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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE132581
2008-12-18 19:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

SITE SURVEY PURSUANT TO ELIMINATION OF UKRAINIAN

Tags:  MTCRE PARM PREL UP 
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VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2581 3531944
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 181936Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 8731
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
						C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 132581 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2033
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL UP
SUBJECT: SITE SURVEY PURSUANT TO ELIMINATION OF UKRAINIAN
SCUD MISSILES (C)

REF: A. STATE 111716

B. KYVI 002339

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).



1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4.



2. (C) Background: The November 18 U.S.-Ukraine missile
destruction talks in Kyiv provided an opportunity to exchange
information and review next steps for moving forward to
eliminate Ukraine's SCUD missiles and related equipment (Ref
B). We want to follow-up on those discussions by beginning
to plan for the visit of a U.S. technical team to
assess/inventory the SCUDS and SCUD-related equipment at the
various sites in Ukraine. Our analysis of the
Ukrainian-provided SCUD inventory indicates approximately a
dozen sites containing SCUDS and related equipment would need
to be visited. (NOTE: There may be additional sites
containing SCUD equipment since the inventory only included
the locations of the missiles and the missile launchers. END
NOTE.) Given that these sites are widely dispersed across
Ukraine, it is imperative that we begin now to start planning
for what will likely be a 2-3 week project for the U.S.
technical team of approximately 6 to 8 personnel, including
the contractor. We would propose t
he site assessment/inventory to take place in late
April-early May 2009.



3. (C) At each of the various sites, the technical team will
inventory and record the type of SCUD equipment, the
manufacturing or serial numbers, and the storage location for
all SCUD equipment. Based on our past experiences with
missile elimination projects, the inventory proceeds
efficiently if the site supervisor/commander has done the
necessary preparatory work. This includes identifying all
SCUD-related equipment and storage locations, and providing
ease of access to the equipment. Prior to the departure of
the U.S. team from each of the sites, the U.S. and GOU team
chiefs will discuss any discrepancies resulting from the
inventory and initial a document of record which lists all
the SCUD-related equipment at that specific site. Going
through this procedure at each of the sites facilitates the
production of a final document of record which is intended to
account for all of Ukraine's SCUDS and SCUD-related
equipment.



4. (C) Action Request: Drawing on the background
information in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, request Embassy Kyiv
approach appropriate host MOD, MFA, and NSDC officials to
stress to the GOU the importance of early, detailed planning
for a U.S. technical team visit in late April-early May 2009.
Request Post push Ukraine to provide a site visit plan and
inform the U.S. of any requirements or approvals that are
required for the U.S. team no later than Jan 19, 2009. This
will facilitate a full discussion of the plan at the next
U.S.-Ukraine bilateral Nonproliferation Working Group meeting
(which could be held in Washington as early as February
2009).



5. (U) Department appreciates Post's assistance. Please
slug response to ISN/MTR, ISN/NDF, and EUR/PRA.
RICE