MACEDONIA: PUSHING FOR PROGRESS ON NAME ISSUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000091

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PUSHING FOR PROGRESS ON NAME ISSUE
BEFORE NATO SUMMIT

REF: A. SKOPJE 87


B. SKOPJE 64 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) We are continuing efforts to persuade Macedonia of the need to
maximize chances for a NATO membership invitation by embracing the
Nimetz framework and proposing a differentiated name for use in
international organizations (ref A). Our GoM interlocutors are
sticking to their long-standing dual-name proposal and are preparing
for an expected Greek veto. They expect to be able to weather the
negative fallout in Macedonia and in the region. They also harbor
hope for an 11th-hour change in Athens's position that would allow an
invitation to go forward. We are trying to persuade them that
putting an offer on the table offers the best hope, though certainly
not a guarantee, of avoiding a veto. The Ambassador's meetings on
Feb. 6 with the two main decision-makers here, Prime Minister
Gruevski and President Crvenkovski,
should provide a clearer indication as to whether Macedonia can be
persuaded to take that step. End summary.

REINFORCING THE NEED FOR PROGRESS ON THE NAME DISPUTE


2. (c) DCM and P/E Chief met with the Prime Minister's
Chief of Staff, Martin Protoger, and Foreign Policy
Adviser, Andrej Lepavcov, February 4 to reinforce the
Ambassador's message to Deputy PM Stavreski the previous
week (ref A) regarding the need to show progress on the
name dispute with Athens prior to the NATO summit this
April. The DCM reiterated the Ambassador's point regarding
the need to maximize Macedonia's chances of receiving a
membership invitation by proposing a differentiated name for
use in international organizations, while maintaining their
constitutional name and using that bilaterally with all
willing countries, as in the framework proposed by UN
Special Negotiator Nimetz in November 2007 (ref B).


3. (C) The DCM noted that the GOM could sell to the public
such a proposal by pointing out that it would amount to ridding
Macedonia of the despised provisional name "former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia," in exchange for a more dignified
name that would be much closer to the constitutional name.
That position would require a consensus among all major governing
and opposition parties that the compromise was worth the benefits
the country would reap from NATO membership, including securing
their identity as a full member of the Euro-Atlantic community.

GOM PLANNING FOR "DAY AFTER" SCENARIO, EXPECTING VETO


4. (C) Protoger said the name dispute was a "17-year
problem that would affect future generations." He said the
government saw no reason why the issue had to be resolved
"in this generation." At any rate, the GOM already was
analyzing the possible post-veto scenario and how Macedonia
would react to that outcome. Skopje had recognized that
Athens's position had "hardened" and expected that it would
veto Macedonia's NATO membership based on lack of an
agreement, on Greece's terms, on the name issue. The
government understood the consequences of a veto, Protoger
said, but "some decisions could not be taken under
pressure."


5. (C) A veto would cause "unpleasant consequences" for both
Macedonia and the region, Protoger continued. In that event,
he expected "greater political uncertainty" in Macedonia and a
rise in the influence of "radical structures," including
separatist elements in the ethnic Albanian community. He
said the government would take "political decisions" and
other measures after a Greek veto, but did not specify what
shape those decisions would take. Any solution leading up
to Bucharest would, he emphasized, have to "protect the
identity of the Macedonian people."

THE END OF MACEDONIA'S EURO-ATLANTIC IDENTITY?


6. (C) The DCM pointed out that Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic
identity would be undermined by a Greek veto and urged the
GOM to consider "putting something on the table within the

SKOPJE 00000091 002 OF 002


Nimetz framework" to give Athens a chance to be flexible on
the question of a veto. He enumerated the benefits that
Macedonia would gain from resolving the issue, including
greater stability, greater confidence in Macedonia's future
among its younger citizens and ethnic minorities, greater
attractiveness to investors, as well as likely expanded
business and travel opportunities with Greece, and urged his
interlocutors to balance those against the likely negative
fallout from a failure to gain a NATO invitation. The
negative consequences included having to explain to the
Macedonian public why Croatia and Albania had succeeded
in advancing their Euro-Atlantic agenda, while Macedonia had not.


7. (C)Protoger said PM Gruevski understood the consequences
of a Greek veto, but his position was "clear." Macedonia
could not accept a compromise under pressure, or one that
undercut Macedonia's identity. No other political leader
in Macedonia could do otherwise, he said, adding that
Macedonia "always had been the one to make concessions to
its neighbors" throughout its history.

AN 11TH-HOUR SWITCH IN ATHENS?


8. (C) Lepavcov asked whether it was likely the Greeks
would change their position at the last minute and allow an
invitation to proceed, but under the condition that Skopje
agree to resolve the issue before ratification. The DCM
replied that a serious Macedonian proposal in the Nimetz
framework might help move things in that direction in
Athens, and would at any rate give us more compelling
arguments to use with other NATO Allies regarding the need
to include Macedonia in NATO enlargement.


9. (C) DCM held a similar exchange with MFA State Counselor Vasko
Grkov on February 1. Grkov said that Macedonia's strategy was to
count on Greece to allow the invitation to proceed, which would then
offer greater scope for reaching a settlement prior to parliamentary
ratification. He absorbed the argument that Macedonia should take
action (i.e., propose a name for international use) to maximize these
prospects, and he made sure to brief Foreign Minister Milososki prior
to his current trip to Washington.

COMMENT


10. (C) Macedonian officials, and PM Chief of Staff Protoger in
particular, feel compelled to defend the party line in these
discussions. We believe they are processing the idea that this
problem will not solve itself and that the Nimetz framework offers a
reasonable way to protect and advance Macedonia's interests.
However, it is clear that the true decision-maker is the Prime
Minister, with the President having the power to act as a spoiler
should he choose to do so. The Ambassador's separate meetings with
those two leaders on Feb. 6 should provide a much clearer indication
as to whether Macedonia can be persuaded to make a serious new offer
to Greece in the Nimetz negotiations.
MILOVANOVIC