MACEDONIA: RESOLVING THE NAME ISSUE -- BACK TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000461

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR - A/S FRIED FROM AMBASSADOR MILOVANOVIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: RESOLVING THE NAME ISSUE -- BACK TO
BASICS

REF: ATHENS 1009

Classified By: AMB MILOVANOVIC, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In order to maximize chances for resolving the name
issue by the December NATO NAC, we recommend the following:

--getting UN mediator Nimetz to refocus talks on the core
issues of a name formulation and scope of use;

--dealing with "peripheral" issues after the name issue has
been resolved, perhaps in a UNSCR, and as part of a package
of confidence-building measures based on resolution of the
name issue;

--leveling an asymmetrical playing field by letting Athens
know that, while it clearly is negotiating from a position of
strength in the post-Bucharest environment, it cannot dictate
the terms of a name solution and expect that Skopje will
accept those terms, even at the risk of the GOM losing its
NATO membership prospect this year;

--in the absence of an action-forcing event such as the
Bucharest Summit, committing to high-level USG engagement to
push and support an effort, complementary to the Nimetz
process, to close an Athens-Skopje deal by the December NAC;
and

--encourage direct talks between PM Gruevski and PM
Karamanlis, preferably in a third country and possibly
starting on the margins of the UNGA, to establish some
personal rapport and give each leader a better sense of his
counterpart's interests in a solution.

PERIPHERAL MATTERS OBSCURE CORE ISSUES
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2. (C) PM Gruevski's letter to the Greek PM asking for
resolution of Macedonian minority rights and restitution
issues in Aegean Greece, and the Greek reaction to it
(reftel),reflect the extent to which progress on the name
issue has gotten bogged down in peripheral issues. Gruevski
believes the latest raft of ideas from UN name mediator
Nimetz contains peripheral issues favorable to Greece (e.g.,
exclusive Greek claims to ancient Macedonian heritage). He
has now responded in kind by throwing the Aegean issue into
the mix (and upped the ante by doing so publicly). We
believe the two sides, led by Nimetz with strong USG backing,
need to get back to basics and to refocus discussions on
resolving the name issue within the framework of the 1995
Interim Accord (IA).

PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST
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3. (U) Under the 1995 IA, and UNSCRS 817 and 845 (1993)
preceding it, both sides committed to negotiations under UN
auspices with a view to reaching agreement on the name of the
state. Such issues as commercial use of the name, use of
toponyms, cultural heritage, or adjectival description of the
Macedonian nationality and language were not mentioned in
either the UN resolutions or the IA.


4. (U) We believe the USG should encourage Nimetz to put
first things first and return to the core issue of finding a
mutually acceptable formulation for the name, and of
determining the scope of use for it. Issues such as minority
rights, claims to ancient heritage, or descriptions of
nationality/language should be left for later discussions,
historical commissions, UNSCRs, etc., once resolution of the
name and scope of use have boosted confidence between the two
sides.

LEVELING AN ASYMMETRICAL PLAYING FIELD
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5. (C) The GOM assesses that Greece, having vetoed
Macedonia's NATO membership invitation at Bucharest, now
believes its position of overwhelming strength removes any
need to negotiate, and that Athens believes there are no
limits to the demands it can impose and goal posts it can

SKOPJE 00000461 002 OF 002


move in order to dictate the terms of a name agreement.
Nimetz's recent floating of ideas, heavily weighted toward
Greek positions, feeds that GOM perception. So does the
recent statement by NATO Secretary General Scheffer to the
effect that the GOM has to recognize that Macedonia is the
one asking for membership in NATO, and not the other way
around. While such arguments may be objectively true, they
only reinforce PM Gruevski's view that no reasonable
compromise is achievable with Greece at this time.


6. (C) Thus, Gruevski's approach has toughened, as reflected
in the letter he sent to PM Karamanlis on Macedonian minority
and restitution issues in Aegean Greece. Currently enjoying
an unprecedented 66% approval rating in the polls, and with
an 82-seat super majority in Parliament, Gruevski is
confident he has the public's support for a tough negotiating
stance. Greece's attempt to wield the EU stick to force a
solution is also likely to fail. Gruevski can live with the
status quo vis-a-vis Macedonia's EU membership bid, since the
country's current "EU candidate country" status gives
Macedonia access to EU development funds, advisers, and
negotiations on a visa liberalization regime. What is
clearly very bad for Macedonia is not -- at least in the
short term -- bad for Gruevski politically.


7. (C) Despite all of the above, we believe it is possible to
persuade Gruevski, and the Macedonians more broadly, to make
a deal on the name that paves the way for NATO and EU
membership and better bilateral relations with Greece. A key
element to re-establishing positive momentum, and refraining
from provocative moves such as the open letter regarding
ethnic Macedonians in Greece, will be convincing Gruevski and
company that we have a way of getting the Greek side to a
more reasonable position. The Macedonians perceive the
Greeks as continuously raising the price tag on an agreement,
with no one else having the ability or willingness to
constrain them. Under these circumstances, giving in on
anything just seems to the Macedonians to invite further
demands. We need to be clear with Athens that it cannot
simply dictate the terms of a solution. If the Greeks are
going to get to pick the name (by limiting the field of
acceptable options),they are not going to convince the
Macedonians to accept a comprehensive scope of use up to and
including changing the Constitution. A much broader scope is
possible with a more modest name change (e.g., Republika
Makedoniya).

MOVING FORWARD: HIGH-LEVEL USG ENGAGEMENT....
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8. (C) In the absence of an action-forcing event on the
horizon comparable to the Bucharest Summit, we believe the
process will require sustained, regular high-level USG
engagement -- perhaps at the level of the Secretary or NSA --
to complement the Nimetz talks and speed progress toward a
solution before the December NAC. The September UNGA would
provide an ideal venue for kick-starting the process, with
the Secretary or NSA Hadley meeting with both Prime Ministers
to push for a solution by December. The parties also should
be invited, again at the highest level, to Washington to hear
USG views, including a tough message to Gruevski that makes
it clear that his last, best chance for resolving this issue
is going to be under the current US Administration,
regardless of who is elected in November. We believe that
approach will be more effective than U.S. shuttle diplomacy
between Athens and Skopje, which could focus excessive local
media attention on the process and unduly raise local public
expectations for a breakthrough.

...AND DIRECT DIALOGUE
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9. (C) Media caricatures of the GOG and GOM in both capitals
appear to contribute substantially to each side misreading or
misunderstanding the positions, intentions and actions of the
other. We believe it would be useful for the two key
decision-makers in this process -- PM Gruevski and PM
Karamanlis -- to meet one-on-one for direct talks to at least
attempt to improve each leader's understanding of his
counterpart's positions and equities in the issue. Although
the attempt could backfire, continued talks only at the
negotiator level (Vassilakis and Dimitrov/Protoger) are
unlikely to get us to a solution by December.
Milovanovic