IAEA REPORTS ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 123074


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA IR TRGY

SUBJECT: IAEA REPORTS ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN NUCLEAR
PROGRAMS

Classified By: ISN - PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 7-8.


2. (C) OBJECTIVES:

-- To note the 19 November 2008 release of reports by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the status of
its respective investigations into the Iranian and Syrian
nuclear programs.

-- To urge host governments to make strong statements on Iran
at the 27-28 November 2008 meeting of the IAEA Board of
Governors in response to Iran's continuing failure to resolve
any of the outstanding issues that surround its nuclear
program or to comply with its international nonproliferation
obligations.

-- To gauge the level of support for the adoption by the IAEA
Board of a resolution on Syria, which the U.S. supports as a
way to highlight Syria's failure to address serious concerns
that have been raised with its nuclear program and lend
support to the IAEA Secretariat,s continued investigation.

-- To urge host governments to support efforts during the
IAEA,s Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (TACC)
meetings 24-26 November 2008 to prevent the approval and
implementation of a Syria-requested Technical Cooperation
(TC) project associated with the construction of a nuclear
power plant in Syria, in light of the IAEA's 19 November
report.


3. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On 19 November 2008, the IAEA released
its latest report on Iran and its first written report on
Syria's nuclear program. These reports are summarized below.
The results are not positive.


4. (SBU) BACKGROUND CONT: With respect to Iran, the report
makes clear that there has been no progress with regard to
addressing the serious concerns that exist with Iran's
nuclear program but indicates that Iran continues to make
progressto augment its capabilities. The report states that
Iran refuses to provide explanations to the IAEA on its past
efforts to develop a nuclear warhead. In particular, the
Director General notes that "unfortunately, Iran has not
offered any cooperation with the Agency since (its September
2008) report and has not yet provided the requested
information, or access to the requested documentation,
locations or individuals." The report also underscores
Iran's failure to comply with its UNSC obligation to suspend
all uranium enrichment-related, reprocessing and heavy
water-related activities. Additional specific details
include:

-- The report notes that Iran continues to enrich uranium at
its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant using approximately 3,820
centrifuges and that installation and testing work is
proceeding with respect to an additional 2,132 centrifuges.
Iran is also continuing to prepare for the installation of a
further 9,000 centrifuges at this plant.

-- The report also notes that Iran's stockpile of low
enriched uranium hexafluoride has reached 630 kilograms, an
increase of 150 kilograms since the end of August 2008 and
over half of the amount Iran would need for one nuclear
weapon (assuming that uranium was further enriched to
weapons-useable levels).

-- The report states that Iran continues to construct a heavy
water research reactor at Arak, but that Iran has refused to
permit the IAEA to conduct a Design Information Verification
(DIV) inspection at the site. Absent this inspection, the
IAEA is "not able to verify the current status of its
construction." Further, since the IAEA's requested access is
fully consistent with Iran's Safeguards Agreement, Iran's
refusal raises further questions about its intentions and
compliance with its international obligations.

-- Consequently, this report is unambiguous in its depiction
of Iran's multiple failures to take steps demanded needed
establish confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
its nuclear program. In its conclusion, Director General
ElBaradei stresses that "unless Iran provides (requested)
transparency, and implements the Additional Protocol, the
Agency will not be able to provide credible assurance about
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran."


5. (SBU) BACKGROUND CONT: With regard to Syria, this is the
first written report that the IAEA has issued on its
investigation in Syria. In so doing, the IAEA took a major
first step towards formalizing the investigation. The fact
that the report was released and that the IAEA Board will
discuss this issue as a set agenda item at its November
meeting is therefore a setback for Syria. The report sharply
contradicts Syria's version of events.

-- In its most significant revelation, the report describes
the presence of man-made uranium particles at the Al-Kibar
site. Syria claims that any uranium found was introduced by
Israeli bombs when the reactor was destroyed, a claim that
the IAEA will discuss with Israel. Syria also alleges that
only one of the IAEA's sample results detected uranium. The
report states clearly that "a number of the Agency's Network
of Analytical Laboratories" had detected &a significant
number of uranium particles8 that have been chemically
processed.

-- The report describes the fact that Syria originally
contended that the site could not have supported a nuclear
reactor "because of, inter alia, the unreliable and
insufficient electricity supplies in the area, the limited
availability of human resources in Syria, and the
unavailability of large quantities of treated water." The
report then goes on to dismiss the majority of these
arguments, noting that the Agency's evaluation was that water
and electrictical resources for the site were sufficient for
a reactor of the size Syria was alleged to have constructed.

-- The report also describes the fact that imagery from both
before and after the September 2007 bombing supports the view
that Al-Kibar housed a reactor. The report notes that "its
containment structure appears to have been similar in
dimension and layout to that required for a biological shield
for nuclear reactors, and the overall size of the building
was sufficient to house the equipment for a nuclear reactor
of the type alleged."

-- The IAEA notes that it has information that Syrian
entities procured "materials and equipment which could
support the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor."
Syria has not provided requested information to address this
concern.

-- The report notes that the IAEA has information and
satellite imagery that suggests that three additional
locations could be related to the facility at Al-Kibar. The
report notes that, as a result, the IAEA requested access to
these locations on 2 May 2008. This access has not been
granted. However, according to the report, "analysis of
satellite imagery taken of these locations indicates that
landscaping activities and the removal of large containers
took place shortly after the Agency's request for access."
Syria has been requested to explain these activities and to
permit the IAEA access to those locations.

-- The Director General concludes his report by noting that
"while it cannot be excluded that the building in question
(at Al-Kibar) was intended for non-nuclear use, the features
of the building(along with the connectivity of the site to
adequate pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to
what may be found in connection with a reactor site. Syria
has not yet provided the requested documentation in support
of its declarations concerning the nature or function of the
destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three other
locations which the Agency has requested to visit."


6. (SBU) BACKGROUND CONT: Seperately, Syria has requested
that the IAEA support a feasibility study and site survey in
Syria for a nuclear power plant (NPP) under the IAEA
Technical Cooperation (TC) program. The United States
believes that such a project would be highly inappropriate
given Syria's failure to resolve the outstanding concerns
about its undeclared nuclear activities. This project could
present a serious risk of nuclear technology and assistance
to diversion, and permit Syria to procure sensitive items
(such as nuclear measurement equipment) under the guise of
supporting this TC project. Moreover, detailed analysis of
the project proposal demonstrates that there are serious
inconsistencies between standard feasibility studies and what
has been requested (e.g., while the IAEA has noted that Syria
is not in a position technically to support a NPP, the IAEA
has simultaneously apparently endorsed a project to determine
the siting of said NPP). This project will be first
discussed at the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation
Committee (TACC) meetings taking place 24-26 November, and
then again at the IAEA Board meetings on 27-28 November.


7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Using the background provided in
paragraphs 3-6, Posts are requested to raise U.S. views on
these reports with highest appropriate host government
interlocutors. With respect to Iran, posts should stress
that Iran's failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA or to
comply with its UNSC obligation to suspend its proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities remains deeply troubling. Posts
should urge host governments to express their strongest
possible concern with this situation in their national
statements at the upcoming November Board of Governors
meeting. Key points should include Iran's failure to address
the IAEA's "serious concerns" regarding past
weaponization-related activities, its refusal to take any
confidence-building steps despite the UNSC's repeated
demands, Iran's denial of access to the Arak reactor despite
its obligation to permit inspections of the facility, and the
urgent need to support the IAEA Secretariat in continuing
with its investigation.


8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST CONT: Posts are also requested to
raise serious U.S. concerns regarding Syria's nuclear program
in light of the IAEA's sample results, and the Syrian
government's failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA's
investigation. Posts should underscore that Syria's refusal
of access to requested facilities is a cause of concern.
Posts should stress that Syria's non-cooperation strongly
suggests that additional support should be given to the IAEA
Secretariat at this critical and early juncture in its
investigation, and that the United States believes the most
appropriate vehicle for this would be a resolution adopted by
the IAEA Board at its November meeting. Such a resolution
would express support for the IAEA,s investigation, cite the
status of the IAEA investigation to date, call on Syria to
cooperate fully with the IAEA, call on the IAEA to report to
the Board on the status of the investigation before the next
meeting, and note that the Board will remain seized of the
issue. Posts should gauge the level of support among host
governments for a resolution at the upcoming Board. (NOTE TO
POSTS: At this time the U.S. is seeking a like-minded proxy
to introduce such a resolution so as to mitigate any claims
that a resolution on Syria is politically motivated. As
such, Posts should not suggest that the U.S. plans to
introduce such a resolution.) Post should also note that, in
light of Syria's non-cooperation and the specific concerns
raised in paragraph 6, the United States believes that
permitting Syria's receipt of technical assistance in a
nuclear power plant feasibility study and site selection
would be highly inappropriate. Posts should urge host
governments to reject this project at the TACC and the Board.


9. (SBU) Posts are requested to report any substantive
responses by 24 November 2008. Richard Nephew (ISN/RA,
202-647-7680, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov),Jody Daniel (ISN/RA,
202-647-9486, DanielJL@state.sgov.gov),and Heather Von
Behren (IO/T, 202-647-2753, VonBehrenHW@state.sgov.gov) are
the Department's POCs for this activity.
RICE


NNNN




End Cable Text