Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08STATE100791
2008-09-20 03:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST - ABKHAZ AND SOUTH

Tags:  UNSCR PREL GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7458
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #0791/01 2640336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200332Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 2989
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3150
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100791 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: UNSCR PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST - ABKHAZ AND SOUTH
OSSETIAN PARTICIPATION IN UN DISCUSSIONS

REF: A) USUN 801 B) STATE 92731 C) USUN 835

Classified By: IO Acting A/S Brian Hook for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100791

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: UNSCR PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST - ABKHAZ AND SOUTH
OSSETIAN PARTICIPATION IN UN DISCUSSIONS

REF: A) USUN 801 B) STATE 92731 C) USUN 835

Classified By: IO Acting A/S Brian Hook for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. Posts, with the exception of
Moscow, should approach host government at Foreign Minister/NSA
or appropriately high level immediately to urge them to oppose
participation by separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (Georgia) in UN Security Council discussions on Georgia.
The United States believes that the international talks to be
held on October 15 in Geneva provide the appropriate forum in
which to hear from such leaders. Participation by Abkhaz and
South Ossetian separatist leaders in UN Security Council
discussions would only be misused to further the campaign to
legitimize declarations of independence by Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.


2. (C) Objectives
--------------

-- Prevent the participation by representatives of
separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia in any Security Council
meeting. We do not want to in any way provide Russia or the
separatist regimes ammunition to legitimize these regions'
declarations of independence and Russia's recognition of their
status.

-- Seek the commitment of the host government to vote "no"
if the issue of the separatist leaders participation in a
Security Council meeting comes to a procedural vote in the
Council.

-- Seek host government views on Russia's proposed October
Arria-style meeting, including Russia's proposal to extend the
UNOMIG mandate under its current name in return for allowing
such a meeting to take place. Note our objection to the
attendance of South Ossetians and Abkhaz representatives in
those type of meetings and our concerns over UNOMIG discussions.


3. (SBU) Post should draw on the following guidance in
discussions with host governments:

-- The appropriate venue to hear the concerns of the
separatist leaders is the October 15 international meeting in
Geneva provided for in the September 8 agreement mediated by the
EU Presidency.. Moreover, the Geneva talks would meet the
intent and goal of point six in the President Medvedev-adopted
August 12 agreement for the "opening of international
discussions on security and stability modalities in Abkhazia and

South Ossetia." UN Security Council discussions are not the
appropriate venue in which to hear from the Abkhaz and South
Ossetian leaders.

-- Inviting the separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia to Security Council discussions would be used by Russia
as part of its campaign to legitimize its recognition of the
separatist regions, which is inconsistent with numerous UN
Security Council resolutions, including most recently UNSCR 1808
of April 2008. Bolstering Russia's recognition by voting to
invite the separatist leaders to the Security Council would set
a dangerous precedent.

-- Before, during and after Russia's invasion of Georgia,
the separatist leaders have also been complicit in the forced
expulsion of the ethnic Georgian population from these regions,
which continues to take place. The South Ossetian separatist
leaders explicitly stated that they do not intend to allow
ethnic Georgian internally displaced persons (IDP) to return to
their homes. These constitute grave human rights abuses. Abkhaz
separatist leaders have also stated that the return of all
Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia is 'impossible.'

-- It is inappropriate to confer any legitimacy on the
separatist regions or the deplorable actions of their separatist
leaders. Allowing such representatives to participate in UN
Security Council discussions would not only be used to confer
legitimacy on their independence claims and actions, but could
also encourage leaders of other separatist groups to seek
similar participation.

-- Just as the U.S. does not support the separatist
leaders' participation in a Council meeting, it does not think
that a Council meeting is the appropriate venue to hear Abkhaz
and South Ossetian IDPs, or 'governments in exile.'

STATE 00100791 002 OF 002



-- The Council must maintain a unified message on
supporting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

-- Russia's proposed Arria-style meeting is likely a tactic
to secure additional votes for a formal Council meeting by
arguing that the U.S. is thwarting the desire of some Council
members to hear from the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist
leaders. Georgia has informed the United States that it no
longer supports an Arria-style meeting that would include Abkhaz
and South Ossetian separatist leaders. As stated, the United
States believes that the appropriate venue for these separatist
leaders to present their views is the October 15 meeting in
Geneva, where their presence will not be used to imply some form
of recognition or legitimization.

Background
--------------


4. (C) On August 28, 2008, during an emergency session of the UN
Security Council, the Council agreed that the separatist leaders
from Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be "heard by the Council
at some opportune moment and under a formula to be decided." We
are seeking to prevent their participation in a meeting of the
Council. Their participation in a Security Council meeting
would add legitimacy to Russia's recognition of the independence
of these two regions.


5. (C) Russia has informed Security Council members that it will
invite 'foreign ministers' of the separatist regimes for an
Arria-style meeting (an informal, and unofficial, meeting called
by a member of the Security Council and held outside of Council
chambers) on October 7 or 8. Russia has also called for their
participation in formal Council discussions related to the
October 15 expiration of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG). The United States strongly opposes participation by
the separatist regimes in UN Security Council discussions.


6. (C) Subsequently, on the sidelines of a meeting of a General
Assembly Open Ended Working Group meeting on September 15,
Russian Ambassador Churkin told Ambassador Khalilzad that the
Russian government could support allowing an extension of the
United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) under its current
mandate and name (reftel C). Churkin said that Russia would not
insist on having a representative of Abkhazia speak at the
Council meeting if the Security Council were to agree that
Georgia would also not be allowed to appear. This is
unacceptable. Georgia would have to be allowed to attend a
Council session called to discuss a UN mission located in
Georgia. In return, Russia would want the United States to
allow representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to attend an
Arria-format meeting in the United States on October 7, as an
alternative to their appearance at a formal Council session. A
straight rollover of the UNOMIG mandate is not possible,
however, as the current mandate of UNOMIG (set out in UN
Security Council resolution 937) is tied to the monitoring and
verification of implementation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement,
which is no longer effective. As a result, any rollover
resolution will likely not be a "technical" rollover but will
involve both re-negotiation of the UNOMIG mandate and language
which underscores Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity.


7. (C) The United States is not obligated to issue visas to the
separatist leaders to facilitate their participation in an
Arria-style meeting, because it is not an official UN meeting.
Based on the information available to us to date, the United
States would likely be obligated under the UN Headquarters
Agreement to issue visas for participation of such leaders in an
official Security Council meeting. If seven or more UNSC
members are opposed, then we can block participation by
separatist leaders in a UNSC meeting.


8. (C) With regard to UNOMIG, the U.S. will also likely seek to
secure Russia's agreement to a resolution to allow UNOMIG to
continue operating temporarily (without changing its name) in
the Abkhaz region of Georgia. The U.S. does not want separatist
leaders from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to participate in UNOMIG
discussions in any way. The U.S. is a strong proponent of
preserving a UN role in the international mechanism for both
Georgia and the region; a continuation of UNOMIG's operations in
the Abkhaz region of Georgia will allow time to develop an
appropriate regional mechanism, while at the same time
permitting existing monitoring work on the ground to continue.

Department Point of Contact
--------------


9. (U) Please report any response/reaction by host government AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE to IO/UNP K.G. Moore, 202-647-0042,
moorekg@state.gov.
RICE