MOI REFORM UPDATE: INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR GOB

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TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KCRCM BU
SUBJECT: MOI REFORM UPDATE: INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR GOB
OFFICIALS

REF: A. SOFIA 00303

B. SOFIA 00301

C. SOFIA 00293

D. SOFIA 00248

E. SOFIA 00229


1. (SBU) Summary. In response to Prime Minister Stanishev's
request for expert advice to reform the Ministry of Interior,
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) Senior Law Enforcement Advisor in Belgrade Gary Bennett
consulted with lead Bulgarian officials May 21-23 in Sofia. The
Bulgarian political leadership stressed the need to begin reforms
immediately (within two weeks) to regain the public's trust,
following the ouster of the former Interior Minister amidst a series
of scandals. Operational staff disagreed about the nature of the
problems (e.g., politically motivated vs. incompetence) and feared
radical change, which might hinder the Ministry's operation. At the
Embassy's request, Bennett outlined high-level recommendations to
address the most pressing priorities the officials raised: organized
crime, corruption, special investigative techniques and internal
control. Bennett also stressed the need to undertake long-term
reforms to improve both the internal culture within the Ministry and
its external image. End Summary.

METHODOLOGY


2. (U) Bennett arrived in Sofia May 20 for internal consultations
within the Embassy. The purpose of the visit was to provide
strategic level perspective on the challenges facing the Interior
Ministry. Over the next two-days, Bennett met with senior Bulgarian
officials, including:

- Dr. Vassil Kirov, Head of Financial Intelligence Directorate,
State Agency for National Security (DANS)
- Mincho Spassov, Chairman, Parliament Committee on Domestic
Security and Public Order
- Mihail Mikov, Minister of Interior
- Petko Sertov, Head of State Agency for National Security (DANS)
- Petar Vladmirov, Head of the General Directorate for Combating
Organized Crime (GDBOP)
- Sonya Yankulova, Deputy Interior Minister
- Pavlin Dimitrov, Secretary General, Ministry of Interior

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP


3. (SBU) The Bulgarian political leadership stressed the need to
implement reforms immediately (within two weeks) in order to regain
the public's trust, following a series of crippling scandals, which
ultimately led to ouster of the former Interior Minister. The
pending European Commission report, which is expected to be sharply
critical of Bulgaria's progress in addressing rule of law, only adds
to the pressure.


4. (SBU) Confident in Interior Minister Mikov's character, senior
Bulgarian leadership in the Parliament and DANS expressed
willingness to help him build a ministry that he is comfortable
managing. Mikov wants the reformed ministry's new structure to
align with its main functions, including security, criminal
investigations, border police, and fire emergency services. The
placement of the specialized intelligence units (DOI, which is in
charge of physical surveillance and DOTI, which executes wiretapping
requests) remains unresolved, with the Interior Ministry favoring
maintaining the structures under its jurisdiction and
parliamentarians leaning towards establishing a separate agency
directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. Mikov said that
physically removing the units from the Interior Ministry would be
almost impossible for technical and logistical reasons. Regardless
of the structure, use of specialized investigative techniques, or
rather overuse of such, has been highlighted as an acute problem for
the system where more than 90 percent of the data collected is not
used in court. To discipline law enforcement, Parliamentarians are
considering, as an interim measure, placing a limit on the number of
wiretapping requests per annum.


5. (SBU) Other reform priorities for senior leadership include
discipline, establishing and enforcing ethical standards, and hiring
and retaining good employees. Mikov intends to strengthen the role
of the Ministry's internal inspectorate by promoting it to a
directorate under his supervision. Anti-corruption efforts are also
high on the Parliamentarians' agenda which, in addition to top-down
house cleaning in the ministry, suggest what they view as exotic
measures like introducing a pocket-money limit for police officers.
Acknowledging the lack of incentive for hard work, politicians
recommend raising the police investigators' salaries, which may be
two-three times below those offered by DANS. Streamlining
cooperation between DANS and MOI, and clearly delineating their
investigative authority is another area for improvement. While
Mikov enjoys a strong personal relationship with DANS Head Sertov,
the exact relationship between DANS and MOI still needs to be
formalized in a statutorily mandated instruction.
OFFICIALS


OPERATIONAL STAFF


6. (U) Operational staff feared that radical reform could undermine
the ministry's operations and hinder the resolution of specific
problems. They perceived that the current crisis in the ministry
involving some political figures had discredited the entire
organization and professional staff. Other specific concerns
included the expedited mechanisms for disciplining and transferring
staff that compromise the MOI's investigative work, as well as
communication and distribution of case information. The handling of
special investigative data by the requesters, who actually leaked
information setting off the recent MOI scandals, is also a problem.



7. (U) The operational level would also like to see police without
legal training (detectives) to have more investigative powers for
lower level crimes. This would multiply the investigative workforce
and allow those investigators with legal training to concentrate on
more complex cases. The politicians oppose the idea of giving more
investigative power to detectives and prefer attracting more lawyers
and paying higher salaries.

SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS


8. (SBU) Acknowledging that many of the ministry's problems could
only be addressed in the long-term, Bulgarian officials expressed a
political imperative to take immediate action. In response, Bennett
provided the following short-term recommendations:

Organized Crime/Corruption

- Thoroughly vet the existing investigative/management cadres within
GDBOP and high levels within the Ministry of Interior (e.g.
financial disclosure; telephone records; unexplained wealth; case
performance); make additional personnel changes where deemed
appropriate
- Assign all the regional Directorate-level representatives of GDBOP
as direct-reports to the agency director
- Clearly define, differentiate, and publish (policy and media) the
investigative mandates of GDBOP and DANS (e.g. define the "high
profile" and "national security" priority for DANS; how will cases
be assigned and what will be the filtering template?)
- Create a standing coordinating working group--- with high-level
GOB leadership--- to bring together all enforcement, criminal
intelligence and prosecutorial entities working on organized crime
and corruption
- Using the model created at the working group level, create
vetted/secure operational task forces with the mission to dismantle
the top organized crime organizations in Bulgaria and to
successfully bring to justice those responsible for the unsolved
murders
- Institute a regular "Report to the People" on case achievements
and challenges

Special Investigative Techniques

- Assess the use and overuse of "wire tapping"--- the original
request, its use in the pre-investigative stages, the communication
to and use by responsible investigative agencies, its relative value
as evidence, its secure storage and ultimate purging.
- In order to ensure more legal consistency to the requests for and
the application of wiretapping:

1. Reduce the number of approving authorities (currently all 28 of
the regional District Court Chairs; appellate level regions?);
provide specialized training and oversight for these authorities

2. Create and implement a mandatory "check list" (from existing law)
to be completed by the requesting agency, reviewed and approved by
the agency chain of command and then by the approving authority;
include in case file
- Institutionally separate the technical process (collection of
information) from the investigative process ("exploiters" of
information collected)
- Create or reinforce regular oversight report to parliament on
basic statistics (e.g. number initiated and in-progress, % of use as
evidence, amount destroyed)
- Maintain detailed internal analysis for day-to-day management

Internal Control

- Consolidate all inspection/security assets and place directly
under the Minister of Interior
- Suggest re-naming for public visibility (e.g. Inspector General)
- Staff already deployed at 28 Regional Directorates should have all
necessary material resources (e.g. vehicles, secure office space,
etc) so as to eliminate reliance on local chain of command

LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS


9. (SBU) Beyond the need to urgently respond to calls for MOI
reform, Bennett discussed evolutionary changes needed to address the
OFFICIALS

MOI's systemic problems.

Organized Crime/Corruption

- Following the vetting and satisfactory performance reviews,
examine the need to gradually return to salary/scales parity between
GDBOP and DANS (a morale, recruitment and retention issue)
- Review and amend appropriate penal and procedural codes to
facilitate stronger prosecutions based upon 1) conspiracies, 2)
criminal enterprises (ala RICO) and 3) negotiated pleas for
cooperating, lesser associates
- To free up staff for a continuous and concerted assault on
high-profile organized crime and corruption cases, consider the
expansion of the investigative mandate to allow appropriately
trained regular police officers (non-Academy graduates) to
investigate minor crimes to conclusion
- Institutionalize Practical Criminal Investigative and Enterprise
Theory Investigative training for all organized crime and corruption
personnel
- Develop positive working relationships with Non-Governmental
Organizations and investigative journalists that specialize in
organized crime and corruption

Special Investigative Techniques

- Ensure that the entire range of special investigative techniques
be strengthened through 1) legal/policy amendments and 2) training
of operatives and unit management. In particular, this
recommendation applies to the use of undercover agents and the
development of informants.

Internal Control

- Consider the expansion of purpose to include professional
inspections and auditing
- Design and implement practices at the Directorate level that will
engage the local chain of command in the issue of accountability
- Develop a database that maintains disciplinary histories of
employees (ideally as part of a larger human resources database
including all noteworthy personnel actions)
- Expand to become a part of a more comprehensive system of
discipline including a circular "learning" model that evaluates
individual & organizational performance for lessons to be learned;
feed back into mission, training and policy development

COMMENT


10. (SBU) The urgency to engage with the Bulgarian authorities as
they began drafting legislation did not allow for a comprehensive,
in-depth analysis of a whole range of cross-impacting reform issues.
Further evaluation will be needed to identify discrete areas for
potential engagement of U.S. law enforcement and assistance
resources. The recommendations provide feasible practical solutions
from experience for the Ministry's new political leadership, which,
beyond its immediate goal to meet the concerns of the EU before the
July report, appears sincere in its efforts to resurrect public
confidence in police. We will continue to engage the Bulgarians on
suggested structural and legislative changes, particularly with
respect to use of specialized investigative techniques and authority
to investigate organized crime.

KARAGIANNIS
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