Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE124032
2008-11-22 00:49:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

(S) PSI: NORTH KOREAN VESSEL OF POSSIBLE

Tags:  PARM PREL MNUC SN KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 220049Z NOV 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T STATE 124032 


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC SN KN

SUBJECT: (S) PSI: NORTH KOREAN VESSEL OF POSSIBLE
PROLIFERATION CONCERN

REF: 06SINGAPORE 3456

Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia A. McNerney and
Acting EAP A/S Glyn T. Davies and, Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------

S E C R E T STATE 124032


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC SN KN

SUBJECT: (S) PSI: NORTH KOREAN VESSEL OF POSSIBLE
PROLIFERATION CONCERN

REF: 06SINGAPORE 3456

Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia A. McNerney and
Acting EAP A/S Glyn T. Davies and, Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S//REL Singapore) We have information that a North
Korean-flagged vessel, the M/V SO HUNG 1, will arrive at
Singapore's Outer Port Limits for bunkering on or around 24
November. Our information indicates that the Singapore-based
firm Seabridge Bunkering PTE Ltd may provide bunkering
services to the So Hung 1. The vessel is destined for Bandar
Abbas, Iran.


2. (S//NF) FOR POST ONLY: North Korean vessels have, in the
past, anchored at the Outer Port Limits in order to avoid
scrutiny from Singaporean authorities.


3. (S//REL Singapore) We have indications that KOMID, North
Korea's primary weapons trading firm, was preparing to send a
possible cargo of cruise missile-related items to Iran in
early to mid-November. Certain cruise missile-related
cooperation by North Korea with other countries is prohibited
under paragraphs 8 (b) and (c) of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1718. Additionally, exports of certain
cruise missile-related items to Iran are banned by paragraph
3 (c) of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737.
While we do not know whether this cargo is aboard the SO HUNG
1, we are concerned that the vessel is carrying items of
proliferation concern.


4. (S//REL Singapore) Singapore is a Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) partner and has been very cooperative in
past efforts regarding North Korean-flagged vessels of
proliferation concern. In 2006, the GOS instructed
Singapore-based firms to not provide bunkering services to
the North Korean-flagged vessel Bong Hoa Son, which transited
Singapore's territorial waters en route to Burma. (REF A).

ACTION REQUEST
--------------


5. (S//REL Singapore) Post should coordinate first with
station and country team prior to approaching GOS officials.
Post is instructed to approach appropriate host-nation
officials and request that in the spirit of our PSI
cooperation, that the GOS, consistent with its national law

and international law:

(1) instruct Singapore-owned or based bunkering service
companies not to provide fuel, food, water, or other services
to the SO HUNG 1 unless an inspection or related activities
have taken place;

(2) as an alternative to bunkering, invite the SO HUNG 1 into
port to receive these services.

(3) inspect the vessel and its paperwork should it enter
Singapore's port or stop in Singapore's territorial waters,
to determine whether the vessel is carrying cargo proscribed
by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 or 1737;
and


(4) share with the USG any information that might be
collected from the SO HUNG 1.

Post may draw from summary or from objectives and talking
points/non-paper below.

OBJECTIVES
--------------


6. (S//REL Singapore) Post is instructed to pursue the
following:

-- Request that the GOS instruct Singapore-based bunkering
service companies to deny services to the SO HUNG 1.

-- Request that the GOS offer a port call as an alternative
to bunkering.

-- Request that Singapore authorities, consistent with its
national law and international law, and in the spirit of our
PSI partnership, inspect the SO HUNG 1 if it enters
Singapore's ports or stops in its waters, and if it is
transporting items, equipment, or materiel to or from the
DPRK in contravention of UNSCR 1718 (2006) or to Iran in
contravention of UNSCR 1737 (2006) or 1803 (2008),request
that the GOS impound the cargo pending further disposition.

-- Emphasize to the GOS that paragraph 8(a) of UN Security
Council Resolution 1718 requires UN Member States to prevent
the transfer to or from the DPRK, through their territories,
of specified WMD and conventional weapons-related items and
technology. In addition, to ensure compliance with this
obligation, paragraph 8(f) of UN Security Council Resolution
1718 calls upon UN Member States to take, in accordance with
their national authorities and consistent with international
law, cooperative action, including through inspection of
cargo to and from the DPRK.

-- Also emphasize that paragraph 3 (c) of UN Security Council
Resolution 1737 requires UN member states to prevent the
transfer to Iran of certain missile-related items.

TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
--------------


7. (S//REL Singapore) Begin talking points/non-paper:

-- In the spirit of PSI partnership, we would like to inform
you of a North Korean-flagged vessel, SO HUNG 1, which is
currently carrying a shipment from North Korea and is
destined for Bandar Abbas, Iran. The vessel intends to call
at the Singapore Outer Port Limits on or about 24 November.
The exact nature of the cargo is unknown.

-- We know that in the past, North Korean-flagged vessels
transporting suspect cargoes have conducted bunkering
operations at Singapore's Outer Port Limits, and we
appreciate Singapore's past assistance to deny bunkering
services to previous suspect vessels.

-- We also have information that North Korea's primary
weapons trading firm KOMID was preparing to send a possible
cargo of cruise missile-related items from North Korea to
Iran in early to mid-November. While we do not know whether
this cargo is aboard the SO HUNG 1, it is possible that the
vessel is carrying items of proliferation concern.

-- North Korean exports of cruise-missile related items would
be contrary to paragraph 8(b) of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1718. Additionally, such exports to Iran
would be contrary to paragraph 3 (c) of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1737.

-- Therefore, we request that the GOS instruct
Singapore-based bunkering service companies to deny services
to the SO HUNG 1, and request that Singapore offer a port
visit to the SO HUNG 1 as an alternative to bunkering in
order to receive services.

-- Should the vessel enter your port or stop in your
territorial waters, we request that appropriate authorities
inspect the vessel. If items, equipment, or materiel that
contravene UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1737, or
1803 are found, we request that the GOS impound the cargo
pending further disposition, in accordance with your national
law.

-- As you know, paragraph 8(a) of UN Security Council
Resolution 1718 requires UN Member States to prevent the
transfer to or from the DPRK, through their territories, of
certain WMD and conventional weapons-related items and
technology. We would also note that paragraph 8(f) of UN
Security Council Resolution 1718 calls upon UN Member States
to take, in accordance with their national authorities and
legislation, and consistent with international law,
cooperative action including through the inspection of cargo
to and from North Korea, as necessary, in order to ensure
that North Korea does not transfer any of the proscribed
items.

-- In addition, paragraph 3 (c) of UN Security Council
Resolution 1737 prohibits the transfer of certain
missile-related items to Iran.

-- We greatly appreciate your assistance, and look forward to
hearing the results of any actions regarding the So Hung 1
that you take.

REPORTING DEADLINE
--------------


8. (U) Post should report results of its efforts by 26
November.

POINT OF CONTACT
--------------


9. (U) POC for follow-up information is Mark Felipe,
ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov, and via
State Ops Center, ISN Duty Officer on November 22 and 23; and
Dan Bischof, EAP/MTS (202) 647-4932, cellphone (202)
297-8272, bishofdr@state.gov.


10. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance. Please
slug responses for ISN, EAP, and T.
RICE


NNNN




End Cable Text