Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE133865
2008-12-23 14:20:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

UAE INTERMEDIARY USED TO DISGUISE IDENTITY OF

Tags:  PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC SZ IR AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3573
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHC #3865/01 3581427
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 231420Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 2944
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8236
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 133865 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC SZ IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE INTERMEDIARY USED TO DISGUISE IDENTITY OF
IRANIAN END-USER FROM SWISS EXPORT OFFICIALS (S)

REF: STATE 132055

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C),
AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 133865

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC SZ IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE INTERMEDIARY USED TO DISGUISE IDENTITY OF
IRANIAN END-USER FROM SWISS EXPORT OFFICIALS (S)

REF: STATE 132055

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C),
AND (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Abu Dhabi,
please see paragraph 4.


2. (S) Background: We have information indicating that
as of early November 2008, the UAE-based firm Alkaen
Equipment and Industrial Supplies LLC was working to
provide Iran's Farazeh Equipment Distributor Company
(FEDCO) with a large quantity of products supplied by
the Swiss firm Quartzcom Ltd. The equipment was flown
from Switzerland to the UAE in late October/early
November, and then transshipped by Alkaen to FEDCO in
Iran. We believe that Alkaen was used in order to
disguise from Swiss export control officials the fact
that the goods were actually destined for an Iranian
end-user. Although the items supplied to FEDCO are not
controlled by any of the multilateral export control
regimes and are widely used in commercial applications,
they can also be used in ballistic missile and unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) programs. FEDCO has acted as a
supplier to entities affiliated with both Iran's
ballistic missile and UAV programs.


3. (S) Objectives: We want to advise UAE officials of
Alkaen's role in providing FEDCO with Swiss-origin
items and request that they investigate and take
measures to ensure that Alkaen ceases its activity on
behalf of Iranian entities of proliferation concern.


4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Abu Dhabi
approach appropriate UAE authorities to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report
response. Talking points also may be provided as a
non-paper. We are also sharing this information with
Swiss officials (Ref).


5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL UAE)

-- We would like to raise with you a matter of
proliferation concern and request your government's
assistance in investigating this activity.

-- We have information indicating that as of early
November 2008, the UAE-based firm Alkaen Equipment and
Industrial Supplies LLC was working to provide Iran's
Farazeh Equipment Distributor Company (FEDCO) with
approximately $150,000 worth of products - including
crystal oscillators - supplied by the Swiss firm
Quartzcom Ltd.

-- This equipment was delivered by air from Switzerland
to Alkaen in the UAE in late October/early November.

-- Alkaen, in turn, transshipped the goods to FEDCO in
Iran.

-- We believe that Alkaen, the UAE intermediary, was
used in order to disguise from Swiss export control
officials the fact that the goods were actually
destined for an Iranian end-user.

-- Crystal oscillators are common in
telecommunications, navigation, avionics, and precise
measurement industries. They are not controlled and
are widely used in many commercial applications.

-- However, they can also be used in ballistic missile
and unmanned aerial vehicle applications.

-- FEDCO has supplied sensitive goods to entities
affiliated with Iran's ballistic missile and unmanned
aerial vehicle program.

-- We urge you to investigate this activity and take
measures to ensure that Alkaen ceases its activity on
behalf of Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

-- We appreciate your support and look forward to
hearing of any actions your government takes in
response to this information.

STATE 00133865 002 OF 002


-- We are also discussing this matter with Swiss
officials.

End talking points/non-paper.


6. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann
with any questions or follow-up issues related to this
case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and
slug reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR.


7. (U) A word version file of this document will be
posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE