Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE120660
2008-11-13 20:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

CFE: NOV 5-7 ROMANIAN-HOSTED HLTF OFF-SITE:

Tags:  KCFE PARM PREL NATO OSCE 
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VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0660 3182104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 132052Z NOV 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 120660 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL NATO OSCE
SUBJECT: CFE: NOV 5-7 ROMANIAN-HOSTED HLTF OFF-SITE:
ALLIES EAGER FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP ON CFE

REF: A. (A) STATE 96113 SEP 11 HLTF GUIDANCE

B. (B) STATE 109281 OCT 16 HLTF GUIDANCE

C. (C) USNATO 398 OCT 16 HLTF REPORTING CABLE

Classified By: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Office Director.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 120660

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2013
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL NATO OSCE
SUBJECT: CFE: NOV 5-7 ROMANIAN-HOSTED HLTF OFF-SITE:
ALLIES EAGER FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP ON CFE

REF: A. (A) STATE 96113 SEP 11 HLTF GUIDANCE

B. (B) STATE 109281 OCT 16 HLTF GUIDANCE

C. (C) USNATO 398 OCT 16 HLTF REPORTING CABLE

Classified By: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Office Director.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. At the November 5-7 Romanian-hosted
off-site HLTF, Allies discussed the current situation
regarding CFE; examined options for a unified way forward;
and agreed on themes for NAC communique language on CFE to
deliver a solid NATO message at the upcoming NATO and OSCE
Ministerials. Not surprisingly, Allies rehashed a litany of
familiar national positions. But they also took on tough CFE
issues, and discussion revealed a number of common themes:

-- Preserve CFE. Allies are unified behind a primary goal:
to preserve the CFE regime. The preferred means is to find a
way to achieve entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty,
ideally with Russia as a fully implementing Party to the
Treaty. However, several Allies argued that CFE without
Russia would still be of tremendous value because it would
automatically make the regime the basis for any future arms
control steps. Uniformly, either in the plenary sessions or
on the margins, most expressed the view that we will never be
able to negotiate the equivalent of CFE or adapted CFE.

-- Keep the Parallel Actions Package alive. Allies stand
behind the Parallel Actions Package as the "only show in
town" and, for now, are looking to the U.S. to find a way to
take it forward They are fully seized of the fact that
Russia's military actions in Georgia have complicated a
solution to the CFE impasse. They believe Russian forces
will be in South Ossetia and Abkhazia for a long time, and
would welcome a way to use CFE to help address this so long
as it doesn't involve making the relationship with Russia
more difficult. It was clear, however, that some Allies are
developing ideas with a slightly different focus: the
Germans said flatly that CFE has value with or without the
"principles" Allies view as integral to the Treaty (e.g. the
need for host nation consent to the presence of foreign

forces) and that NATO must engage in a dialogue with Russia
on CFE and the Medvedev proposal or risk undermining those in
Moscow (namely the Foreign Ministry) who support arms control
and cooperative approaches to security.

-- Continue implementing CFE. The vast majority of Allies
are determined to maintain the moral high ground by
continuing to implement CFE despite Russia's continued
"suspension"; they stressed that NATO should not take any
retaliatory or punitive steps that could further undercut the
Treaty or give Russia an excuse for pulling out of the
regime. They want to send a clear and firm message at the
Ministerial that emphasizes the merits of the "generous"
Alliance position while criticizing Russia's unconstructive
approach.

-- Medvedev proposal seen as interesting, albeit vague. The
Medvedev proposal loomed large in this brainstorming session.
Despite Russia not having provided any true substance, a
number of Allies were explicitly open to new ideas and more
details, while also insisting that any new architecture must
be based on the current Euro-Atlantic framework with NATO,
the OSCE and human rights at the core. Others underscored
the Medvedev proposal,s lack of substance noting the irony
of Russia calling for a new security Treaty when it is
destroying CFE. On the margins, non-Quad Allies told members
of the U.S. team that the U.S. needed to lead by telling
Allies what Washington thinks of the Medvedev approach, and
by shaping a unified NATO response. Some claim to be under
pressure from Russia directly (through its diplomatic push
throughout Europe) and from France (in the EU) to express
openness to the Medvedev proposal. End Summary.


2. (SBU) HLTF Head of Delegation Deputy Assistant Secretary
Karin L. Look led the U.S. delegation. The delegation was
comprised of State/EUR/RPM Laurendeau, DOD/OSD Perenyi,
DOD/JCS, Col Hartford, State/VCI/CCA Lt Col Ducceschi and
State/USOSCE Jules Silberberg.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Options for a unified way forward
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3. (C) No Ally was optimistic about Russia returning to
implementation of the current CFE Treaty. But throughout the
discussions, all said they place the highest value on CFE as
the critical foundation of conventional arms control in
Europe. They want the stability and confidence provided by
the regime. There was broad support at the off-site for the
U.S.-expressed view that Allies should maintain a thoughtful,
measured approach ) without concessions or red lines ) that
served NATO's interests, especially as it would be impossible
to negotiate a CFE equivalent. Only the Czech Republic
expressed openness to the idea of NATO retaliating in the
near-term against Russia's suspension, by matching it. The
other Allies who addressed the issue argued to avoid any
retaliatory or punitive measures. Several repeated a common
concern that Russia might use such measures as a "reason" to
withdraw from the Treaty altogether. Allies' primary goal is
still to achieve entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty,
ideally with Russia as a fully implementing Party, but "not
at any price." Allies, with the possible exception of
Germany, are not prepared to forget the Istanbul commitments
or abandon Georgia. But they are not happy about the
situation Russia's suspension and invasion of Georgia has
created.

-- Comment: A decade of relentless support for
implementation of the Istanbul commitments as the trigger for
ratification of Adapted CFE has had its effect: most Allies
view host nation consent as a key principle that NATO cannot
sacrifice. Georgia has put that position to the test. Many
Allies (not just the Germans) view Georgia's actions in South
Ossetia as irresponsible, and they are angry that this has
placed CFE and the stability it represents in greater peril
than before. End comment.


4. (C) In a telling moment, Allies agreed that it would not
be useful to define what NATO meant in its Bucharest
communique by indicating that Allies would not continue
unilaterally to implement CFE "forever." They want to bring
Russia back to CFE, the sooner the better, but otherwise they
want to establish CFE as the single available basis for any
future arms control (see below). Many Allies emphasized the
need to maintain NATO's current approach of implementing CFE
even while Russia does not, at least until the new U.S.
administration is in place, holding out for serious Russian
engagement on the Parallel Actions Package, and waiting until
the spring for serious consideration of any shift in position
on implementation. They also recognized that at some point
this approach will become untenable. The U.S. noted it would
not argue for withholding data in December, and that it found
Canada's proposal ) to use the data exchange as a public
diplomacy opportunity to make a clear statement of principle
as to why Allies continue to implement ) appealing.


5. (C) Is a/CFE without Russia an option? Some Allies
remarked that the current situation was simply leading to
continued erosion of CFE and its eventual death. The Czech
Republic, in particular, used this sentiment to continue to
push for contingency planning so Allies would be prepared for
a "future without the CFE" and the possibility that Russia
could withdraw from CFE.

-- In the spirit of the "brainstorming" basis of the
off-site, this theme resulted in several Allies - with
Germany in the lead - opining that a/CFE without Russia would
still be of value and could serve as the basis for a future
arms control regime. All agreed that it would be impossible
to negotiate CFE's equivalent, but advocates of a/CFE even
without Russia claimed that keeping the CFE regime alive
would mean that Russia could eventually return to CFE
(however far-fetched such an idea might be). None addressed
the fact that this could amount to setting aside the Istanbul
commitments and core principles of the Treaty. Canada and
Denmark expressed concerns with the notion of the value of
a/CFE without Russia and the Netherlands cautioned that this
idea would need further reflection as it would amount to
Russia receiving the benefits of CFE without any of the
costs.


6. (C) Need for a Proactive Approach: The UK highlighted
that the status quo was advantageous to Russia, and that
Allies should consider ways to make the situation less
comfortable for Russia and more comfortable for the Alliance.
The U.S. stressed the need to consider a more proactive
approach rather than simply biding time until Spring, as some
had suggested, and losing an opportunity to take the
initiative. The U.S. rep said that CFE being "valuable" is
more than a slogan: we need to consider how to apply it to
current challenges. Perhaps Allies could develop an approach
in keeping with our principles that demonstrates CFE's
application to recent events and addresses Georgian security
in a way that Georgia finds beneficial.

-- Allies expressed openness to such an idea if it could
address the situation in Georgia (by way of updating the
Parallel Actions Package) and have serious prospects for
achieving entry into force of a/CFE. However, they did not
have ideas of their own about how this could be achieved.
Allies were clear that they stand behind the Parallel Actions
Package as the "only show in town," but at this point they
are looking to the U.S. for creative ideas that could build
Georgia's security and lead to the U.S. resuming engagement
with Russia in bilateral talks when appropriate.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Delivering a solid NATO message:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) Allies quickly agreed on basic themes for the
December NAC communique and OSCE Ministerial. There was
agreement that the NAC CFE communique language should draw
from elements of the Bucharest language, updated to reinforce
a firm message that should underscore the Allies' collective
commitment to CFE, growing concern at Russia's continued
suspension, condemnation of Russia's actions in Georgia, and
the fact that Russia has not been helpful in finding
solutions or engaging seriously on the parallel actions
package.

-- Allies agreed provisionally to focus on NAC communique
language rather than a separate statement to mark the
anniversary of Russia suspension, which could give it more
weight unnecessarily. It would be essential to note that
Allies continue to implement their Treaty obligations due to
their commitment to cooperative security arrangements and to
fulfillment of international agreements, as well as the
importance attached to the confidence that results from
military transparency and predictability. This statement
could then be utilized in Vienna in conjunction with the
annual data exchange.

-- On the margins quad allies reviewed a draft text that the
UK passed to the IS as a starting point. This text will be
worked by the HLTF-deputies with the aim of finalizing
language for the NATO Ministerial at the upcoming November 21
HLTF.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bilats with Romanian reps
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8. (C) In advance of the HLTF Off-site, State/VCI DAS Karin

L. Look, accompanied by EUR/RPM Jennifer Laurendeau and
VCI/CCA Kathryn Ducceschi, met separately with Foreign
Affairs Advisor of the Office of the President Anca Ilinoiu
and then with MFA Secretary of State for Strategic and Global
Affairs IIulian Buga. Both the U.S. and the Romanians
underscored their skepticism about the Medvedev European
Security Treaty proposal and the need for a unified NATO
position to counter Russia's bilateral efforts to promote it.
The Romanians said that Russia's diplomatic push on the
Medvedev proposal is having an impact in many European
capitals, and that France is pushing in the EU for
flexibility. They stressed the need for U.S. leadership,
noting that the U.S. needs to make its views known. The
Romanians also took the French to task for appearing to
promise an OSCE Summit, stressing that substance should drive
that decision. The U.S. concurred that there was no need for
a Summit when there was no substance and also stressed (both
in the bilats and at the off-site) that there was no need for
a new architecture when the current system is working and
Russia's actions are destroying a key element - CFE.


9. (C) On moving forward with CFE, U.S. rep Look advocated
for an even-keeled and unified approach that preserves our
core principles and would lead to the adapted Treaty rather
than starting from scratch. She emphasized the importance of
a productive approach that focused on leveraging or
influencing Russia to return to implementation and that could
also benefit Georgia. Foreign Affairs Advisor Ilinoiu was
keen on any approach that could unify NATO, address Georgia's
security and preserve our principles while reengaging Russia
on the parallel actions package. Romania would be with the
U.S. "1000 percent" if we could devise such an approach.
RICE