Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE110691
2008-10-16 19:23:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

ELIMINATION OF UKRAINIAN SCUD MISSILES

Tags:  MTCRE PARM PREL 
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VZCZCXYZ0019
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0691 2901927
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 161923Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 8113
S E C R E T STATE 110691 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2028
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: ELIMINATION OF UKRAINIAN SCUD MISSILES

REF: LETTER FROM UKRAINE MOD (09/26/08)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM.
REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T STATE 110691

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2028
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: ELIMINATION OF UKRAINIAN SCUD MISSILES

REF: LETTER FROM UKRAINE MOD (09/26/08)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM.
REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4.


2. (S) Background: At the July 31-August 1 U.S.-Ukraine
Nonproliferation Working Group (NPWG) meeting in Kyiv,
Ukraine indicated its readiness to move forward to eliminate
its SCUD missiles and related equipment. (NOTE: In 1994 the
U.S. committed to facilitate Ukrainian membership in the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). By 1997, Ukraine
had made substantial progress toward meeting U.S. criteria
for membership in the MTCR. The remaining hurdle to U.S.
support was Ukraine's willingness to forgo its MTCR Category
I offensive military missiles. This issue was resolved in
March 1998 when the USG and Ukraine concluded a confidential
MOU, which, inter alia, committed Ukraine to eliminate at
least one-half of its SCUD missiles and launchers by December
31, 2003 and the remaining systems by December 31, 2015. END
NOTE.) We indicated that we were also ready to move forward,
and provided a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (in
Ukrainian) for review. We also offered a return visit of
U.S. experts
in September to discuss the MOU in detail. Our expectation
was that this visit would then be followed by a team of
technical experts in late September/early October to
assess/inventory the SCUDS and related equipment at the
various sites.


3. (S) Ukraine did not respond to our request for a visit in
September. However, we recently received a follow-up letter
from Ukraine's Oleksandr Dotsenko, Director, Department of
International Aspects of Non-Proliferation and Arms Control,
National Security and Defense Council. The letter outlines
several steps apparently aimed at completing the SCUD
elimination project in an efficient and timely manner. In
order to address the points raised in the GOU letter, we
would like to again propose sending a team to Kyiv for
discussions with GOU experts on the details of SCUD
elimination.


4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Kyiv approach
appropriate host government officials and seek agreement from
the GOU for a visit of a U.S. team for a full day of SCUD
elimination talks on November 14, 17, or 18. Post may draw
on background information in paras 2-3 above and
nonpaper/talking points below when making request.


5. (S) Begin Talking Points/Nonpaper:

(Secret/Rel Ukraine)

-- Consistent with our 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
the U.S. remains prepared to discuss the provision of
technical and financial assistance to eliminate Ukraine's
SCUD missiles and equipment.

-- As discussed in Kyiv at the U.S.-Ukraine Nonproliferation
Working Group meeting on July 31-August 1, we would like to
send a team to Ukraine to discuss the specifics of the issue.

-- The U.S. team also would be prepared to address the
specific points raised in the letter we recently received
from your government concerning the modalities of the SCUD
elimination project.

-- We therefore propose one-day of talks in Kyiv on either
November 14, 17, or 18.

-- We look forward to working with you on this matter and
would appreciate your response at the earliest opportunity.


6. (U) Department appreciates Post's assistance. Please
slug response to ISN/MTR and EUR/PRA.
RICE