Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE115948
2008-10-30 19:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

PSI: OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN PARIS,

Tags:  KNNP MNUC PARM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHC #5948/01 3041935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 7584
RUEHBD/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PRIORITY 7653
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 115948 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL
SUBJECT: PSI: OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN PARIS,
FRANCE (SEPTEMBER 25-26, 2008),PART 1 OF 2

REF: STATE 115935

SUMMARY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 115948

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL
SUBJECT: PSI: OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN PARIS,
FRANCE (SEPTEMBER 25-26, 2008),PART 1 OF 2

REF: STATE 115935

SUMMARY

1. The seventeenth Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting took
place in Paris, France on September 25-26, 2008.
Delegations from the 20 OEG countries participated.
Information contained in this cable is provided for
Posts' information and is not to be passed to host
governments.

OBJECTIVES AND ACTION REQUEST


2. REFTEL provides a non-paper to pass to host nation
governments of all PSI-endorsing states to keep them
abreast of developments in the PSI community. Posts
are requested to provide assessments of what PSI
outreach activities (including exercises, table top
exercises emphasizing a national response plan for
WMD-related interdiction, commodity identification
training, etc.) might provide value-added
capacity-building effects to the host country.
Email replies to POC are acceptable, following
delivery of REFTEL non-paper.

BACKGROUND


3. Meeting Summary: France hosted the seventeenth
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational
Experts Group (OEG) meeting in Paris on September
25-26, 2008. Delegations from the 20 OEG countries
participated - Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Singapore, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States. The meeting built upon the momentum
generated at the PSI 5th Anniversary meetings in
Washington, DC on May 28-29, 2008 and focused on
developing concepts for the future of the OEG and PSI.
New this time, France organized break out groups on the
Future of the OEG, Coordinating Outreach and Exercises,
Relations with Industry, and Media Strategy. Of note,
France added a plenary session on law enforcement issues
after the U.S. and other countries requested that this
subject area receive more attention than earlier agenda
drafts allowed. Detailed information on the agenda and
related discussions can be found in the Chairman,s
Statement in paragraph 18 below.


4. Delegation: The U.S. delegation was led by Richard
Douglas, OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global
Threats. The delegation included representatives from

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy and
General Counsel),the Department of State (ISN),
U.S. African Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern
Command, U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of
Homeland Security (Legal, Customs and Border
Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office
of Naval Intelligence.


5. Introduction: Mr. Michel Miraillet, Under Secretary
of Defence for Policy (France),welcomed PSI Operational
Experts to Paris on September 25, 2008. Mr. Miraillet
emphasized the importance of raising awareness and
providing tools to all PSI countries so that they are
equipped to help prevent proliferation, and he called
upon OEG countries to enhance the effectiveness of PSI.
The OEG meeting was chaired by Camille Grand, Director
of the Foundation for Strategic Research.


6. Future of the OEG: New Zealand chaired a discussion
on the Future of the OEG in an effort to ensure its
continued value and sustainability. The U.S. delegation
pursued its interest in further regionalization of PSI
activities, provided that communication among OEG
countries could be maintained. Regarding frequency of
OEG meetings, the group was comfortable with an annual
OEG and more frequent regional meetings.


7. Coordinating Outreach and Exercises: The U.S.
chaired a discussion on the relationship between
outreach activities and exercises, recognizing that

STATE 00115948 002 OF 007


a degree of coordination among OEG countries would
improve the effectiveness of these activities and
help prevent saturation among PSI partner countries.
The group made three proposals to the OEG plenary
to improve coordination.


8. Relations with Industry: The UK chaired a
discussion on relations with industry, reflecting a
widely-shared view that building relationships with
industry - particularly the export and transport
industries - is an effort worth pursuing.


9. EU role in PSI: France, as current President of the
EU, included two agenda segments on the EU's involvement
in PSI. First, France invited Mr. Andreas Strub from the
Council of the European Union to discuss the EU's
approach to counterproliferation. Second, Poland
introduced the concept of a Regional OEG meeting for EU
member countries. During the ensuing discussion, the
following conclusions were drawn: 1) While the EU
provides a complementary and supportive operating
framework for PSI, decisions to participate in any
specific interdiction action remained with EU member
states' national governments, and 2) Poland's proposed
Regional OEG would be welcomed and should include all
European PSI countries, not only EU member states.
It should be noted that the U.S. conveyed its position
on this issue to France and Poland prior to the OEG
meeting, was satisfied with the conclusions reached
in Paris and will continue to look for ways that
international organizations can play complementary
roles with PSI.


10. German-hosted PSI web-based portal: Germany
presented an updated concept for a web-based PSI portal
that was first introduced at the London OEG in February

2008. Germany asked for volunteers to participate in a
small working group to further refine the portal
concept and develop business rules for its use. The
U.S. volunteered for this effort, recognizing the
important role that a portal will play in strengthening
the PSI community and providing all PSI partners with
access to key PSI documents and points of contact.
Some delegations expressed reservations with granting
portal access to all PSI partners. Germany noted that
it would consider all comments back in its capital,
with the objective of confirming the access policy
soon. The U.S. strongly supports providing all PSI
partners with access to OEG and PSI documents,
noting the OEG's responsibility to work on behalf
of all PSI partners.


11. U.S.-hosted OEG meeting with regional
participation: The U.S. will host the next OEG meeting
with regional participation from Western Hemisphere
countries on May 12-14, 2009 in Miami, Florida.
The purpose will be three-fold: 1) to convene a full
OEG meeting to review key issues and action items from
the Paris OEG meeting, 2) to explore region-specific
issues related to WMD proliferation and interdiction
with non-OEG PSI partners in the Western hemisphere,
and 3) to conduct outreach to countries in the region
that have not yet endorsed the PSI.


12. FOR ANKARA: On September 26, the U.S. delegation
held a bilateral meeting with the Turkish delegation,
led by Ms. Elif Comoglu Ulgen, Head of Department in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegation
thanked Turkey for its cooperation on prolifertion
related issues, recognizing the proliferation
challenges posed by its geography. The U.S. encouraged
Turkey to host a PSI OEG or Regional OEG meeting in
the future; Ms. Ulgen responded that the MFA senior
leadership was waiting to see whether other OEG
partners would volunteer.


13. FOR BUENOS AIRES: Members of the U.S. delegation
approached Coast Guard LCDR Rogelio Pellegrino to
discuss how Argentina might assist with planning for
the U.S.-hosted Miami OEG meeting scheduled for May
12-14, 2009, including by providing translation
assistance and by encouraging attendance among
Western Hemisphere countries.


14. FOR CANBERRA: On September 24, the U.S. held a
bilateral meeting with Australia, led by Mr. Murray
Perks, Assistant Secretary of Security Policy and
Programs in the Department of Defence. Australia favors
a customized approach to regional PSI outreach, noting
that Asia-Pacific countries are more receptive to a PSI

STATE 00115948 003 OF 007


message that a) emphasizes the links between security
and trade, rather than a more narrow emphasis on
stopping illicit WMD-related shipments, and b) places
PSI in a broader context of related nonproliferation
initiatives, e.g. UNSCR 1540. Australia reported that
Mr. David Ritchie, Deputy Secretary in the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, returned from the PSI 5th
Anniversary meeting with the intention that Australia
will host a PSI event, perhaps an exercise, in the 2010
timeframe. There were no confirmations or additional
details provided during the OEG meeting.


15. FOR LONDON: On September 24, the U.S. held a
bilateral meeting with the UK, led by Mr. John Noble,
Director and PSI Operational Lead in the Ministry of
Defence. This was Mr. Noble's first OEG meeting as Head
of Delegation. The UK supports finding ways to increase
the operational focus and efficiency of OEG meetings,
as well as an emphasis on industry outreach.


16. FOR OTTAWA: On September 24, the U.S. held a
bilateral meeting with Canada, led by Mr. Claude
LeBlanc, Director for Arms and Proliferation Control
Policy in the Department of National Defence. This was
Mr. LeBlanc's first OEG meeting as Head of Delegation.
Canada reported on the VIII Conference of Defence
Ministers of the Americas (CDMA),meeting in Banff,
Canada, 2-6 September 2008, noting that Uruguay showed
interest in PSI. Canada was in agreement with the U.S.
that there would be value in establishing a more
regular schedule of future OEGs, so that countries
could have a firm basis for planning their
participation. Canada agreed to assist the U.S. with
the Miami OEG meeting to be held May 12-14, 2009.
Finally, Canada noted that they are considering hosting
a PSI exercise in 2011.


17. FOR WARSAW: On September 24, the U.S. held a
bilateral meeting with Mr. Lukasz Zielinski, Head of
Nonproliferation Division in the Security Policy
Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Poland's new Head of Delegation, Mr. Marek Szczygiel,
Deputy Director of the Security Policy Department of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was not able to attend.
Poland is interested in exploring ways for the European
Union to be more involved in PSI but remains committed to
keeping the OEG as a group of nations. During the OEG
meeting, Poland presented a proposal to host a Regional
OEG meeting for European Union countries in June 2009.
Several countries, including Norway, Turkey, and the U.S.
commented on the value of a European OEG that would be
inclusive of all countries in the region regardless of
their affiliation with the EU. Poland also intends to
host a regional exercise with Central and East European
countries in Hungary sometime in 2009.


18. FOR WELLINGTON: On September 24, the U.S. held a
bilateral meeting with the New Zealand delegation,
led by Ambassador Dell Higgie, Ambassador for
Counter-Terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade. The U.S. congratulated New Zealand on the
successful execution of PSI Exercise Maru on
September 15-19 in Auckland. The exercise showcased
law enforcement and customs aspects of WMD-related
interdiction and made good progress in conducting
outreach in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand
supports the idea of inviting non-endorsing
countries to observe OEG meetings to emphasize the
transparency among PSI partners. New Zealand offered
to publish a PSI newsletter as a means of improving
communication among all PSI partners between OEG
meetings and exercises. New Zealand also offered to
draft a sample PSI national response plan for small
countries, as a way of translating the PSI Model
National Response Plan for countries with limited
capacity to do it on their own. Both offers were
welcomed by the U.S.


19. Begin Chairman's Statement:
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE OPERATIONAL
EXPERTS GROUP MEETING PARIS, FRANCE September
25-26, 2008. PART 1 OF 2

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational
Experts Group (OEG) met in Paris, France, from September
25th to 26th, 2008. Twenty OEG countries were present -
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union

STATE 00115948 004 OF 007


attended the OEG by invitation.

Welcoming Remarks


20. After the Chairman of the meeting, Camille Grand,
Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research,
welcomed the PSI Operational Experts to Paris, Michel
Miraillet, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy
(France),underlined in his opening presentation the
PSI's importance as a tool, aside from the existing
strict legal framework, to prevent the proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, their means of delivery,
and related materials. In our globalised world,
Mr Miraillet emphasised the PSI's objective of
developing and increasing the awareness in order to
prevent illicit activities which might lead to
proliferation. He further stressed the significance of
providing a unified front, at national and multinational
levels, to face of the risk of proliferation. Given the
difficulty of establishing the actual end-use of
suspected goods, Mr Miraillet highlighted the need to
reach out to all relevant actors, including private
players involved in the shipping industry. He
underscored the interest of organizing events to raise
awareness - Guistir is a recent example -, aimed at
involving countries with little knowledge of the PSI
but in strategic locations in terms of WMD proliferation
networks. Mr Miraillet's final remarks focused on PSI
interception achievements and the need to increase
sharing information on these real cases to enhance the
overall efficiency and credibility of the PSI. Above
all, he reminded participants of France's interest in
engaging more and more the Initiative towards efficiency
driven activities.

International General Overview


21. In the context of the PSI's fifth anniversary, the
United States presented the successful results of the
Senior-Level Meeting, at the end of which was issued the
Declaration of Washington, and of the PSI Outreach
Workshop. The key priorities for the future were set out:
to focus on regional PSI activities and outreach
workshops, especially to encourage further state
endorsements; to seek to strengthen communication
channels among counterpart government agencies in PSI
partner states; to continue work to strengthen relevant
international law and frameworks. Japan mentioned the
importance non-proliferation was given at the last G8
Summit and presented its priorities during its G8
Presidency. Italy stated that non-proliferation
will stay high in the agenda during its Presidency.


22. The discussion emphasised the turning point the PSI
is at and the evolving challenges it faces. One of OEG
members' objectives is to send a clear message to
proliferators: the PSI is active, it works. It is
changing proliferators' behaviour. Participants
expressed their wish for more universal support for
the PSI. They underlined the usefulness of outreach
activities and regional meetings. Involving more
countries, encouraging them to adhere to the Paris
Principles, implies examining their regional role.
Dispelling misunderstandings fits into these outreach
activities. Last, participants stressed the necessity
of continuing PSI exercises and increasing
intergovernmental cooperation.

EU Combat against Proliferation Approach


23. The Representative from the European Union,
Mr. Strub, explained which PSI-related issues are
dealt with at EU level in Europe, and how the
European Union is playing a role. Mr Strub reminded
participants of three levels at which the EU is acting
and can be involved in PSI activities. First, the EU
provides an appropriate legal basis of relevance to
PSI activities. It transposes UNSCR sanctions at EU
level and goes a step further by implementing its own
set of sanctions. It has established a legal regulatory
framework in areas where states have transferred
authority to the European Union (eg, dual-use control
regime). It sets out best practices for Member States
(eg, customs regulations). Second, the EU offers
capacity building and institutional support in
implementing PSI Interdiction Principles - the Joint
Research Centre develops operational tools in areas
such as the surveillance of maritime traffic and
container screening. Third, EU institutions contribute
to the fight against proliferation through assistance

STATE 00115948 005 OF 007


and outreach efforts to third countries, and this
includes inserting a WMD clause in cooperation
agreements with third parties.


24. Poland offered a perspective on how the European
Union could be involved in the PSI. While the PSI
should be stronger and more universal, it should also
be more efficient and effective. As participants
already stated the need of regional OEGs, Poland
reminded delegations of the unique framework the EU
provides. It recalled its proposal to host a regional
OEG which could be partially dedicated to EU issues.
This OEG could include EU institutions and agencies.
Such a forum will facilitate the reflection on how
the EU's activities fit into the PSI and exploring
ways to strengthen it further.


25. The EU is committed to the fight against
proliferation, as its 2003 WMD strategy illustrates.
France outlined the objectives of the French EU
Presidency in order to fight proliferation. Those
priorities are threefold. First, address the
proliferation crises with a special emphasis on Iran
and North Korea. Second, strengthen non-proliferation
regimes and tools (NPT, CTBT, Multilateral Nuclear
Approaches, MTCR, suppliers groups, HCOC). Third,
implement concrete actions to prevent and counter
proliferation by identifying trends and the best ways
of dealing with proliferation. The EU is currently
working on a new action plan against proliferation.


26. Participants recognised the EU's added value in PSI
activities. Partners expressed wide support for the
Polish initiative of hosting a regional operational
Experts Group meeting in 2009. Countries expressed an
interest in the EU perspective while emphasising the
necessity of also examining PSI issues in other regions
and their specificities. With regards to practical
cooperation, the EU contributes to provide the legal
framework, reinforces capabilities, facilitates
information sharing and exchanging best practices for
EU members. It was recalled that while operating within
the framework provided by the EU, EU member states act
on a national, bilateral or multilateral basis when
dealing with real cases.

Capability Building / Technical Assistance / Updates


27. Singapore presented an analysis of technical
verification capabilities, based on PSI member feedback.
It identified strengths and areas for improvement. The
OEG member states as a whole are strongest in
verification of missile-related, biological- and
chemical-related items verification. Gaps lie in
verification capabilities of nuclear-related items.
Gaps also lie in laboratory verification and providing
expert witnesses, while OEG is stronger in
identifying items.


28. Denmark informed the Group on FATF's efforts to
prevent proliferation finance. The FATF's mandate was
extended in 2008 to include the analysis of financing
aspects of WMD proliferation. FATF's approach is based
on recommendations on the implementation of UNSC
resolutions. It seeks to provide tools for implementing
those resolutions on the financing aspects based on a
typology process (threat assessment, methods and
measures, identification of policy issues). Denmark
underlined that the main PSI challenge in this regard
is information and intelligence sharing with financial
institutions and industry. Fight against WMD
proliferation financing thus represents a new line
of approach.


29. Germany gave a presentation on the PSI internet
website project: - www.psi.diplo.de -. At the moment,
the website contains practical information, contact
details, an archive of previous meetings and exercises.
An access can be requested by all PSI members who will
be provided with Login ID and password. Germany suggested
improvements to the website including increased
participation, more content (PSI newsletter, search
engine, "national areas", etc.) and better interactivity
(discussion groups, information exchanges, video
streaming from meetings, etc.). At a more practical
level, Germany mentioned the possibility of creating a
core group of interested states for the website's
management and expanding administrators' rights.


30. All participants underlined the importance of the

STATE 00115948 006 OF 007


work Germany has undertaken. Delegates discussed the
development and use of the German website as a PSI
information repository and outreach tool. Some countries
noted the potentially sensitive nature of information on
PSI activities and the necessity to reflect further on
the conditions of access. Acknowledging the announcement
made at the PSI 5th anniversary Senior level meeting in
Washington DC on May 28th, 2008 to allow access to all
PSI partners, delegations are asked to review the
website's current content and notify Germany of any
sensitive materials that should not be made available
to all by November 15th, 2008. Additionally, Germany
proposed that a small group of OEG delegates work
together to developp business rules that would govern
the use of the website. Several countries including
the US volunteered to work with Germany in this small
and open group.

Real Case Debriefings


31. The United States presented a 2008 case to illustrate
the use of bilateral ship-boarding agreements supporting
the implementation of PSI statement of Interdiction
Principles, UNSCR 1540 and the 2005 SUA Protocol. Such
agreements facilitate operations and encourage the
development of internal procedures. The case described
was related to a dual-use machine tools with a potential
application in weapons of mass destruction and delivery
systems development programs. It was provided by a North
Korean entity working with brokers in Asian and Western
European nations. The commercial merchant vessel
transporting the goods was destined for a Syrian port.
This case highlights that reciprocal boarding agreements
are an important tool in operationalising the PSI, that
a national coordination process for interdiction
decisions is crucial and that there is a need to exercise
and develop Standard Operating Procedures. It shows that
PSI leverages the relationship and the capabilities of
partners. It also underlines that interdictions options
in port are significant but that it is also critical to
act in a timely manner.


32. Japan outlined a case that occurred in 2003. It was
related to a company about to export stabilised direct
current supplies that can be used to develop nuclear
weapons and missiles. The material was destined for
North Korea. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
had notified the company in 2002 that an export licence
was required. Nevertheless, the company loaded three
items on a ship destined for Thailand - without the
required licence. These goods were intercepted in Hong
Kong and further investigation highlighted that they
were meant to be re-exported to North Korea. It was the
first Japanese case of a company violating the catch-all
regulation under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Act. Usually, exporters give up exporting the goods if
notified. Consequently, the METI launched an on-site
investigation of the company and requested that Hong
Kong confiscate the items. METI issued the company
with an administrative guidance to bring the goods back
to Japan. The company complied at its own cost. The
Japanese judiciary sanctioned the company and its CEO
for this incident. Japan underlined the interdiction's
success: it had a strong deterrent effect; information
sharing and prompt action for cooperation by the
relevant authorities allowed seizure of the cargo.


33. Canada and the Netherlands gave a presentation on a
joint Netherlands-Canada intercept of a uranium analyzer
shipped from Canada to Iran via Dutch territory. There
were doubts about the consignee/end-user. The Dutch
authorities, with interagency cooperation, stopped the
shipment for further investigation. The item was not
listed but sensitive, and as such was subject of the
watch-list and of the EU Iran embargo regulation.
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs imposed a
catch-all provision on the Dutch freight forwarder and
the goods were returned to Canada after establishing
contact and cooperation with the freight forwarder and
Canadian authorities. Once the goods were back in Canada,
the Canadian Border Services Agency retained them and
conducted intelligence and enforcement checks. Canadian
authorities located the import and export documents -
which indicated that the end-user was the Atomic Energy
Organisation of Iran - and examined the shipment. It
seized the goods and referred the case to the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, as required by law. This case
is still under investigation. Information from the
enforcement action provided usable evidence of linkage
between AEOI and declared consignee. International and

STATE 00115948 007 OF 007


domestic cooperation was effective and essential in the
successful interception and enforcement. It was also
concluded that watch lists are useful but must be
combined with a workable catch-all clause.


34. Turkey presented its experience in terms of
on-the-ground practices. It emphasised the need for
control at origin, of adequate intelligence, of good
international and interagency cooperation and of equal
burden-sharing. Turkey also underlined the importance of
transmitting interception requests in time. When Turkey's
assistance is requested, or when Turkish authorities
decide to intervene, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
conducts further investigation. Intelligence-sharing is
critical before making a political decision. As an
illustration, Turkey mentioned some cases that fell
under UNSC resolutions. Turkish authorities consider
outreach (industrial, bilateral and multinational)
activities to be paramount. The presentation concluded
on four priorities: universalisation, effective export
controls, increased intelligence exchange and
international cooperation.


35. France and Greece jointly presented an interdiction
involving a suspicious cargo transporting various goods
ambiguously listed as "construction materials". The
shipment included double base components that could be
used for SCUD-type missiles and was en route from North
Korea to a Middle-East country. The interception rested
on the following legal foundation: the UNSCR 1718 (2006),
the EU regulation 329/2007, the EU Controlled Military
List and the elusiveness of manifest and packing list.
France and Greece pointed out the interdiction's
successes (what worked well) and the difficulties faced
during the interdiction's four phases: alert, operations
planning, operations management, and post-interception.
They underlined the valuable experience this interdiction
has been for the agencies involved and that both
countries were working on identifying strengths and
weaknesses to improve their respective national plans,
capabilities and reaction mechanisms. The interdiction
confirmed the value of a national response plan, Standard
Operating Procedures, a strong legal basis for action,
and good communication between PSI partners. But it
showed the need to improve the relationship between
authorities and industry, strengthen signatories' PSI
commitments, focus outreach towards states that are key
locations on the air or sea route towards areas of
concern.


36. The discussion confirmed the importance of sharing
information, the necessity of finding the appropriate
legal basis and the critical importance of bilateral
and multilateral cooperation, without neglecting the
national level. It was mentioned that countries
increasingly deal with unlisted items, which impacts on
the legal situation. Another challenge is the need for
adequate intelligence and informing industry. Experience
tends to prove that companies inform authorities of
suspicious shipments or transactions when briefed.
Participants expressed their keen interest in real
case debriefings in future OEG meetings.

END OF PART 1 OF 2 OF PSI OEG CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

POINTS OF CONTACT


37. Please slug responses for OSD GSA (Beth Flores) and
State/ISN/CPI (Carlos Guzman). USG POC for PSI
Operational Experts Group issues is Beth Flores,
OSD/GSA (beth.flores@osd.mil). USG POC for PSI policy
issues is Carlos Guzman, State/ISN/CPI
(GuzmanCS@state.gov).
RICE