Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE117745
2008-11-05 15:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

U.S.-ROK PYROPROCESSING COOPERATION

Tags:  ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY KS 
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O P 051514Z NOV 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 117745 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY KS

SUBJECT: U.S.-ROK PYROPROCESSING COOPERATION

Classified By: ISN Patricia A. McNerney, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 117745


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY KS

SUBJECT: U.S.-ROK PYROPROCESSING COOPERATION

Classified By: ISN Patricia A. McNerney, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and Action Request: On October 20, 2008, the United
States explained to the ROK its determination that the pyroprocessing
process as contemplated by the ROK was reprocessing and proposed new
parameters for U.S.-ROK bilateral cooperation in this area.
Following discussion of the issue, the Korean side asked for a
non-paper laying out the U.S. proposal. Embassy is requested to
provide the non-paper contained in paragraph 7 to appropriate ROK
officials in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST)
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),and to solicit
an early ROK response to this non-paper . End Summary and Action
Request.


2. (C) On October 20, 2008, ISN DAS Mary Alice Hayward met with MEST
Director General of the Atomic Energy Bureau MOON Byung-Ryong to
discuss the future direction of U.S.-ROK cooperation in
pyroprocessing. DAS Hayward was accompanied by ISN/NESS Deputy
Director Alex Burkart, DOE/NE Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary
Carter Savage, NNSA/NA-24 Senior Advisor Mark Goodman and Idaho
National Laboratory program manager Mike Simpson. MOON was
accompanied by LEE Jang Keun, Director of the Disarmament Division,
MOFAT; CHANG Soon-heung, Provost, Korea Advanced Institute of Science
and Technology and Korean Atomic Energy Commission Member; KIM
Dae-ki, Director, Nuclear Cooperation Division, MEST; and PARK
Seung-won, Vice President, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
(KAERI).


3. (C) Drawing on an interagency-cleared decision paper, DAS Hayward
advised the ROK that, in contrast to earlier determinations in 2002
and 2006, the United States now considers the fuel cycle technology
known as pyroprocessing to be reprocessing. This new determination,
particularly in light of Korean plans for future development of this
fuel cycle, led the United States to reconsider the nature and scope
of its cooperation with the ROK in this area. DAS Hayward laid out
the various factors considered, including policy with respect to
enrichment and reprocessing technology transfer generally, potential
impact on the Six-Party Talks process for denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula, and the closeness of the U.S.-ROK partnership,
including extensive cooperation in nuclear research and development.
She explained that, in light of those factors, the United States had
decided to approve a limited program of cooperation in pyroprocessing
technology, with the most sensitive activities occurring in the
United States. This would be conditioned on the ROK: accepting
limits on its in-country activities, supporting U.S. efforts in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group to adopt a criteria-based approach to
enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology transfers and
shelving its plans for new pyroprocessing facilities until the United
States and Korea had jointly assessed the technical feasibility,
economic viability and the nonproliferation acceptability of
pyroprocessing. Following a discussion in which members of the
Korean delegation sought to challenge and reverse the U.S. position,
Director General Moon asked for the United States to provide a
non-paper with its proposal for the ROK to study. DAS Hayward
agreed.


4. (C) Subsequent to this meeting, CHANG pulled Burkart aside to
further explore the U.S. position. In reiterating U.S. views,
Burkart added that the United States fully understands Korean
concerns about spent fuel management, particularly in light of its
growing nuclear power program. He pointed out, however, that
pyroprocessing was not a short-term solution to the problem. The
only practical short-term measure was construction of additional
interim storage facilities. This would give time for additional
solutions to be explored, as the United States had suggested. The
two discussed the importance to the Korean Government of
demonstrating to its public that, in pursuing cooperation between
Korea and the United States, it was addressing the Korean spent fuel
management problem and not just assisting in addressing the U.S.
spent fuel management problem. In this regard, Chang agreed that it
might prove useful for the Korean side to suggest activities,
consistent with the U.S. proposal, for cooperation for the two sides
to consider in order to enhance the public perception of the activity
in Korea.


5. (C) On Tuesday, October 21, DAS Hayward, accompanied by Burkart
met with KAERI President YANG Myung Seung to further discuss the U.S.
proposal. YANG expressed the view that KAERI should be focusing on
implementing its current research and development (R&D) plan that was
aimed at demonstrating pyroprocessing technology. He also expressed
disagreement with KAERI Vice President Park's focus on planning for
future facilities. Yang seemed more than willing to consider the
U.S. cooperation proposal if it helped him meet KAERI's current R&D
goals. [Comment: In November 2007, Yang was promoted over Park's
head to become President of KAERI. There appears to remain some
willingness on Yang's part to tolerate Park's ambitions in order to
avoid further antagonism. End Comment.] Yang seemed willing to
consider the U.S. cooperation proposal.


6. (C) A Korean-speaking advisor to the U.S. delegation reported his
impression of the reactions of KAERI staff and leadership to the U.S.
position. First, KAERI's top priority was to begin "hot" work (i.e.
experiments on U.S.-origin spent fuel) at the ACPF. While they
professed disappointment with the U.S. decision to oppose "hot"
electrorefining work at KAERI, overall they appeared pleased with the
U.S. position. Second, KAERI staff misunderstood the U.S. position,
believing that the United States had agreed to allow ACPF to begin
hot experiments. They did not understand the nuance that the United
States would initiate a decision process (by working on a joint
determination of safeguardability) without prejudice to the outcome
of that process.


7. (C/REL KOK) Begin Text of Nonpaper. The paper is
"CONFIDENTIAL/Releasable to the Republic of Korea" in its entirety.

United States - Republic of Korea (ROK)
Pyroprocessing Cooperation

Background

In 2002, the United States approved a framework for cooperation with
the Republic of Korea (ROK) in certain areas of pyroprocessing. The
fact that pyroprocessing, as understood at the time, did not separate
pure plutonium was a key factor in this approval, and the process was
deemed not to be reprocessing. A continuation of the cooperation was
approved in 2006, in the context of subsequent developments,
including the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and President
Bush's 2004 initiative on restricting enrichment and reprocessing
(ENR) transfers.

Approval of this cooperation was conditioned on the ROK's agreement
that, until the United States determines otherwise, pyroprocessing
activity conducted in the ROK would be limited to activities that do
not involve the use of irradiated source material or any special
nuclear material. It was further agreed that "hot" experiments,
i.e., those involving irradiated nuclear material, would be conducted
in the United States.

What Has Changed

Technical considerations and ROK plans have led the United States to
reassess the 2002 and 2006 decisions. Recent advances in
pyroprocessing technology have demonstrated improved methods that
greatly reduce the quantity of fission products in the separated
plutonium product. These advances have led the United States to
conclude that the full pyroprocessing process should be considered
reprocessing as it is conventionally understood: i.e., the
separation of fissile material from fission products in irradiated
nuclear fuel.

It is noteworthy that Korean plans have also changed. The Korean
Atomic Energy Research Institute's (KAERI) interest in pyroprocessing
has evolved from a focus on spent fuel conditioning (reduction in
volume and radioactivity) to development of the closed fuel cycle
based on pyroprocessing, where spent light water reactor fuel would
be reprocessed to separate out fission products for disposal and
fissionable material for fabrication into fuel for use in fast
reactors. This closed fuel cycle proposal, and the construction of
facilities to support it, was presented most recently by MEST to the
29th meeting of the ROK-USA Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear
Energy Cooperation, held in October, 2008. In this regard, KAERI has
-- proposed new projects on technology development with Idaho
National Laboratory;
-- asked a U.S. firm, Gamma Engineering, to complete a cost analysis
and conceptual design study for a proposed commercial-scale
pyroprocessing plant to be located in the ROK; and
-- informally asked for a Joint Determination of Safeguardability to
permit "hot" experiments at its existing Advanced Spent Fuel
Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) using roughly 40 kg of spent
fuel containing U.S.-obligated nuclear material, providing a draft
program plan to cover this work.

Dealing with Changed Circumstances

The U.S. Government's reassessment of the 2002 and 2006 decisions
considered, beyond technical factors, three additional political
factors: impact on the Six-Party Talks; impact on U.S. policy on
transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology; and impact on
U.S.-ROK bilateral relations and nuclear cooperation.

One concern is the extent to which any U.S. decision to proceed with
pyroprocessing cooperation with the ROK would undermine certain
agreed principles related to the goal of a denuclearized Korean
Peninsula. Given the U.S. conclusion that the full pyroprocessing
process as currently contemplated by the ROK constitutes
reprocessing, there is the question of ROK commitments under the 1992
ROK-DPRK Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, which rules out possession of enrichment or reprocessing
facilities in the North and the South (and which the September 2005
Six-Party Talks Joint Statement affirmed should be "observed and
implemented"). Unlimited U.S.-ROK cooperation on advanced
pyroprocessing research could also inadvertently encourage the DPRK
to seek similar capabilities or provide it with a justification for
restarting its now-disabled reprocessing plant.

The United States must also consider the impact of pyroprocessing
cooperation with the ROK on its goal of restricting enrichment and
reprocessing equipment and technology (ENR) transfers and gaining
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreement on a criteria-based approach
to such restrictions. U.S. policy precludes any transfer of
reprocessing equipment and technologies to any country not possessing
a full-scale, functioning reprocessing plant. A criteria-based
approach to the transfer of ENR, once adopted by the NSG, would
govern future technology supply.

The United States strives to be a strong and reliable partner in
cooperation with the ROK. The United States recognizes that the ROK
is in a unique situation with the world's sixth-largest nuclear power
program, with nuclear power providing nearly 40 percent of the ROK's
electricity and a commitment to further enhancing the role of nuclear
power as a clean source of power for its growing economy. The United
States also recognizes the need for the ROK to manage the spent fuel
arising from the generation of nuclear power. Cooperation between
the United States and the ROK in this area goes back over 25 years
and includes studies and technology development, including safeguards
technology. The United States also recognizes the ROK as an
important partner in international nuclear cooperation, including the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) framework. This partnership
benefits from Korean experience in infrastructure development, spent
fuel and waste management, grid appropriate reactor design, fuel
cycle technology development and implementation and safeguards
technology development. U.S.-ROK cooperation also promises to make
an important contribution to the pursuit of fuel cycle technology
development under GNEP.

Proposal for Future Cooperation

The United States has considered whether it should terminate
pyroprocessing cooperation or whether it can fully cooperate in
future development of a pyroprocessing-based closed fuel cycle in the
ROK. In light of the factors cited above, neither approach is
viable. Instead, the United States proposes to continue cooperation
on research and development, building on commitments made in 2002.
The purpose of this cooperation would be to reach a joint conclusion
in future years as to the viability of pyroprocessing on technical,
economic, and nonproliferation grounds.

The ROK should be aware that its engagement in pyroprocessing
cooperation with a third party without the involvement of the United
States could trigger sanctions under various provisions of U.S. law
on both the ROK and the cooperating partner, requiring the
termination of significant U.S. nuclear cooperation with the ROK and
its partner, unless waived by the President.

The following are the major elements of the U.S. proposal:


1. The United States would agree to continued cooperation in research
and development of pyroprocessing technology in order to determine
jointly with the ROK whether pyroprocessing is feasible on a
technical and economic basis and acceptable on nonproliferation
grounds.


2. The ROK would agree to shelve indefinitely plans for constructing
any future domestic facilities for "hot" pyroprocessing work, beyond
the ACPF, at least until the technical and economic feasibility and
nonproliferation acceptability have been determined jointly by the
United States and the ROK.


3. The United States and the ROK would agree on the desirability of
having any future plant that included capabilities beyond
electroreduction, if jointly deemed viable, located outside of the
ROK at a mutually acceptable location, perhaps as a multinational,
GNEP-related demonstration project, with the ROK as a major partner.
The two sides would agree to study this concept as part of their
pyroprocessing cooperation.


4. The United States would agree, contingent on the NSG reaching
agreement on a criteria-based approach for ENR transfers, and subject
to applicable U.S. laws and regulations, to share pyroprocessing
technology.


5. The ROK would support the U.S. proposal in the NSG for a
criteria-based approach for ENR transfers.


6. The United States would agree that pyroprocessing technology
transfers could, subject to applicable U.S. laws and regulations,
include technology that is deemed "sensitive nuclear technology"
(SNT) under U.S. law and regulations, and therefore subject to U.S.
legal controls on use and retransfer (under sections 127 and 128 of
the Atomic Energy Act).


7. The ROK would agree to accept required SNT controls on U.S.-shared
technology. This agreement would be contained in a bilateral
agreement meeting the requirements of U.S. law. These include the
requirement for U.S. consent rights over retransfer of any SNT
exported from the United States, and the requirement that the nuclear
material and equipment produced or constructed through the use of
U.S.-origin SNT must be subjected to the same conditions under
section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act (relating to IAEA safeguards,
peaceful uses, adequate physical security, retransfer and alteration
in form or content) including U.S. consent rights, as would apply to
exports of U.S.-origin nuclear material and equipment. The language
of the current U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation agreement does not cover
transfers of SNT or material or equipment produced through the use of
SNT. Separate government-to-government assurances would therefore be
required.


8. The two sides would agree that all Korean work involving
electrorefining and downstream activities that use spent fuel or
other special nuclear material would take place jointly in the United
States or in a mutually agreed upon third country. Work with
simulated materials (not involving spent fuel or other special
nuclear material) could continue in the ROK.


9. The two sides would agree to limit cooperation in electrorefining
technology to development of processes producing a relatively impure
plutonium-bearing product (e.g., those using liquid cadmium
cathodes),unless the sides jointly decide otherwise, for example, in
the context of agreement on development of a multinational
pyroprocessing plant located outside the ROK as an alternative to a
plant located within the ROK.


10. The United States would approve, contingent on the NSG reaching
agreement on ENR criteria and subject to applicable U.S. laws and
regulations, the KAERI-INL CRADA involving collaborative work with
small amounts of nuclear materials in the United States.


11. During the intervening period, the United States could approve,
on a case-by-case basis, work that does not involve transfer of SNT.
Within that constraint, the United States would approve, subject to
applicable U.S. laws and regulations, the Gamma Engineering request
to conduct a conceptual design and economic analysis of a generic
future large-scale pyroprocessing facility in an unspecified
location.


12. To enable an early decision on whether to authorize the ACPF to
begin processing spent fuel containing U.S.-origin nuclear material,
and without prejudice to the outcome of that decision, the United
States and the ROK would agree to begin jointly the necessary
processes under the U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation agreement and under
U.S. law and in accordance with an agreed program plan for the ACPF.


13. In order to develop such a program plan, the plan included in
Draft/KAERI/AR-790-rev2/2008 would be amended in an appropriate
manner to include reference to work by the ROK and the United States
to develop a conceptual approach for the role of ACPF and potential
future commercial-scale electroreduction facilities in future ROK and
international spent fuel management activities, addressing, for
example:
-- the use of electroreduction as a spent fuel conditioning process,
including interim storage and eventual geological disposal;
-- the use of electroreduction as a freestanding front-end process,
to produce from spent fuel a material form for transport to a
pyroprocessing facility outside the ROK for further separation and
fabrication into reactor fuel;
-- the role of ACPF as an element of international collaborative R&D
effort on pyroprocessing;
-- assessments of economic viability as well as safety, security,
safeguards and proliferation risks associated with each of these
uses, and
-- continued collaboration on safeguards technologies and approaches
for pyroprocessing facilities.


14. The ROK would agree not to construct any follow-on facility to
the ACPF until completion of the conceptual approach referred to
above.


15. The ROK would agree not to introduce electrorefining,
electrowinning or similar separations capabilities into the ACPF or
any follow-on facility.


16. The two sides would agree, in accordance with their domestic laws
and procedures, to incorporate this proposal at an early date into a
bilateral agreement, perhaps through a Confidential Minute or as a
Confidential Annex to the agreement on SNT transfer referred to
above.

The United States believes that this proposal is an excellent basis
for future cooperation. While requiring the ROK to curtail some of
its planned domestic activities, the proposal also anticipates
collaboration in those areas through unprecedented sharing of
Sensitive Nuclear Technology and conclusion of a
government-to-government agreement covering SNT transfers.

The United States also considers this proposal to be a package and
cannot agree to pieces of the package separately. However, the
United States recognizes the strong domestic requirement for the ROK
to be seen as undertaking actions that address its own spent fuel
management issues, and would be willing to consider additional
activities that could be carried out in the context of and not in
contradiction to the terms of this proposal.

End Text
RICE


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End Cable Text