that other countries share this concern.
However, we have serious reservations about this, and
similar proposals, well-intentioned though they may be, to
negotiate a multilateral arms control treaty under the
auspices of the CD.

- We do not believe that a one-size-fits-all treaty is a
practical response to this issue. INF-range missiles are
inextricably interwoven into complex regional situations.
To successfully eliminate these missiles, the specifics of
these regional dynamics must be understood and addressed
within the context of those specific situations.

- We are concerned that such a proposed treaty would
inevitably become mired in CD politics, and thus risk
replacing concerted and directed international
non-proliferation efforts with political inaction and
gridlock.

- This has been the lesson of three United Nations missile
panels, each of which has underscored the inability of the
international community to reach consensus on developing a
universal approach to the missile issue. Moreover, we
believe the three UN missile panels have shown that such
approaches would divert attention and resources from
successful and ongoing efforts to address missile
proliferation that have yielded successes and produced
results.

- The United States is also concerned that France intends
to lower the range of missiles subject to elimination to
those with a range below 500 km. The United States and
many of its allies have missile systems of those ranges
and their prohibition could raise U.S. national security
concerns and those of our allies.

- The United States recognizes the significant dangers
posed to regional stability and international peace and
security through missile proliferation and supports, in
principle, the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles of INF ranges, i.e., with
ranges between 500 and 5500 km; however, the United States
is not convinced that a global treaty is the best way to
address the issue. We welcome the opportunity in that
context to continue our work with the French Republic to
address the threat posed by the proliferation of
ground-launched missiles of INF-range.


7. (C) Begin text of the French proposal to globalize the
INF Treaty, as received in English only.

Basic Elements of a Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate
Range Ground-to-Ground Missiles

I - RATIONALE

- The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles with
increasing range constitutes a growing threat to global
and regional security. Increasing missile tests over the
last few years in the Middle East and Asia, together with
missile development programs within a growing number of
countries, point to the need for accelerated
non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in this area, in
the interests of promoting regional and international
stability and reducing the availability of delivery
systems capable of delivering WMD.

- The aggravation of missile proliferation, in particular
with short- and intermediate-range, requires from the
international community to come up with a collective and
normative response.

- There is however a lack of a multilateral
legally-binding regime to back up non-proliferation and
disarmament efforts in the missile field.

-- The MTCR acts as a consultative and coordinating
mechanism on export control policies and mechanisms;

-- The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC),which promotes restraint in the
development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles
(including, where possible, reduction of national
holdings) and introduces annual declarations and
pre-launch notifications, serves essentially as a
transparency- and confidence-building measure.

-- A few bilateral agreements do exist (the INF, START
Treaties between the United States and Russia),but they
do not provide an appropriate basis for multilateral
action.

- Therefore, we propose that a multilateral treaty on
elimination of short- and intermediate-range
ground-to-ground missiles be elaborated and concluded,
with the double objective of strengthening the
international non-proliferation regime, by addressing
missile proliferation, and contributing to efforts in the
field of disarmament.

This Treaty would contribute to eliminating existing
lacunas in international non-proliferation and disarmament
regime regarding missiles, complementing efforts within
existing international instruments in that field (HCOC,
MTCR),and strengthening general and regional security.
In particular, elimination of short- and
intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles would
represent a net increase in security at the regional
level, as most of the missiles that the Treaty would
address (in particular if it covers missiles with a range
capability in excess of 150 km) are essentially regional
in application.

II - SCOPE OF THE TREATY

- General obligations

Such an international Treaty could comprise the following
basic elements:

-- the obligation for the Parties, upon entry into force
of the Treaty, not to manufacture, develop and deploy
short- and intermediate-range missiles or their stages and
launchers;

-- the obligation for the Parties to eliminate, under a
phased time frame, all their short- and intermediate-range
missiles, launchers thereof and associated supporting
facilities and equipment.

- Definitions of types of short- and intermediate-range
ground-to-ground missiles

1) General definition

-- The Treaty would cover ballistic and cruise
ground-to-ground (i.e. sea-launched missiles should be
excluded) missiles, with any kind of payload. For
purposes of the Treaty, the terms "ballistic missile", "
cruise missile" and "ground-to-ground" missiles should be
defined.

-- Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should be excluded
from the scope of the Treaty;

-- Range capability:

--- For the long range: 5500 km would be coherent
with NATO classification. No strategic or technical
reason justifying a different range has yet been
identified.

--- For the short range, two options would be
possible:

-------------- 150 Km, consistent with NATO SRBM
definition; it would allow to address missiles which are
used in regional conflicts but not controlled under MTCR;

-------------- 300 Km, consistent with MTCR definition.

2) Declaration mechanism

To guaranty a certain flexibility of application, these
general definitions could be associated with a declaration
mechanism:

-- Each Party would, by ratifying the Treaty, designate
its existing national types of short- and
intermediate-range missiles covered by the Treaty.

-- An actualized declaration could then be submitted
annually by each Party.

- Elimination procedures

A phased approach could apply to elimination procedures:
each State Party to the Treaty should eliminate all its
short- and intermediate-range missiles, launchers thereof
and associated supporting facilities and equipment, in a
specified time-period depending from the range, for ex:

-- IRBMs (3000 - 5500 Km) would be immediately
eliminated;

-- MRBMs (1000 - 3000 Km) would be eliminated within a
mid-term period (for ex 10 years);

-- SRBMs (150/300 - 1000 Km) would be eliminated within
a specific time frame, defined by each State Party but not
beyond an agreed deadline.

- Compliance and exchange of information related to the
obligations

The Treaty would rely on a voluntary information and
transparency basis (initial and annual declarations).

- Other provisions

-- A permanent body could be established (an informal
conference-based structure without fixed secretariat - as
currently used by the NPT - a formal treaty-based
international institution).

-- Duration of the Treaty and withdrawal: The Treaty
would be of unlimited duration. It could introduce
provisions regarding withdrawal.

-- Entry into force: it would require the ratification
of a determined number of countries most active in the
field (all states which have claimed to have performed
nuclear tests / only the P5 / other)

III - METHOD

- Consultations

-- circulation of the proposed Treaty for study by UK
and then in P3;

-- consultations with the other members of the P5;

-- circulation within EU, in view of its possible
endorsement;

-- presentation to the Member States of the Conference
on Disarmament (possibly by the EU);

-- The EU could propose a resolution to the UNGA, in
order to call for the launching of negotiations on the
Treaty.

- Fora to be negotiated

The CD would be the most logical negotiating body, as it
is the single multilateral forum the international
community has at its disposal for global negotiations in
the field of disarmament.

There are UN bodies dealing with outer space but their
mandates are not entirely pertinent. The UN First
Committee could be a useful vehicle but is not in itself a
negotiating body. Another option would be a special body
set up to deal with the Treaty. Existing bodies have
however the advantage of established legitimacy and
membership, so avoiding some of the procedural
difficulties of establishing new bodies, and avoiding to
weaken existing bodies such as CD.

End text.
RICE


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End Cable Text