VZCZCXYZ0004 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #2581 3531944 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R 181936Z DEC 08 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 8731 INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE |
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 132581 |
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4. 2. (C) Background: The November 18 U.S.-Ukraine missile destruction talks in Kyiv provided an opportunity to exchange information and review next steps for moving forward to eliminate Ukraine's SCUD missiles and related equipment (Ref B). We want to follow-up on those discussions by beginning to plan for the visit of a U.S. technical team to assess/inventory the SCUDS and SCUD-related equipment at the various sites in Ukraine. Our analysis of the Ukrainian-provided SCUD inventory indicates approximately a dozen sites containing SCUDS and related equipment would need to be visited. (NOTE: There may be additional sites containing SCUD equipment since the inventory only included the locations of the missiles and the missile launchers. END NOTE.) Given that these sites are widely dispersed across Ukraine, it is imperative that we begin now to start planning for what will likely be a 2-3 week project for the U.S. technical team of approximately 6 to 8 personnel, including the contractor. We would propose t he site assessment/inventory to take place in late April-early May 2009. 3. (C) At each of the various sites, the technical team will inventory and record the type of SCUD equipment, the manufacturing or serial numbers, and the storage location for all SCUD equipment. Based on our past experiences with missile elimination projects, the inventory proceeds efficiently if the site supervisor/commander has done the necessary preparatory work. This includes identifying all SCUD-related equipment and storage locations, and providing ease of access to the equipment. Prior to the departure of the U.S. team from each of the sites, the U.S. and GOU team chiefs will discuss any discrepancies resulting from the inventory and initial a document of record which lists all the SCUD-related equipment at that specific site. Going through this procedure at each of the sites facilitates the production of a final document of record which is intended to account for all of Ukraine's SCUDS and SCUD-related equipment. 4. (C) Action Request: Drawing on the background information in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, request Embassy Kyiv approach appropriate host MOD, MFA, and NSDC officials to stress to the GOU the importance of early, detailed planning for a U.S. technical team visit in late April-early May 2009. Request Post push Ukraine to provide a site visit plan and inform the U.S. of any requirements or approvals that are required for the U.S. team no later than Jan 19, 2009. This will facilitate a full discussion of the plan at the next U.S.-Ukraine bilateral Nonproliferation Working Group meeting (which could be held in Washington as early as February 2009). 5. (U) Department appreciates Post's assistance. Please slug response to ISN/MTR, ISN/NDF, and EUR/PRA. RICE |