MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IN BITTER PUBLIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000606

SIPDIS
BELGRADE PLEASE PASS PODGORICA

STATE FOR EUR/SCE AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IN BITTER PUBLIC
FEUD OVER NAME NEGOTIATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Macedonian leadership -- PM Gruevski and
President Crvenkovski -- are deadlocked on how to proceed with the
name talks with Greece, name negotiator Dimitrov told the Ambassador
Sept. 30. UN Negotiator Nimetz will reportedly present a "take it or
leave it" proposal to both sides Oct 6-7 in New York, but Dimitrov
believes neither Athens nor Skopje will be able to accept it, and the
talks will then likely be broken off for some time. Gruevski and
Crvenkovski's bitter feud may have softened somewhat with Crvenkovski
agreeing Oct 3 to participate in an Oct 6 meeting with the major
political parties to coordinate prior to the New York meetings. End
summary.

The Deep Freeze
--------------


2. (C) The GoM's chief negotiator on the name issue, Nikola Dimitrov,
told the Ambassador Sept. 30 that President Crvenkovski and PM
Gruevski are deadlocked over how to proceed with these negotiations.
Dimitrov said the two have fundamentally different approaches and
could barely speak to each other during a tense "coordination
meeting" the previous day. The two leaders have escalated their
already scathing rhetoric about each other in the press, Crvenkovski
accusing Gruevski of abdicating his responsibility to pursue the
negotiations seriously, with Gruevski responding that the President
is essentially manufacturing a controversy to improve his political
standing leading up to the end of his term this spring, after which
it is expected that he will once again become leader of the main
opposition party, the Social Democrats (SDSM). The tone may have
improved somewhat Oct 3, when Crvenkovski announced he would
participate in a meeting with the major party leaders on Oct 6 to
coordinate on the name negotiations.


3. (C) These scathing press duels follow a tense week of speculation
on events at the UNGA, which Crvenkovski and FonMin Milososki
attended, but Gruevski did not. The PM and his advisors were furious
when Crvenkovski excluded Milososki from his meeting with Nimetz, and
proceeded to taunt the President, essentially daring him to come home
with a deal on the name which would then be put to a referendum (the
subtext being that Gruevski would ensure its failure and humiliate
Crvenkovski). Dimitrov (please protect) told the Ambassador in
strict confidence that Milososki had refused Nimetz's request to meet
separately during the UNGA. (While we have not sought to confirm
this with Nimetz, if true this calls into question Gruevski's
seriousness in pursuing a solution.)

Take It or Leave It Proposal
--------------


4. (C) Dimitrov reported that Nimetz told him that he will present a
final package very soon as a "take it or leave it" deal for capitals
to consider. (Dimitrov told us Oct. 1 that Nimetz has called for a
meeting in New York for Oct. 7.) Dimitrov added that, according to
Nimetz, Greek FonMin Bakoyannis viewed Nimetz's latest proposal as
entirely unacceptable to Greece, primarily on the issues of scope of
use of a new name and the use of "Macedonian" as the adjective to
describe national identity. Dimitrov had little hope that Athens
would find another Nimetz proposal acceptable, and that the current
political stalemate here would preclude any serious consideration in
Skopje. He predicted this would lead to a prolonged pause in
negotiations. In recent previous discussions with us, Dimitrov has
told us that Nimetz is frustrated and confessed to be "running out of
ideas."

Deep Divisions Over Macedonia's Future
--------------


5. (C) Dimitrov told us he believes Gruevski and Crvenkovski have a
fundamentally different view of the negotiations and, more
importantly, Macedonia's future. Dimitrov portrays the President as
believing the country has a bleak future if it is not a NATO and EU
member, thus he believes the GoM must quickly make deal on the name
in order to integrate as quickly as possible. Crvenkovski also
believes Macedonia must enlist the aid of the international community
in the negotiation process, and in order to do so must be seen as
being willing to compromise on the name, as long as the country's
dignity and identity remain intact.


6. (C) Dimitrov sees Gruevski as more motivated by the fear of going

SKOPJE 00000606 002 OF 002


down in history as the leader who lost Macedonia's name and identity;
these are more crucial than Euro-Atlantic integration. Dimitrov
opined that Gruevski believes Macedonia can survive and even prosper
without NATO and EU membership. Dimitrov professed to be deeply
concerned that Macedonia's e-Albanian community will rapidly become
dissatisfied with the lack of movement toward these Western
institutions and that interethnic tensions will rise, perhaps
rapidly.

Comment: A Future Without NATO and EU?
-------------- --------------


7. (C) It is generally known that Dimitrov is closer to Crvenkovski.
Following quarrels with Gruevski some months ago he has always been
accompanied by Gruevski's COS in meetings with Nimetz. It cannot be
said that he is a dispassionate observer. Nonetheless, his analysis
of the President and the PM's differing perspectives is consistent
with that of many other contacts. There is some evidence that the
Gruevski government is laying the groundwork for preparing the
Macedonian people for remaining outside the Alliance and the EU for
some years to come. Among others, Milososki has made public
statements to the effect that the country will thrive outside these
organizations even as others in the region -- Albania, Serbia, Kosovo
-- move forward, arguing that their membership in these institutions
will also stabilize Macedonia. We have continued to press the point
publicly and privately that Macedonia's future lies inside these
organizations; any other path will bring significant risks.


8. (C) We should not underestimate the role that political ambition
and personal animosity are playing in this dispute. Since Gruevski's
VMRO-DPMNE swept to power in 2006, he and Crvenkovski have chafed
under an at best uneasy state of cohabitation. With the prospect of
a possible "take it or leave it" proposal on the near horizon, we are
at a critical stage of this lengthy process.

REEKER