Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SKOPJE21
2008-01-14 16:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: NATIONAL NATO COORDINATOR ON THE NAME

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO MK GR 
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VZCZCXRO1638
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0021/01 0141638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141638Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6885
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0149
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2167
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000021 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE, ATHENS FOR AMB SPECKHARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: NATIONAL NATO COORDINATOR ON THE NAME
DISPUTE

REF: 2007 SKOPJE 987 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000021

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE, ATHENS FOR AMB SPECKHARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: NATIONAL NATO COORDINATOR ON THE NAME
DISPUTE

REF: 2007 SKOPJE 987 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) Macedonia's NATO Coordinator/Name Negotiator, Nikola
Dimitrov, told the Ambassador during a January 11 meeting
that it appeared increasingly likely that Greece would veto
NATO membership for Macedonia in the absence of a resolution
of the name dispute before the NATO summit in April. He said
the GOM remains firm in rejecting any name change in exchange
for NATO membership, and that the Greek veto threat has
strengthened Macedonian rigidity in this regard. Pressed by
the Ambassador to consider a way out of the maze, Dimitrov
said the 2005 Nimetz (triple-name) proposal might be a
starting point for moving the UN talks on the name forward.
The Ambassador urged that Macedonia take a comprehensive look
at the benefits as well as costs of reaching an accommodation
with Greece on international usage of their name. She
recommended that the GOM make a constructive proposal at the
next round of UN-mediated talks with Greece. End summary.


VETO LOOMING


2. (C) Macedonia's National NATO Coordinator and Name
Negotiator, Ambassador Nikola Dimitrov, reviewed current
developments regarding the name issue during a meeting with
the Ambassador January 11. Dimitrov said that, during recent
bilateral consultations in Berlin, his German counterparts
had told him they believed Macedonia deserved to be invited
to join NATO, but that the Greeks were almost certain to veto
an invitation unless Macedonia agreed to a name solution
before the Bucharest Summit. The Germans had bluntly added
that it was unlikely other EU/NATO countries would pressure
Athens to withhold a veto.

GREECE UNYIELDING


3. (C) Dimitrov also said he had met with his Greek
counterpart in the name negotiations recently in Brussels; it
had been apparent from that meeting that Athens was
determined to use a veto in the event the two sides did not
reach an agreement on the name before the Bucharest Summit.

The two negotiators were scheduled to meet again on January
21, Dimitrov said, together with UN Special Envoy Nimetz and
an observer from the office of the UN Secretary General.
Nimetz was hoping to achieve progress in that meeting on
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and on the name
negotiations, but the Greeks were set against any movement on
CBMs in the absence of a name solution, Dimitrov said. He
expected there would be a follow-up encounter in February.

MACEDONIANS FIRM -- NO NAME CHANGE FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP


4. (C) Dimitrov said that Macedonia's NATO Interministerial
Committee, which includes opposition party representatives,
had met on January 10 to review progress on meeting NATO
criteria and to discuss the Greek veto threat. Dimitrov said
that the opposition party representatives, including from the
ethnic Albanian DUI party, were even more vehement than the
members of government in rejecting any name change for the
sake Macedonia's NATO bid. He added that the GOM would
counter any attempt to impose a deadline for resolving the
dispute before the NATO summit, but might consider pledging
not to use a NATO invitation (in the event Athens relented)
to pursue a unilateral name change.

VETO THREAT INCREASES MACEDONIAN RIGIDITY


5. (C) The Ambassador urged Dimitrov to consider working with
Nimetz and the Greeks on a solution that would be
substantially agreed before the Bucharest Summit, but not
announced until after membership invitations had been issued.
Dimitrov said that was unlikely, and that the Greek veto
threat had actually strengthened inter-party cohesion in
Macedonia on keeping the constitutional name intact. His own
negotiating instructions were now "more rigid," he said,
which gave him even less flexibility in pursuing a compromise
solution.

SKOPJE 00000021 002 OF 002




6. (C) Greek proposals to change the name to "New Macedonia,"
"Upper Macedonia," or "Slav Macedonia" were non-starters,
Dimitrov said, as was the Greek insistence that a compound
name solution would have to be used in all multilateral fora
and in Macedonia's bilateral relations. If Athens ultimately
vetoed a NATO invitation for Macedonia, he added, Skopje most
likely would consider the 1995 Interim Agreement "nullified"
and would take the name issue to the UN Security Council.

LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT OF THE MAZE


7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the GOM had run through a
realistic cost-benefit analysis of different courses of
action, including the use of a differentiated name in
international fora, and whether Macedonia might be willing to
offer a proposal that went beyond the current dual-name
proposal to keep the Nimetz talks moving. Dimitrov replied
that Nimetz's October 2005 proposal (practically a
triple-name solution) had been acceptable as a starting point
for discussions. He would discuss with the Prime Minister
and President later during the week of January 14 whether
there might be a possibility for moving beyond the dual-name
framework, but was not optimistic about prospects for doing
so.


8. (C) Visibly emotional, Dimitrov said that if Macedonia
were to enter NATO after being forced to compromise on the
name, that would contradict the very principles of NATO as an
Alliance of democratic countries. Such an outcome would run
counter to NATO values and would send a negative signal to
future NATO aspirants.


9. (C) The Ambassador asked whether it would be possible for
the GOM to prepare the ground for an eventual differentiation
in Macedonia's name for use in international fora by arguing
to the public that the country would retain its
constitutional name intact, and would only be shedding the
hated "FYROM" in exchange for a compound formulation built on
the constitutional name. Dimitrov said he had raised such
arguments in the past, but both the President and Prime
Minister had rejected such thinking out of hand. The
Ambassador pressed Dimitrov to think of ways to exit the
maze, proposing that the government compile a pros and cons
"balance sheet" for courses of action that might end the
impasse.

COMMENT: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARIBDIS


10. (C) The polished and normally unflappable Dimitrov
clearly was shaken by the thought that it increasingly looks
as if both Skopje and Athens will in the end collide as they
navigate domestic political waters in the runup to the
Bucharest Summit. Greece's increasingly visible veto threat
has, predictably, hardened attitudes in Macedonia. In the
days and weeks ahead we will engage Macedonia's leadership to
help them focus instead on the country's present and future
interests.


11. (C) We believe the best we can hope for, given the
determination of Macedonia's political leadership not to
appear to be conceding on the name issue in exchange for NATO
membership, is a scenario in which Macedonia receives an
invitation on the merits of its performance and under the
provisional name "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
as agreed in the 1995 Interim Accord, but is then pressed to
resolve the name dispute before its membership is ratified by
all NATO members. This would involve language to that effect
in the invitation letter and/or a pledge by Macedonia not to
pursue a name change once in NATO. But the essential element
will be a compromise on international (not bilateral) usage
as proposed in the Nimetz framework.
MILOVANOVIC