APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 115017

SIPDIS, NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: AS: 10/28/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO IR
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING (GAERC)


1. (U) Classified by Bill Lucas, Director, EUR/ERA.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 18.


3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold two
meetings in early November: an informal gathering
(Gymnich) in Marseille on November 3 and a formal
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
meeting in Brussels November 10-11. Although the
agendas for both meetings may change somewhat, as of now
we expect discussion topics to include: the future of
transatlantic relations (Gymnich),Israeli-Palestinian
peace process (Gymnich and GAERC),Afghanistan/Pakistan
(Gymnich),Syria/Lebanon (Gymnich),Iran (Gymnich),
Russia/Georgia (Gymnich and GAERC),the Doha Round
(GAERC),and the planned EU anti-piracy mission off the
Horn of Africa (GAERC). A background section covering
some of these issues is provided prior to a section
containing talking points.


4. (SBU) Talking Points only are to be delivered as
soon as possible at the appropriate level to EU members
only. Other posts should not/not deliver these points.
Posts are requested to place particular emphasis on our
points on Russia/Georgia (don't resume PCA negotiations
until Russia meets its commitments under the Georgia
ceasefire agreement),Iran (need more sanctions
pressure),and Syria/Lebanon (engage with Syria only as
reward for real policy changes). The Russia points are
relevant not only for the Gymnich and GAERC meetings,
but also of course for any discussion of the EU-Russia
summit scheduled for November 14. Posts are requested
to include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables
and to reference this cable. End Summary.

BACKGROUND
--------------

IRAN


5. (SBU) We are pleased that the EU finally reached
agreement on a Common Position to complete
implementation of UNSCR 1803 in early August.
Thereafter, EU experts struggled for weeks to reach
consensus on the Council Regulation giving effect to the
Common Position. They argued chiefly over the listing
of names of individuals and entities in the annexes and
the handling of breaches of contracts resulting from the
new regulations. Negotiations were difficult due to EU
countries' economic concerns, given the regulation's
direct impact on EU members' vessels, cargo, export and
financial interests. EU Council working groups have now
finalized the draft annexes to the Common Position that
are required to put it into practice, and we expect the
text to be approved by ministers without further
discussion in early November. Finally finishing work on
1803 should make it easier to get the EU to focus on new
steps.


6. (S/NF) Unfortunately, there are currently no EU
proposals on the table for new autonomous sanctions
going beyond existing UNSCRs. Given how acrimonious and
grueling the negotiations were over the text simply to
complete implementation of 1803, there is little
appetite for further autonomous EU measures at present.
EU Member States seem to be leaning toward giving the
1803 legislation time to be adopted and "digested"
before going further. Despite these difficulties, we
need the EU to remain fully engaged in all aspects of
the dual-track strategy towards Iran. The French MFA is
concerned that the P5+1 may "lose a year" waiting for
the new U.S. administration to learn the ropes, during
which time Iran would continue enriching uranium. The
French are thus interested in discussing the issue with
the new U.S. administration as early as possible, not
least so that the Europeans can get a sense of where

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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING (GAER
Washington would like to go with regard to sanctions and
engagement. In the interim, the French intend to
continue to push their EU partners to go further on
sanctions, particularly on additional designations, and
we understand that the U.K. is on board with this
effort.


7. (SBU) High Representative Solana has remained in
contact with the Iranians, but Tehran has still failed
to provide a clear, positive response to the latest P5+1
offer. As a result, the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted UNSCR 1835 on September 27, demonstrating
continued international resolve and unity in our
commitment to the dual track strategy.


8. (C) Our emphasis continues to be on multilateral
diplomacy through the P5+1, but we will also seek to
increase pressure on Iran by working with the EU, and
bilaterally with likeminded countries. We thus continue
to urge the EU to adopt a series of additional
autonomous measures that go beyond existing EU policy.
Options include additional designations under existing
EU policy, further tightening of inspection provisions,
and tightening of export credits. A strong set of new
EU sanctions would not only send a clear signal of EU
resolve, but also weaken other countries' excuses for
not acting against Iran. At the national level, we are
already coordinating with individual EU Member States
(France, UK, Germany and Italy) and other like-minded
countries to explore other means to increase pressure on
Iran, including measures to be taken in the areas of
finance, energy and insurance. Other countries do
follow Europe's lead on Iran; on October 15 Australia
imposed new financial and travel sanctions on 20
individuals and 18 organizations " including Bank Melli
and Bank Saderat " and ended government-financed export
credits in an effort to "match and deliberately go
beyond" the EU Common Position on UNSCR 1803.

SYRIAN ENGAGEMENT


9. (C) The French have been forward leaning on European
engagement with Syria and assert that this openness has
resulted in a number of positive Syrian actions,
including the October 15 announcement of diplomatic
relations with Lebanon, the recent meetings of the joint
Syrian-Lebanese committees on delineating the border and
returning prisoners, and Bashar al-Asad's commitment to
President Sarkozy to continue negotiations with Israel.
Although these initiatives would be positive steps if
fully implemented, we have seen little, if any concrete
action to fulfill them.


10. (C) The U.S. has used recent meetings with Syrian
Foreign Minister Muallem to reiterate our key issues of
concern. These include Syria's continued defiance of
United Nations Security Council resolutions, support to
terrorist groups and their leaders, non-cooperation with
the IAEA, efforts to procure nuclear technology and non-
conventional weapons, harboring of foreign fighter
facilitators, and oppression of human rights activists.


11. (SBU) Any future engagement between the U.S. and the
Syrian government will be conditioned on meaningful
Syrian efforts to change its behaviors and promote peace
and stability in the region.

EU SOMALIA ANTI-PIRACY EFFORTS


12. (S) The European Union is in the operational
planning stages for an anti-piracy ESDP mission that
would start in December. We expect approval for the
mission at the November GAERC. The ESDP mission lead is
the United Kingdom, which plans to establish operational
headquarters in Northwood, UK, with forward headquarters
afloat. The UK is looking at a small coordination cell
(6 or fewer existing people) in Bahrain who would be
designated as the EU coordination cell. This EU cell
could work through existing Coalition and U.S. officers
in Bahrain who are likewise designated NATO liaison
officers. The UK has suggested, and we support, a daily
meeting between the two groups to preserve the NATO-EU
link. This is a case where our preference to engage the

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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING (GAER
EU on military issues through NATO has been maintained,
as both NATO and the EU will be present in both
Northwood and Bahrain, and it can serve as a model for
future NATO-EU cooperation and coordination.


13. (SBU) Separately, we understand that the European
Commission is working to launch a Critical Maritime
Routes Initiative intended to help improve security
along key shipping corridors, including the HOA and the
Malacca Straits. The initiative will provide aid to
third countries to enhance vessel tracking and
information sharing between ports. We welcome this
initiative as a useful complement to the ESDP anti-
piracy mission and hope to be able to obtain additional
information on the initiative as it moves forward.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS


14. (SBU) "Transatlantic relations" will be on the
agenda for the November 3 EU Foreign Ministers' Gymnich
meeting in Marseille. This is the second extended
Gymnich review (following the September 5-6 Gymnich
discussion in Avignon) of a French paper likely to be
shared with this and the next U.S. Administration. The
paper is intended to be a political assessment of U.S.-
EU relations in view of the upcoming U.S. presidential
elections, and an inventory of subjects on which the
U.S. and EU will need a shared vision. While we have
not seen a revised version, the original draft covered
Middle East issues, Iran, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Russia,
the multilateral system, climate change, human rights,
and non-proliferation.


15. (SBU) Papers circulated by EU Member States in
preparation for the discussion on transatlantic
relations have also focused on issue areas and revised
structures for our consultations. We understand that
the ideas proposed have included inviting the Secretary
of State to the occasional Gymnich meeting, returning to
two U.S.-EU summits per year (with one being Gymnich
style),and addressing such subjects as financial market
stability, food security, and development policy
coordination. As part of the broader ferment on
transatlantic relations outside the EU's Gymnich
discussions, former French PM Balladur and others even
suggest regular meetings of virtually all U.S. cabinet
secretaries with their EU troika counterparts.

DOHA ROUND


16. (SBU) The central trade priority of the United
States remain achieving a successful conclusion to the
Doha Round negotiations - one that opens markets and
creates new trade in agriculture, industrial goods, and
services, particularly from the advance developing
countries (Brazil, China and India). Although a
breakthrough was not achieved during the meetings in
Geneva in July, WTO Members made tremendous progress in
moving the Doha negotiations forward on multiple fronts.
The impasse resulted from some specific issues - most
notably with regard to the agriculture "Special
Safeguard Mechanism" (SSM). But it is important to
underscore that key open issues in agriculture, NAMA and
in services are indicators as to what remains the
linchpin to Doha success: securing meaningful market
access from key emerging markets.


17. (SBU) The U.S. government continues to work with
WTO Members to advance the negotiations and achieve an
ambitious outcome that results in new trade flows.
Senior officials meetings have resumed in Geneva on
agriculture and industrial goods. We believe a
modalities deal in agriculture and NAMA is still doable
by the end of the year if all parties want that goal in
good faith. Achieving a modalities package on
agriculture and industrial goods will also set the stage
shortly thereafter for new revised offers in the
services negotiations.


18. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
possible (in advance of the November 3 Gymnich and the
November 10 GAERC).

STATE 00115017 004 OF 008


RUSSIA/GEORGIA

-- We welcome EU Special Envoy Pierre Morel's skillful
launching of the Geneva talks on October 15, and applaud
his ability to bring the parties together.

-- We also welcome the consensus within the plenary
session in Geneva -- albeit with the absence of one
delegation -- to support Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity.

-- We regret that the separatists walked away from the
table and that neither they nor the Russians were
willing to accept any of the procedural compromises that
Ambassador Morel proposed and that the Georgian
delegation was willing to accept in order for the
discussions to continue.

-- As we clearly stated in Geneva on October 15, Russia
still has not fulfilled its commitments with respect to
the August 12 ceasefire or the subsequent September 8
agreement negotiated by French President Sarkozy, which
both clearly state that Russia must withdraw its forces
to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

-- Russian forces remain in the Kodori Valley in
Abkhazia and in the Akhalgori region in South Ossetia,
both of which were controlled by Georgia prior to the
conflict. Russia also has far more troops in the
separatist regions than it did prior to the start of the
conflict.

-- Civilian populations in these and other regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain vulnerable to
marauding militias and irregulars, and reports of
harassment and intimidation continue to come in. Russia
has been unwilling or unable to provide for the security
of these regions and has blocked international
humanitarian aid, most recently by temporarily denying
access to the World Food Program at Perevi, just outside
of the South Ossetian administrative boundary.

-- In our dealings with Russia, we must speak with one
voice and condemn its failure to abide by these
commitments, which run directly counter to the August 12
and September 8 agreements that Russia signed.

-- We fully support Ambassador Haber's call for access
inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the EU Monitoring
Mission, just as we support OSCE Special Envoy
Talvitie's call for access inside South Ossetia for OSCE
monitors, members of ODIHR, and the OSCE High
Commissioner for National Minorities.

-- International access to the separatist regions would
help protect the vulnerable populations living there and
would help restore security so that internally displaced
persons (IDPs) can return to their former places of
residence. As winter approaches, the task of securing
the return of IDPs is becoming increasingly urgent.

-- Given reports of human rights violations and violence
in the conflict zones, the need for an international
presence inside these regions remains critical.

--We encourage the European Union to continue to
postpone negotiations with Russia on a new EU-Russia
partnership agreement (PCA) until Russia has met all its
commitments under the ceasefire agreement, including
allowing access for humanitarian assistance and
international monitors in the breakaway regions and
withdrawal of forces to positions held prior to the
outbreak of hostilities, which entails a complete
withdrawal from such areas as the Upper Kodori valley
and Akhalgori.

--We would also encourage the European Union to refrain
from further discussion on President Medvedev's proposal
for a new European Security Treaty. President
Medvedev's endorsement in Evian of five principles of

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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING (GAER
such a new European security architecture, including
respect for sovereignty and preservation of
international law, rings hollow, particularly given
continued Russian occupation of Georgian territory.

IRAN

--Our emphasis continues to be on multilateral diplomacy
through the P5+1, but we will also seek to increase
pressure on Iran by working with the EU and like-minded
countries to adopt autonomous national measures.

--We appreciate the EU's August adoption of a new Common
Position to implement fully UNSCR 1803 and understand
the process of putting the new Common Position into
practice will be completed very soon.

--Iran is counting on a period of international
inaction. We would also like to see the EU continue
pressuring Iran by adopting a series of truly new
autonomous measures that go beyond existing UNSCRs and
existing EU policy. A strong set of new EU autonomous
sanctions would not only send a clear signal of EU
resolve, but also weaken other countries' excuses for
not acting against Iran.

--The EU's measures, such as the designation of Bank
Melli, do have an impact on Iran's decision-making. We
also know that many Arab and Asian countries look to the
EU for leadership on Iran and are likely to follow its
lead on any additional steps taken regarding Iran. We
note that on October 15 Australia imposed new financial
and travel sanctions on 20 individuals and 18
organizations ? including Bank Melli and Bank Saderat ?
and ended government-financed export credits.

--Beyond sanctions, we urge EU member states to approach
their domestic insurance firms that supply maritime and
aviation insurance, or reinsurance, to end all business
with Iranian entities or individuals.

--We would welcome EU reinforcement of the message to
countries of key importance in the shipping arena to
robustly implement the inspection provision in UNSCR
1803 on Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL),
including China, South Korea, and the UAE. We are
interested in hearing about any effects that have come
about as a result of the adoption of the EU Common
Position on 1803, which specifically placed additional
reporting requirements on IRISL and Iran Air Cargo.

--We urge the EU to implement and build upon measures
imposed in existing UNSCRs to increase the pressure on
Iran. Iran has already adapted its evasion tactics to
circumvent existing designations and has moved to using
its other state-owned banks to conduct proliferation-
related transactions and expanding its intra-banking
network. Iran's illicit finance is a systemic problem
that demands action beyond simply targeting specific
banks. As the Financial Action Task Force noted this
month, Iran's weak anti-money laundering and
counterterrorism finance mechanisms also highlight that
countries should take action to strengthen preventive
measures to reduce the risk to their financial systems.

--Time is of the essence. Sanctions are working but
need moretime; meanwhile, Iran is advancing in its
uranium enrichment and other sensitive nuclear
activities in a bid to present the international
community with a fait accompli that we cannot accept.

--In addition to its proliferation activities, Iran
continues to be an egregious sponsor of terrorist
activity, both through training and direct financial
support. Iran's support to terrorists, particularly in
Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq, is a threat to these
fragile democracies and a direct violation of UNSCR

1747.

SYRIAN ENGAGEMENT

--Syria must be held accountable on all of its public
pledges. These include delineating the Syria-Lebanon

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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING (GAER
border and exchanging embassies between Syria and
Lebanon, and cutting off completely the flow of foreign
fighters to Iraq.

--The October 15 announcement that Syria and Lebanon
would establish diplomatic relations was a positive
step; however, we await the concrete actions needed to
implement this agreement. Syria's long track record of
destabilizing involvement in Lebanese affairs should not
be forgotten because of one diplomatic gesture.

--Robust engagement with Syria could work to undermine
our allies in Lebanon, who remain concerned about Syrian
intentions and any signs of wavering international
support for a sovereign, independent Lebanon. These
concerns are especially significant in the context of
Lebanon's spring 2009 elections, which will serve as a
watershed for the country's fledgling democratic
institutions.

--The international community must remain united in
pressing for Syrian action on clearly identified
benchmarks, including compliance with UN Security
Council resolutions, preventing Palestinian rejectionist
groups from undermining the Palestinian Authority,
ending support for terrorist groups, interdicting
foreign fighters entering Iraq, ceasing to allow illicit
weapons shipments from being transported across its
borders, complying with IAEA investigations into the
clandestine procurement of nuclear technology, and
ending the harassment and detention of political
dissidents and human rights supporters.

--The Syrian regime must not be rewarded for low-cost
actions that do not represent a significant change in
Syria policies and actions. Our view is that
engagement, including any progress on the EU-Syria
Association Agreement, is an appropriate reward only
when real change occurs and Syria demonstrates its
willingness to play a constructive role in the region.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE

--Annapolis launched the first substantive negotiations
in nearly a decade.

--The absence of public agreements or a flurry of press
releases should not be mistaken for a lack of progress.

--The Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not have
endured for 60 years if the obstacles to peace were few
and the solutions easily reached.

--The framework for negotiating a final resolution of
the conflict is before us: Determined, professional
negotiations between the parties; consistent yet
constructive international engagement; and a vigorous
effort to improve conditions on the ground.

--This formula has resulted in several key advances:

--Israel and the Palestinians now express common
aspirations.

--They underscore their commitment to reaching a
comprehensive agreement on all issues, without
exception, as agreed at Annapolis.

--They pledge to continue their bilateral,
confidential, and continuous negotiations until
this goal is achieved.

--They both attest that the negotiating structure
is effective and productive and that they intend to
keep it in place.

--President Bush's vision of a Palestinian state at
peace with Israel will not come in a single dramatic
moment, but rather as the result of a methodical,
sincere commitment by the parties to conclude a lasting
agreement that benefits both their people.

--Ongoing, high-level U.S. engagement on this issue is

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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING (GAER
sustained not by false hope or an unrealistic assessment
of the challenges but by our belief in the sincerity of
the parties' commitment to the negotiations, by the
recognition of the progress they have made, and by the
genuine possibility of a breakthrough if the current
negotiating structure remains intact.

--The seriousness of the process is illustrated by the
sensitivity of the issues under negotiation. The
international community must ensure that its actions are
supportive of the negotiations rather than
interventionist. The United States has steadfastly
respected the parties' request to maintain the bilateral
and confidential nature of the dialogue and urges other
international actors to do the same.

--The Quartet has played a vital role in coordinating
international support and limiting unhelpful or
unfocused activism. It is imperative that the
international community continue to adhere to this
formula, which has proven to be effective. The Quartet
has also worked to promote sustainable political
arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza, which will only
be based on the Quartet principles: renunciation of
violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past
agreements between the parties.

EU SOMALIA ANTI-PIRACY EFFORTS

--We welcome the ongoing planning by the European Union
to deploy an anti-piracy operation intended to escort
World Food Program vessels and merchant shipping off the
Horn of Africa.

--We are pleased to be close to establishing pragmatic
NATO-EU cooperation in both Northwood and Bahrain
through which the U.S. may engage with the ESDP mission.
We believe this operation may provide the two
organizations with a model for future coordination.

--We also welcome the European Commission's plans to
launch a Critical Maritime Routes Initiative intended to
help improve security along key shipping corridors,
including the HOA and the Malacca Straits. We look
forward to learning more about this initiative as it
moves forward.

--We would like to work closely on a longer term plan to
strengthen regional judicial and maritime capacity and
are interested in EU planning in this regard.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

--The United States remains concerned about the security
situation along Pakistan's western frontier,
particularly in and around the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) that allows extremists to
orchestrate operations across the border in Afghanistan
and beyond.

--Signs of bilateral improvement between Pakistan and
Afghanistan create a fresh opportunity for better
cooperation between the two countries. The United
States remains committed over the long-term to helping
Pakistan alleviate problems along its border with
Afghanistan. Without a collective international effort,
however, it will be difficult to contain the existing
threat emanating from the Tribal Belt.

--We believe the international community, including the
European Union, can and should do more to support and
fund Pakistani efforts to stabilize the border area.

--We urge EU support for our proposal for Pakistan to
appoint a high-level government official to oversee a
World Bank-administered Frontier Trust Fund (modeled on
the Afghan Reconstruction Fund) so that donors can write
checks for frontier development. Many donors are eager
to provide assistance for the border, and this is a
mechanism to help them achieve that.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS


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SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING (GAER
-- We understand transatlantic relations will be on the
Gymnich agenda once again, to include an assessment of
priorities in view of the upcoming U.S. elections. We
expect that maintaining strong transatlantic relations
will be a key priority for whichever administration
succeeds the current one.

--We think that new global security and economic
challenges will require faster, more coherent responses
from all of us. We should make sure that transatlantic
cooperation structures are up to these challenges, since
a strong transatlantic partnership is the cornerstone of
our security. We would appreciate your perspective on
which issues will most require a joint approach.

DOHA ROUND

--We stress the U.S. commitment to achieving a
successful Doha outcome. We are prepared to work right
through the end of the year to reach a breakthrough.

--The linchpin to achieving a successful conclusion to
the Doha Round remains securing meaningful new market
access from key emerging markets in agriculture, NAMA
(non-agricultural market access) and services.

--The economics are real ? Doha will set the terms of
trade through the next decade and beyond. We note an
April 2008 IMF economic outlook projection that 50% of
global economic growth between now and 2013 would be
provided by China, India, Brazil, Argentina and ASEAN.

--The United States remains willing and able to
negotiate. Senior officials are currently engaging
through capital to capital contacts and in Geneva.

--We are looking for senior officials to bring new
creativity to addressing the many key open issues in
agriculture, NAMA and in services.

--In NAMA, we need participation in sectoral tariff
elimination agreements by major exporters/producers -
including advanced developing countries like Brazil,
China and India ? to balance July's poor formula and
flexibilities result. We need the EU to step up and
engage on pushing sectorals and China/India/Brazil
participation. We hope to see the Commission put new
energy into sectorals.

--In agriculture, US negotiators have returned to Geneva
to try to move forward on SSM and the other unresolved
agriculture issues (e.g. tariff simplification).

--We believe a modalities deal in agriculture and NAMA
is still doable by the end of the year if all parties
want that goal in good faith.

--The United States is continuing to work, as we have
done on previous rounds carrying through administration
changes.

END NON-PAPER TEXT
RICE