AUGUST 2008 VISIT TO NORTH KOREA BY A UAE

S E C R E T STATE 123035


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2033
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL IR AE KN

SUBJECT: AUGUST 2008 VISIT TO NORTH KOREA BY A UAE
DELEGATION FOR MEETINGS WITH KOMID (S)

REF: A. 00 STATE 068398

B. STATE 081224

C. ABU DHABI 000865

D. STATE 032956

E. ABU DHABI 000448

F. STATE 080523

G. ABU DHABI 000867

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C) AND (D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Abu Dhabi, please
see paragraph 5.


2. (S) Background/Objective: In July 2008, the U.S. raised
with the UAE information indicating that North Korea's
primary weapons trading firm, the Korea Mining Development
Corporation (KOMID),was working to acquire a visa so that
its representative could travel to the UAE (Ref B). Because
this individual had been associated with North Korea's
assistance to Iran's missile program and in light of past
missile-related cooperation between the UAE and North Korea,
we requested UAE officials provide us with details regarding
the purpose of this representative's visit to the UAE. As of
November 2008, we have not received a substantive response
from the UAE to this demarche. Since our July discussions,
we have learned that a delegation from the UAE traveled to
North Korea in August 2008 for meetings with KOMID. As was
the case with the planned travel of the KOMID representative
to the UAE in June 2008, we are concerned that this UAE
delegation's travel to North Korea potentially could be
related to missile cooperation. We therefore want to raise
this activity with UAE officials and request they share with
us any available information on the purpose of these contacts
with North Korea.


3. (S) Additional Background/For Post Only: The 1999
transfer of Missile Technology Control Regime Category I Scud
ballistic missiles and related equipment from North Korea to
the UAE triggered a review under the U.S. missile sanctions
laws. As a result of this review, the USG determined on
April 6, 2000 that sanctionable activity took place requiring
the imposition of sanctions on North Korea's Changgwang
Sinyong Corporation (now known as KOMID) and the UAE's Armed
Forces General Headquarters. However, the USG further
decided, as permitted under the law, that it was essential to
the national security of the United States to waive these
sanctions against the UAE entity. The decision to waive
sanctions was made based on assurances provided to the USG by
then UAE Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mohammed bin
Zayid (MBZ) on behalf of the UAE government (UAEG).
Specifically, MBZ affirmed the U.S. understanding that the
UAE missile force consists of fewer than 30 missiles, roughly
half Scud C and half Scud B, and that the UAEG is committed to:
a) not acquire any additional ballistic missiles capable of
delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least
300 km; b) not upgrade the range/payload capability of the
missiles the UAE currently possesses; c) not possess
unconventional warheads or weapons of mass destruction; and
d) not conclude any new missile technology or arms deals with
North Korea (Ref A).


4. (S) In a separate matter, we would like to follow-up with
UAE authorities concerning information we raised in April
2008 indicating that the UAE-based aerospace firm Noor
Aerospace Technologies was working to supply Iran's unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) program with several types of jet
engines controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) (Refs D and E). We also want to follow-up with the
UAEG on a case we discussed in July 2008 concerning efforts
by the UAE firm Golden Triangle Testing Equipment to procure
fifty export-controlled Swiss-origin machine tools on behalf
of an Iranian end-user (Refs F and G). We want to request an
update from UAE officials on the status of their
investigations in both of these cases and ask for any
available details on actions taken by the UAEG in response to
the information provided by the U.S.


5. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Abu Dhabi approach
appropriate UAE authorities to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 6 below and report response.
Talking points may be provided as a non-paper.


6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)

Korean Mining Development Corporation

-- We would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation
concern involving your government and North Korea.

-- You will recall that in July 2008, we shared with you
information indicating that North Korea's primary weapons
trading firm, the Korean Mining Development Corporation
(KOMID),was working to acquire a visa so that its
representative could travel to the UAE.

-- Our information indicated that the individual seeking this
visa had been associated with KOMID's assistance to Iran's
missile program and we are concerned that he was traveling to
the UAE to promote missile-related cooperation between KOMID
and your government.

-- Although we requested you provide us details concerning
the purpose of this visit, we have yet to receive a response
from your government on this issue.

-- Since our July 2008 discussions, we have learned that a
delegation from the UAE traveled to North Korea from August
16-20 for meetings with KOMID.

-- As was the case with the KOMID representative's visit to
the UAE, we are concerned that this activity may be related
to missile cooperation that would be inconsistent with United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 and would
appreciate learning more about the purpose of this
delegation's visit to North Korea.

Noor Aerospace Technologies

-- In April 2008, we raised with you our concerns that the
UAE-based aerospace firm Noor Aerospace Technologies was
working to supply the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries
(HESA) with several types of jet engines and that HESA plans
to use these engines in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
applications.

-- We understood that Noor Aerospace Technologies intended to
falsify export licensing documents identifying these engines
and their ultimate destination to facilitate their transfer
to Iran.

-- We believe the jet engines to be supplied by Noor
Aerospace Technologies are controlled by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and are prohibited from
being transferred to Iran under UNSCR 1737.

Golden Triangle

-- In July 2008, we advised that the UAE firm Golden Triangle
Testing Equipment L.L.C. had expressed interest in procuring
fifty Swiss-origin machine tools on behalf of an Iranian
end-user.

-- The machines sought by Golden Triangle Testing Equipment
are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the
Wassenaar Arrangement and are well-suited to manufacturing
ballistic missile components such as impellers and turbine
blades.

-- In both these cases, we asked that you investigate this
activity and take measures to prevent unauthorized transfers
to Iran that would be inconsistent with UNSCRs 1737, 1747,
and 1803.

-- We would appreciate an update on your inquiries into these
three cases at the earliest possible time.

-- We look forward to continuing cooperation on this and
other nonproliferation matters.

End talking points/non-paper


7. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone:
202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for
ISN/MTR.


8. (U) A word version file of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
RICE


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End Cable Text