CFE: A/S FRIED'S DECEMBER 17 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 133417

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL RS GG MD
SUBJECT: CFE: A/S FRIED'S DECEMBER 17 MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR ANTONOV YIELDS FRANK TALK AND
REPETITION OF RUSSIAN MAXIMALISM

Classified By: EUR A/S DAN FRIED FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried and an
interagency team met for five-plus hours December 17 in
Geneva to review the status of the CFE Parallel Actions
Package with Russian Disarmament Director Anatoliy Antonov
and his experts. The discussion combined Russian maximalism
on CFE -- and many of Prime Minister Putin's colorful
indictments of the current Treaty -- with one of the most
interesting and concrete discussions of specific ideas that
we have had in many months (probably not since fall 2007).
Russian posturing echoed U/S Rood's meetings on other topics,
with the Russian team explicitly staking out ground for
dealing with the next U.S. Administration. Discussion
touched broadly on all the major elements of the package, but
the meeting focused substantively on three issues: Georgia,
the flank, and Russia's suspension. On the flank, the
Russian message was explicit: Antonov asked Fried to "tell
the Obama Administration that there will never be a deal on
CFE unless subceilings on Russia's forces on its territory
are eliminated."


2. (C) Process -- in particular the way ahead for
U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia dialogue on CFE in light of the
impending change of Administration in the U.S. -- was also a
major theme. Antonov and Fried agreed that it would be
important to have a follow-on US-Russia meeting in the new
year, certainly prior to any German-hosted CFE-wide seminar
event on lines suggested by German Foreign Minister
Steinmeier at the OSCE Ministerial. Fried expressed openness
to the idea of expanded participation by affected countries
in some of the U.S.-Russia bilateral exchanges. Antonov made
clear that he thought both the U.S.-Russia channel, and some
expanded discussion, were needed. He observed that any event
involving all 30 CFE states, such as Steinmeier appeared to
be proposing, would not in the end offer a venue for actually
solving issues. Antonov gave no indication, however, that he
would attempt to dissuade the Germans from going ahead with
plans for a CFE event in spring 2009.


3. (SBU) A/S Fried was accompanied by VCI DAS Karin Look,
EUR/RPM Jennifer Laurendeau, CFE Expert Michael Powell,
VCI/CCA Lt Col Kathryn Ducceschi, DoD JCS Col Darren
Hartford, and OSD Peter Perenyi. In addition to Antonov, the
Russian team included: Anton Mazur, Sergey Federyakov, and
Col Vladislav Golubev, an MOD expert serving with Russia's
JCG delegation. End Summary.

A Half-day of Russian Maximalism...
--------------


4. (C) Antonov used the first three hours of the meeting to
underscore familiar maximalist positions on the Parallel
Actions Package in general, arguing again that, on a number
of specific points, the package is really "Russian actions
for NATO promises," rather than equal obligations. Antonov
resurfaced the argument that the U.S. had walked back from
the October 2007 parallel actions proposal, largely because
of the positions of its friends and Allies. He said the U.S.
had not incorporated key Russian concerns into the package,
mentioning that there were a number of places in the text
where NATO commitments were expressed conditionally, while
Russia was expected to take decisive action. He suggested
that "would" should be "will" where it concerned movement by
NATO Allies on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty; the
U.S. and Russia should agree on a definition of "substantial
combat forces," not just "consider" one; and parameters
should be established for Baltic accession to CFE as part of
the parallel actions discussion. That is, Russia wants the
terms for Baltic accession set out in the near term, rather
than in the future as part of their formal CFE accession
process, after the Adapted Treaty has been ratified by all
current CFE States and entered into force. Antonov did not
dwell in specific terms on the Russian proposal to establish
a collective ceiling on the equipment holdings of all the
members of NATO, but he called for "parity" between NATO and
Russia, claiming that Russia is concerned by U.S.
establishment of "new bases" in Bulgaria and Romania, by the

STATE 00133417 002 OF 005

SUBJECT: CFE: A/S FRIED'S DECEMBER 17 MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR ANTONOV YIELDS FRANK TALK AND
REPETITION OF RUSSIAN MAXIMALI
deployment of NATO CFE TLE to the Baltics ("four aircraft!"
the U.S. team rejoined) and the growth in TLE holdings by the
Baltic states, and by reports of U.S./NATO activities in
Central Asia. Antonov reiterated the need to draw a line
between CFE and the frozen conflicts. Finally, he queried
the meaning of NATO's position that the current situation,
where Allies implement CFE while Russia does not (because of
its unilateral suspension),"cannot last indefinitely."
Moscow wondered if this was a threat; Fried and DAS Karin
Look assured Antonov it was an expression of political
reality, not a threat.


5. (C) A/S Fried observed that while he wanted to avoid
polemics, it was important to make clear that neither the
U.S. nor NATO Allies accepted this vision of Russia as
disadvantaged either by NATO enlargement or by the CFE
Treaty. Far from building up to threaten Russia, in fact the
equipment holdings of NATO allies had dropped dramatically in
the last ten years. Fried recalled that while the U.S.
equipment ceiling for tanks under the current CFE Treaty is
approximately 4000, in fact, the U.S. has 90 tanks in Europe
today, according to our current CFE data. Fried warned that
ideas like parity between NATO and Russia seem like an effort
to re-establish dividing lines that the Adapted Treaty was
designed to do away with.


6. (C) Comment: Antonov's comments about the evolution of
the parallel actions package and on Russia's perception of
threats from an advancing NATO are old chestnuts, which have
long-since been answered in previous U.S.-Russian CFE
discussions with extensive briefings on key issues, such as
U.S. plans for rotational training in Bulgaria and Romania.
It appeared that Antonov was recapitulating the full litany
of Russia's CFE concerns for the record, in advance of the
U.S. change of administration. When Fried offered to review
the text of the package and determine where language could be
refined, so the new Administration's team could receive the
most up-to-date picture, Antonov demurred. He made clear
that he did not want to engage in line-in/out at this point
and was saving any flexibility for the future, preferring to
inveigh against the U.S. and NATO for loss of time as a
result of our non-engagement following the Russian attack on
Georgia, and for "unhelpful" accusatory statements in Vienna
and Brussels. End Comment

...Creative U.S. Ideas...
--------------


7. (C) Antonov was visibly surprised when the U.S. advanced
specific ideas for updating the Georgia portion of the
parallel actions package. He agreed to take back to Moscow
the three bullets the U.S. and Georgia had agreed as a basis
for updating the Georgia portion of the package (text at
para 9 below). While Antonov and veteran Russian CFE expert
Anton Mazur asked thoughtful questions about the specifics,
Antonov claimed that he did not see why steps on Georgia were
an essential element of a CFE solution, particularly in the
wake of Russia's military action. Despite the posturing,
Antonov did not return to the earlier Russian suggestion that
Georgia and Moldova do not belong in a CFE package: in fact,
Antonov suggested that the U.S. and Russia were probably
closest to agreement on Moldova, which was not discussed in
detail. In a private dinner with Fried that evening, Antonov
(who claimed to have spoken to Lavrov) said that what the
U.S. envisioned on Georgia was too far-reaching; but Moscow
would try to come up with some ideas of its own.


8. (C) In presenting the new ideas on Georgia, Fried
stressed that one of the reasons the U.S. had not resumed
bilateral discussions with Russia on CFE in fall 2008 was the
need to identify a way forward on CFE and Georgia in light of
Russia's military action in August, and Moscow's recognition
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries. From
a CFE perspective, the presence of significant Russian forces
on Georgian territory without Georgia's consent was obviously
a huge issue. The U.S. and NATO consider South Ossetia and
Abkhazia to be part of Georgia. The principle of host nation
consent to the presence of foreign forces is explicitly
contained in CFE. Until August Russia had been withdrawing
its presence from Georgia in accordance with the Istanbul
commitments and only one issue was left -- Gudauta. But
Russia's actions in August, and its announced basing plans,
had changed that picture. To move forward on ratification of
Adapted CFE we would need creative ideas -- that Georgia
could support -- to address the situation we now face in
Georgia.


STATE 00133417 003 OF 005


9. (C) Fried said the ideas we had developed represented a
major effort by the Georgians and the U.S. to find a way to
prevent our efforts to save CFE from being derailed by
Russian actions in Georgia. In effect our proposal
acknowledged that Russia would have forces in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia for a long while. Fried characterized this as a
major gain for Russia; the immediate benefit to Georgia was
the transparency provided. These ideas were crafted,
explicitly, not to deviate from the principles and goals of
the August cease fire agreement and CFE itself. Fried shared
three bullets:

-- Withdrawal of all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE)
from the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
-- An international presence at Gudauta and other relevant
facilities;
-- A transparency and verification regime, using Adapted CFE
modalities to provide information on and monitor the number
and armament of:
-- Russian military, security and other forces in
the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a tool
to observe and facilitate full implementation of the military
withdrawal elements of the August 12 ceasefire agreement;
-- Russian military forces in the North Caucasus
Military District;
-- Comparable Georgian forces.


10. (C) Antonov immediately objected that the South
Ossetians and Abkhaz are not part of CFE; and that Russia
could never agree to language that referred to those
countries as "the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia," and objected to the characterization of August's
events as a "war," preferring to call it a "Caucasus crisis."
Fried said dryly that as a practical matter we would have to
find a political way forward to avoid creating a black hole.
Nobody besides Russia and Nicaragua considered those regions
independent countries. That was the reality. The U.S.
assumed that Russia would be in a position to significantly
influence their approach. The Russians then asked a number
of substantive questions about the specifics of the
transparency measures:

-- What type of international presence did we envision at
Gudauta? (Answer: This is for negotiation, not a
take-it-or-leave-it package. An OSCE presence was an obvious
choice. Other options might build on the UN role in
Abkhazia, for example. A permanent presence was possible, or
one could envision a periodic presence, but something more
than inspection team visits.)
-- What other "relevant facilities" would be covered by
this provision? (Answer: Russia had announced that it would
establish major garrisons at several locations in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. They would be covered.)
-- Why would we use CFE modalities for transparency if all
the TLE had been withdrawn? (Answer: The Adapted CFE
modalities we envisioned to utilize were a good basis because
they had already been agreed, and we knew how to apply them.
The Russian military presence was significant no matter what
its armament. Russian statements suggested that Russia
envisioned a presence that would include TLE for some time.)
-- Why should all of the NCMD be included in these measures?
Would there be double coverage for inspections, in CFE and
via this agreement? (Answer: At this point double coverage
is not an issue, since Russia is not implementing CFE. It
may be that some parts of the NCMD are not relevant to the
security situation in Georgia; that could be discussed.
Those that are should be covered by the measures. Georgia
has agreed to provide comparable transparency regarding its
own forces; this is something Russia has claimed is needed.)
-- Why does the language refer to Russian "military,
security, and other forces?" (Answer: We want it to be
clear that all Russian military forces should be encompassed.
A shoulder patch that says "peacekeeping" should not serve
as a basis for exclusion. There was no intention to capture
civilian humanitarian efforts; but "railway workers" that are
actually troops would be covered.)


11. (C) Comment: Despite the number of Russian questions
and their level of detail, it was clear at the outset that
the Russian team considered the U.S./Georgian ideas to be
overly ambitious, though they agreed to report them to Moscow
immediately. (In the full meeting, Antonov asked "why should
we do this? We didn't lose the war.") It remains to be seen
whether Antonov 's private claim to Fried, that Russia would
respond to the U.S. with some ideas of its own, will yield
useful input. Antonov's interest in knowing how widely the
specifics of the U.S. ideas have been shared with NATO Allies

STATE 00133417 004 OF 005


...And frank talk about the Flank issue
--------------


12. (C) While the U.S. pushed for serious thinking about
how to address the situation in Georgia via CFE, for their
part the Russian team pressed for a U.S. reaction to the
Baluyevskiy flank proposal, insisting that there would never
be an agreed Parallel Actions Package if Russia's concerns on
the flank were not addressed.

-- Fried and team made clear that changing the flank regime
before the Adapted Treaty entered into force seemed like an
impossibility: it was hard to imagine how key players, like
Turkey or the U.S., could ratify the Adapted Treaty in its
current form, if there was a deal to revise one of its core
limits already in place. Changes to the flank should be an
issue for after entry into force. Antonov interjected that
if the political will was there, this could be solved in the
near term.
-- On substance, Fried told Antonov flatly that the
Baluyevskiy proposal amounted to abolition of the flank for
Russia and its retention for all others, including the
Baltics: its only real effect was to re-label Russia's
overall ceiling for the area of application as its flank
limit, which meant that in theory Russia could locate its
entire force structure in the NCMD.


13. (C) The Russian team countered that didn't have to be
the end of the story. They made clear that Russia's bottom
line is that there could be no legal subceilings restricting
movement of Russian forces on its territory. Three times
Antonov interrupted the flow of discussion to ask Fried to
convey this message to the incoming Administration, citing
the strong personal views of Putin on this matter. However,
Antonov also took pains to recount the history of the flank,
underscoring that the regime was originally designed to
prevent Soviet forces that were being withdrawn from Eastern
Europe from being concentrated in the north or south. The
context that created the regime, he argued, was long past.
He sought to modify Fried's summary of the Baluyevskiy
proposal, noting that if Russia's entire territory became
part of the flank, Russia would be subject to the Adapted CFE
Treaty's brigade-level temporary deployment provision, not
the larger division-sized "exceptional" temporary deployment
provision that attached to the flank. Nor would Russia be
able to get additional TLE allocations from Belarus or
Kazakhstan, which are not flank countries. CFE expert
Jennifer Laurendeau dismissed these points out of hand:
Russia's overall ceiling for the area of application was so
large that it dwarfed the holdings of any neighbor. Russia's
TD level was essentially irrelevant to the balance in the
region.


14. (C) Fried seconded her analysis and sharply countered
Antonov's main message that Europe had moved beyond the need
for flank limits: Russia's attack on Georgia, combined with
its suspension of CFE, had fueled reasonable concerns about
Russia's forces and intentions. In the wake of Russia's
attack, it was not only Turkey, but many Allies, who believed
that the flank limits are now more significant, not less,
than in the past. Antonov countered that he had discussed
the flank with Norwegian officials, and they did not seem
worried about the balance of forces in their neighborhood.
Laurendeau asked whether Russia was prepared to honor the
political commitments it made at Istanbul regarding force
levels in Pskov and Kaliningrad, and with regard to the
Leningrad Military District (LEMD) as a whole (the last was a
private commitment between Norway and Russia on no-increase
in the LEMD). Antonov briefly noted that Russia's 1999
commitment not to significantly increase its permanently
stationed forces in the two regions was predicated on "the
present politico-military situation," which he said had
changed with NATO enlargement to include the Baltics. But he
concluded that it was likely Russia would honor those
commitments, even if there was no CFE flank regime. It
appeared as well that Antonov thought it likely that Russia
would consider comparable political commitments or "CSBM"
ideas for the south, if the legal limits were dropped. The
Russian team said they could not put this proposal on the
table formally at this point, and stressed that Putin would
insist on elimination of legal restrictions on where Russia
can locate forces on its own territory.


15. (C) Antonov asked if the U.S. understood Turkey's
position on the flank. The Turks had said they were open to

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SUBJECT: CFE: A/S FRIED'S DECEMBER 17 MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR ANTONOV YIELDS FRANK TALK AND
REPETITION OF RUSSIAN MAXIMALI
revising the flank. But they also insisted the flank needed
to remain. What did they have in mind? The U.S. team
explained that Ankara has been very clear about its readiness
to consider an adjustment to Russia's flank ceilings if
Russia can demonstrate a military need for a higher figure.
This has already been done twice in CFE, in 1996 and in 1999.
What Ankara is opposed to, however, is any notion of
abandoning the principle of flank limits applying to a group
of countries in the region, and a part of Russian (and
Ukrainian) territory.


16. (C) Comment: The exchange on the flank was frank and
informal. Antonov and his experts grasp the problem of
asking NATO members to negotiate a major change to a Treaty
that is not yet in force -- a course that might make Adapted
CFE unratifiable. But there is no doubt -- and Antonov
confirmed this to Fried privately -- that the Russian team
faces a Putin-derived imperative regarding elimination of the
flank limits for Russia. It is less clear whether Russia's
desire to maintain the flank regime for other Treaty members
(while it is eliminated for Russia) also comes from top
levels of the Russian government; Antonov appears to
recognize that as a twofer, this position is flatly not
negotiable. Regarding the Russian flank itself, this meeting
was the first time the Russian team has been prepared to
discuss openly the notion of a substitute, where political
commitments take the place of the current Treaty's legal
limits. However, for Turkey - and a number of other Allies -
the flank is the core of the Treaty, and they would most
likely reject this idea, particularly if it is accompanied by
a reduction in the special transparency provisions that apply
to the flank. End comment.

Next Steps
--------------


17. (C) Looking ahead, Fried and Antonov returned to the
question of Russia's resuming implementation of the Treaty.
Antonov highlighted that Russia does not agree with the last
sentence of the parallel actions package, which says that
Russia will resume implementation of the current Treaty once
the parallel actions package is agreed. He acknowledged that
this was the first time he had objected to the text. Citing
the "actions for promises" theme, he asserted that the rest
of the package would have to be definite, with specific
agreements reached, for Russia to resume implementation.
Fried countered that it was Russia that had ceased
implementing the Treaty, and he doubted that NATO Allies
would be prepared to "buy" Russia's return to fulfillment of
obligations it is legally committed to meet. Moreover, it
was hard to see how Allies could ratify the Adapted Treaty if
Russia was not implementing any part of CFE. Antonov hinted
that there might be conditions where Russia could resume
implementation of some portion of the CFE "regime" (vice, the
current Treaty),such as the information exchange, or
inspections. But not the flank limitations.


18. (C) Given the number and complexity of the issues, all
agreed that it would be desirable for the U.S. and Russia to
meet again early in the new year if possible. Antonov
expressed interest in expanding participation to include the
Quad plus Italy in subsequent discussions; Fried reiterated
his July message that he was open to expanding participation,
but suggested that those allies most interested in the
specific substantive issues (like Turkey and Norway on the
flank issue, or the Baltics on their issues) needed to be
involved. He noted that he personally might not be involved,
due to the change of Administration, but he would ensure the
transition team was fully briefed.


19. (C) Fried and Antonov agreed to communicate again in
the next month to review the status of the issues and options
for resuming discussions.
RICE