Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE118079
2008-11-05 20:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

US POLICY ON RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL AF 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 118079 

SENSITIVE

RESENDING CABLE TO ADD EMBASSIES CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON FOR ACTION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL AF
SUBJECT: US POLICY ON RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. 07 STATE 152286

B. STATE 058369

C. STATE 108114


Classified By: SCA DAS Donald A. Camp, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 118079

SENSITIVE

RESENDING CABLE TO ADD EMBASSIES CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON FOR ACTION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL AF
SUBJECT: US POLICY ON RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. 07 STATE 152286

B. STATE 058369

C. STATE 108114


Classified By: SCA DAS Donald A. Camp, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary and action request: Department is releasing
this message to reiterate interagency agreed guidance on
reconciliation with the Taliban and insurgent leaders (reftel
A) in light of recent press reporting. Posts are requested to
draw upon background paragraphs with host government
interlocutors as appropriate to clarify the U.S. position.
Posts can draw upon communication strategy talking points for
use with the press.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (SBU) President Karzai,s September 30 Eid message, amidst
growing signs of disunity among insurgents and terrorists,
has prompted suggestions of more ambitious discussions with
insurgent elements about their return to legitimate life in
Afghanistan. In his message, President Karzai stated, "For
two years I have been sending letters and messages to the
Saudi king, and requested him, as a world Muslim leader, to
help us bring peace in Afghanistan. The preparation for
negotiations is going on, on a daily basis. Our envoys
traveled many times to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but the
discussions have not started yet. We hope that it happens
soon." Reftel C provides an update on the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia's involvement in reconciliation talks with the
Taliban. The Government of Afghanistan has made clear that
it will only talk to individuals and groups who are prepared
to renounce violence and accept the Constitutional order.


3. (C/REL NATO, EU, KSA, UAE, PAKISTAN, INDIA, KUWAIT, OMAN,
QATAR, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN, KYRGYSTAN,
KAZAKHSTAN) The U.S. goal is to support the Government of
Afghanistan in defeating the insurgency and bringing
long-term stability to Afghanistan based on democratic
principles and respect for human rights. Co-opting elements
of the Taliban and other insurgent groups, and bringing them
verifiably into peaceful, law-abiding life would strengthen
Afghan society and weaken the insurgency. It could also
provide intelligence benefits, impede enemy recruitment and
save lives.


4. (SBU) International press reporting is inaccurately
stating that the U.S. will accept the reconciliation of
Taliban Leader Mullah Omar. The U.S. has not taken any such

position. The U.S. continues to support the possibility of
talks between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban
and other insurgent groups, but any talks should be
Afghan-led and identify clear redlines that are agreed by the
Afghans and international partners.


5. (C/REL NATO, EU, KSA, UAE, PAKISTAN, INDIA, KUWAIT, OMAN,
QATAR, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN, KYRGYSTAN,
KAZAKHSTAN) It is the USG position that individuals or groups
interested in reconciling must be prepared to (a) lay down
their arms and return to normal life, (b) recognize the
constitution and the authority of the democratically elected
government, (c) refrain from criminal activity once they
return, and (d) have no association with Al-Qaeda.
Additionally, there should be no power-sharing or other
arrangements that would give insurgents governmental
authority as a reward for reconciliation (which would
effectively reward insurgent violence and undermine the
constitutional processes),and there will be no protected
geographic areas or other arrangements that would limit the
authority of the central government in any region of
Afghanistan.


6. (C/REL NATO, EU, KSA, UAE, PAKISTAN, INDIA, KUWAIT, OMAN,
QATAR, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN, KYRGYSTAN,
KAZAKHSTAN) The U.S. will continue to pursue vigorously its
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. If the
Government of Afghanistan advises the U.S. Government of its
intention to pursue reconciliation negotiations with
individuals or groups, the U.S. will consider whether to
suspend military operations or activities that target these
individuals or groups. The Government of Afghanistan should
be in a position of strength in these negotiations, with
Afghan National Security Forces and international forces
continuing to conduct security operations.


7. (SBU) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has an important role in
the Muslim world, and we believe Saudi Arabia can play a
constructive role in supporting Afghan-led efforts to
reconcile with the Taliban and other insurgents.

--------------
COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY
--------------


8. (U) U.S. spokespersons may use the following points in
explaining U.S. policy on reconciliation.

-- The Government of Afghanistan and its partners recognize
that no insurgency can be defeated by military means alone.
Afghan authorities have also detected indications of
war-weariness and a desire from some tribal elders to end the
violence and come to terms with the Afghan government.

-- As he seeks to end the senseless violence in Afghanistan,
it is essential that President Karzai have every possible
tool at his disposal to reconcile disaffected tribes and
invite them to join the political process.

-- Our policy on political reconciliation has not changed.
We continue to support reconciliation talks that the
Government of Afghanistan initiates and leads, with the
understanding that reconciliation with insurgents will
require that they lay down their arms and return to normal
life, recognize the constitution and the authority of the
democratically elected Afghan government, refrain from
criminal activity once they return, and have no association
with Al-Qaeda.

If asked whether Mullah Omar or other senior members of the
Taliban can be reconciled:

-- Press reports indicating that the United States has agreed
to accept the reconciliation of Taliban leader Mullah Omar
are false.

-- We have no serious indication from the Taliban that they
are willing to reconcile with the Afghan government. Mullah
Omar also has the blood of thousands of Americans on his
hands, based upon the support that he provided Osama bin
Laden.

-- Reconciliation with individuals or entities under
international sanction ultimately will require consultation
with the international community.

-- Reconciliation with any individual, regardless of rank or
affiliation, should be pursued within the parameters
established by the Afghan government, namely: insurgents must
be willing to lay down their arms and return to normal life,
recognize the constitution and the authority of the
democratically elected Afghan government, refrain from
criminal activity once they return, and have no association
with Al-Qaeda.
RICE