MACEDONIA'S PM GRUEVSKI ON THE MAY 29 AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000099

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S PM GRUEVSKI ON THE MAY 29 AGREEMENT
AND NAME ISSUE

REF: A. SECSTATE 8781

B. SKOPJE 59

C. SKOPJE 95

Classified By: POLOFF NEISULER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

SUMMARY


1. (C) In a February 6 meeting with PM Gruevski, the
Ambassador began by highlighting two issues the GOM should
close to complete its NATO accession tasks: the social
package for victims of the 2001 conflict and a draft language
law. Pledging his commitment to address these issues,
Gruevski pointed to the name issue with Greece as the real
stumbling block on Macedonia's path to NATO. He acknowledged
Macedonia's NATO and EU prospects would be limited if the
issue was not resolved, and suggested that the best time for
a solution was after Macedonia received an invitation to join
NATO and before the Greek Parliament's ratification. He
pledged to consider UN negotiator Nimetz's next proposal
seriously. He made it clear, however, that any compromise on
the name would have to be endorsed by a majority of the
Macedonian citizens in a referendum. That Gruevski is
considering any possibility of a compromise is encouraging.
We believe we can make additional steps towards getting
Macedonia into NATO if we press both Skopje and Athens to
accept a compromise along the lines of the Nimetz framework.
The Gruevski government will also be seeking assurances or
guarantees that a compromise on the name would result in NATO
membership. End summary.

SOCIAL PACKAGE -- WILL DO IT, BUT WILL DISAVOW IN PUBLIC...


2. (C) During a February 6 meeting with PM Gruevski, the
Ambassador delivered ref A points on sustaining aspirant
progress in the run-up to NATO's April summit. Assuring
Gruevski that the USG wanted to see all three Adriatic
Charter countries become NATO members, the Ambassador
reminded him that the two outstanding issues from the
governing VMRO-opposition DUI May 29 agreement (ref B) --a
social package for the victims of the 2001 conflict and a
draft language law-- required closure. The Ambassador
encouraged the PM to start implementing the victims of
conflict social package. Gruevski responded that his
government was ready to offer "jobs and money" to the persons
that DUI had already proposed. Warning against DUI
"triumphalism" on the issue, especially in the context of
counter-pressure from a newly-found organization of
eMacedonian veterans from the 2001 conflict and from
coalition partner DPA, he said that the GOM would publicly
disavow any government role in such a settlement, if asked.

LANGUAGE LAW -- WILL GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS, BUT IT'S
DIFFICULT...


3. (C) Gruevski was pessimistic about a language law and
repeated he had not promised to complete a draft law as part
of the May 29 agreement. He expressed frustration at
opposition SDSM's refusal to participate in the process,
saying had SDSM agreed to participate there would already be
an acceptable draft in Parliament. The Ambassador urged
Gruevski to work off of a joint language law draft that the
Parliament could then refine. Gruevski returned to old
arguments but pledged to keep trying to find a solution.

THE NAME ISSUE -- THE GREEKS ARE STUCK, BUT WE HAVE OUR
LIMITATIONS TOO...


4. (C) Emphasizing that the U.S. position on the name issue
is unchanged, the Ambassador told Gruevski the danger of a
Greek veto on Macedonia's NATO invitation is real (ref C).
Gruevski acknowledged that Greek politicians had painted
themselves into a corner that gave them no leverage for
compromise on the name issue. "If I were Karamanlis and did
not veto in Bucharest, I would hand in my resignation,"
Gruevski opined. He stressed that the Macedonians also faced
limits on their flexibility and had to fight for the use of
their constitutional name internationally. He thought that
the only way out would be for a compromise after Macedonia's
invitation to NATO and before the ratification by the Greek

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Parliament. The Ambassador agreed that the situation was not
easy for the Macedonians or the Greeks, but it was imperative
for the two sides to look to the future and to the regional
implications of leaving their dispute unresolved.

WILL TRY TO ACCEPT THE NIMETZ PROPOSAL, BUT ONLY WITH THE
CITIZENS' CONSENT...


5. (C) The Prime Minister made no comment on the formula
contained in UN negotiator Nimetz's framework, but said an
agreement would depend on the specific proposal. He said
that FM Milososki recently had floated the names "Independent
Republic of Macedonia" and "Sovereign Republic of Macedonia,"
with the argument that the qualifying adjectives "reflected
reality" and did not change the overall name. Then why not
call you "the wise Antonio Milososki," countered Gruevski.


6. (C) Gruevski said that, no matter how difficult and
absurd the situation, he understood the positives and the
negatives that came from resolving/not resolving the name
issue. That is why he pledged to look at the Nimetz proposal
with an open mind and, "if there is any way we could accept
it, and explain it to the public, we will try to resolve
this."


7. (C) Any change to the name, though, even if only for
international use, had to be endorsed by the citizens in a
referendum. "This is not just my country. I cannot change
the name on my own. That would be undemocratic," said
Gruevski. He believed that he would have to remain neutral
on such a referendum, but the Ambassador pushed back and
pointed out that politicians of all stripes would need to
work together to support a positive outcome. If the parties
agreed to move away from the question "the name (and national
identity) or NATO" to "FYROM or a differentiated name and/and
NATO," the referendum could be framed in a positive light.
Gruevski said he was not pessimistic about the outcome,
because the citizens would understand that the future of the
country was at stake and would vote accordingly. He said he
remained committed to working on the issue, but added that
the Greek side would need serious pressure, too, to come to a
compromise solution.

COMMENT


8. (C) Gruevski is confident that his government has
accomplished the majority of its NATO-related tasks. The
social package issue is approaching quiet closure, while the
language law working group will keep grappling with opposing
viewpoints. We expect the two sides to start discussing a
joint language law draft (a compilation of the VMRO and the
DUI drafts) at the working group's next meeting on February

11.


9. (C) On the politically-charged name issue, Gruevski
appeared rational and willing to keep an open mind about
possible compromise. As noted in ref C, we are cautiously
optimistic that the GOM can be induced to move beyond the
traditional "dual name" formula and might be ready to make a
bolder move toward compromise on a name for international
usage. Gruevski's willingness to seriously consider Nimetz's
proposal shows that he understands Macedonia's options and is
moving toward a more sober problem-solving approach.
MILOVANOVIC