Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SKOPJE618
2008-10-09 14:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: CRVENKOVSKI URGES POSITIVE U.S.

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK GR MT KV 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2281
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0618/01 2831407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091407Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7727
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0425
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2357
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000618 

SIPDIS

BELGRADE PLEASE ALSO PASS PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR MT KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: CRVENKOVSKI URGES POSITIVE U.S.
PRESSURE IN BOTH ATHENS AND SKOPJE ON NAME ISSUE; SUPPORTS
KOSOVO RECOGNITION, BUT CRITICAL OF PROCESS

REF: SKOPJE 616

Classified By: Amb. Reeker for reasons 1.5. (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000618

SIPDIS

BELGRADE PLEASE ALSO PASS PODGORICA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR MT KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: CRVENKOVSKI URGES POSITIVE U.S.
PRESSURE IN BOTH ATHENS AND SKOPJE ON NAME ISSUE; SUPPORTS
KOSOVO RECOGNITION, BUT CRITICAL OF PROCESS

REF: SKOPJE 616

Classified By: Amb. Reeker for reasons 1.5. (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The U.S. and other close allies should press
both Athens and Skopje to consider the latest UN Mediator's
name proposal positively, President Crvenkovski urged the
Ambassador in an Oct. 9 meeting. Crvenkovski admitted not
knowing the full content of the package, but even though it
appeared to lean more toward Greece's position there was
likely enough positive content for both sides to accept it or
at least use it as a solid basis for further negotiation. He
doubted whether PM Gruevski was prepared to be flexible.
Ambassador said he planned to speak with the PM and strongly
urge him not to say "no." Crvenkovski complained that
Gruevski's tactics of using a parliamentary debate on Kosovo
recognition could lead to unnecessary public discord when --
in his view -- the Macedonian people were already prepared to
accept it. Ambassador said that recognition was already
overdue and the result was more important than the PM's
tactics. End summary.

A Deal We Can Work With?
--------------


2. (C) President Crvenkovski told the Ambassador Oct. 9 that
name negotiator Dimitrov gave him only a summary by phone of
the latest proposal from UN Mediator Nimetz, which he said
upon Greek negotiator Vassilakis' insistence Nimetz only
called a "set of ideas." Crvenkovski understood that --
whatever it is called -- the proposal is closer to the Greek
position than Nimetz's Sept. 11 paper, in particular on the
question of Macedonian identity and language. He believes
both Greece and Macedonia may have reasons to accept or
reject it. Crvenkovski admitted that he could not know Greek
PM Karamanlis' thinking on the proposal, but noted the Greek
press was not entirely negative.


3. (C) The President urged that neither side say no, and
instead take the opportunity of Nimetz's two-week vacation to
consult internally. He requested direct, positive U.S.
pressure on both Skopje and Athens to consider the proposal
and, if not agree to it outright, at least accept it as a
solid basis for further negotiation. Pressure from the UK
and Germany could also be helpful, but not from France, as
Paris is viewed in Macedonia as far too pro-Greek.


4. (C) Crvenkovski was pessimistic that PM Gruevski would be
flexible going forward. For his part, the President did not
plan to hold a coordination meeting with Gruevski too
quickly, preferring to lay the groundwork and project
Macedonia as considering the proposal calmly and seriously.
He was deeply concerned that should a name proposal go to
referendum, Gruevski may sabotage it; the entire Macedonian
political leadership must be behind a solution, he insisted.
Ambassador responded that he would call the PM the same day
and urge him not to reject any deal out of hand. Macedonia
must be reasonable and willing to negotiate whether Greece is
or not.


5. (C) Ambassador reached Gruevski later Oct. 9 and urged him
to consider the proposal or use it as a basis for
negotiation. Gruevski responded that he is not fully
informed about its content, but he heard from his chief of
staff -- who was in New York with GoM name negotiator
Dimitrov -- that Dimitrov thought the latest Nimetz proposal
was "one of the worst" in recent memory. Nevertheless, the
PM agreed that "tactically we shouldn't say no right away."

Kosovo Recognition: Get It Done
--------------


6. (C) Crvenkovski noted that the parliament was set to
debate recognition of Kosovo the same day, adding that as
president he had no legal role in the issue. He expressed
disappointment that Gruevski and his party, VMRO-DPMNE, have
apparently chosen not to take an official position but plan
to "leave it up to parliament." He worried that a
parliamentary debate with no clear position from the
government would stir unnecessary public discord even though
the public here is prepared for this step. This should not
be viewed as just an "Albanian issue." Ambassador understood
this concern, but added that Washington viewed Macedonian
recognition of Kosovo as overdue and our expectation was that
the matter would be closed today. (Note: While the it is

SKOPJE 00000618 002 OF 002


correct that the opposition SDSM is upset that the government
did not formally propose recognition and is debating that
issue in parliament, we still expect the issue will be closed
today, Oct. 9. SDSM has assured us that the party strongly
supports recognition itself.)
Reeker