DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

S E C R E T STATE 116467


NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: MR
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources

SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source:
October 30, 2008


1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, October 31, 2008


2. (U) Iraq ) Paragraphs 7-15


3. (U) Significant Events ) Paragraphs 16-24


4. (U) Key Concerns ) Paragraphs 25-39


5. (U) Cyber Threats ) Paragraphs 40-47


6. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents ) Paragraphs 48-68


7. (U) Iraq


8. (S//NF) Security operations effective in curbing attacks
on Basrah International Airfield:


9. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA wishes to highlight excerpts from a
recent NGA report reviewing countermeasures put in place at
the Basrah International Airfield, which is home to -- among
other USG contingents mentioned in the report -- a U.S.
Regional Embassy Office (REO). REO Basrah has been
particularly susceptible to indirect fire (IDF) due largely
to its proximity to Jaysh al-Mahdi Special Groups (JAM-SG)
and other Shi,a militants for whom IDF, with its standoff
qualities, remains a weapon of choice.


10. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Between March and June,
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launched a 14-phase offensive,
Operation Charge of the Knights, to regain control of Basrah
Province from insurgents and militants. This operation
successfully curbed IDF on Basrah International Airfield and
effectively ended attacks originating inside the city limits
of Basrah. IDF attacks against the airfield have decreased by
83 percent since operation,s Phase 1 ended on April 1.
Geospatial intelligence analysis indicates attacks
originating near the center of the city of Basrah have
diminished since the operation, but attacks originating north
of the Qarmat Ali waterway have continued, albeit at lower
levels.


11. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Basrah International
Airfield is home to Coalition forces, Contingency Operating
Base (COB) Basrah and is the headquarters of the 70th Iraqi
Air Force Squadron, the Iraqi Army 14th Division Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Company, and the 14th
Division Bomb Disposal Company. Because of its importance to
Coalition forces and ISF, the airfield has historically been
a target of IDF attacks by insurgents and other militants
since Operation Iraqi Freedom began.


12. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Operation Charge of the
Knights was an Iraqi security initiative that used elements
of the Iraqi Army, Ministry of Interior, and local police
forces to quell insurgent violence in Basrah Province. The
operation began on March 25, lasted approximately 90 days,
and was executed in 14 phases. Although all phases involved
eradicating violent elements from the city of Basrah, several
focused on securing other areas of Basrah Province, including
the cities of al Qurnah, al Faw, and Abu al Khasib. ISF has
maintained high visibility throughout both the city and
province since operations began, according to analysis of
imagery.


13. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Imagery analysis and
DoD reporting indicate the Basrah Khorramshahr Port of Entry
(POE) -- the closest land-based border crossing to the city
of Basrah -- has been closed to vehicular traffic since the
beginning of the operation, to prevent weapons and insurgent
smuggling from Iran. Multi-National Division Southeast
reports the closure of the POE has helped stem the flow of
weapons from Iran into the city.


14. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) The monthly attack average
since the operation is significantly less than the monthly
attack average of the three months preceding the start of the
operations. Since April 1, analysis shows a change in
geographic distribution in points of origin for IDF attacks
from inside the city of Basrah to the outskirts of the city.
Such a shift indicates the operation was successful in
curbing attacks in the city, probably driving militants out
of the city center.


15. (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) The number of IDF
attacks against Basrah International Airfield has dropped
significantly since Operation Charge of the Knights. However,
DoD reporting indicates the insurgents who recently trained
in Iran are attempting to re-enter Iraq via the Basrah
Khorramshahr POE. When the Basrah Khorramshahr POE reopens to
vehicular traffic, IDF attacks on the airfield will likely
increase, because insurgents who fled security operations in
Basrah may return, and weapons will be more easily smuggled
from Iran. Because the POE is only 20 km east of the city,
there is a strong likelihood that militants using this POE
will return to the city of Basrah to carry out attacks on the
airfield. (Please see imagery on pages 5-6). (Appendix source
1)


16. (U) Significant Events


17. (SBU) WHA - Brazil - U.S. Embassy Brasilia received a
suspicious letter October 30 mailed from Lap, Sao Paulo. The
letter was opened in the weapons of mass destruction mailroom
facility where it revealed a typed letter to all people of
the world concerning the powers the divine God of Chyren. The
letter, with dried blood smeared on the pages, talked about
the future of the world and the apocalypse; however, most of
the letter was impossible to understand. There was no
evidence of pathogens or other substances in the envelope, so
mailroom operations returned to normal. The RSO will pass the
information to the Brazilian Federal Police for follow up.
(RSO Brasilia Spot Report)


18. (SBU) EUR - Lithuania - U.S. Embassy Vilnius received a
telephonic bomb threat at 2:23 p.m. on October 30. The caller
stated (in Lithuanian) a bomb was going to explode if he did
not get $1 billion dollars. The call was recorded and
reviewed by Embassy security elements. Local guard assets
searched the compound and Marines at Post One reviewed
cameras; nothing was found out of place on the compound. The
local police were notified to investigate further. (RSO
Vilnius Spot Report)


19. (SBU) AF - Democratic Republic of Congo - Emergency
Action Committee (EAC) Kinshasa convened October 30 to
discuss the October 29 evacuation of USG staff and the
current security situation in the eastern region of the
country. The EAC recommended continued travel restrictions to
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and that all
Mission staff remain in Gisenyi until further notice. The
U.S. Embassy remains concerned about the potential for
violent demonstrations within Kinshasa, especially against
the United Nations in the DRC. Post officials will continue
to closely monitor the situation and report ongoing
developments. (Kinshasa 0952)


20. (C) Djibouti - EAC Djibouti met on October 30 to discuss
the attacks in Hargeysa, Somaliland, and Bossaso, Puntland.
EAC members agreed the method and apparent level of
coordination of the attack are unprecedented in Somaliland.
EAC members were unaware of any specific threats against the
U.S. Embassy or U.S. Citizens/interests in-country; however,
members noted the recommendation of Djiboutian officials to
the RSO that the Embassy increase its security posture.
Despite the proximity of the Embassy to the neighboring
Ethiopian Embassy and UN compound, the EAC assesses the
Djiboutian Government, despite its limited resources, will
fully support Post in any emergency situation. The Embassy
has been at a heightened security level since the September
17 attack on Embassy Sana,a in Yemen. (Appendix source 2)


21. (S//NF) Sudan - On September 29, the Sudanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs informed the U.S. charg d,affairs that the
Government of Sudan (GoS) would not allow an Embassy trip to
Nyala and a joint United Nations African Union Mission in
Darfur-USG trip to East Jebel Marra, Darfur, scheduled for
September 30. This denial came after a week of submitting
three diplomatic notes, high-level discussions between
multiple USG representatives, and even the Embassy,s prompt
response to the unusual request for information about the
airplane,s flight crew. While this is not the first time the
GoS has denied USG travel, it illustrates a number of
realities about the nature of the GoS, its strategy in
dealing with the international community, and its paranoia
about more exposure to the troubled region of Darfur.
(Appendix source 3)


22. (S//NF) EAP - Burma - EAC Rangoon met October 30 to
discuss arrangements for the upcoming election night events.
The RSO advised he will request host-nation security support
for the event; deploy additional local guards; make all the
security arrangements; and continue to liaise with Government
of Burma security offices for the latest intelligence
concerning any threat to the event. (Appendix source 4)


23. (SBU) China - On October 27 at 2 p.m., Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Beijing reported a fire had broken
out in the computer server room. The office is located on the
17th floor of the Silver Tower. The fire was limited to the
computer server room, but smoke affected the entire office
and could be smelled throughout much of the building. All ICE
employees were accounted for. Two ICE and one Customs and
Border Protection American direct hires suffered from smoke
inhalation and were transported to Peking University Hospital
for treatment. The server room was heavily damaged, with many
pieces of equipment charred or melted. The local fire
department is conducting an investigation of the fire. The
ICE offices will remain closed pending damage estimates and
developments in the investigation. The server room supported
all USG offices located in the Silver Tower office building.
The U.S. Embassy staff is developing work-arounds for
providing services to affected offices. (Beijing 4098)


24. (SBU) SCA - India - EAC Kolkata convened October 30 to
discuss multiple bomb blasts in Assam State. At the time of
this writing, as many as 12 blasts occurred almost
simultaneously in Assam,s capital of Guwahati and towns to
the north, including Kokrajhar, Barpet, and Bonbaigaon.
Currently, all known AmCits in the region have been accounted
for, and a DoD contingency group working in northeast Assam
and Arunchal Pradesh has been contacted and is safe. The EAC
discussed the ongoing violence and unpredictability, and
agreed a new travel restriction to Assam should be imposed
for USG employees and their family members. The EAC also
approved a Warden Message addressing the situation in Assam.
(Kolkata 0300)


25. (U) Key Concerns


26. (//GBR S//FVEY) EUR - Turkey - KGK reportedly preparing
attack: Tearline released October 30 indicates a Kongra-Gel
(KGK) commander has issued instructions for KGK operatives to
carry out attacks targeting associates of the conservative
Nationalist Movement Party as well as state personnel.
Additionally, KGK has been transferring personnel to the
Adana, Mersin, and Amanoslar regions, with the aim of
carrying out attention-grabbing attacks and to act as
reinforcements. DS/TIA/ITA notes, while this threat stream
has been developing for some time, and KGK threats this time
of year and in these locations are not unusual, the
information indicating the transfer of personnel to Adana --
a city with a developed Western tourist infrastructure, a
U.S. diplomatic presence, and a major U.S. military base with
more than 5,000 personnel -- is troublesome; additionally,
Mersin is another nearby city with a major tourism industry
and was the scene of a suicide vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device earlier this year. Although U.S. interests
should not be targeted directly by any KGK attack, it is
likely, given the dense nature of Adana and Mersin, official
American personnel may be in the vicinity if and when an
attack occurs, and collateral damage could result. (Appendix
source 5)


27. (S//NF) NEA - Israel/Palestinian Territories - According
to Jordanian General Intelligence Department information, an
al-Qa,ida operative in Lebanon (linked to known al-Qa,ida
facilitator ,Imad) claimed al-Qa,ida,s plan to target
Israel would be a small operation because the poor financial
situation is insufficient to support large operations. There
is no further information on timing, methods, or targets of
this operation.


28. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes, while reports of al-Qa,ida,s
influence in Gaza exist, there is no information regarding
definitive attack planning targeting Israel. Prior tearline
information reported, &According to uncorroborated
information from Middle East sources in September,
al-Qa,ida,s presence was reportedly growing in the Gaza
Strip. Al-Qai,da was thought to have gotten a start in the
Gaza Strip as early as 2001 with the pro-Taliban
demonstrations and rallies. It was speculated that some of
the more extreme Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) members
began adopting the al-Qa,ida ideology at the beginning of

2004. By 2006, al-Qa,ida had allegedly taken a more tangible
form with the appearance of Jaysh al-Islam, a splinter of the
PRC group that was thought to have ties to al-Qa,ida
facilitator Ahmad al-Mazlum.8 Previous reporting indicated a
small number of individuals affiliated with al-Qa,ida in
Gaza. Reporting from mid-August alleged an eight-person
al-Qa,ida cell led by an Egyptian national was operating in
Gaza. This information originated with the Palestinian
Mukhabarat and remains uncorroborated. The arrest of six
self-identified al-Qa,ida members in July suggested
influence of al-Qa,ida in Israel, but did not indicate any
actual contact with al-Qa,ida members, with the exception of
a chat room conversation. Prior reporting such as the
unsubstantiated claim by a Gaza-based al-Qa,ida sympathizer
that suicide bombers were going to attack U.S. interests in
late July demonstrates the influence of al-Qa,ida within
Gaza and the presence of sympathizers. Recent tearline
information indicates a larger al-Qa,ida influence and
presence in the Gaza Strip than earlier reporting.


29. (S//NF) ,Abd al-Aziz al-Jammaz, a.k.a. Imad aka
Salman, is a known Lebanon-based al-Qa,ida-linked
facilitator and operator associated with the hotbed of
extremist activity in the,Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee
camp. The Saudi-born Imad is suspected of involvement in
multiple terrorist operations, including attacks against
United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon.


30. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA further notes the likelihood of an
al-Qa,ida-linked attack in Israel increases if the alleged
growing al-Qa,ida presence in Gaza is successfully combined
with the experience and networks of foreign extremists such
as Imad. However, it is unlikely a transnational al-Qa,ida
operation within Israel would be &small,8 as the source of
this report contends. Israel presents a difficult operating
environment, and the subsequent reaction of Israeli security
forces would likely be severe -- deterrent factors which
suggest any extremist operation would likely be commensurate
in size to the risk. Lacking further information on the
ultimate source of this information and the vague nature of
the threat, the credibility of this threat remains
questionable. (Appendix sources 6-9)


31. (S//NF) SCA - Afghanistan - NDS officer facilitating
suicide bombers targeting Westerners: As of mid-October, a
purported officer of the Afghan National Directorate of
Security (NDS) named Mustafa was facilitating two suicide
bombers. A sensitive source with thirdhand access claimed
that one of the bombers intended to target Westerners or
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) elements in
Kabul. The second bomber wanted to target the Wardak Province
Provincial governor or an individual named Haji Mosa.


32. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA name checks on NDS officer Mustafa and
Haji Mosa were inconclusive. Insurgents have increasingly
targeted Western civilians this year. The Afghanistan NGO
Safety Office notes at least 18 incidents in Kabul Province
this year in which insurgents and criminals have targeted
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),but not all included
foreign nationals. Compared to previous years, there has been
a consistently high volume of incidents against foreigners
and an increased frequency in the deliberate targeting of
foreigners. Most recently in Kabul, a female Canadian
journalist was kidnapped, and a female British aid worker was
assassinated. It is still unclear if the murder of the two
DHL executives by a guard last weekend was due to personal
grievances or a planned criminal/insurgent assassination.
(Appendix source 10)


33. (S//NF) Pakistan - Kidnapping threat against unspecified
targets in Islamabad: Tearline reports, &As of late October,
a two-man kidnapping-for-ransom team had been dispatched by
Khyber Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
Pakistan-based Afridi warlord Mangal Bagh to Islamabad, with
order(s) to kidnap two to four unidentified persons. The only
identifying characteristic of one of the targets was that he
was a millionaire. The head of the kidnapping team was Ghazi
Zinatullah (variant: Zeenatullah) from Bara, Khyber Agency,
FATA. Zinatullah,s assistant was Wahidullah (variant:
Waheedullah). Wahidullah was also from Bara.8


34. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes there is little convincing
reporting indicating Mangal Bagh and his supporters have the
capability to operate in Islamabad. Furthermore, the vague
nature of this report renders it difficult to properly vet;
although, name checks on Ghazi Zinatullah and Wahidullah and
their variants yielded negative results. It is likely,
however, Bagh and his network have the capability to launch
kidnapping operations in Peshawar; reporting from
mid-September indeed suggests he may have been involved with
the August 26 ambush of the U.S. Consulate principal officer
in Peshawar.


35. (S//NF) That said, since the beginning of September, four
intelligence reports have detailed al-Qa,ida and Pakistani
extremist plots to kidnap Westerners in Pakistan. Reporting
detailing plots in Islamabad suggests kidnappers planned to
target the F-6, F-7, and F-11 areas of Islamabad, presumably
since they are neighborhoods where most Western foreigners
reside. (Appendix sources 11-20)


36. (S//NF) Pakistan - Threat to U.S. Consulate Lahore and
unspecified residence: As of late October, the al-Jihad group
led by Sajid Ullah Moavia planned to attack U.S. Consulate
Lahore with shoulder-fired rockets from the rooftops of
nearby high-rise buildings. The group, likely linked to
al-Qa,ida,s Usama al-Kini, also planned to attack an
unspecified residence on Zafar Ali Road in Lahore.


37. (S//NF) Although this information is likely circular in
nature, DS/TIA/ITA judges al-Qa,ida and its affiliates are
actively targeting Western interests in Lahore, including the
U.S. Consulate and organizations, entities, or venues
associated with the United States. Tearline from late
September warned, &Terrorists were reportedly targeting the
U.S. Consulate in the Punjab Province for suicide bombings
and sniper attacks in late September. Extremists were
planning to target the Lahore Consulate for suicide bombings
using explosive-laden cars or suicide vests as well as
snipers to shoot Americans driving out of the compound.8


38. (S//NF) While reporting detailing threats to Western
interests in Pakistan has increased following the September
20 attack against the Marriott, earlier reporting regarding
threats to Lahore is of particular concern due to its
credibility and the demonstrated capability of terrorists to
repeatedly carry out attacks in the city. Sensitive reporting
from late July reported terrorists planned to attack U.S.
organizations in Lahore. Likewise, Pakistani security
services arrested four suspects linked to senior al-Qa,ida
operative Usama al-Kini (Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE) number 48128) in late July who plotted
&large-scale8 attacks in the Punjabi capital and maintained
a list of addresses of VIPs -- including officers of the
Federal Investigative Agency, the police, and political
leaders -- their routes, and a full schedule of their
engagements.


39. (S//NF) Name checks on Sajid Ullah Moavia yielded
inconclusive results; although, it may reference Ismatullah
Mauvia (TIDE number 10541403),who is reportedly a leader of
a Jaish-e-Mohammed splinter group that is currently part of
Usama al-Kini,s network. It is unclear if this splinter
group is known as al-Jihad. Al-Jihad is also the name of an
infamous Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the
1970s that targeted high-level Egyptian Government officials
for attack. (Appendix sources 21-31)


40. (U) Cyber Threats


41. (U) England - Establishing new agencies to fight cyber
crime:


42. (U) Key highlights:
A recent study on cyber crime incidents ranked the UK
second behind the U.S.
The UK,s NFRC is anticipated to begin operations in 2009.
A police force specializing in cyber crime will operate in
support of the NFRC.
The threat of cyber crime is receiving increased global
recognition.


43. (U) Source paragraph: &A new agency of the Attorney
General,s Office, the National Fraud Strategic Authority
(NFSA),has been established today (October 1) to increase
protection for the UK economy from the harm caused by fraud
through the creation of a more hostile environment for
fraudsters, both at home and abroad.8


44. (U) CTAD comment: According to a survey commissioned in
2007 by security software company AVG Technologies, 43
percent of Britons feel more at risk for cyber theft than
other crimes including burglary, assault, and robbery. Of the
individuals polled, one in three had experienced theft over
the Internet by way of tactics such as spear-phishing e-mail
messages and credit card fraud. In a separate study conducted
by online identity firm Garlik, cyber crime in the UK rose by
more than 9 percent that year, with more than 250,000
reported incidents of online financial fraud alone. Fears
about cyber crime expressed by citizens of the UK are
certainly valid, as the country has risen to the rank of
second place behind the U.S. in number of reported cyber
crimes.


45. (U) CTAD comment: To assist in stifling the rise of cyber
crime incidents in the UK, the Attorney General,s Office has
announced the establishment of the NFSA tasked to &work with
private, public, and third-sector organizations to initiate,
coordinate, and communicate counter-fraud activity across the
economy.8 Furthermore, plans are also underway for a
National Fraud Reporting Center (NFRC) anticipated to begin
operations in 2009. The NFRC will function as a central point
of contact for reporting e-crime, as well as an entity
responsible for the organization of strategy for mitigating
cyber incidents. A variety of online offenses will be handled
by this agency, to include credit card theft, phishing, and
hacking. In order to facilitate the coordination of
nationwide investigations and bring together reports from
victims of cyber crime across the UK, the NFRC will provide a
telephone and Web-based reporting service that will &enable
individuals and companies to share information on reports of
fraud and receive advice and information to protect
themselves from future attacks.8


46. (U) CTAD comment: In addition to the NFRC, the UK
Government plans to subsidize a new organization dubbed the
Police Central e-crime Unit (PCeU). The PCeU,s mission will
be focused on the investigation of cyber crimes and Internet
fraud and will operate in support of the NFRC. As part of the
UK,s national offensive against cyber crime, the PCeU will
also collaborate with other police forces and crime-fighting
agencies in operations concerning international and organized
crime on the Internet.


47. (U) CTAD comment: The omnipresent cyber threat is
garnering increased attention on a global scale, with focus
turning toward better understanding ways to mitigate illicit
activity. Initiatives such as those instituted by the UK as
well as the establishment of transnational endeavors such as
the International Multilateral Partnership Against
Cyber-Terrorism -- of which the U.S. is a participant (see
CTAD Daily Read File dated June 9) -- highlight the global
awareness of the need for the development of systems and
policies designed to defend against malicious cyber
operations. Continued progress in this arena could aid in the
creation of focused channels for global reporting of
cybercrime, which may lead to increased insight for law
enforcement and intelligence communities into the tactics,
techniques, procedures, and motivations of cyber threat
actors. (UK Attorney General,s Office News Release, &UK
Toughens Up on Fraudsters with New Anti-Fraud Authority,8
October 1, 2008)


48. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents


49. (SBU) WHA - Barbados - Surveillance Detection Team (SDT)
Bridgetown observed a man near the New Embassy Compound (NEC)
October 28. He appeared to be paying close attention to the
people exiting the visa section. (SIMAS Event:
Bridgetown-00809-2008)


50. (SBU) Barbados - SDT Bridgetown observed a man near the
NEC October 29. The man appeared to be paying close attention
to the people exiting the visa section. He carried a digital
camera and two cell phones. The man departed the area after
approximately 20 minutes. (SIMAS Event: Bridgetown-00810-2008)


51. (SBU) Bolivia - SDT La Paz observed a man photographing
the front of the U.S. Embassy October 27. The man then
departed the area walking north. (SIMAS Event: La
Paz-00328-2008)


52. (SBU) Brazil - SDT Recife observed a man across the
street from the U.S. Consulate at 2:20 p.m. on October 27.
The man appeared to be attempting to hide behind a lamp post
while looking toward Post. After approximately 10 minutes, he
departed the area. At 4:30 p.m., the man walked down the
street in front of the Consulate, looking toward the Mission
as he walked. (SIMAS Event: Recife-01014-2008)


53. (SBU) Honduras - SDT Tegucigalpa observed a man standing
on the sidewalk near the U.S. Embassy October 17. The man
observed the gate to the Consular area. Local Guard Force
(LGF) personnel interviewed the man, who refused to give his
name. After approximately 20 minutes, he departed the area in
a Mazda pickup truck.


54. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Vehicle: Gray Mazda
pickup truck (two door); License plate: PAP-7192 (Honduras).
(SIMAS Event: Tegucigalpa-00276-2008)


55. (SBU) Peru - SDT Lima observed a woman near the
visitor,s entrance of the U.S. Embassy October 28. She was
approached by a local police officer and told to move. Half
an hour later, she was observed again near Post,s visitor,s
entrance. LGF and police personnel interviewed the subject,
who stated she was waiting for a friend who was inside the
Embassy. After approximately 25 minutes, she departed the
area in a taxicab without meeting anyone.


56. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject: Maribel
Julissa Leandro De Los Reyes. Identification number:

07508366. (SIMAS Event: Lima-04360-2008)


57. (SBU) EUR - Germany - A suspicious individual
photographed with his cell phone camera up and down
Marbachweg Street and Homburger Landstrasse in Frankfurt
October 2.


58. (SBU) RSO Action/Assessment: This is an initial sighting
of the subject. The route he was photographing is of
considerable concern, as it is the primary route between the
Mission housing area and the U.S. Consulate General. (SIMAS
Event: Frankfurt-00518-2008)


59. (SBU) Germany - A suspicious bicycle with a plastic bag
in its basket was parked at a bus stop close to U.S.
Consulate General Frankfurt housing September 9. The bicycle
was checked with negative results. The following day, the
bike was gone.


60. (SBU) RSO Action/Assessment: Mission personnel use this
bus stop as a primary transit route. (SIMAS Event:
Frankfurt-00509-2009)


61. (SBU) Spain - Three Middle Eastern-appearing men sat on a
bench in front of the U.S. Ambassador,s residence in Madrid
October 21. A member of the Ambassador,s security detail
noticed the subjects, who departed the area on foot after 20
minutes. (SIMAS Event: Madrid-00437-2008)


62. (SBU) EAP - Malaysia - SDT Kuala Lumpur observed two
Middle Eastern-appearing men in front of the U.S. Embassy at
3:14 p.m. on October 29. They photographed each other along
the street in front of Post. After approximately 5 minutes,
they departed toward the south and entered the Iranian
Embassy at 3:32 p.m. (SIMAS Event: Kuala Lumpur-00661-2008)


63. (SBU) Vietnam - SDT Ho Chi Minh City observed a man
across the street from the U.S. Consulate General October 29.
The man took notes and then photographs of the front of Post.
The man departed the area on foot after approximately 5
minutes. (SIMAS Event: Ho Chi Minh City-00320-2008)


64. (SBU) SCA - Pakistan - SDT Lahore observed a man sitting
in a rickshaw (three-wheeled taxi) parked near the access
road to the U.S. Consulate October 16. The man watched
Post,s access road and turned away two potential customers.
Local police interviewed the subject, who stated he did not
take either of the potential customers because he did not
know the location of their intended destinations. After
approximately 30 minutes, he departed the area.


65. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject: Habib Ahmed
Bhatti. National identification card number:
35202-808057276-5. (SIMAS Event: Lahore-00683-2008)


66. (SBU) Pakistan - SDT Lahore observed a man on a bicycle
near the access road to the U.S. Consulate October 16. The
man observed the vehicles passing by and talked on his cell
phone. The local police interviewed him, and he stated he was
waiting for his friend. The man departed the area after
approximately 30 minutes.


67. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject: Mohammad Din.
National identification number: 35202-2845350-1. (SIMAS
Event: Lahore-00692-2008)


68. (SBU) Pakistan - SDT Karachi observed a man sitting on
the sidewalk near an access gate to one of the U.S. Consulate
General residential housing compounds October 19. After
approximately 20 minutes, the man departed the area. (SIMAS
Event: Karachi-00277-2008)

SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request.


RICE