MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI ON THE NAME AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000098

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI ON THE NAME AND
NATO

REF: A. STATE 8781


B. SKOPJE 95

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Ambassador underscored to President Crvenkovski
during a meeting February 6 that finding a compromise
solution on the Macedonia-Greece name dispute is the best way
to ensure Macedonia receives a NATO invitation at the
Bucharest Summit in April. Crvenkovski acknowledged that
Macedonia does not have good long-term prospects for
resolving the name, and agreed a "good proposal" by UN
Negotiator Nimetz might be the way to resolve the name
dilemma and secure a NATO invitation. He posed a number of
questions, however, regarding the modalities of such a
compromise solution. That he did so, and also discussed the
inter-party consensus that would be absolutely critical for
acceptance of such a solution, is mildly encouraging.
Continued work with both Skopje and Athens to compromise on
the name issue along the lines of the Nimetz framework in the
runup to Bucharest, combined with as much honest assurance as
we can provide to Macedonia that its acceptance of such a
compromise would pave the way to a NATO invitation, offers
the best hope for a way forward. End summary.

CONTINUE REFORM PROGRESS, ACCELERATE NAME RESOLUTION EFFORTS
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2. (C) The Ambassador delivered ref A points on sustaining
NATO aspirant progress to President Crvenkovski on February

6. She told Crvenkovski that Macedonia needed to continue
efforts to implement the May 29 agreement, including
submitting a draft language law to Parliament and beginning
implementation of a social package for victims of the 2001
conflict.


3. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. wants Macedonia in NATO,
agrees the name issue is not a membership criterion, and
would continue to insist that both Macedonia and Greece
adhere to the 1995 Interim Agreement. Athens, however, did
not accept that position. Greece would exercise a veto on an
invitation for Macedonia if a name resolution was not agreed
before the NATO Summit in Bucharest this April. The best
hope for avoiding a veto, she added, was to reach a
compromise before Bucharest in which Macedonia would keep its
constitutional name, including for bilateral use, but would
agree to a differentiated name for international usage. That
would pave the way for Macedonia's membership in NATO and
future accession to the EU. It also would rid the country of
the detested FYROM acronym currently used in the UN and other
international organizations.


4. (C) The Ambassador urged that the GOM present proposals
for a name for international usage to Nimetz before the next
bilateral meeting in Athens on February 19. She pledged
that, if the government took that politically challenging
step, we would work with both coalition and opposition
parties to help build a consensus for the compromise. In the
end, NATO membership was Macedonia's to lose. Fair or not,
the name issue was the last remaining major obstacle to an
invitation at Bucharest.

A VETO LOOMS, REALITY SETS IN
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5. (C) Crvenkovski asked whether Athens was serious about a
veto. He said Greece knew that the U.S. wanted all three
Adriatic Charter members in NATO and that Athens therefore
refused to budge from its hardline position, confident that
Washington would direct the pressure on Skopje for a
resolution. He questioned whether Athens would, at the 11th
hour, refrain from a veto.


6. (C) The Ambassador reiterated our view that Athens was
serious about a veto. She pointed out that what we were
proposing as a way forward was far from the Greek position
and would require us also to lean heavily on Athens.
Crvenkovski agreed that the GOG had little room for maneuver
on the issue, given its razor-thin parliamentary majority.

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He also acknowledged that, over the long-term, even if Greece
allowed Macedonia to enter NATO as FYROM, the name issue
would remain unresolved. Athens would be able to pressure
Skopje by using its veto elsewhere (e.g., regarding EU
accession). And Skopje would be unable to prevail in its
attempts to get international organizations to accept its
constitutional name. Trying to get the UNSC to approve a
change in its name also would be futile, since a single UNSC
member would be able to block such a move. "We can never
hope for a complete victory," he said, suggesting that a
"good proposal" under the current Nimetz process might be the
best way out.

QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS
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7. (C) Turning to the practical aspects of reaching an
agreement, Crvenkovski unloaded a battery of practical and
politically important questions he said had to do with the
"formulation, packaging, and technology" of a possible
agreement. Where would Nimetz make his proposal for a
resolution? In Athens? If so, that would put Skopje in an
awkward position. If both sides refused the proposal, what
then? What if Skopje accepted, but Athens rejected? Would
Macedonia still receive a NATO invitation? It would be
devastating for the government, he said, if Macedonia was
seen to have compromised without any payoff in the end.


8. (C) Continuing, Crvenkovski asked whether a proposal would
be made public before the invitation at Bucharest, or at the
same time as a NATO invitation was extended? What if the
leaders on both sides agreed to a compromise solution, but
the Greek parliament would not ratify it or the Greek
government fell? Again, Macedonia would have compromised and
paid a heavy domestic political price, for no payoff. On a
more detailed level, he asked how would a new name (e.g.,
Independent Republic of Macedonia) be transcribed at the UN?
What would the "short name" be? How would it be abbreviated?
Macedonia could not change the description of its language
(Macedonian) or nationality (Macedonian),he said.


9. (C) The Ambassador said it was too early to address the
President's specific questions, but acknowledged that they
were important and promised to report them to Washington.
She noted that, regardless of the Greek response to a
proposal, a clear YES from Skopje would show flexibility and
seriousness about reaching a compromise. That would give us
more leverage to use with the Greek side in pressing for
compromise that would open the door to Bucharest. It was
important for the USG to know that the GOM would be ready to
accept a Nimetz proposal. In the meantime, it was important
that the GOM propose some options to Nimetz.


10. (C) Crvenkovski said that, even if the leadership
accepted a compromise name, there would be a strong
inter-party as well as public opinion battle to win
acceptance of it. Would the compromise be acceptable to
Athens as a "final" resolution of the matter? Political
leaders here would not want to face the possibility of
agreeing to a compromise, only to find Athens still blocking
NATO accession. Given a "good proposal" and good answers to
the key tricky detailed questions he had posed, Crvenkovski
felt, however, that the major ethnic Albanian parties could
be brought around, as could the major ethnic Macedonian
opposition party (SDSM). The key to a complete political
consensus would be PM Gruevski's governing VMRO party.

FINISH REFORMS BEFORE BUCHAREST
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11. (C) Crvenkovski agreed with the Ambassador regarding the
need for continued implementation of the May 29 agreement,
and added that it would be important to resolve both the
language law and social package issues before the Bucharest
Summit. If not, he said, Gruevski would pocket a NATO
invitation and later ignore both issues, which would raise
inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia.

COMMENT
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12. (C) As noted in ref B, we are cautiously optimistic that

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the GOM is beginning to think seriously about options for
resolving the name issue, beyond their traditional "dual
name" formula. That Crvenkovski is already thinking about
the tricky detailed modalities of a possible solution, and
the internal political challenges of building a consensus for
it, is mildly encouraging. To have any chance of a NATO
invitation for Macedonia and a resolution of the name issue,
we believe we will have to work with Nimetz to facilitate
good answers to Crvenkovski's detailed questions and couple
carefully calibrated continued pressure on Skopje with strong
consistent pressure on Athens to be flexible. The leadership
here is also likely to insist that, if it does agree to a
differentiated name for international use, it can only
survive politically in doing so if it receives a NATO
invitation this April.


13. (C) In thinking through how Macedonia's leaders can
shield themselves from the risks of an unrequited compromise,
we assess that they may need to condition in some way their
final acceptance of a differentiated name for international
organization use on completion of the NATO ratification
process.
MILOVANOVIC